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Abstract 
2005 was a landmark year in the European Union’s (EU) financial reporting history as all EU 
listed firms were required to switch from national accounting standards to IFRS. Using a sample 
of European commercial banks, this study explores two research questions within the framework 
of equity valuation theory: (i) whether the disclosed fair value estimates of loans and advances; 
held-to-maturity investments; deposits; and other debt, as well as the recognition of derivatives at 
fair value, are value relevant, (ii) whether the adoption of IFRS led to a reduction in European 
banks’ cost of equity capital. 
 
The results show that the fair value of loans and advances and other debt are value relevant as is 
the recognition of derivatives at fair value. Further analysis revealed that the relevance of fair 
value of loans and derivatives is contingent on banks’ financial health and earnings variability, 
respectively, as well as on the ability of countries to enforce IFRS. The findings also indicate that 
the cost of equity capital of European commercial banks decreased after the adoption of IFRS. 
However, banks domiciled in countries with continental accounting standards and weak 
enforcement rules experienced a greater reduction in their cost of equity capital. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis deals with the application of the International Financial Reporting Standards 
(hereafter IFRS) by a single industry, the European commercial banking. The study relates to 
two major streams of accounting literature, i) the value relevance of fair value accounting, and ii) 
the economic consequences from the mandatory adoption of IFRS. 
 
Value relevance research deals with the statistical relationship between the accounting numbers 
and measures of market value, such as share prices or returns (Barth, 2000). A major strand of 
value relevance studies examines the significance of fair value estimates in explaining share 
prices (Landsman, 2007). These studies provide evidence on whether fair values are useful in 
making investment decisions. Fair value accounting has been proposed as an alternative 
measurement system to historical cost accounting and has been adopted by the International 
Accounting Standards Board (hereafter, IASB) and the US standard setting body, the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (hereafter, FASB), in several of their standards. For example, fair 
values have been used extensively in measuring financial instruments, such as investment 
securities and derivative financial instruments (trading and hedging). The usefulness of fair 
values over and above other measurement attributes (e.g. historical costs), in explaining market 
values, is another major question of the value relevance research. (Barth, 2006b) 
 
The IASB deals with financial instruments in the accounting standards: International Accounting 
Standard (hereafter, IAS) 39, IAS 32, IFRS 7 and IFRS 9. IAS 39 is concerned with the 
recognition and the measurement of financial instruments, and IAS 32 and IFRS 7 with their 
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presentation and disclosure, respectively. IFRS 9 is a new standard on financial instruments with 
which the IASB intents to replace completely IAS 39. The term fair value is defined in IAS 39 as: 
‘the amount for which an asset could be exchanged, or a liability settled, between knowledgeable, 
willing parties in an arm’s length transaction’ (see, IAS 39, 2003b). 
 
Proponents of fair value accounting argue that fair values provide more relevant and up-to-date 
information to investors than historical cost accounting, and thus whenever it is possible assets 
and liabilities should be measured at fair value (Penman, 2007, p. 33). However, there are 
concerns with respect to the reliability of fair value estimates as sometimes they are based on 
subjective assumptions. 
 
The other stream of accounting research that this thesis deals with relates to the economic 
consequences of the mandatory adoption of IFRS. IFRS are regarded as a set of high quality 
accounting standards as compared to national accounting standards. For example, Barth et al. 
(2008) examined the accounting quality of the IFRS in 21 countries and found less earnings 
management, more timely loss recognition, and more value relevance as compared to a control 
group of firms following non-US national accounting standards. Moreover, the adoption of IFRS 
is a commitment to increased disclosure by many countries, such as the risk related information 
of all financial instruments (e.g., IFRS 7 requires the disclosure of credit risk, liquidity risk, and 
market risk). In theory, high quality accounting standards and increased disclosure are related to 
less uncertainty for investors and thus, a reduction in the information asymmetry between 
managers and shareholders (Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991).  This leads to a reduction in the cost 
of equity capital (hereafter CE). The adoption of IFRS can also reduce the CE through the 
information comparability across the financial statements of firms as investors (and analyst) do 
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not have to adjust financial accounts to overcome the differences between national accounting 
standards. 
 
1.2  Research objectives  
Previous studies support the view that fair values of financial instruments are relevant and 
reliable enough to be reflected in share prices (Barth, 1994; Barth et al., 1996; Venkatachalam, 
1996; Ahmed et al., 2006). However, most of these studies deal with US GAAP and US 
commercial banks. To date there is not a single study that tests the value relevance of fair values 
of European banks that report under the new adopted IFRS. Moreover, there are reasons to 
believe that the value relevance of fair values may differ in other jurisdictions outside the US, 
such as in Europe. For example, the US market is regarded as a highly efficient market whereas 
many European markets, such as the Portuguese and Polish may be less efficient or even 
inefficient. Motivated by the argument above the first research objective of the thesis is defined 
as follows: 
(1) To examine whether fair value estimates under IFRS for the financial instruments of 
European commercial banks are value relevant incrementally to their book values.  
 
This study provides evidence for the value relevance of disclosed fair values of Loans and 
Advances, Held-to-Maturity Investments, Deposit Liabilities, and Other Debt. According to IAS 
39, banks recognise these financial instruments at amortised cost. However, IAS 32 requires the 
disclosure of their fair values in the notes of the financial statements. The availability of two 
values (fair values and amortised costs) for these financial instruments makes feasible the 
examination of the value relevance of fair values incrementally to book values. 
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In addition, evidence is also provided for derivatives’ fair value recognition. Prior to the adoption 
of IFRS, under national accounting standards, banks were treating derivatives as off-balance 
sheet instruments or even ignoring them. Under IFRS, however, most European commercial 
banks recognise for the first time derivatives at their fair value (IAS 39). Hence, this thesis also 
tests the valuation implications of the recognition of derivatives at fair value. 
 
Further evidence is provided on whether the relevance and reliability of fair value estimates of 
loans and derivatives vary with the financial health of banks and their earnings variability 
respectively. In particular, Barth et al. (1996) find that fair value estimates of loans are less 
relevant for banks with low capital adequacy ratios. This is because banks with low capital 
adequacy ratios have more incentives to manipulate fair values estimates of loans in order to 
increase this ratio. With respect to the relationship between earnings variability and derivatives, 
Barton (2001) found that firms use derivatives to smooth earnings. Thus, investors should also 
value less the fair value estimates of derivatives for banks with high earnings volatility. 
 
Even though most of European countries were required to apply a uniform set of accounting 
standards from 2005 onwards (i.e. the IFRS), the application of IFRS may have differed from 
country to country. Some countries could have applied IFRS in more detail, due to stricter 
enforcement rules, and some other in a more relaxed way. This is likely to affect the reliability of 
fair value measurements given the fact that investors take into account institutional differences 
between countries when making economic decisions. Some studies in the literature found that the 
value relevance of accounting numbers (e.g. earnings, book value of equity) varies with country-
specific institutional differences (Ali & Hwang, 2000). Ruland et al. (2007, p. 101) also discuss 
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the importance of controlling in international accounting studies for the institutional differences 
between countries. Hence, given the cross-country sample of this thesis, the study controls for 
the institutional differences between the sample European countries using the country-specific 
scores provided by Kaufmann et al. (2009). It is argued that the market will regard as less 
relevant fair value estimates of banks domiciled in countries with weak enforcement rules than of 
banks domiciled in countries with strong enforcement rules. This later statement is based on the 
notion that banks domiciled in weak enforcement rule countries have more freedom to 
manipulate fair value estimates. 
 
With respect to the economic consequences of IFRS, there is some early evidence in the 
literature regarding the impact of the mandatory adoption of IFRS on firms’ CE (Daske et al., 
2008; Lee et al., 2008; Li, 2010). However, these studies either examine all industries in 
aggregate (including financial institutions) or exclude financial institutions from the analysis. 
Therefore, there is a need to examine financial institutions separately in order to avoid the 
industry-effect. Thus, the second research objective is as follows: 
(2) To examine whether the mandatory adoption of IFRS had an impact on the CE of European 
banks. 
 
Banking industry is an important sector in each economy: commercial banks act as 
intermediaries between savers and investors by allocating funds to productive activities of the 
economy. Thus, an increase or a decrease in banks’ CE, could also affect the cost with which 
they charge the funds they lend (e.g. the interest rates). 
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It is not clear whether the adoption of IFRS results in lower CE (Armstrong et al., 2010, p. 39-
40). This will depend on a trade-off between the potential benefits and costs. IFRS provide high 
quality financial information to investors and thus reduces information asymmetries between 
managers and shareholders. On the other hand, firms’ commitment to increased disclosure, as a 
result of adopting IFRS, may incur compliance costs to the new standards, especially for smaller 
firms. 
 
This study also provides evidence on whether the impact on CE differs between sub-groups of 
the sample banks. In particular, the study examines whether the CE is lower for banks with low 
analyst following as compared to banks with high analyst following. Usually, firms with high 
analyst following provide a substantial amount of financial information to investors independent 
to the requirements of accounting standards (Botosan, 1997). This thesis also examines whether 
the decrease in the CE is higher for banks domiciled in countries with Continental accounting 
systems and in Strong enforcement rule countries. Continental accounting systems (e.g. German 
GAAP) have greater differences with IFRS than Anglo-Saxon accounting systems (e.g. the U.K. 
GAAP) (Nobes, 2008). Moreover, Strong enforcement rule countries (as measured by country-
specific scores provided by Kaufmann et al., 2009) are more likely to force firms domiciled in 
their jurisdictions to apply IFRS in detail than Weak enforcement rule countries. 
 
1.3 Overview of methodology 
1.3.1 Theoretical framework 
The theoretical framework of the thesis is the equity valuation theory. Value relevance studies 
base the development of their empirical models on equity valuation models that provide the 
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theoretical foundation of their results (Barth, 2006b). A number of equity valuation models have 
been used by empirical studies to address value relevance questions. For example, Barth et al. 
(1996) used the Balance Sheet Model to examine whether fair value disclosures are value 
relevant. In another empirical study, Wang et al. (2005) used the Ohlson (1995) model to 
examine the value relevance of derivatives’ fair value disclosures.    
 
Equity valuation theory also serves as the theoretical framework for the purpose of estimating the 
CE for the economic consequence tests. CE is defined in the literature as the ‘…rate of return 
investors require on an equity investment in a firm’ (Damodaran, 2002). Given that the CE is 
unobservable, researchers need to calculate it. Early studies in the literature used an asset pricing 
model, such as the Capital Asset Pricing Model (hereafter, CAPM), to derive the CE. However, a 
major criticism of CAPM is that it involves realized returns (i.e. historical data) (Fama & French, 
2004). Therefore, later studies base the estimation of CE on equity valuation models that use 
forward-looking data, such as analysts’ forecasted earnings per share. These models are the 
Residual Income Valuation Model and the Earnings Growth Model (i.e. Ohlson & Juettner, 
2005). 
 
1.3.2 Research Methodology 
The value relevance of fair value accounting is tested using econometric techniques which are 
standard research approaches in accounting literature. In particular, in order to test the value 
relevance of fair value disclosures over and above book values the Balance Sheet Model is 
implemented (Landsman, 1986; Barth, 1991). Hence, changes between market values and book 
values of equity are regressed on changes between fair values and book values of the financial 
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assets and liabilities. Financial assets include Loans and Advances and Held-to-Maturity 
Investments and financial liabilities include Deposit Liabilities and Other Debt. These are the 
primary variables of interest. The model also controls for a number of variables that are found in 
the literature to explain significantly share prices. These variables are a proxy variable for: 
interest rate risk, default risk, core deposit intangible, the notional amounts of derivatives, the 
credit-related off-balance sheet instruments, and the non-IAS 39 assets and liabilities. The 
findings are tested under alternative specification models for robustness. 
 
With respect to the value relevance of derivatives’ fair value recognition, the empirical model is 
based on the valuation model of Ohlson (1995) (see also, Wang et al., 2005). This model 
regresses the market value of equity on the book value of equity, two earnings variables 
(operating income and securities income), the fair values of net hedging and net trading 
derivatives and a set of control variables. The control variables are the same as the ones used in 
the previous empirical model, the value relevance of fair value disclosures (see previous 
paragraph). Again findings are also provided by using alternative specification models for 
robustness, including among others a changes model and a Balance Sheet Model. 
 
The methodology of the economic consequences test is separated into two steps. In the first step 
the CE for each commercial bank is calculated for a period of three years before the mandatory 
adoption of IFRS (2002, 2003, and 2004) and three years after the mandatory adoption of IFRS 
(2005, 2006, and 2007). Four methods are used to calculate the CE. Two methods are based on 
the Residual Income Valuation Model as implemented by Gebhardt et al. (2001) and by Claus & 
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Thomas (2001); and two other methods are based on Earnings Growth Model (i.e. Ohlson & 
Juettner, 2005) as implemented by Gode & Mohanram (2003) and by Easton (2004).  
 
In the second step the calculated CE is regressed on a dummy variable that takes the value of one 
for periods after the mandatory adoption of IFRS and zero otherwise. The empirical model 
controls for a number of variables such as the capital adequacy ratio, loans-to-deposits ratio, 
market beta, variability in earnings, the book-to-market ratio, size, financial leverage, risk-free 
rate, and US listing. A significant and negative coefficient for the dummy variable indicates that 
the CE has been decreased after the mandatory adoption of IFRS. 
 
Furthermore, in order to test whether the impact on the CE differs with respect to specific factors, 
such as analyst following, the classification of national accounting standards, and countries 
enforcement rules, a series of additional models developed. Under these models three indicator 
variables are developed, one for each of the factors above: an indicator variable for low vs. high 
analyst following, an indicator variable for Continental vs. Anglo-Saxon accounting systems, and 
an indicator variable for Strong vs. Weak enforcement rule countries. Finally, these indicator 
variables are interacted with the dummy variable that indicates whether an observation is before 
or after the mandatory adoption of IFRS.   
 
1.4 Contribution to the literature 
The first objective of the research is directly related to the value relevance literature, and 
specifically to studies that examine the relevance and the reliability of fair value estimates. Most 
of the previous studies focus on US GAAP and provide evidence on whether fair value estimates 
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for specific assets and liabilities are relevant and reliable enough to be reflected in share prices. 
Regarding financial instruments, most of the evidence supports the view that fair values are 
relevant to investors. For example, Barth (1994), Bernard et al. (1995), Petroni & Wahlen (1995), 
and Carroll et al. (2003) found the fair values of investment securities value relevant. Barth et al. 
(1996) also found that fair values of loans and core deposits significantly explain market prices. 
Venkatachalam (1996) and Ahmed et al. (2006) provide evidence on derivatives’ fair values. 
 
Most of the studies cited above test the value relevance of fair values in the context of US GAAP 
and the US banking sector. However, there is no evidence to date on the value relevance of fair 
value estimates of European banks in the context of IFRS. Although fair values are relevant in 
the US market this may not be the case in other jurisdictions, such as the European market. 
Institutional differences between jurisdictions may lead to finding different results. For example, 
the US market is regarded as highly efficient. In contrast, most of European markets are less 
efficient or even inefficient (an exception can be the UK market which is an equity-based 
market). Thus, this thesis contributes to the literature by providing further evidence on the 
argument regarding the relevance and reliability of fair value accounting using a unique cross-
country sample of European commercial banks that apply IFRS in a possibly inefficient 
environment. 
 
The second objective of the thesis, which is examined under the economic consequences test, is 
directly related to studies that investigate the impact of increased disclosure on CE. In general, 
there is evidence in the literature that supports the view that increased disclosure reduces the CE 
(e.g., Dhaliwal, 1979; Botosan, 1997). Studies which dealt with this issue in the context of the 
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IFRS adoption can be separated into two groups. The first group of studies investigate the 
economic consequences of IFRS adoption for periods prior to their mandatory adoption date 
(2005); these studies examine the impact of the IFRS adoption on the CE using a sample of early 
adopter firms (Cuijpers & Buijink, 2005; Daske, 2006; Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000). These studies 
provide mixed results. The second group of studies, which are more relevant to this thesis, 
examine periods including the mandatory adoption period after 2005 (Daske et al., 2008; Lee et 
al., 2008; Li, 2010). These studies provide some evidence that the CE has reduced after the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS. However, all of these studies examine many industries in aggregate 
or exclude financial institutions from the analysis (see, Lee et al, 2008). This approach, although 
it gives a general indication on whether IFRS decreased CE, it does not take explicitly into 
account industry-specific characteristics that may have affected the CE. Moreover, commercial 
banking sector is important for the economy as a whole as it provides the funds which are 
necessary for other firms to finance their operations and grow. A reduction in commercial banks’ 
CE results in a reduction of the interest rates which banks charge on the funds they lend. Thus, 
lower CE for banks benefits the economy as a whole. This fact dictates the separate examination 
of commercial banking sector. Thus, the second test of the thesis contributes to the literature by 
investigating the impact of the mandatory adoption of IFRS on European banks’ CE. 
 
1.5 Structure of the thesis  
The thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 discusses regulations that apply to European 
commercial banks, such as accounting standards and capital adequacy rules. European listed 
banks were required to adopt the IFRS from 2005 onwards ((EC) No. 1606/2002). Accounting 
for financial instruments is discussed in three standards: the IAS 39, IAS 32, and IFRS 7. A 
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discussion is also provided regarding the new project of IASB to replace IAS 39 (i.e. IFRS 9). 
US GAAP on financial instruments are also presented. Apart from accounting rules, banks also 
follow capital regulatory rules based on the Capital Accord which includes the regulation on 
banks’ capital requirements developed by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). 
 
Chapter 3 presents the theoretical framework of the thesis. Equity valuation theory provides the 
theoretical framework for both the value relevance and the economic consequences tests. The 
Chapter also discusses methodological approaches to calculate the CE, which is the dependent 
variable of the economic consequences test. Moreover, it is analyzed how CE relates to 
accounting standards.  Finally, a critical view of the value relevance research is presented. 
 
Chapters 4 and 5 are the literature review Chapters of the thesis. Chapter 4 reviews the literature 
of the first objective of the thesis, which is to examine the value relevance of fair value 
accounting under IFRS, whilst Chapter 5 reviews the literature of the second objective of the 
thesis which is to investigate the economic consequences of the mandatory adoption of IFRS on 
the CE. 
 
Chapter 6 is dedicated to the research methodology of the value relevance tests, and Chapter 7 to 
the research methodology of the economic consequences test. Chapters 8 and 9 report the 
findings of the tests, respectively. Finally, Chapter 10 provides a synopsis of the thesis and 
concludes. 
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1.6 Conclusion 
This thesis deals with the application of IFRS by European commercial banks. It focuses on two 
major streams of accounting research: i) the value relevance of fair value accounting, and ii) the 
economic consequences of the mandatory adoption of IFRS. This Chapter presents the research 
motivation and the research objectives of the thesis. Furthermore, it discusses the theoretical 
framework of the thesis, which is the equity valuation theory, and outlines the research 
methodology. Finally, it explains the relationship and the contribution of the thesis to the 
literature. 
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Chapter 2: Regulations for European Commercial Banks 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the regulatory framework within which European commercial banks 
operate. It is separated into two parts. The first part discusses the accounting rules, and 
specifically the IFRS which became mandatory in 2005 for all listed European firms. The 
accounting standards that were expected to have profound effects on the financial statements of 
banks are those related to financial instruments. Thus, the analysis focuses on IAS 39, IAS 32, 
and IFRS 7 that provide measurement, disclosure and presentation rules for financial instruments. 
IFRS 9 is also briefly explained given that it will replace IAS 39 from 2013 onwards. Although 
the discussion focuses on commercial banks, accounting rules for financial instruments are also 
applicable to non-financial firms. The second part discusses banks’ capital requirements as have 
been developed by the Basel Committee and have been adopted by the EU for all EU’s banks.  
 
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.2 discusses the accounting for financial 
instruments, such as classification requirements, measurement and reporting issues and hedge 
accounting. It also analyzes the endorsement procedure of IAS 39 within the EU, the current 
project of the IASB to replace IAS 39 (i.e. IFRS 9), and US rules for financial instruments. 
Section 2.3 discusses the capital adequacy rules as have been developed by the Basel committee, 
and finally, Section 2.4 draws a conclusion. 
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2.2 Accounting for financial instruments 
Accounting for commercial banks is directly related to accounting for financial instruments as 
banks’ balance sheets are dominated by financial assets and liabilities. IAS 32 defines financial 
instrument as, 
“...any contract that gives rise to a financial asset of one entity and a financial liability or equity 
instrument of another entity” (IAS 32, para 11). 
 
 A financial instrument is a contractual right to receive cash or other financial assets from 
another entity or to deliver cash or other financial assets to another entity (IAS 32, para 11). Fair 
value accounting is at the centre of the discussion on financial instruments as it is a major 
measurement basis for recognising and disclosing financial assets and liabilities (see, IAS 39). 
However, there are still concerns on whether fair values are the ideal measurement basis for all 
financial instruments and thus, other measurement bases are proposed by standard-setters such as 
the amortized cost.  
   
The IASB deals with accounting for financial instruments mainly in three accounting standards. 
The IAS 39 “Financial instruments: Recognition and Measurement” (IASB, 2003b), IAS 32 
“Financial instruments: Presentation” (IASB, 2003a), and IFRS 7 “Financial instruments: 
Disclosures” (IASB, 2005). IAS 39 deals with recognition and measurement issues, IAS 32 
deals with presentation issues, and IFRS 7 deals with disclosure issues1. IAS 39 is regarded as 
one of the most complicated and controversial accounting standard as it requires the 
measurement of many financial instruments at fair value. Banks hold a substantial amount of 
                                                 
1 IFRS 7 was issued at the 18th of August 2005 and was effective for annual periods beginning on or after the 1st of 
January 2007. However, early adoption was encouraged by the IASB. IFRS 7 supersedes IAS 30 “Disclosures in 
Financial Statements of Banks and Similar Financial Institutions” and the disclosure requirements of IAS 32. It 
should be noted that before IFRS 7 becomes effective, IAS 32 was dealing with both presentation and disclosure 
issues. 
27 
 
financial instruments and thus the measurement requirements, imposed by IAS 39, change 
radically the way banks value and present the financial instruments in their balance sheets. 
 
2.2.1 Classification of financial instruments 
IAS 39 defines four general categories of financial instruments namely: i) Financial assets or 
Financial liabilities at fair value through profit or loss, ii) Held-to-maturity investments, iii) 
Loans and receivables, and iv) available-for-sale instruments (IAS 39, para 9). For all other 
financial liabilities (e.g. deposit liabilities, long-term debt), although IAS 39 does not classify 
them in a separate category, it gives general instructions regarding their measurement.  
 
A financial instrument should be classified at fair value through profit or loss if either of the two 
following conditions are met: i) it is classified as held for trading or ii) it is designated upon 
initial recognition at fair value through profit or loss, usually, referred as the fair value option 
(IAS 39, para 9). The first condition is satisfied if a financial instrument is held for short-term 
profit-taking or if it is a derivative contract, other than a contract designated as an effective 
hedging derivative. The second condition, the fair values option, allows banks to designate a 
financial instrument, upon initial recognition, at fair value through profit or loss either because it 
eliminates significant inconsistencies arising by measuring the financial assets and liabilities 
under different methods, or because a group of financial instruments are managed or evaluated 
for risk management purposes at fair value2.         
 
                                                 
2 The fair value option was one of the two main disagreements between the IASB and the EC in EU’s endorsement 
process. The other disagreement is the macro-hedging accounting. Regarding the fair value option, the IASB and the 
EC came into an agreement. Macro-hedging accounting is still pending. A complete discussion on the endorsement 
procedure of the EC regarding the IAS 39 is included in a later section of this chapter (Section 2.2.4).   
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Held-to-maturity investments are defined as non-derivative financial assets with fixed or 
determined payments and fixed maturities (IAS 39, para 9). A bank can classify a financial asset 
as held-to-maturity investment if it has the ability and intention to hold it to the maturity. Usually, 
debt instruments qualify for this category. Equity instruments are not eligible to be classified as 
held-to-maturity investments as they have indefinite life or their related expected cash flows can 
not be specified with precision at the inception (AG17, IAS 39). 
 
Under loans and receivables, banks classify the financial instruments with fixed or determinable 
payments that are not quoted in an active market. Thus, financial assets that are quoted to active 
markets can not be classified as loans and receivables, but they may qualify as held-to-maturity 
investments (AG26, IAS 39). 
 
Available-for-sale instruments include financial assets that are designated as available-for-sale 
by banks or financial assets that are not classified in one of the previous three categories. Finally, 
for all other financial liabilities, such as deposit liabilities and long-term debt (i.e. financial 
liabilities other than at fair value through profit or loss) IAS 39 do not gives specific definitions. 
With respect to commercial banks, deposits are the most important liability that represents more 
than the fifty percent of banks’ total liabilities.  
  
2.2.2 Measurement and presentation issues 
IAS 39 requires different measurement bases for the categories of financial assets and liabilities 
described above. This means that banks’ balance sheets are a mixture of different measurement 
bases, in particular a mixture of fair values and amortized costs. 
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According to IAS 39, all financial instruments should be measured at fair value upon initial 
recognition (IAS 39, para 43). However, the subsequent measurement of financial instruments 
depends on the category to which they belong. Specifically, the financial assets and liabilities at 
fair value through profit or loss and the available for sale assets should be recognised at fair 
value. Changes in the fair value of the financial instruments at fair value through profit or loss 
should be recognised in the income statement, whilst changes in the fair values of the available 
for sales securities should be recognised in equity. Held-to-maturity investments and loans and 
receivables should be recognised at amortized cost using the effective interest rate method. For 
all other financial liabilities, such as the deposits and the long-term debt, banks should recognise 
them at amortized cost using the effective interest rate method. However, each bank at the 
balance sheet date should examine whether its financial assets and liabilities, carried at amortized 
cost and the available-for-sales financial assets, are impaired. See table 2.1 for a summary on the 
measurement bases of financial instruments under IAS 39. 
 
Although IAS 39 requires specific categories of financial instruments to be recognised at 
amortised cost, IAS 32 (and later IFRS 7) requires the disclosure of their fair values in the notes 
to the financial statements for comparison. Thus, banks provide two values for the Loans and 
Advances, Held to Maturity investments, Deposit Liabilities, Debt Securities, and Subordinated 
Debt: the amortised cost which is recognised in the financial statements (required under IAS 39) 
and the fair value which is disclosed in the notes to the financial statements (required under 
IAS32/IFRS 7).                  
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Table 2.1 
Measurement basis of financial instruments 
Under the IAS 39 
 
 Initial 
 Measurement
 
Subsequence 
measurement
 
Changes in values 
Loans and Advances 
 
Fair value 
 
Amortised cost 
Subject to impairments (profit 
or loss) 
 
Financial assets at fair value 
through profit or loss 
 
Fair value 
 
Fair value 
 
Profit or Loss 
Available for Sale  
 
Fair value 
 
Fair value 
 
Equity or when subject to 
impairment profit or loss 
 
Held-to-Maturity investments 
 
Fair value 
 
Amortised cost 
Subject to impairments 
 
Deposit Liabilities 
 
Fair value 
 
Amortised cost 
Subject to impairments (profit 
or loss) 
 
Financial liabilities at fair  
value through profit or loss 
 
Fair value 
 
Fair value 
 
Profit or Loss 
Other liabilities (e.g. Long-
term debt) 
 
Fair value 
 
Amortised cost 
Subject to impairments (profit 
or loss) 
Hedging Derivatives Fair value Fair value Profit or Loss / Equity 
 
 
In order to clarify the concept of fair value, IAS 39 provides guidance in paragraphs AG69-
AG82. This guidance aims to alleviate some of the concerns regarding the reliability of fair 
values and to ensure greater verifiability. The guidance imposes a measurement hierarchy for fair 
values, starting from the most reliable and objective estimates to the least verifiable and 
subjective estimates. Thus, the IASB makes clear that the best estimate of fair value derives from 
listed financial instrument in active markets. In that case the fair value is the quoted market price 
or equally speaking the market value of the instrument. On the other hand, the absence of active 
markets leads banks to use valuation techniques that market participants commonly implement to 
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estimate fair values, such as discounted cash flow models and option pricing models. To assure 
greater reliability in estimating fair values using valuation techniques, the IASB requires firms to 
base their estimates more on market inputs and less on entity-specific inputs (IAS 39, para. 
AG75). 
 
Thus, the fact that the fair value is not always a market value (mark-to-market), but also an 
estimated amount (mark-to-model) makes the term “fair value” a broader concept than the term 
“market value” even if sometimes these two values coincide (Khurana and Kim, 2003).  
 
When banks calculate the fair value of a financial instrument should consider a number of 
observable market factors that can affect its fair value. IAS 39 provides factors such as the time 
value of money, credit risk, foreign currency exchange prices, commodity prices, equity prices, 
volatility, prepayment risk and surrender risk, and servicing costs (IAS 39, para. AG82). For 
example, a bank should account for interest rate changes when estimating the fair value of a loan 
by discounting the loan’s expected cash flows with the prevailing interest rate. 
 
Regarding deposit liabilities, which represent a major liability for banks, IAS 39 states that the 
fair value of a financial liability with a demand feature, such as a demand deposit, can not be less 
than the amount payable on demand (IAS 39, para 49). Hence, banks assume that the fair value 
of demand deposits equals the carrying amount and no difference arises between the amortised 
cost and the fair value. For all other deposits (i.e. term deposits) banks use discounted cash flow 
models to estimate their fair values3. 
                                                 
3 Indicative extracts from the Annual Report 2006 of Lloyds TSB Group (p. 117) illustrate how banks estimate the 
fair values of loans and deposits in practice. A) For loans: “…For commercial and personal customers, fair value is 
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The other measurement basis required by IAS 39 is the amortized cost. This concept, applies to 
the vast majority of banks’ financial instruments, which consists of Loans and advances, Held-
to-maturity investments, and financial liabilities other than those classified at fair value through 
profit or loss (e.g. deposits and long-term debt). The amortised cost is calculated using the 
effective interest rate method which is the interest rate that exactly discounts the expected cash 
flows of a financial instrument, throughout its expected life, to the net carrying amount of the 
financial instrument. IAS 39 allows banks, when estimating the expected cash flows, to consider 
every contractual term of the instrument, such as prepayments, calls and similar options. 
However, future credit losses, such as the possibility that a related counterparty will be defaulted, 
should not be taken into account. The effective interest rate is also used to recognised gains or 
losses in the income statement. 
 
2.2.3 Hedge accounting  
As discussed above, IAS 39 requires some financial instruments to be measured at fair value and 
some others at amortised cost. Butler (2009, p. 68) observes that, 
‘this inconsistent treatment causes the artificial volatility and is a major headache for entities like 
banks’. 
 
Specifically, this mixed measurement approach results in higher earnings variability because it 
diminishes the physical hedging between the losses of a financial instrument with the gains of 
                                                                                                                                                             
principally estimated by discounting anticipated cash flows (including interest at contractual rates) at market rates 
for similar loans offered by the Group and other financial institutions. The fair value for corporate loans is 
estimated by discounting anticipated cash flows at a rate which reflects the effects of interest rate changes, adjusted 
for changes in credit risk. Certain loans secured on residential properties are made at a fixed rate for a limited 
period, typically two to five years, after which the loans revert to the relevant variable rate. The fair value of such 
loans is estimated by reference to the market rates for similar loans of maturity equal to the remaining fixed interest 
rate period”. B) For deposits: “The fair value of deposits repayable on demand is considered to be equal to their 
carrying value. The fair value for all other deposits and customer accounts is estimated using discounted cash flows 
applying either market rates, where applicable, or current rates for deposits of similar remaining maturities”.  
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another financial instrument when they are all measured at fair values. Thus, the purpose of 
hedge accounting is to provide an artificial match between gains and losses in order to reduce 
risk.   
 
According to IAS 39 (IAS 39, para 86), the hedging relationships can be of three types, namely: 
a fair value hedge, a cash flow hedge, and a hedge of the net investment in a foreign operation. 
As the term indicates, a fair value hedge aims to hedge banks’ exposure to changes in fair values 
of recognised assets and liabilities and of unrecognised commitments. Similarly, the cash flow 
hedge aims to hedge banks’ exposure against the variability of financial instruments’ cash flows. 
Finally, a net investment hedge is a hedge of an entity’s interest in the net assets of that operation 
against a foreign currency exposure. 
 
The accounting treatment of the hedging activity depends on the type of the hedging discussed 
above. If a hedging relationship is a fair value hedge then the gains and losses of both the 
hedging instrument and the hedged item are recognised in the profit or loss for the year statement. 
If a hedging relationship is a cash flow hedge or a hedge of net investment in a foreign operation 
then the effective portion of the gains and losses on the hedging instrument is recognised in 
equity, whilst the ineffective portion is recognised in the profit or loss statement.       
 
IAS 39 imposes some restrictions as to which types of financial instruments can qualify for 
hedge accounting. For example, it precludes the use of held-to-maturity investments as hedged 
instruments, regarding the interest rate risk. Held-to-maturity investments are usually held to 
maturity and thus changes in values are irrelevant. Furthermore, IAS 39 precludes the use of fair 
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value hedge accounting for demand deposits that are managed in a portfolio with other financial 
assets and liabilities. This is the macro hedging activity of banks that it was also a core 
disagreement between the EC and the IASB; this issue is discussed in the next section. 
 
2.2.4 EU on the adoption of IFRS 
With Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 July 
2002, European Union made mandatory the adoption of IFRS for all European listed firms from 
2005 onwards. The objective of this adoption is to ensure, 
‘a high degree of transparency and comparability of financial statements and hence an efficient 
functioning of the Community capital market and of the Internal Market’ (Article 1).  
 
However, in order the EU to adopt IFRS and their related interpretations an endorsement process 
has been adopted by the European Commission (EC). This endorsement process requires the 
technical assessment of each accounting standard by the European Financial Reporting Advisory 
Group (EFRAG) and the submission of its comments to the EC. The EFRAG comprises 
preparers, professional accountants, users and academics and it is a private sector body which 
role is to advice the EC in the endorsement process of the IFRS. After the EC receives the 
comments of the EFRAG proposes the endorsement of the accounting standard to the European 
Parliament and to the Accounting Regulatory Committee (ARC), a committee comprises 
representatives of EU Member States. The EU Member States discuss and comment on the 
proposed standard and vote for its endorsement. 
 
However, the endorsement process of the EC was not favourable for all of the IASB standards. 
For example, the intention of the EU to adopt the IFRS in 2005 caused some concerns, especially 
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in relation to standards dealing with financial instruments (IAS 32 and 39). The two most 
important concerns were the fair value option and the macro hedging (BIS, 2004a; EBF, 2003). 
These concerns led the EU to endorse the IAS 32 and 39 with two major ‘carve-outs’ until the 
IASB reconsiders the issues. Thus, the paragraphs, relating to the fair value option and the macro 
hedging, have not been included in the version of IAS 39 that was adopted by the EU. All other 
standards were endorsed by the EU as published by the IASB. 
  
The fair value option permitted firms to measure upon initial recognition all financial assets and 
liabilities at fair value without any restriction (IAS 39). This statement caused the reaction of the 
European Central Bank (hereafter, ECB) and of prudential supervisors represented in the Basel 
Committee who argued that the fair value option could be used inappropriately by firms, 
especially for their liabilities (BIS, 2004a). These concerns caused the IASB on 16 June 2005 to 
issue amendments to the fair value option in IAS 39. The amendments restricted the use of the 
fair value option to specific circumstances. For example, when it eliminates or reduces 
accounting mismatches, when a group of financial assets and liabilities is managed and evaluated 
at fair value due to risk management purposes, and when an instrument contains an embedded 
derivative. 
 
The macro hedging has been raised by European banks through their representative body, the 
European Banking Federation (EBF, 2003). European banks argued that IAS 39 restricts the 
application of hedge accounting for demand deposits by not permitting the use of fair value 
hedge accounting for such instruments. This is because the IAS 39 requires that the fair value of 
a demand liability is not less than the amount payable on demand (IAS 39, para 49). This rule 
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became an obstacle for banks to apply the fair value hedging to a portfolio of financial assets and 
liabilities that includes demand deposits. Banks were concerned that this prohibition will force 
them to change their asset-liability management and to incur addition costs to their accounting 
systems. Banks classify their financial instruments in portfolios based on their expected 
maturities to manage risk. The argument of banks is that the expected maturities of demand 
deposits in aggregate (i.e. core deposits) usually differ significantly from their contractual 
maturities (on demand). Based on historical statistical observations, the expected maturities of 
demand deposits are longer than on demand. Thus, using discounted cash flow models, the fair 
value of demand deposits in aggregate is usually a smaller amount than the amount payable on 
demand. However, as stated above, the IAS 39 in paragraph 49 does not allow the fair value of a 
liability to be less than the amount payable on demand. This restricted banks to follow their 
asset-liability management for their macro hedging activity.         
 
The amendment of the fair value option by the IASB on 16 June 2005 has been endorsed by the 
EC on 15 November 2005, and finally the IASB and the EC came into an agreement. On the 
other hand, no agreement has yet been achieved regarding the macro hedging, and thus the EC 
has adopted a version of the IAS 39 that excludes the provisions for the macro hedging 
restrictions.    
 
The other important involvement of the EU in accounting standard setting was in 2008 when the 
credit crunch forced many banks to write-down huge amount of losses in financial assets, such as 
subprime loans. Arguably, the measurement of financial instruments at fair value became a 
difficult procedure in inactive markets; hence fair value is not the ideal measurement method for 
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recognising assets in a forced liquidation or a distressed sale. Furthermore, accounting rules have 
been criticised for causing market volatility. This led many European politicians, including the 
French President Nicola Sarkozy, to ask the IASB to suspend mark-to-market accounting and 
change the rules on fair values. Finally, in 13 October 2008, the IASB succumbed to pressures 
and permitted the reclassification of financial assets (other than derivatives) out of the fair value 
through profit or loss category.    
   
2.2.5 A new standard on financial instruments (IFRS 9) 
IAS 39 has been criticized for its complexity by preparers of financial statements, auditors, and 
users (IASB, 2008). Since its publication in 1999 the IASB received numerous comments and 
suggestions to improve accounting for financial instruments and to simplify the rules. The 
pressure for a change was intensified during the financial crisis of 2008 when accounting 
standards, and specifically IAS 39, were blamed for amplifying volatility due to the huge write-
downs of losses relating to the fair values of banks’ financial instruments. 
 
This criticism led the IASB to re-examine accounting rules and gradually to replace completely 
IAS 39. Towards this aim, the IASB issued in November 2009 a new standard, the IFRS 9 
“Financial instruments” which consists of the first phase of a project to replace IAS 39. This 
version of IFRS 9 discusses only the classification and measurement of financial assets. It was 
re-issued in October 2010; this version includes the requirements on accounting for financial 
liabilities. The effective date of mandatory adoption is 1 January 2013, with early adoption 
permitted for the year-end 2009. 
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The aim of the IASB with IFRS 9 is to reduce complexity, improve comparability, and aid 
investors to understand better accounting for financial instruments. The differences between the 
old standard, IAS 39, and the new standard, IFRS 9, are remarkable. IFRS 9 eliminates two 
broad categories of financial instruments, those of available-for-sale assets and held-to-maturity 
investments. Financial assets are now classified according to their measurement basis, namely: as 
at fair values or at amortized cost. IFRS 9 adopts a new approach to classify financial assets 
based on two criteria: the objective of the entity’s business model and the contractual cash flows 
of the financial asset. Each entity first considers its business model regarding its purpose to hold 
financial assets to collect contractual cash flows, as opposed to holding financial assets to realise 
short-term returns. The business model test is not necessarily performed separately for each 
asset, but can be applied to aggregated assets. On the other hand, the contractual cash flow 
characteristic test should be applied on an asset and only for assets that are measured at 
amortized cost because of the business model criterion. According to the contractual cash flow 
characteristic, the contractual terms of a financial asset should give rise at specific dates to cash 
flows that are solely payments of principal and interest on the principal outstanding. 
 
The debt instruments are measured at amortized cost if both the business model test and the cash 
flow characteristic test are met. All other debt instruments should be recognised at fair value. 
Equity instruments that are held for speculation should be measured at fair value with changes 
recognised in the income statement. A new category of financial assets is the equity investments 
with no trading objective. These financial instruments should be also measured at fair value but 
their changes are recorded to other comprehensive income instead of the income statement. 
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However, IFRS 9 makes clear that any dividends arising from these instruments should be 
recognised in the income statement. 
 
Another important change between the provisions of IAS 39 and IFRS 9 is the different 
treatment of equity instruments and derivatives that do not have quoted market prices and their 
fair value cannot be estimated reliably. Whilst IAS 39 required their recognition at cost, IFRS 9 
requires their measurement at fair value. Finally, all derivatives should be measured at fair value 
through profit or loss. However, IFRS 9 gives the option to firms to continue treat hedging 
derivatives as required under IAS 39 (see, Section 2.2.3). 
  
The fair value option, which was also present in IAS 39, is permitted by IFRS 9. This rule 
applies to all financial assets and allows a firm to designate a financial asset upon initial 
recognition at fair value through profit or loss given that this treatment eliminates accounting 
mismatches. Finally, reclassifications from the amortized cost category to the fair value category 
and vice versa are not prohibited, but they need to be based on changes of the entity’s business 
model which are usually rare.   
 
 
2.2.6 US GAAP on financial instruments 
Up to now the accounting for financial instruments is examined within the context of IFRS. 
However, a brief mention should be made to the US GAAP for two reasons. First, most of the 
value relevance studies on financial instruments are within the context of US accounting 
standards, and second both the IASB and the FASB collaborate to produce common rules 
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regarding financial instruments or to eliminate the differences (see, Memorandum of 
Understanding between the FASB and the IASB, 2006).  
 
US GAAP addresses accounting for financial instruments in a number of standards. The first 
standard that included disclosure requirements for financial instruments was SFAS No. 105 
“Disclosure of Information about Financial Instruments with Off-Balance-Sheet Risk and 
Financial Instruments with Concentrations of Credit Risk” (FASB, 1990). Specifically, it 
required the disclosure of notional principal amounts, the term of the instruments, and possible 
losses arise from contracts with off-balance sheet risk (this standard was superseded by SFAS 
No. 133 (FASB, 1998)). 
 
An important US standard on this issue was SFAS No. 107 “Disclosures about fair value of 
financial instruments” (FASB, 1991). It was the first US standard that required the disclosure of 
the fair values of all financial assets and liabilities, either recognised or not in the financial 
statements. Although some US firms were disclosing voluntarily the fair values of some financial 
instruments, SFAS No. 107 made this disclosure mandatory for both on and off-balance sheet 
instruments.  
 
Similar to IAS 39 classification, SFAS No. 115 “Accounting for certain investments in debt and 
equity securities” (FASB, 1993) addressed the accounting and reporting for investments in 
equity securities (that have readily determinable fair values) and for investments in debt 
securities. This standard classifies debt and equity securities in three categories: i) Held-to-
maturity securities (debt instruments where the entity have the ability and intend to hold to 
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maturity), ii) trading securities (debt and equity securities that are bought for short-term profit 
realisation), and iii) available-for-sale securities, (all other debt and equity securities that are not 
classified in one of the other two categories).   
 
Derivative instruments were examined under separate standards, SFAS No. 119 and SFAS No. 
133. The aim of SFAS No. 119 “Disclosure about Derivative Financial Instruments and Fair 
Value of Financial Instruments” (FASB, 1994) was to amend existing requirements of the SFAS 
No. 107 and No. 105. For example, it required the distinction between financial instruments held 
for trading and other than trading purposes, and required the disaggregation of reported 
information about derivatives. Later, SFAS No. 119 was superseded by SFAS No. 133 
“Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities” (FASB, 1998). This last 
standard made mandatory the recognition of all derivatives at fair value either as a financial asset 
or as a financial liability. Hedge accounting is also the topic of this standard and its treatment is 
similar to that of IAS 39. Specifically, SFAS No. 133 requires three categories of hedging: i) a 
fair value hedge ii) a cash flow hedge, and iii) a hedge of the foreign currency exposure of the 
net investments in foreign operations. 
 
Concerns from users of financial statements (e.g. investors) regarding the reliability of fair value 
estimates led the FASB to issue a separate standard to addresses issues related to fair value 
measurements. Hence, SFAS No. 157 “fair value measurements” (FASB, 2006) gives the 
definition of fair value and establishes a framework for measuring fair value. This standard do 
not supersedes previous standards on financial instruments but provides guidance on how to 
measure fair values. Finally, the fair value option, which is present in IAS 39, is also permitted 
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by the FASB under certain conditions (see, SFAS No. 159 “The Fair Value Option for Financial 
Assets and Financial Liabilities” (FASB, 2007)). 
 
2.3 Capital regulations for commercial banks 
2.3.1 The need for regulation 
Commercial banks perform a vital role in an economy. They act as financial intermediaries 
between borrowers and savers as they transfer money from people and organizations that have 
surplus of funds to those that have deficit of funds (Casu et al., 2006). In other words, they 
collect money from the public via deposits and allocate them to productive activities in the 
economy by giving loans. This operation of banks contributes significantly to the economic 
growth of a country. This sensitive role of banks makes necessary their regulation by imposing 
restrictions on minimum capital requirements. In theory, regulation promotes public confidence 
and alleviates concerns that a bank will go bust.  
 
2.3.2 The 1988 Capital Accord (Basel I) 
Traditionally, the regulation of commercial banks was performed by central banks. Specifically, 
for the euro zone, this role is undertaken by the ECB with the cooperation of the independent 
central banks based around the EU countries. Central banks also have their own “bank”, the 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS), which is an international organization with members 
the majority of the central banks of the developed and developing countries. BIS states that the 
objective of the organization is to ‘foster international monetary and financial cooperation, and to 
serve as a bank for central banks’ (Available from: www.bis.org/ [Accessed 1 September 2009]). 
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In order to achieve its objective, BIS operates a number of committees that discuss on a regular 
basis monetary and financial matters. Such a committee is the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (hereafter Basel Committee) which aims to improve banking supervision by 
developing capital adequacy rules for commercial banks. The Basel Committee published in 
1988 the “Capital Accord” which was the first attempt to provide details on how banks shall 
measure capital adequacy and minimum capital requirements. Under the Capital Accord the 
capital adequacy of a bank is determined using the Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) as presented 
below: 
 
 
CAR  = Tier 1 + Tier 2 
On and off-balance sheet assets (weighted by credit risk) 
 
The numerator of this ratio consists of a bank’s capital. According to the Basel Committee, this 
capital is separated between two elements, the core capital, widely known as the Tier 1 and the 
supplemental capital, widely known as the Tier 2. Tier 1 capital consists of the i) banks’ equity 
capital, and ii) the published reserves from post-tax retained earnings. Tier 2 capital comprises of 
i) Undisclosed reserves, ii) Asset revaluation reserves, iii) General provisions/general loan loss 
reserves, iv) Hybrid debt capital instruments, and v) Subordinated term debt4. 
  
The denominator of the ratio is the on and off-balance sheet assets of a bank, weighted by credit 
risk. The rationale behind this ratio is that banks should keep a minimum amount of capital 
relative to their credit risk that can cover future potential losses. Therefore, assets in the 
denominator are classified based on their credit risk by specifying risk weights for each bank’s 
                                                 
4 Certain deductions should be made from Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital. Specifically, goodwill needs to be deducted 
from the Tier 1 capital and investments and subsidiaries from the total capital base (Tier 1 + Tier2).  
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asset. Specifically, it assigns no risk (0%) to cash and claims on central governments and central 
banks, low risk (20%) to claims on banks incorporated in the OECD and to short-term claims 
with maturities a year or less, moderate risk (50%) to mortgages, and high risk (100%) to claims 
to the private sector, such as commercial loans. In addition, the Capital Accord assigns to all off-
balance sheet items equivalent weights based on their credit risk. 
 
The ratio above indicates that banks with more low credit risk assets have higher capital 
adequacy ratios, and thus lower possibility to be in trouble due to customer defaults. According 
to the Basel Committee, each commercial bank needs to maintain a CAR above 8%. In addition 
the Tier 1 capital to weighted assets (i.e. Tier 1/weighted assets) should be above 4%. It also 
requires that the Tier 1 capital should be at least 50% of the total bank’s capital base (Tier 1 and 
Tier 2). 
 
2.3.3 Basel Amendments (1996) to incorporate market risk  
The Capital Accord focused only on credit risk, ignoring other important types of risk, such as 
market risk5. This led to criticism of the Basel Accord’s approach of measuring capital adequacy 
and urged Basel Committee to re-examine rules on capital in order to incorporate market risk. 
The assets of banks that are most vulnerable to market risk are those in their trading book which 
consist primarily of short-term positions usually held for speculation. 
 
In order to improve the 1988 Basel Accord, the Basel Committee issued in 1996 specific 
amendments to incorporate the market risk in measuring capital requirements. Specifically, it 
                                                 
5 Market risk arises from the fluctuation in values of banks’ assets caused by changes in market prices of equities, 
interest rates, exchange rates, the commodities’ prices and any other changes in market values. 
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introduced a third type of capital in the numerator of CAR, the Tier 3 capital. This capital 
consists of short-term subordinated debt and can be used solely to support the market risk. This 
means that the Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital will continue to cover the credit risk including the credit 
counterparty risk with respect to derivatives in both the trading and the banking books. Tier 3 
capital is limited to up to 250% of the Tier 1 capital. 
 
In order for both the credit risk and the market risk to be incorporated consistently into the 
calculations of the CAR, the measure of market risk should be multiplied by 12.5 (which is the 
reciprocal of the minimum CAR of 8%) and then added to the risk-weighted assets relating to the 
credit risk. Thus the CAR under these calculations represents the capital that is available to cover 
both types of risk, the credit and the market risk.   
 
2.3.4 Basel II – The Three Pillar Approach 
The amendments introduced in 1996 to overcome the criticisms of the Capital Accord proved 
insufficient. Further discussions between the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and other 
constituents, such as bankers, resulted in the publication of a new document in 2004 titled, 
“International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: a Revised 
Framework” (BIS, 2004b). This document proposes a new framework to measure banks’ credit 
risk and introduces three pillars that aim to provide a holistic approach in measuring banks’ 
capital adequacy. 
 
The first pillar aims to quantify banks’ risk and to set minimum capital requirements to support 
the risk undertaken by financial institutions. It allows banks to adopt new measures of credit risk 
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by examining the creditworthiness of their counterparties in detail and not by applying the “one 
size fits all” approach which was used by Capital Accord. Banks can use both internal risk 
ratings and external credit risk assessments in order to evaluate the credit risk. Furthermore, 
Basel II introduces a new type of risk, the operational risk defined as ‘the risk of loss resulting 
from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external events’. The 
rules regarding the measurement of market risk have not changed since the amendments in 1996. 
Thus, under Basel II the CAR is expanded to include three types of risk in the denominator, 
namely: the unchanged measures of market risk (the amendments of the Capital Accord in 1996); 
new measures of credit risk (as discussed above); and the operational risk. Tier 1 and Tier 2 
capital in the numerator are kept unchanged as well as the minimum capital adequacy ratio of 8% 
for the total CAR (Tier 1 and 2) and the 4% requirement for the ratio of Tier 1 capital to 
weighted assets. 
 
The second pillar is referred to as the supervisory review process. Under this pillar supervisors 
should closely monitor banks’ activities and risks and provide guidance on the minimum amount 
of capital that should be kept separately by each bank in order to support the undertaken risk. 
Furthermore, supervisors should encourage banks to develop their own risk management systems 
and to improve their risk measurement techniques regarding their financial instruments. 
Moreover, supervisors have the right to require banks to hold more capital than the minimum 
requirements (i.e. 8%) if they believe that some banks undertake excessive risk.  
 
Finally, the third pillar is a supportive function of the first two pillars. It requires banks to 
disclose a substantial amount of information to the financial community (e.g. analyst and 
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investors in general) relating to the capital requirement of banks. In particular, banks need to 
disclose information such as the risk exposure, the methods they use to calculate capital 
adequacy, and details of their risk management techniques.     
 
Following the financial crisis of 2008, Basel Committee moved again to improve banks capital 
regulations by introducing stricter rules. This movement is called the ‘Basel III’ and intends to 
strengthen banks’ capital and improve liquidity rules. For example, it gradually increases the 
minimum capital for the Tier 1 ratio from 4% to 6% until the 1st of January 2015. The total 
capital requirement is retained at 8%.    
    
2.3.5 EU on Capital Adequacy Requirements 
The EU promoted the adoption of a single set of rules on capital adequacy requirements that aim 
to strengthen the credibility of financial institutions while at the same time it hoped that they 
would boost the functioning of an integrated European economy. The Codification of Banking 
Directive (2000/12/EC), which was a consolidation of two Directives of the EC (the Directive of 
solvency ratio (89/647/EEC) and the Directive of own funds (89/299/EEC)), together with the 
Directive of the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions (93/6/EEC) 
constitute the EU legislation framework that incorporates the requirements of the Basel Accord. 
These laws apply to all credit institutions and investment firms in the EU. 
 
The issue of new capital rules (the Basel II) by the Basel Committee in 2004 led the EU to 
commence all the necessary procedures in order to incorporate the new capital adequacy 
requirements into its own legislation. The outcome of the discussions resulted in the Capital 
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Requirements Directive (CRD) that consists of the Directive 2006/49/EC on the capital adequacy 
of investment firms and credit institutions and the Directive 2006/48/EC which relates to the 
taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions. These two Directives form an 
equivalent agreement to the provisions of the Basel II framework. The new EU law came into 
force on the 1st of January 2007 and was fully adopted by the 1st of January 2008.      
 
2.4 Conclusion 
This Chapter explored the regulations within which European commercial banks operate by 
analysing the accounting and capital adequacy rules that apply to these institutions. Accounting 
for financial instruments was the focus of the analysis as they dominate banks’ financial 
statements. All European listed firms were required to follow the IFRS from 2005, and thus the 
discussion is performed within the IFRS context, covering accounting standards on financial 
instruments, such as the IAS 32, IAS 39, and the IFRS 7. However, the US GAAP was also 
discussed for two reasons: i) there is a tendency during the last few years between the IASB and 
the FASB to develop a common set of accounting standards, and specifically, to achieve 
converge on financial instrument rules (see, IASB and FASB’s “Norwalk Agreement”)6, ii) for 
comparison, as most value relevance studies on financial instruments use US GAAP. Finally, the 
Chapter discussed the capital adequacy rules, such as the Capital Accord requirements and the 
Basel II provisions to which Banks are subjected. This was necessary given the fact that a 
number of variables in this thesis are based on banks’ capital adequacy ratios. 
                                                 
6 Available from: http://www.fasb.org/news/memorandum.pdf, [Accessed 17 March 2009]. 
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Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework 
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter discusses the theoretical framework of the thesis which is the equity valuation 
theory. Both value relevance research and cost of equity research, which this thesis deals with, 
are based on this framework. The chapter also explains the relationship between CE and 
accounting standards which provides the argument regarding why one should expect that the 
adoption of IFRS will reduce the CE. Finally, a critical view of the value relevance research is 
discussed. 
 
Barth (2006b) defines value relevance as ‘the relation between share prices, or returns, and 
accounting information’. Equity valuation theory provides models that link accounting numbers 
to market values, and not surprisingly these models have been used extensively in the value 
relevance research (Barth et al., 1996; Eccher et al., 1996; Nelson, 1996; Wang et al., 2005).  
 
Equity valuation theory also provides the theoretical framework for the second part of the thesis 
which examines the effects that the mandatory adoption of IFRS has on banks’ cost of equity 
(See, the second research objective in Chapter 1). CE, however, is not observable and needs to be 
estimated. Equity valuation models provide us with the equity value of a firm given its CE. Most 
of the inputs of equity valuation models can be found from published figures, such as share 
prices and firms’ expected earnings, and therefore, it is possible to infer the CE under certain 
assumptions. Although, this is not the only approach for obtaining the CE (e.g. early studies used 
the CAPM that uses historical observations to derive the require rate of return (i.e. the CE)) it is 
now the most popular in the accounting literature (Gebhardt et al., 2001). 
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The chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.2 discusses the equity valuation theory. This 
includes the discussion of the following equity valuation models: the dividend discount model 
(hereafter DDM); the residual income valuation model (RIVM); the Ohlson’s (1995) model, the 
Feltham-Ohlson (1995) model; the Ohlson & Juettner (2005) model; and the balance sheet model 
(BSM) which is a standard research model in the value relevance literature and is adopted by this 
thesis. This section also discusses the approaches used in the literature to determine the CE. 
Section 3.3 discusses the relationship between CE and accounting standards, and Section 3.4 
provides a critical view of the value relevance research. Finally, Section 3.5 concludes. 
 
3.2 Equity valuation theory 
This section is separated into two sections. The first section makes an in-depth analysis of the 
equity valuation models (Section 3.2.1) and the second section discusses the CE which 
constitutes an important input to equity valuation models (Section 3.2.2). 
 
3.2.1 Equity valuation models  
3.2.1.1 The Dividend Discount Model (DDM) 
At least in theory, DDM is probably the only valuation model that is regarded as non-
controversial in the accounting and finance literature. It is common in equity valuation to assume 
that the price of a firm at a specific point in time equals the present value of the expected future 
dividend distributions to its shareholders discounted at the cost of equity capital of that firm 
(Barker, 2001). The above fundamental statement of valuation can be applied equally to any 
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security and is not limited only to equity valuation. In its general form the DDM can be 
expressed as below: 
   [ ]∑
∞
=
+
−=
1τ
τtt
τ
t dERP      (3.1) 
Where, 
 
Pt =   the market value per share at date t, (i.e. share price) 
R  =  the cost of equity (r) plus 1 
E[dt+τ]  =  the expected dividend per share at date t+τ 
 
 
Equation (3.1) implies that in order to derive the market value of equity, first, the expected future 
dividends should be estimated for each year after year t, and second, these dividends should be 
discounted at firm’s cost of equity capital. The DDM is known in the financial economics 
literature at least since 1938 and can be traced in the work of Williams (1938). Although the 
model has limited empirical implications, it helped both practitioners and academics to 
understand how assets are priced and it is the fundamental model upon which the equity 
valuation theory was built. As Barker (p. 18, 2001) states in his analysis of the DDM, 
‘any theoretical valuation model must be reconcilable with the DDM, or else it is conceptually 
flawed’. 
 
The link between the DDM and the valuation models is crucial as it provides the necessary 
theoretical underpinning to any empirical research relating to equity valuation. 
 
Other versions of the DDM can be obtained by making small modifications to equation (3.1). For 
example, substituting the term “expected dividends” with the more general term “expected cash 
flows” the model can also be used in assessing investment projects and the prices of assets other 
than equities. An interesting modification of the DDM is the Gordon Growth Model (see Barker, 
2001; Damodaran, 2002) which makes the assumption that future dividends grow at a constant 
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rate in perpetuity. The Gordon growth model can be easily derived by simple mathematical 
transformations of Equation (3.1): 
gr
d
P 1tt −
= +       (3.2) 
The constant term g in equation (3.2) denotes growth in dividends. Assuming that dividends 
grow at a constant percentage, the model requires only the estimation of three parameters, 
namely: next period’s dividends dt+1, the cost of equity capital r, and the growth in dividends g. 
Equation (3.2) demands r to be greater than g otherwise the value of the asset would be negative. 
 
3.2.1.2 The Residual Income Valuation Model (RIVM) 
As analysed above the market value of equity in the context of DDM is based only on expected 
dividends (i.e. cash flows to equity), given the cost of equity capital. However, other valuation 
models, such as the RIVM, use solely accounting information inputs. As Rees (1995) and Lee 
(1999) observe RIVM is not new in the accounting literature, but can be traced in the works of 
Preinreich (1938), Edwards & Bell (1961), Edey (1962) and Peasnell (1982). Under this model, 
the market value of equity is the outcome of two accounting constructs i) the book value of 
equity, and ii) the present value of abnormal earnings. Mathematically this relationship can be 
expressed as follows: 
[ ]∑
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=
+
−+=
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τtt
τ
tt xΕRbvP       (3.3) 
Where: 
bvt = book value of equity at time t  
[ ]α τtt xE +  = expected abnormal earnings at date t+τ 
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Ohlson (1995, p. 667) defines abnormal earnings as the excessive amount of earnings over 
“normal” earnings. “Normal” earnings are the anticipated return on the beginning of the period 
book value of equity (the return that investors expect to earn). This anticipated return can be 
expressed as the product of the beginning of the period book value of equity at date t-1 and the 
cost of equity capital (r). Thus using symbols abnormal earnings are defined as follows: 
1tt
α
t bvrxx −×−=      (3.4) 
Where tx  is actual earnings for the period (t). RIVM (Equation 3.3.) assumes that the book value 
of equity (bv) underestimates the market value of equity, due to conservative accounting, and 
thus an additional construct is necessary to capture the difference between the book value and the 
market value of equity. This additional construct is the present value of all future abnormal 
earnings which alternatively can be viewed as a firm’s goodwill. It is reasonable to assume that 
under an accounting system where all assets and liabilities are measured at market value, the 
book value of equity (bv) equals the market value (P) and thus the present value of abnormal 
earnings in equation (3.3) is zero ( [ ]∑
∞
=
+
−
1τ
α
τtt
τ xΕR = 0). In all other circumstances P≠ bv and thus 
the term [ ]∑
∞
=
+
−
1τ
α
τtt
τ xΕR  ≠  0. Usually in practice bv < P due to conservative accounting and as a 
consequence the present value of abnormal earnings is a positive number. 
 
Substituting equation (3.4) into equation (3.3) and making some simple transformations we can 
have a different interpretation of RIVM using the relationship (3.5). 
( )[ ]∑
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     (3.5) 
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Equation (3.5) implies that Pt = bvt if and only if future ROE equals firm’s cost of equity capital 
(r). ROEt denotes the return on equity at date t and is defined as the ratio of earnings at date t 
divided by the book value of equity at the beginning of the period t-1. In a highly competitive 
business environment ROE equals cost of equity capital (r) as firms do not have significant 
competitive advantages to support excessive earnings. In a different situation, firms possessing 
some forms of competitive advantages have a ROE that is greater than r and as a consequence 
their P is greater than bv. However, even in a competitive business environment ROE may differ 
from r due to conservative accounting (Frankel & Lee, 1998). 
 
Returning back to the statement of Barker (2001) that every valuation model must be reconciled 
to the DDM in order to be theoretical consistent it will be an omission not to present the link 
between the DDM and the RIVM. Clean Surplus Relation (CSR) provides this link. The term 
Clean Surplus Relation means that all gains and losses pass through the income statement in a 
way that the difference between the book value of equity at the end of the period t and at the 
beginning of the period t-1 equals earnings at date t minus dividends at date t. 
tt1tt dxbvbv −=− −  or  
t1ttt dbvbvx +−= −       (3.6) 
Substituting Equation (3.6) into (3.4) and making some arrangements we can express dividends 
(dt) as follows: 
t
α
t1tt bvxbvRd −+×= −  ,  where R=r+1    (3.7) 
Substituting Equation (3.7) into Equation (3.1) (the DDM formulae), we obtain the RIVM, see 
Equation (3.3). Thus, the link between the DDM and the RIVM is justified by assuming that the 
accounting system follows the Clean Surplus Relation. The empirical failure of the RIVM to 
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capture market value of equity can be interpreted as a rejection of the DDM, which is the 
fundamental valuation model. However, Lo & Lys (2000) argue that this is a naive conclusion 
given that RIVM requires prediction of future expected earnings which are usually vulnerable to 
measurement errors. Thus, failure of the RIVM to estimate share prices can be attributed to the 
noise arising from the input data and not from the misspecification of the model. Lo & Lys (2000) 
conclude that the RIVM is ‘…neither implementable nor testable’ and that the contribution of 
Ohlson (1995) in the valuation theory is the transformation of the RIVM to an empirically 
testable valuation model using Information Dynamics (ID). 
 
3.2.1.3 The Ohlson (1995) model         
Ohlson (1995) developed a parsimonious valuation model which links market values to 
contemporaneous accounting data. The formulation of the model is based on three 
straightforward assumptions. The first one is that the model builds on the neoclassical approach 
to equity valuation that of the DDM. The second assumption relates to a Clean Surplus Relation 
accounting system where the book value of equity at the end of the year equals the book value of 
equity at the beginning of the year plus year’s earnings minus dividends. One can easily observe 
that the first two assumptions are the ones that are also used to derive the RIVM. However, the 
contribution of Ohlson to equity valuation theory relates to his third assumption, the Information 
Dynamics (ID), which impose that the abnormal earnings follow an autoregressive process of 
AR(1). 
 
RIVM demands the prediction of abnormal earnings. In order to estimate these predictions, 
Ohlson (1995) assumes a linear relationship for abnormal earnings as follows: 
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12tt1t εγvv ++ +=      (ID2) 
Where, 1tε and 2tε  are zero mean disturbance terms. Equation (ID1) imposes abnormal earnings 
to follow a time-series process in a way that abnormal earnings at year t+1 is a linear function of 
two components: a) of abnormal earnings of the previous year, year t and b) of a scalar variable 
representing “other information” ( tv ) not yet incorporated into accounting data. “Other 
information” tv  is assumed to follow an AR(1) process (see, Equation ID2) and it affects 
abnormal earnings with a lag of exactly one period. Because of its abstract nature, “other 
information” was excluded by many testable empirical implementations of Ohlson (1995) model 
assuming that tv = 0 (see Frankel & Lee, 1998). This assumption imposes abnormal earnings to 
follow an AR(1) process which makes the model more convenient in its application, but less 
accurate as it excludes a possibly value relevant variable. “Other information” can be viewed as 
all the value relevant events not yet incorporated in current and past abnormal earnings but they 
will affect future abnormal earnings. Rees (1995) explains “other information” as the set of 
information affecting future earnings that analysts struggle to acquire. According to Rees “other 
information” may include,  
‘…macroeconomics activities and their relationship to the company’s activities, breakdowns of 
the company’s activities by industrial and geographical segment, knowledge of the company’s 
relative strength in the markets in which it operates, knowledge of patent protections and so on. 
Some of this information will be available in notes to the financial statements but some will not’. 
 
The model imposes specific restrictions for the parameters ω and γ which are limited to be non-
negative and less than one (0≤ω<1 and 0≤γ<1). These restrictions imply that both abnormal 
earnings and “other information” converge toward zero as t grows to infinity. The rationale 
behind these restrictions is in conformity with a competitive business environment. If a firm 
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possesses a competitive advantage generating positive abnormal earnings this will attract other 
firms to enter into the same market in order to benefit from the excessive profits that the market 
generates. In the long-run competition will diminish every competitive advantage that firms have 
and thus abnormal earnings will converge toward zero. 
 
Parameters ω and γ can also be interpreted as being the persistence parameters of a
tx  and tv . The 
closer these parameters are to unity the longer the competitive advantages will last for firms and 
the slower the abnormal earnings and “other information” will converge to zero. It is worthwhile 
to state that in the long-run both a
tx  and tv  asymptotically converge to zero. 
 
Based on the three assumptions above, namely: the DDM, the Clean Surplus Relation and the 
Information Dynamics, Ohlson (1995) derives a linear equity valuation model that expresses the 
equity value of a firm as a linear function of i) current book value of equity, ii) current abnormal 
earnings, and iii) “other information”. 
t2
α
t1tt vαxαbvP ++=        (3.8) 
Where,    ( ) 0ωRω/α1 ≥−=  
    ( )( ) 0γRωRR/α2 >−−=  
The advantage of the Ohlson (1995) model over the RIVM is that it uses contemporaneous 
numbers to derive firm’s market value of equity, whilst RIVM relies on the prediction of future 
abnormal earnings. However the modelling of Ohlson’s (1995) “other information” is still a 
controversial issue in the literature. 
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Ohlson’s (1995) approach to valuation implies “perfect” accounting (i.e. unbiased accounting). 
Unbiased accounting occurs when on average the market value of equity equals the book value 
of equity. This can be seen equivalent to Ohlson (1995) model (Equation 3.8) where the market 
value of equity is a weighted average of book value of equity, an earnings construct, and a zero 
mean “other information” variable. Assuming an unbiased accounting is not realistic in 
accounting practice. Feltham & Ohlson (1995) developed a valuation model which builds on 
Ohlson (1995) model with the difference that accounts for conservative accounting.        
 
3.2.1.4 The Feltham & Ohlson (1995) model 
Ohlson (1995) model implies unbiased accounting. In contrast, Feltham & Ohlson (1995) 
incorporate conservative accounting in their analysis. They separate firm’s activities into 
financial ( fa ) and operating activities ( oa ). They argue that the book value of financial assets 
and liabilities equals their market value and thus no goodwill arises from financial activities. On 
the other hand, operating assets and liabilities do no have observable market values. This results 
in accrual accounting for measuring operating income and net assets, and thus book value differs 
from market value (i.e. unrecognised goodwill arises). 
 
The fact that financial activities follow “perfect” accounting made Feltham & Ohlson (1995) to 
model investors’ expectations about future abnormal earnings using solely operating earnings 
(earnings from operating activities). They developed a Linear Information Model (LIM) as 
follows: 
11112111txo ++ +++= ttt
a
t voaox εωω
α       (LIM1) 
122221to ++ ++= ttt voa εωα
α        (LIM2) 
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131111t ++ += ttv εγν         (LIM3) 
142212t ++ += ttv εγν         (LIM4) 
Where, 4,...,1,ε τjt =+ j ,  are zero mean disturbance terms. 
 αtox = abnormal operating earnings for the period end of t 
  toα = net operating asset at t 
And  tν    = other information at t 
Equation (LIM1) imposes that one year ahead abnormal operating earnings ( α 1tox +  ) are a linear 
function of i) current abnormal operating earnings, αtox , ii) current operating assets, toα , and iii) 
other information, tν . The parameters of “other information”, 1γ and 2γ , are restricted to be less 
than one or else 2,1,1 =< hhγ . This condition dictates “other information” not to have any effect 
on future “other information” as t grows to infinity.  
 
The parameter, 11ω  can be seen as the persistence of abnormal operating earnings taking the 
values between zero and one, 10 11 <≤ω . The restriction of 11ω to be less than the unity imposes 
abnormal operating earnings in the long-run to converge to zero.  
 
Growth in operating assets is determined by parameter 22ω , which is set to be FR<≤ 221 ω . The 
lower bound for 22ω is one indicating a zero growth for a firm. In case where 122 >ω , growth is 
positive. The upper bound for growth is limited to that of FR  (i.e. one plus cost of equity capital). 
This upper bound eliminates extraordinary growths.  
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The final parameter, 12ω , is related to unbiased versus conservative accounting. As discussed 
above (see, Ohlson (1995) model), Feltham & Ohlson (1995) incorporated conservative 
accounting in their model. Thus, a positive 12ω  indicates conservative accounting whilst a zero 
12ω  relates to unbiased accounting. Setting 012 =ω , LIM1 becomes similar to Equation (ID1) of 
Ohlson (1995) model which is built on “perfect accounting”. Hence, the restriction for the 
parameter 12ω is 012 ≥ω . Based on the analysis above, Feltham & Ohlson (1995) derive a linear 
valuation function as follows: 
tt
a
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Where, 
ttt oafabv +=  
 
11
11
1 ω
ω
α
−
=
FR
 
 
( )( )1122
12
2 ωω
ω
−−
=
FF
F
RR
R
a  
 ( )
( )( ) ( )




−−−
==
2
2
111
21 ,, γ
α
γω
βββ
FFF
F
RRR
R
 
Comparing Ohlson (1995) model, Equation (3.8), and Feltham & Ohlson (1995) model, Equation 
(3.9), they differ as of the toa  variable. A positive parameter for toa , ( )02 >α , is the correction 
for the understatement of book value of equity due to conservative accounting. When 02 =α , 
Equation (3.9) becomes identical to Ohlson (1995) model (see, Equation (3.8)), indicating 
unbiased accounting.  
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3.2.1.5 The Earnings Growth Model (EGM) - Ohlson & Juettner (2005) Model 
The model of Ohlson & Juettner (2005) is a parsimonious Earnings Growth Model (EGM) that 
relates firm’s market value of equity to expected earnings per share of next year, short-term and 
long-term growth in earnings per share, and the CE. An important difference between the Ohlson 
& Juettner (2005) model and the other valuation models, such as the RIVM, the Ohlson (1995) 
model, and the Feltham & Ohlson (1995) model, is that it does not involves the book value of 
equity in the valuation process. 
 
Ohlson & Juettner (2005) argue that valuation process starts from next-period expected earnings 
per share capitalized: 
r
eps
P 10 = . However, this simplified model needs also to be adjusted for a 
premium, which according to Ohlson & Juettner (2005) should be related to growth of expected 
earnings per share beyond next-period.  
 
t
t
zR
r
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P ∑
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=
−+=
1
11
0         (3.10) 
Where,  [ ]tttt epsRrdpseps
r
z ∗−+= +1
1
  t=1,2,K 
and, R = 1+r 
The term tz shows that growth in earnings per share (eps) relies on earnings retention ( trdps ): 
cost of equity capital (r) multiplied by dividend per share (dps). Under the extreme scenario of 
zero earnings retention (eps = dps), premium is zero (i.e. 0=tz ) when the growth in expected 
earnings per share (eps) is zero or equally speaking when tt epseps =+1 . On the other hand of full 
earnings retention (dps = 0), premium is zero (i.e., 0=tz ) when growth in expected earnings per 
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share equals r ( r
eps
epseps
t
tt =
−+1 ). The case of zero premium ( 0=tz ) in Equation (3.10) leads to 
normal earnings performance, with
r
eps
P 10 = . However, in case of zt>0, the model implies 
superior earnings performance. Ohlson & Juettner (2005) impose tz to follow an AR (1) process 
as shown below: 
tt zz ∗=+ γ1     , t=1, 2, K     (3.11) 
Where,   R<≤ γ1  and 01 >z  
The growth rate γ  is restricted to be equal or greater than the unity. Ohlson & Juettner (2005) 
argue that a growth rate of less than one is implausible given conservative accounting. Note that 
when 1<γ expected earnings per share (eps) performances become normal as t grows to infinity. 
Assuming a fixed growth rate for z , equation (3.10) is restated as: 
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Equation (3.12) can be seen as a generalization of the Gordon Growth Model (see, Section 
3.2.1.1). Introducing a measure of short-term growth in equation (3.12) such 
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Solved as for the cost of equity capital, r: 
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Equation (3.14) is an important equity valuation model in accounting literature that provides an 
estimate for the cost of equity capital. Ohlson & Juettner (2005) model and RIVM provide the 
two theoretical valuation models that this thesis uses in order to calculate the cost of equity 
capital. For the application of these models in estimating the cost of equity capital see analysis in 
Chapter 7, Section 7.3.1. 
 
3.2.1.6 The Balance Sheet Model (BSM) 
The BSM is based on the basic accounting identity which defines equity as the difference 
between total assets and total liabilities. Under historical cost accounting the basic accounting 
identity is defined using historical values as follows: 
BVE = BVA - BVL      (3.15) 
Where, BVE denotes Book Value of Equity, BVA denotes Book Value of Total Assets, and BVL 
denotes Book Value of Total Liabilities. In perfect and complete markets, where all assets and 
liabilities are publicly traded and have observable market values, the basic accounting identity 
can be expressed using market values instead of historical values. 
 MVE = MVA – MVL     (3.15a) 
Or assuming that a firm has J assets and K liabilities, Beaver (1998) presents the BSM as follows: 
∑ ∑
= =
−=
J
1j
K
1k
kj MVLMVAMVE      (3.15b) 
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Where, MVE, MVA, and MVL denote Market Value of Equity, Market Value of Assets, and 
Market Value of Liabilities, respectively. Equation (3.15a) holds only in theory and cannot be 
tested empirically as the market values of some assets and liabilities are not observable. Going 
one step further to more realistic settings (i.e. incomplete and imperfect markets), an accounting 
system that bases on fair value accounting tries to mimic the settings of perfect and complete 
markets by using valuation models to determine the values of non-publicly traded assets and 
liabilities. Under uncertainty and in a full fair value accounting system, equation (3.15a) can be 
expressed using fair values instead of market values plus an error term.  
   MVE = FVA – FVL + ε         (3.15c) 
The error term ε was added in equation (3.15c) to correct for potential measurement errors in 
estimating fair values, management biases, and omitted variables, such as unrecognised goodwill.  
 
The BSM can be found at different versions in value relevance studies according to the demands 
of the research. For example, if the purpose of the research is to examine the value relevance of a 
disclosed fair value amount, the BSM model can be used as expressed in equation (3.15c). For 
example, Venkatachalam (1996) regresses directly the market value of equity on the fair values 
of assets and liabilities and the fair values of disclosed derivatives. However, if the purpose of 
the research is to examine the value relevance of the fair value of an asset or liability over its 
historical cost then the BSM can be expressed as the equation that links the differences between 
the market value and the book value of equity to the differences in fair values and book values of 
assets and liabilities. Adding and subtracting BVE in equation (3.15c) and using the definition of 
BVE as presented in equation (3.15) an alternative version of the BSM is shown in Equation 
(3.16). 
MVE – BVE = (FVA – BVA) – (FVL – BVL) + ε    (3.16) 
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Equation (3.16) is a widely used theoretical model in the value relevance literature (e.g., Barth et 
al., 1996; Eccher et al., 1996; Nelson, 1996; Park et al., 1999; Petroni & Wahlen, 1995). It 
examines the extent to which the differences between fair values and book values of assets and 
liabilities explain cross-sectionally the discrepancy between the market value and the book value 
of equity. The rationale of this model (Equation 3.16) is that as long as the fair values of assets 
and liabilities are measures of current values then any material difference between fair values 
and historical costs should explain the excess of market value of equity over the book value of 
equity. 
 
As discussed in Section 3.2.1.1, Barker (2001) suggests that each valuation model should be 
reconciled with the fundamental valuation model, the DDM, in order to be theoretically 
consistent. Barth (p. 12, 2000) suggests that the, 
‘asset and liability values are the present value of the expected dividends, or cash flows, 
associated with the underlying rights and obligations’ 
 
This statement implies a direct link between the two models, the DDM and the BSM. The 
following two equations demonstrate this link as they show that the fair values of assets 
(Equation 3.17) and liabilities (Equation 3.18) can be alternatively viewed as the discounted 
future claims and obligations, respectively.  
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Where, ( )[ ]it ACFE  and ( )[ ]Jt LCFE  refer to the Expected Cash Flows of an Asset i and 
Expected Cash Flows of a Liability J, respectively and k is the prevailing interest rate.  
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3.2.2 Cost of equity capital 
The discussion above demonstrated the importance of the CE in the equity valuation theory. This 
section discusses the standard approaches in the literature to calculate the CE. The CE is an 
unobservable measure that investors require as a return when they invest on a firm. The fact that 
it is unobservable requires its estimation. Two streams can be found in the literature to estimate 
the CE. The first stream uses asset pricing models, such as the CAPM, and the second stream 
uses equity valuation models, such as the RIVM. 
 
Since the development of the CAPM in the 1960s, finance literature recommended the use of an 
asset pricing model (e.g. the CAPM or the three-factor model of Fama & French, 1993, 1995, 
1996) in estimating the equity risk premium (i.e. the CE)7. Asset pricing models have their origin 
to the seminal work of Markowitz (1959) suggesting that individuals base their investment 
decisions on two statistical measures, the mean, and the variance. Under the mean-variance 
analysis, as it is alternatively known in the finance literature, rational investors seek to select 
investment portfolios that maximize their expected returns while at the same time minimize the 
variance of returns. 
 
Building on the mean-variance analysis, Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) developed the CAPM 
which provided the first theoretical approach on how to quantify the risk and return of capital 
assets. Based on two assumptions that all investors have homogenous expectations about the 
distribution of assets’ expected returns, and the existence of borrowing and lending at a risk-free 
rate of interest, CAPM defines the expected return of an asset as a function of the risk-free 
                                                 
7 The equity risk premium is defined as the excess required rate of return over the risk-free rate usually the interest 
rate of the 10-years government US bonds. 
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interest rate, fR  plus a risk premium, the covariance of asset’s return, ( )iE R , with the return of 
the market portfolio, ( )ME R , 
   ( ) [ ( ) ]i f iM M fE R R E R Rb= + -        
Where,   
2
( , )
( )
i M
iM
M
Cov R R
R
b
s
=       
Fama & French (1993, 1995) provided empirical evidence that size and book-to-market equity 
(the ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity) can further explain the cross-section 
variations of expected returns incrementally to the market risk. The three-factor model has been 
used by both empirical research and practitioners as an alternative to the CAPM in order to 
provide estimates of the CE. A forth factor usually added to the three-factor model is the 
‘momentum effect’ which means that stocks that performed well relative to the market, tend to 
continue to outperform in the future and vice versa, stocks that underperformed in the near past 
tend to underperform in the future (Carhart, 1997; Jegadeesh & Titman, 1993).  
 
However, later empirical evidence suggests that using the CAPM, or the Fama & French model, 
is a flawed way of estimating the equity risk premium (Claus & Thomas, 2001; Fama & French, 
2004). A major criticism is that they are based on historical data (i.e. realised returns). Thus, later 
studies turned to a more dynamic approach in estimating the CE using forward looking data, 
such as forecasted analysts’ earnings per share (Claus & Thomas, 2001; Easton et al., 2002; 
Gebhardt et al., 2001; Gode & Mohanram, 2003; Ohlson & Juettner, 2005). These studies are 
based on equity valuation theory and specifically on the RIVM and the EGM, discussed in 
Sections 3.2.1.2 and 3.2.1.5, respectively. 
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Under the RIVM, the CE is the model-implied required rate of return which can be seen 
alternatively as the internal rate of return (IRR) that equates the current share price of a firm, to 
the current book value per share and the discounted expected abnormal earnings. 
 
The EGM, as developed by Ohlson-Juettner (2005), is a parsimonious valuation model that 
relates share price to the one-year ahead and two-year ahead earnings per share, the forthcoming 
dividend per share, a perpetual growth rate (γ), and a short-term growth that is assumed to decay 
asymptotically to the perpetual growth rate (γ). Contrary to the RIVM, the Ohlson-Juettner (2005) 
model needs no estimates of the forecasted book values per share and does not requires data for 
the forecasted earnings per share beyond the second year ahead. 
 
Hence, given the limitations of the CAPM, this thesis focuses on the second stream of research to 
estimate the CE, which uses forecasted data instead of historical data. In total, four models are 
used to estimate the CE. The first two models are based on the RIVM and are the Gebhardt et al. 
(2001) model and the Claus & Thomas (2001) model. The other two models are based on the 
EGM and are the Gode & Mohanram (2003) model and the Easton (2004) model. These models 
are discussed extensively in the methodology chapter of the cost of equity capital (see, Chapter 
7). The fact that all of the four models above are based on subjective assumptions (e.g. expected 
growth in earnings) makes the calculation of the CE sensitive to different inputs. Thus, given that 
none of these four models is proved in practice to be superior relative to the others, the average 
CE is also used in the empirical analysis. The next section shows the link between CE and 
accounting standards.     
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3.3 CE and accounting standards 
The purpose of this section is to explain the relationship between CE and accounting standards. 
The section is separated into two sections. The first section explores how increased disclosure 
relates to the CE. Most of theoretical discussion predicts that increased disclosure and more 
quality in financial reporting results in lower CE. The second section provides some views that 
one set of accounting standards, such as the IFRS, may result in lower CE. Diverse accounting 
standards result in more adjustment costs when investors compare financial statements prepared 
under different accounting rules. 
 
3.3.1 Increased disclosure and CE 
The notion that high quality accounting standards and increased disclosure decrease CE and 
hence increase share prices, ceteris paribus, is a dominant theme in the accounting literature 
(Ball, 2006; Levitt, 1998). As early as 1950s, Horngren (1957, p. 598) suggested that:  
‘It is probable that the analyst would be better able to make intelligent decisions concerning 
securities if he should receive corporate information in bigger and better quantities and qualities’.  
 
He also added that, 
 
‘Analysts generally will be more interested in firms that disclose as opposed to those which do 
not’. Horngren (1957, p. 600). 
 
The argument of Horngren (1957) above implies that increased disclosure constitutes a positive 
signal for analysts in particular, and investors in general. Well-informed investors experience 
less uncertainty in their investment decision process and as a consequence, apply a relatively 
lower CE to those firms that disclose more. A relatively lower CE is translated into a relatively 
higher share price for firms with increased disclosure. Two streams of research exist in the 
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literature that attempt to explain how increased disclosure relates to lower CE (Botosan, 2006, p. 
33). 
 
The first stream of research argues that increased disclosure reduces the estimation risk of firms’ 
expected returns. Choi (1973) presents the association between increased disclosure and the CE, 
mathematically. Building on the theoretical notion that a firm’s value is driven by the expected 
dividend streams and the dispersion of these streams, he expresses the value that an individual 
assigns to a firm as the utility function f : 
( )wDfV Di ,,,, νσνσ ′′=             (3.19) 
Where,  
Vi  = Perceived value of a firm by an individual 
D  = Expected dividend streams for the firm (the bar over the variables refers to expected 
values) 
v´ = the value of all other alternative assets in the market 
σ    = The dispersion (measured as the standard deviation) of the probability distributions of 
D and v´ 
w = individual’s wealth constraints 
 
A firm’s attitude toward disclosure affects only variable D (dividend streams) which is depended 
on firm’s expected income (Y). An individual assigns probabilities to the different levels of 
expected dividends (this forms its probability function). As long as the ability of a firm to 
distribute dividends is related to a number of accounting measures (e.g. income, cash flows, debt 
to equity ratios) the level of a firm’s disclosure affects indirectly individual’s expectations about 
future dividend streams. However, given the relationship between dividends and income, the 
dispersion of the expected value of dividends is related to the dispersion of firm’s income 
expectations. Based on the above argument two more functions derive: 
( )YgD =   (3.20)     ( )YD h σσ =     (3.21) 
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Individuals form their expectations about a firm’s income, Y, based on a set of information, such 
as past data and future expectations regarding a firm (e.g. accounting data), data on the related 
industry, and macroeconomic factors. Thus, the income distribution function of an individual j 
for a firm i in an industry N is conditional on the available information to this individual and can 
be expressed mathematically as, ( )iNj ItY = . Choi (1973) makes the assumption that the higher 
the level of information iNj I , the better the firm and the industry performs in total
8. He also 
argues that although the expectations of each individual separately for a firm’s accounting 
variables are poor estimates of ‘true’ value, taking the expectations of individuals in total, they 
are quite unbiased estimates of the long-term ‘true’ value. Equations (3.19) to (3.21) together 
with equation ( )iNj ItY =  are aggregated in a single equation (3.22). Taking the differential 
calculus of equation (5.22) with respect to I  and Iσ , equations (3.23) and (3.24) derive 
respectively. 
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Interpreting equations (3.23) and (3.24), Choi (1973) argues that increased disclosure affect a 
firm’s value not by changing the mean expectations of the individuals, which assumed to be 
unbiased estimates of the true values and thus 0=∆Ι i , but through the reduction in the 
                                                 
8 Choi (1973) explains that an increase in earnings or/and a decrease in debt to equity ratio are signals of good 
performance resulting in both cases in an increase of the level of
iNj I . This is based on the assumption that firms 
that perform well are more likely to disclose more, in order to communicate the good ‘news’ to the market. 
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dispersion, Iσ , regarding these expectations. Thus, individuals become less uncertain about the 
future expectations of accounting variables. Given the fact that: i) any firm’s value at any point 
in time incorporates the mean expectations of all investors, and ii) increased disclosure reduces 
the dispersion of these expectations and hence uncertainty, and as a consequence CE is reduced 
and share price increases. 
 
In another study, Barry & Brown (1985) provide an example of two securities (A and B) in order 
to explain that increased disclosure matters when investors choose between competing 
investments. They first assume that the two securities, A and B, have identical estimates of 
expected returns and variances, but estimates of security A are based on twenty quarterly 
observations, whilst estimates of B are based on only four quarterly observations. Barry & 
Brown (1985) argue that in a Bayesian framework the dispersion in the distribution of future 
returns will be higher for security B and lower for security A. Thus, investors would prefer to 
invest in firm A with the lower estimation risk. Coles et al. (1995) support also the view that 
increased disclosure reduces the estimation risk that investors face when estimate payoff 
distributions. They argue that investors have more information for some firms which results in 
lower beta (i.e. CE) and higher share price.      
 
The second stream of research argues that increased disclosure decreases information 
asymmetries between managers and shareholders, which increases securities’ liquidity, which in 
return reduces the CE. Amihud & Mendelson (1986) argue that higher bid-ask spreads result in 
higher transaction costs for investors who require higher returns. This fact increases firms’ CE. 
Amihud & Mendelson (1986) also argue that firms with high bid-ask spreads have incentives to 
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increase the liquidity of the issued securities through information disclosure.  In another study, 
Diamond & Verrecchia (1991) provide evidence that the CE decreases when the liquidity of 
share prices increases due to higher levels of disclosure. They explain that improvement in 
liquidity attracts large traders who increase demand for firm’s securities and thus increase share 
price and reduce CE. Finally, Easley & O’hara (2004) argued that investors demand higher 
return for firms with greater private information than public information. They suggest that:  
‘firms can influence their cost of capital by affecting the precision and quantity of information 
available to investors. This can be accomplished by a firm’s selection of its accounting standards, 
as well as through its corporate disclosure policies’ Easley & O’hara (2004, p. 1578).   
 
Uninformed investors face higher uncertainty and thus demand higher return for firms with 
higher private information. However, if a firm starts to disclose more information to the market 
this will increase demand for its shares, which in return will increase liquidity. Finally, more 
public information is related to lower information asymmetries which decrease firm’s CE. 
 
However, increased disclosures may not always result in lower CE for all firms. It is likely that 
disclosing more information to the financial markets will cause more variability in share prices, 
especially when the disclosed information reveals additional risk for these firms. A recent 
example was the financial crisis of 2008, where a number of banks that were disclosing the 
negative changes in the fair values of their financial instruments resulted in high share price 
variability around the date of the disclosures. Hence, even that the theory suggests that increased 
disclosure is better than poor disclosure this is may not always be the case under certain 
conditions (e.g. financial crises). 
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3.3.2 Uniformity of accounting standards and CE  
The adoption of one set of accounting standards by a number of countries that previously applied 
diverse accounting standards may reduce CE. Investors when they have to select between two 
equity investments usually compare (among other things) the financial statements of these firms. 
If the firms follow different accounting standards, investors need to make adjustments in order to 
make the results comparable. This procedure demands an in-depth knowledge of the different 
accounting rules which incurs additional costs for investors, such as to educate themselves in 
order to interpret financial statements prepared under different accounting standards. 
 
There are views in accounting practice and academic literature that one set of accounting 
standards may lead to a lower CE. For example, Sir David Tweedie, the then Chairman of IASB, 
argued in 2004 in his speech, before the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs of 
the United States Senate that: 
‘A single set of international standards will enhance comparability of financial information and 
should make the allocation of capital across borders more efficient The development and 
acceptance of international standards should also reduce compliance costs for corporations and 
improve consistency in audit quality.’9         
 
This view is shared by Ball (2006, p. 11) who suggests that investors will be benefitted if many 
countries adopt the IFRS as this will reduce the adjustment costs for making financial statements 
comparable. Several other academic studies support this proposition. For example, Armstrong et 
al. (2010, p. 32) argued that, 
‘Investors also might have believed that application of a common set of standards would have 
convergence benefits, such as lowering the costs of comparing firms’ financial position and 
performance across countries…’. 
 
 
                                                 
9 Available from: http://www.iasplus.com/resource/040909tweedietestimony.pdf [Accessed 19 January 2011]. 
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Moreover, Hail et al. (2010, p. 358) argued that comparability also increases liquidity as 
investors can distinguish between less and more profitable firms. As explained above, this 
increased liquidity results in lower information asymmetries and as a consequence lower CE. 
Ray (2010) also examined the costs and benefits of uniform accounting standards based on a 
neoclassical approach. He argues that regulators (e.g. IASB) aim to provide accounting standards 
that maximize social welfare. Uniform accounting standards improve social welfare if variation 
between firms is low. Firms with small differences (e.g. in size) have lower compliance costs as 
standard-setters produce accounting standards that fit better to the ‘average’ firm. On the other 
hand, if differences between firms are large, then multiple accounting standards serve better the 
needs of firms as they reduce compliance costs, and as a consequence promote social welfare. 
Ray (2010) also explains that when differences between investors are large then uniform 
accounting standards are those that increase social welfare because they draw more investors in 
capital markets providing more liquidity. Investors experience costs of interpreting diverse 
accounting standards and making the necessary adjustments. Uniform accounting standards aid 
investors to compare investment opportunities in an economy and to allocate capital efficiently. 
Efficient capital allocation reduces the CE. Hence, Ray (2010) concludes that standard-setters 
need to trade-off the costs and benefits of applying uniform accounting standards as opposed to 
diverse accounting standards.  
  
 However, despite the benefits of one set of accounting standards (under certain assumptions, 
see, Ray, 2010), Zeff (2007) argues that genuine comparability is still difficult to be achieved 
(under the IFRS) due to cultural differences between countries. Such differences are related to i) 
business and financial culture, ii) accounting culture, iii) auditing culture, and iv) regulatory 
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culture. Thus, whether the adoption of IFRS lead to higher comparability between the financial 
statements of firms, which prepare their accounts under different accounting standards, is an 
empirical question.            
 
3.4 A critical view of value relevance research 
Value relevance research uses empirical models to examine the relevance and reliability of any 
accounting number published in financial statements. Beaver (2002, p. 462) explains that, 
‘the theoretical foundation of value relevance studies is a combination of a valuation theory plus 
contextual accounting arguments that allow researchers to predict how accounting variables 
relate to the market value of equity’. 
 
Thus, Beaver (2002) suggests that value relevance research is based on two elements: valuation 
theory (described above in Section 3.2) and contextual accounting arguments which set the 
accounting questions that researchers want to explore. For example, a contextual accounting 
argument of this thesis is the first research question presented in Section 1.2 that examines 
whether fair value estimates under IFRS for the financial instruments of European commercial 
banks are value relevant incrementally to their book values. 
 
Proponents of value relevance argue that the results of value relevance research can inform 
standard setting as it is a way to operationalize the qualitative characteristics of accounting 
information, the relevance and reliability (Barth et al., 2001). Barth (2007, p. 8) observes that,  
‘when applying the Framework to measurement questions, the IASB focuses on determining 
which measurement basis best meets the objective of financial reporting, the elements definitions, 
and the qualitative characteristics of accounting information’. 
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Thus, Barth (2007, p. 13) argues that value relevance studies can inform standard setters on the 
extent various measurement bases comply with the qualitative characteristics of relevance and 
reliability (i.e. faithful representation), as stated in the IASB’s Conceptual Framework (IASB, 
2010). 
 
However, other studies take an opposite view. For example, Holthausen & Watts (2001, p. 4) 
argue that without an underlying descriptive theory of accounting and standard setting, value 
relevance research has limited implications for standard setting. They also suggest that the 
associations between accounting numbers and market values, that value relevance studies report, 
are of little interest to standard setters. Another criticism of value relevance research is that it 
focuses only on one group of users of financial statements; the investors, who use accounting 
information in their investment decision making process. However, accounting information is 
also be used for contracting purposes (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986) and this is ignored by value 
relevance research. However, Barth et al. (2001) suggest that, 
‘Although financial statements have a variety of applications beyond equity investment, e.g., 
management compensation and debt contracts, the possible contracting uses of financial 
statements in no way diminish the importance of value relevance research, which focuses on 
equity investment’. 
 
Thus, based on the argument above, financial reporting serves different objectives and users of 
financial statements. The fact that value relevance research focuses only on a single group of 
users, the investors, it does not mean that financial reporting can not serve other purposes such as 
contracting purposes (i.e. debt covenants). The methodology of this thesis adopts the investor 
point of view as the objective of financial reporting. This decision does not diminish the 
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importance of financial statements for contracting purposes which is also another core objective 
of financial reporting. 
 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the equity valuation theory which provides the theoretical framework for 
the empirical part of the thesis, i.e., value relevance and the economic consequence tests. Value 
relevance studies underpin the development of their empirical models on equity valuation theory 
as otherwise these models would have been regarded as ad hoc constructs. Equity valuation 
theory also provides the theoretical models for estimating the cost of equity capital which is 
prerequisite for the economic consequence part. 
 
The valuation models presented are: i) the DDM which is the neoclassical approach to valuation, 
ii) the RIVM that uses accounting numbers to derive equity’s value, iii) the Ohlson (1995) model 
which builds on the RIVM by incorporating linear information dynamics, iv) the Feltham & 
Ohlson (1995) model that extends Ohlson (1995) model to incorporate conservative accounting, 
v) the Ohlson & Juettner (2005) model which is a an abnormal earnings growth valuation model, 
and vi) the BSM that relates equity value to the difference between assets and liabilities’ values 
(i.e. the basic accounting identity). 
 
As stated in the introduction, the interest of this thesis is to examine whether fair value estimates 
of banks’ assets and liabilities are value relevant incrementally to their book values. Thus, for the 
value relevance tests of this thesis, the model that provides the link between accounting numbers 
and market values is the BSM. The advantage of the BSM model over the other valuation models 
79 
 
(e.g. RIVM) is that it provides a direct link between the values of assets and liabilities and the 
market value of equity.  
 
Equity valuation theory also provides the theoretical background for estimating the CE, a vital 
measure for the economic consequence test. In particular, this thesis uses four methods of 
estimating the CE, which are the most common in accounting literature (Daske et al., 2008). Two 
of the models are based on the RIVM and are the Gebhardt et al. (2001) method and the Claus & 
Thomas (2001) method. The other two models are based on the EGM and are the Gode & 
Mohanram (2003) method and the Easton (2004) method10. The advantage of these models over 
other models, such as the CAPM is that they use forward looking data (e.g. expected earnings) 
instead of historical data. 
The chapter also analyzed the relationship between CE and accounting standards. In summary, 
theoretical studies conclude that increased disclosure reduces CE. Choi (1973) has shown 
mathematically that the CE reduces when the dispersion of the expectations on firms accounting 
variables decreases. Amihud & Mendelson (1986) and Diamond & Verrecchia (1991) found that 
the CE is reduced when increasing the liquidity of share prices and Easley & O’hara (2004) 
argue that firms can reduce CE if they choose to provide more public information than private 
information. Moreover, the adoption of IFRS (which for most countries is a commitment to 
increased disclosure and to more quality in financial reporting) can reduce CE through better 
comparability of financial statements across countries. This is mainly because investors will 
eliminate the necessary adjustments in order to make firms’ accounts comparable (Ball, 2006; 
Armstrong et al., 2010). The benefits of uniform accounting standards will be higher the lower is 
the variation between firms (Ray, 2010). 
                                                 
10 These four models are discusses in details in Chapter 7, the methodology chapter for the cost of equity test. 
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Finally, the chapter presented a critical view of the value relevance research. Advocates of the 
value relevance research argue that this type of research can provide valuable inputs to standard 
setters, given that it is a way to operationalize relevance and reliability (i.e. faithful 
representation), two qualitative characteristics stated in IASB’s and FASB’s conceptual 
frameworks (Barth et al., 2001). On the other hand, other researchers believe that value relevance 
cannot inform standard setters in the absence of an underlying descriptive theory of accounting 
and standard setting Holthausen & Watts (2001).  
  
Having analysed extensively the equity valuation theory which underpins both the value 
relevance and the economic consequence tests, the next two chapters review the empirical 
studies of the value relevance literature (Chapter 4) and the empirical studies relating to the 
economic consequence part (Chapter 5). 
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Chapter 4: Review of Value Relevance Empirical Studies 
 
4.1 Introduction 
So far this thesis has explored the theoretical framework of the study, the equity valuation theory 
(see, Chapter 3). Several value relevance studies have used this framework to empirically test the 
relevance and reliability of accounting numbers either recognised in the financial statements or 
disclosed in the notes. In particular, the value relevance literature attempts to operationalize the 
standard setters’ qualitative characteristics of relevance and reliability by using empirical models 
underpinned by the equity valuation theory (Barth et al., 2001). 
  
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the empirical findings of the value relevance literature. 
Value relevance studies adopt the view that investors are the core users of financial statements 
and, therefore, they use econometric techniques to provide evidence on the relationship between 
accounting numbers and share prices. Barth (2000, p. 16) defines value relevance as the extent to 
which ‘…the accounting amount is associated with some measure of value e.g. share prices’. In 
another study of Eccher et al. (p. 80, 1996), value relevance is defined ‘…in terms of the 
association of supplementary fair value disclosures with share prices’. Although value relevance 
studies test several accounting numbers in the financial statements (e.g. net income), this thesis is 
particularly focused on the value relevance of fair value measures. Value relevance studies 
conclude that the measurement method (e.g. fair value or amortized cost) that correlates the most 
with share prices is the most relevant to investors (AAA FASC, 1998). 
 
Due to the fact that this study deals with banks, the review of empirical studies is categorised 
into two groups: banking and non-banking. Section 4.2 presents the empirical studies on banks. 
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The analysis distinguishes further between US and non-US studies. This distinction is made 
because US studies dominated the value relevance literature, whilst non-US studies and in 
particular, studies on IFRS are not in a plethora. All of the studies, however, both US and non-
US relate to financial instruments. Section 4.3 discusses the non-banking literature, which covers 
industries such as industrial firms, mutual funds, property-liability insurers, software firms, 
investment property firms. The analysis is again presented separately for US and non-US studies. 
The literature on non-banks involves not only financial instruments, but also intangible and 
tangible assets. Finally, Section 4.4 concludes.         
 
4.2 Empirical Studies on Banks 
The value relevance literature on banks is mainly related to financial instruments. This is not 
surprising given that financial instruments constitute the majority of bank’s assets and liabilities. 
 
4.2.1 The US literature 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.2.6, SFAS 107 was the first US standard which required the 
disclosure of the fair values of all financial instruments in the notes of the financial statements. 
Therefore, studies before SFAS No. 107 examined fair values in a period where banks were 
disclosing voluntarily fair values in the notes of financial statements. The discussion of these 
studies is in Section 4.2.1.1. Section 4.2.1.2 provides the findings under SFAS No. 107 and 
under the derivative standards, SFAS Nos. 109 and 133. SFAS No. 115 required the 
classification of equity and debt securities in three categories, namely: held-to-maturity, trading 
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assets, and available-for-sale securities. These studies are analysed in Section 4.2.1.3. Finally, 
Section 4.2.1.4 discusses recent studies that relate to the requirements of SFAS No. 157.        
 
4.2.1.1 Evidence before SFAS No. 107 
Two early studies of Barth (1994) and Ahmed & Takeda (1995) provide some first evidence on 
the fair values of investment securities. The samples of these studies cover periods before 1992, 
the year when SFAS No. 107 became effective. Before this standard, US banks voluntarily 
disclosed the fair values of investment securities. 
 
Barth (1994) provides evidence on the value relevance of investment securities’ fair values and 
their related gains and losses. Using data from 1971 – 1990 for US banks she sheds some light 
on the argument surrounding the merits of fair value accounting over historical cost accounting. 
Specifically, Barth examines two research questions, namely: i) whether investment securities’ 
fair values are associated with share prices incrementally to historical costs, and ii) whether fair 
value gains and losses, resulted by changes in investment securities’ fair values, are associated 
more with changes in share prices (returns) than historical costs. Her methodology for the value 
relevance of investment securities’ fair values is based on the BSM described in Chapter 3. 
Including in a single model the two values of investment securities (the recognised historical 
values and disclosed fair values) and the book value of equity before investment securities, she 
reports a higher coefficient for investment securities’ fair values, indicating incremental 
explanatory power to historical costs. On the other hand, using an earnings capitalisation model 
no evidence is provided for the fair values’ gains and losses of investment securities.  
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One should expect that as long as investment securities’ fair values have incremental explanatory 
power, then fair values’ gains and losses (which are the changes in investment securities’ fair 
values) should also have incremental explanatory power. Barth (1994) provides two 
interpretations. i) Estimation errors in investment securities’ fair values are relative small when 
considered separately for each year. However, taking together two years to calculate securities’ 
gains and losses this makes the aggregated estimation errors larger, affecting the results for the 
gains and losses. ii) Correlated omitted gains and losses from assets and liabilities that are not 
taking into account by the model (e.g. non-investment securities), could have hedged the 
investment securities’ fair value gains and losses making them insignificant. 
 
Contrary to Barth (1994) who gives support to the first interpretation, Ahmed & Takeda (1995) 
provide evidence for the second interpretation. Specifically, they found that failing to control in 
the model for net assets’ gains and losses of non-investment securities (due to interest rate 
changes), can bias the coefficient of the changes in unrealised gains and losses of investment 
securities. 
 
Another study before SFAS No. 107 is that of Riffe (1997). This study provides evidence on the 
valuation implication of the notional amounts of derivatives in a period where the US GAAP did 
not require the disclosure of fair values of derivatives. Banks were disclosing from 1986 the 
notional amounts of all off-balance sheet instruments in the Y-9 reports as required by Federal 
Reserve. Later on, SFAS No. 105 also required banks to disclosure the notional amounts of off-
balance sheet instruments for fiscal years ending after June 15, 1990. Riffe (1997) separates 
between market-related and credit-related off-balance sheet instruments. The evidence is based 
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on two pooled across banks and time valuation models, the BSM and the Ohlson (1995) model 
(see, Chapter 3). The sample of the research consists of 242 bank holding companies using 
quarterly data from September 1986 through December 1989. The results support the value 
relevance of the notional amounts for both groups of off-balance instruments. Their signs are 
found to be positives, indicating that investors find hidden values in the notional amounts which 
they incorporate in share prices. 
 
4.2.1.2 Evidence under SFAS No. 107, 109, and 133  
Three concurrent studies of Barth et al. (1996), Eccher et al. (1996), and Nelson (1996) test the 
value relevance of disclosed fair values for a sample of US banks. The purpose of their studies is 
to examine the value relevance of SFAS No. 107 for the first two years of its adoption, 1992 and 
1993. Evidence is provided separately for investment securities, loans, deposits, long-term debt 
and off-balance sheet items. Their primary model is based on the BSM which regresses the 
differences between the market value and book value of equity (Barth et al., 1996; Nelson, 1996) 
or the market-to-book value ratios (Eccher et al., 1996) on the differences between fair value 
disclosures under SFAS No. 107 and their related book values (see, Equation 3.16 in Chapter 3). 
 
The findings of the three aforementioned studies support the view that investment securities’ fair 
values provide incremental explanatory power beyond that provided by the related book values, 
and thus their fair values are relevant in equity valuation. However, findings regarding the other 
financial instruments (loans, deposits, long-term debt and off-balance sheet instruments) are not 
in consensus. 
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In particular, Nelson (1996) finds that the fair values of loans, deposits, long-term debt and off-
balance sheet instruments do not have incremental explanatory power relatively to book values. 
Examining the market-to-book value ratios, in 1992 and 1993, she finds that they are greater than 
one, even if the book values are adjusted for the fair values of SFAS No. 107 disclosures. The 
greater than one market-to-book value ratio indicates that part of market value of equity remains 
unexplained by the book values and the SFAS No. 107 disclosures. Thus, Nelson (1996) adds 
two more variables in the primary model to control for future growth opportunities of banks. The 
aim is to capture the unexplained value of market value of equity. These variables are the 
historical growth in the book value of equity and the return on equity (ROE)11. Under this model, 
even though the explanatory power has been increased, the fair values of investment securities 
are not any more significant. Nelson (1996) attributes the change in significance of investment 
securities to high collinearity between the fair values of investment securities and the ROE. 
 
Contrary to Nelson (1996), Eccher et al. (1996) find the fair values of net loans significant in 
1992 with the expected positive sign. The fair values of long-term debt, even though they find to 
be significant in 1992, they have the opposite sign. With respect to deposits and off-balance 
sheet fair values there are no evidence to suggest that they are value relevant. Results in 1993 
support the view that only investment securities’ fair values have incremental explanatory power, 
but relatively weaker than in 1992. Loans’ fair values in 1993 are marginally significant in only 
one of model specifications. 
 
                                                 
11 According to Bernard (1994) the growth in book value of equity and the ROE are found to play a significant role 
in explaining the market-to-book value ratio. 
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Eccher et al. (1996) also test the incremental value relevance of fair values over and above 
historical costs. They argue that historical cost variables, such as profitability, loan quality, 
capital adequacy, and liquidity can capture part of goodwill over the fair values. Thus, they first 
developed a benchmark model that included the historical cost data discussed above. Then they 
expanded this model to include the fair values of SFAS No. 107. The results reveal that fair 
value disclosures have incremental explanatory power over and above historical cost. The R-
squared increased in 1992 from 44% for the benchmark model (the model that included only 
historical data) to 63% when the fair values were incorporated in the model. Findings in 1993 are 
not so robust. Overall, Eccher et al. (1996) conclude that investors are better-off by having 
available both values: historical costs and fair values, with historical costs contributing 
significantly in the value relevance of reported information. 
 
Contrary to Eccher et al. (1996), the results of Barth et al. (1996) indicate that the fair values of 
loans are statistically significant in both years, 1992 and 1993 with the expected positive sign. 
Similar to the other two studies (Eccher et al., 1996; Nelson, 1996), no evidence suggests that 
deposits and off-balance sheet instruments explain the difference between market and book value 
of equity. Regarding long-term debt fair values are found to be significant only in 1993. Barth et 
al. (1996) attributed the insignificant results for the fair values of deposits to the requirements of 
SFAS No. 107 to state the fair values of deposits, with no defined maturities, equal to their book 
values (on demand values). Furthermore, they attribute the insignificant results for off-balance 
sheet instruments to measurement issues and ambiguities in deriving their fair values.  
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A major difference between Barth et al. (1996) and the studies of Eccher et al. (1996) and Nelson 
(1996) is the way the former study controls for omitted variables. Barth et al. (1996) include in 
the primary regression model, apart from the SFAS No. 107 variables, two other sets of variables 
that according to the literature are found to contribute significantly in explaining the variation in 
banks’ market values. The first set of variables includes the fair values of pension assets, as 
disclosed under SFAS No. 87 (see Barth, 1991; Landsman, 1986), the book values of non-
financial assets and liabilities (i.e. non – SFAS No. 107 assets and liabilities) and a proxy 
variable for core deposits. Omitting these variables can bias the coefficients of the under 
investigation variables. Core deposits are an important intangible asset for banks where 
according to US GAAP are permitted but not required to be disclosed in the financial statements.  
The second set of variables is competitor to SFAS No. 107 variables and includes nonperforming 
loans (Beaver et al., 1989), and interest-sensitive assets and liabilities (see Beaver et al., 1989; 
Flannery & James, 1984a, 1984b). The value of a loan portfolio is affected by the financial 
health of borrowers (default risk) and by macroeconomics factors such as the change in interest 
rates (interest rate risk). Thus, Barth et al. (1996) included the variables of non-performing loans 
and the interest-sensitive assets and liabilities to control for the default risk and the interest rate 
risk, respectively12.  
 
Barth et al. (1996) find concurrently significant the coefficients of the fair values of loans and the 
coefficients of nonperforming loans and the interest-sensitive assets and liabilities. They argue 
that although fair values of loans are value relevant, they do not capture all the value related 
information of the default risk and the interest rate risk. Findings for the fair values of loans are 
                                                 
12 Interest-sensitive assets are defined as total assets less non-financial assets and interest earning assets reprised 
within a year. Interest-sensitive liabilities are the total deposits and long-term debt less their values reprised within a 
year.   
89 
 
robust under alternative model specification (e.g. using December share prices and controlling 
for growth opportunities).   
  
Overall, the results of the studies of Barth et al. (1996), Eccher et al. (1996), and Nelson (1996) 
support the findings of early studies (e.g. Barth 1994) that investment securities’ fair values are 
value relevant. In contrast, fair values of deposits and off-balance sheet instruments do not have 
any incremental explanatory power relative to their book values. Fair values of long-term debt 
are found statistically significant with the expected sign only in Barth et al. (1996), and only in 
1993. Loans’ fair values are significant in Barth el al. (1996), for both years, and in Eccher et al. 
(1996) in 1992 (see Table 4.1 below). 
Table 4.1 
Summary of the value relevance disclosures under SFAS No. 107 
 
 Barth et al. (1996) Eccher et al. (1996) Nelson (1996) 
Investment Securities Value-relevant Value-relevant Value-relevant* 
Loans Value-relevant Value-relevant* No evidence 
Deposits No evidence No evidence No evidence 
Long-term debt Value-relevant* No evidence No evidence 
Off balance sheet No evidence No evidence No evidence 
 
* Value-relevant only in some model specifications or in one of the two years examined, 1992 or 1993 (see the 
analysis for further information). 
 
All the three studies, did not find significant the fair values of off-balance sheet instruments.  An 
explanation for this finding is the ambiguities in SFAS No. 107 regarding derivatives and other 
off-balance sheet disclosures. For example, under this standard, banks although they disclose the 
fair value of off-balance sheet instruments, they do not disclose whether this fair value represents 
a net receivable position (i.e. asset) or a net payable position (i.e. liability). Furthermore, SFAS 
No. 107 does not distinguish between trading and other than trading derivatives. These 
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ambiguities have been amended by SFAS No. 119, which consists the subject of Venkatachalam 
(1996). 
 
Venkatachalam (1996) uses the BSM, described in Chapter 3, to test whether fair values of 
derivatives, used in asset-liability management, and the fair values of other off-balance sheet 
items (e.g. loan commitments, letters of credit, and guarantees) are significant in explaining 
cross-sectional variations in share prices. Venkatachalam (1996) includes also additional 
variables in the model to incorporate the values of on-balance sheet items, such as the fair values 
of the financial instruments required under SFAS No. 107 (fair values of loans, deposits, 
investment securities, long-term debt) and a variable for the remaining net book value. 
Furthermore, two other variables are used to control for correlated omitted variables, namely: net 
pension and post-retirement benefit obligations, and the book value of nonperforming loans. 
 
The results show that derivative fair values are positively and significantly related to market 
values, suggesting that they are value relevant. Similar results are presented for SFAS No. 107 
variables and the net pension costs. On the other hand, the fair values of other off-balance sheet 
items are insignificant. These results are robust to other model specification (e.g. a changes 
model). Fair values of derivatives are also found to be value relevant over and above their 
contractual amounts (the notional amounts) indicating that fair values convey additional 
information to investors. 
 
SFAS No. 119 requires also the disaggregation of the notional amounts of derivatives. 
Venkatachalam (1996) performs two tests. The first test examines the usefulness of separating 
91 
 
the notional amounts of off-balance sheet instruments in notional amounts of derivatives and 
notional amounts of other off-balance sheet items. The second test investigates whether the 
disaggregation of the notional amounts of derivatives in derivatives used for trading and for risk-
management purposes are useful to investors. Both tests reveal that investors are better-off by 
having the disaggregated amounts in the financial statements. 
 
Seow & Tam (2002) used a different model to empirically test the value relevance of disclosed 
values of derivatives. Specifically, they developed an ad hoc empirical model regressing share 
returns on earnings and market beta and on a series of derivative variables, such as the notional 
amounts of derivatives, credit derivatives exposure, and gains and losses on trading and non-
trading derivatives. The results support the view that disclosures on derivatives, required under 
SFAS No. 105, 107, and 119, explain significantly the returns, with the only exception the 
notional amounts of derivatives.      
 
A more recent study on derivative disclosures under SFAS No. 119 and SFAS No. 133 is that of 
Wang et al. (2005). Using a different methodological approach than that of Venkatachalam 
(1996), they provide evidence on the information content of the notional amounts of derivatives 
for a sample of US commercial banks. Based on the suggestions of Ohlson (1995) that the 
market value of equity is a linear function of book value of equity and earnings (See, Chapter 3, 
Section 3.2.1.3), Wang et al. (2005) find the notional amounts of derivatives value relevant13. 
Although they find significant the notional amounts of derivatives, further tests do not support 
the view that derivatives’ fair values are also value relevant. The opposite results for the fair 
                                                 
13 Wang et al. (2005) based on Ohlson (1995) include in their model the book value of equity, net earnings, and a 
third variable that proxies for ‘other information’. ‘Other information’ is proxied by the growth in sales in the last 
three years. 
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values of derivatives between this study (Wang et al., 2005) and previous studies 
(Venkatachalam, 1996) can be attributed to methodological issues (e.g. different approaches to 
the valuation model, explanatory variables, correlated omitted variables). 
 
The studies on derivatives above examine disclosed amounts of fair values. SFAS No. 133 
required the recognition of all derivatives in fair values. Ahmed et al. (2006) test the value 
relevance of both the disclosed and the recognised fair values of derivatives using a sample of 
US banks. They investigate two samples. A sample before the effective date of SFAS No. 133, 
where banks held simultaneously disclosed and recognised fair values of derivatives, and a 
sample of banks that used to disclose derivatives’ fair value before SFAS No. 133 and after 
SFAS No. 133 recognised them in the balance sheet. Ahmed et al. (2006) operate a similar 
enough model to the one used by Venkatachalam (1996) (the BSM analysed in Chapter 3). In 
particular, the market value of equity is regressed on the disclosed and recognised fair values of 
derivatives, on the balance sheet values of the remaining assets and liabilities, and on a number 
of control variables, such as the nonperforming loans and the core deposits. Evidence from both 
samples indicates that recognised fair values have significant explanatory power in contrast to 
disclosed amounts where they found to be insignificant. Thus, investors perceive the recognised 
amounts as being more relevant in decision making than disclosed amounts.     
 
4.2.1.3 Evidence under SFAS No. 115 
Park et al. (1999) test whether the difference between the fair values and the historical costs of 
available-for-sale assets and held-to-maturity investments explain the differences between banks’ 
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market value and book value of equity or the returns (raw returns and abnormal returns)14. They 
use a model based on the BSM similar to Nelson (1996). Findings indicate that fair values of 
available-for-sale assets and held-to-maturity investments are significant in determining market 
values (either in level or in changes form). The results from the model that uses raw and 
abnormal returns, as a dependent variable, are significant for the available-for-sales assets, whilst 
for held-to-maturity investments the results are only significant under the raw returns model. 
Held-to-maturity investments have lower marketability than available-for-sale assets as they are 
usually debt securities that the management have the intention and ability to hold them to 
maturity. In contrast, available-for-sale assets are equity securities which are more liquid. This 
resulted in finding the fair values of available-for-sale assets significant with higher explanatory 
power than the held-to-maturity investments. 
 
Given that share prices reflect a portion of future expected earnings, Park et al. (1999) examine 
whether available-for-sale assets are related to future earnings more than held-to-maturity 
investments. Using as the dependent variable next year’s ROE, Park et al. (1999) find that only 
the coefficient of available-for-sale assets is significant in explaining future earnings, whilst the 
coefficient of held-to-maturity investments is not. This last finding strengthens the view that 
available-for-sale assets are more relevant in estimating future earnings and thus equity market 
values. 
 
                                                 
14 Park et al. (1999) do not examine trading securities as the difference between fair values and book values of these 
instruments is zero. 
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4.2.1.4 Evidence under SFAS No. 157 
Three recent studies of Song et al. (2010), Goh et al. (2009), and Kolev (2008) examine the value 
relevance of fair value hierarchy (i.e. three levels of fair value measurements) required under 
SFAS No. 157. The aim of these studies is to test whether the market perceives the fair value 
measurements of Level 1 as being more reliable estimates than Level 2, and Level 2 estimates as 
being more reliable than Level 3.  
 
The sample of these studies is the banking industry covering data from the first three quarters of 
2008 (Kolev (2008) examines only the first and the second quarter). Using similar models, they 
regress share prices on the three hierarchical levels of fair values (i.e. Level 1, 2, and 3). The 
results support the view that fair value estimates based on observable market prices (Level 1) are 
more value relevant than the fair value estimates based on indirect observable data (Level 2), and 
the fair value estimates based on subjective assumptions made by banks (Level 3).     
 
In addition, Song et al. (2010) found that the reliability of fair value estimates increases for all 
Levels as the strength of firm’s corporate governance increases. Specifically, Song et al. (2010) 
report for low corporate governance firms a close to zero coefficient for Level 3 variable and 
lower, although still significant, coefficients for Level 1 and 2 variables. This finding suggests 
that strong corporate governance can mitigate information asymmetries and estimation errors 
which are more obvious in Level 3. 
 
Apart from corporate governance, which is tested by Song et al. (2010), capital adequacy ratios 
and big four auditors are likely to affect the market pricing of fair values. Goh et al. (2009) 
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provide evidence on these two issues. Banks with capital adequacy ratios over the sample’s 
median have significantly higher coefficients for fair value estimates of Level 3 than banks with 
capital adequacy ratios below the sample’s median. Interpreting this result, researchers argue that 
investors assign higher liquidity risk to banks with low capital adequacy ratios as it is more likely 
to sell their illiquid assets in unfavourable prices in case of disorder markets. Regarding the big 
four auditors, Goh et al. (2009) find that the presence of ‘high quality auditors’ increases the 
reliability of mark-to-model fair value estimates (Level 2, and particularly Level 3) and thus the 
value relevance. Similar to Song et al (2010) and Goh et al. (2009), Kolev (2008) documents 
higher reliability for mark-to-model estimates of banks with higher equity capital. 
 
Studies on SFAS No. 157 also provide some first evidence on whether the reliability of fair value 
estimates decreased as the economic crisis worsened in 2008. Song et al. (2010) fail to provide 
evidence that the reliability of fair value estimates decreased during the period of their study 
(from the first quarter to the third quarter of 2008). Goh et al. (2009) find that the reliability of 
fair values decreased only for mark-to-model levels (Level 2 and 3), but not for mark-to-market 
model estimates (Level 1). Further evidence of Goh et al. (2009) suggest that investors assigned 
higher liquidity risk to mark-to-model fair value estimates as the economic crisis worsened in 
2008, which is indicated by a reduction in the coefficient of Level 3 financial instruments. 
 
4.2.2 The non-US literature 
Value relevance literature, analysed above, is dominated by US studies. On the other hand, 
research based on non-US data is rare. Moreover, research on banks that examine the value 
relevance of the financial instruments’ fair values as required under IFRS does not exist. 
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 Some first non-US evidence on the empirical valuation of mark-to-market accounting is 
provided by Bernard et al. (1995) using a sample of Danish banks and thrifts. Their research 
objective was to provide evidence on the reliability of fair values that will aid US standard-
setters to decide whether to require fair values under US GAAP. Bernard et al. (1995) investigate 
two major mark-to-market adjustments, namely: price adjustments on investments and off-
balance sheet items, and the loan loss provisions. Results indicate that Danish banks do not 
manipulate price adjustments as they depend on observable market prices. In contrast, with 
respect to the loan loss allowance there is some evidence of manipulation. 
 
Bernard et al. (1995) also compare the market-to-book ratios between Danish and US banks. 
Although the average ratios are much higher than the unity for both Danish and US banks, the 
dispersion in ratios is higher for the US banks. Researches observe that the higher volatility in 
US ratios is attributed i) either to the fact that the volatility of the unrecorded goodwill of US 
banks is higher than that of Danish banks, or/and ii) the discrepancy between market value and 
book value of equity for the US sample is substantially higher than that of the Danish sample. 
Due to data availability on goodwill, the first interpretation can not be tested. Regarding the 
second interpretation, Bernard et al. (1995) argue that mark-to-market accounting, that Denmark 
banks follow, provides more relevant information for valuing their assets than historical cost 
accounting that US banks follow. 
 
Having analysed extensively the value relevance literature, regarding the fair values of banks’ 
financial instruments, the findings can be summarised as follows. Overall, the results support the 
view that financial instruments’ fair values are value relevant to investors. However, it is obvious 
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that some fair value estimates are associated more with share prices, whilst some others have 
weaker associations. Investment securities’ fair values are found unanimously value relevant by 
all studies. For all other fair value estimates, even though results are not uniform, they seem to be 
quite relevant and reliable to be reflected in share prices. Table 4.2 below summarises the 
empirical studies on the banking literature and facilitates the comparison of the studies. There is 
some evidence to support that fair values of loans can explain significantly share prices, even 
though their estimates involve subjective assumptions (Barth et al, 1996). Fair value of deposits 
proved not to be value relevant. A plausible explanation is the requirement of the FASB for all 
banks to state the fair values of demand deposits at face values. A plethora of studies examine 
the fair values of derivatives (see Venkatachalam, 1996; Ahmed et al., 2006; Seow & Tam, 
2002). The results support the view that the fair values of derivatives, either disclosed or 
recognised in the financial statements, are value relevant. Moreover, evidence on the notional 
amounts of derivatives show that they provide relevant information to investors incrementally to 
their fair values (Venkatachalam, 1996; Riffe, 1997; Wang et al., 2005). Finally, recent studies 
on SFAS No. 157, which classifies fair value estimates on three Levels based on the reliability 
criterion (i.e. direct observable market values, indirect observable market values, and mark-to-
model estimates) indicate that this classification is value relevant. Furthermore, the findings 
show that fair value estimates based on observable market prices (Level 1) have greater 
explanatory power than the estimates under Level 2 and 3, which are based on indirect values 
and subjective assumptions. 
9
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4.3 Empirical studies on Non-Banks 
The non-banking literature includes samples of industrial firms, manufacturing firms, 
mining firms, mutual funds, investment property firms, software firms, property-
liability insurers. The findings involve any kind of asset and liability measured at fair 
value, such as tangible and intangible assets. The studies are separated into US and 
non-US studies.  
  
4.3.1 US – Empirical Studies 
The US studies are separated further into financial instruments and non-financial 
instruments. 
 
4.3.1.1 Financial instruments 
A major argument surrounding fair value accounting is whether fair value estimates, 
regarding non-tradable securities, are reliable enough to be value relevant. Carroll et 
al.  (2003) and Petroni & Wahlen (1995) address this issue by examining the value 
relevance of different types of securities for a sample of closed-end mutual funds and 
property-liability insurers, respectively. 
 
In particular, Carroll et al. (2003) use a sample of 143 closed-end mutual funds to 
examine the reliability of investment securities. They separate between six general 
categories of investment securities based on their reliability. The six groups (stated 
with the most reliable first) are: investments in publicly held equity securities from 
G7 countries, private and public equities from developing countries, US government 
and municipal securities, investments in corporate bonds, a group of other 
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investments, such us mortgage backed securities, convertible securities, preferred 
stocks, and options and warrants, and a last group of other securities not classified in 
one of the above categories.  
 
Using a level and a return model, similar to the ones used by Barth (1994), Carroll et 
al. (2003) test for the association of fair values of each of the six categories above 
with share prices and returns. They observe that the fair values of all six groups are 
highly related to market values. Despite the concerns, this finding indicates that even 
the fair value estimates of investment securities trading in thin markets are reliable 
enough to be reflected in share prices. Contrary to previous studies (Barth, 1994; 
Petroni & Wahlen, 1995), Carroll et al. (2003) argue that their findings support the 
reliability of investment securities’ fair value. They explain that such significant 
results are mainly related to the full fair value accounting which is applied by closed-
end mutual funds. Specifically, closed-end mutual funds hold solely investment 
securities’ assets which are measured in fair values. In contrast, empirical studies that 
test other industries that partly apply fair value accounting suffer from correlated 
omitted variables, and thus special consideration is needed in designing the research 
methodology15. 
  
Although Carroll et al. (2003) find the fair value estimates of different types of 
investments value relevant, Petroni & Wahlen (1995) provide opposite results. Using 
a sample of 56 property-liability insurers they observe that only the fair values of 
equity investments and US Treasury investments are associated to share prices. Other 
                                                 
15 Carroll et al. (2003) suggest that “…the difference in investment securities fair value gains and 
losses results between Barth (1994) and this study is most likely attributable to the elimination of 
correlated omitted variable problems in the closed-end setting, suggesting that the incremental 
informativeness of fair value information may improve when a comprehensive fair value system is 
employed”.   
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types of securities, such as municipal and corporate bonds and other debt instruments 
proved to be insignificant. Hence, fair value estimates based on securities traded in 
active and more liquid markets are considered more reliable, and thus value relevant 
to investors, whilst fair values of non-traded securities are found unreliable. 
 
In another study, Simko (1999) examines the value relevance of net cumulative 
holding gains of financial assets, financial liabilities, and derivative contracts for a 
sample of nonfinancial firms. The net cumulative holding gains are measured as the 
difference between fair values (as disclosed under SFAS No. 107) and their related 
book values. Simko (1999) implements a model based on Feltham & Ohlson (1995) 
(see Chapter 3, Section 3.2.1.4). In his primary specification model (Simko, 1999, p. 
253) he regresses the market value of equity on the three primary variables of interest, 
namely: the holding gains of financial assets, financial liabilities, and derivative 
contracts. He also controls for a number of additional variables imposed by the 
theoretical model of Feltham & Ohlson (1995). These variables are the net book value 
of financial assets, the net book value of nonfinancial assets, the abnormal earnings of 
the current period, and the abnormal earnings of the next period. Findings support 
only the value relevance of the cumulative holding gains of financial liabilities and 
only in years 1993 and 1995, where the differences between the fair values and book 
values are more substantial. Contrary to previous studies on banks (e.g. Barth et al., 
1996; Eccher et al. 1996; Venkatachalam, 1996) fair values of financial assets and 
derivatives are found insignificant. Simko (1999) argues that the lower explanatory 
power for the financial instruments of nonfinancial firms is attributed to accounting 
rules that do not recognise the changes (gains or losses) in values of nonfinancial 
assets. Recognised gains and losses of financial instruments are negatively correlated 
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to a proxy of gains and losses of nonfinancial assets, making the fair values of 
financial instruments insignificant. 
 
Evidence on investment securities presented above relates to trading assets excluding 
equity investments that accounted under the equity method (equity investment over 
20 percent). However, large blocks of shares are not treated necessarily as trading 
securities in valuation. For example, due to high transaction costs when selling a large 
block of shares results in receiving a net amount which is much lower than the quoted 
market price. Furthermore, the expected cash flows to blockholders usually exceed 
the expected cash flows to trading investors due to synergies between investors 
(blockholders) and investees. Based on the argument above, Graham et al. (2003) test 
empirically whether fair value disclosures under the equity method are reflected in 
share prices. Using the model of Ohlson (1995), they find fair value disclosures 
significant under the equity method. However, their findings are limited only to 
publicly traded securities and cannot be extended to other types of instruments. 
 
4.3.1.2 Non-financial instruments 
US GAAP do not allow upward revaluations of tangible assets. Thus, this section 
analyses only intangible asset revaluations. Intangible assets, such us goodwill, 
patents, computer software, trademarks, copyrights, and R&D are important elements 
in the financial statements of some firms (e.g. software development firms, internet-
based firms, pharmaceutical firms). For most of these firms, intangible assets are the 
most valuable asset for profit making.  
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Motivated by FASB’s concerns regarding the capitalisation of R&D expenditures, 
Lev and Sougiannis (1996) examine the value relevance of R&D using both a returns 
and a level specification model. The capitalisation of R&D expenses was unavailable 
and thus researchers estimated it. They first calculated the amortisation rate of R&D 
capital, as the coefficient of a regression of current earnings on the R&D expenditures 
of the previous year and a series of other control variables. Then they used the 
amortisation rates to adjust reported earnings and book values as of the R&D 
capitalisation. 
 
Findings suggest that R&D adjustments are highly correlated with contemporaneous 
share prices suggesting that R&D capitalisations are relevant in explaining market 
values. Additional tests reveal that R&D capitalisation is only partial related to 
contemporaneous returns. R&D capitalisation is also found to be related to 
subsequent year’s returns, suggesting that a substantial amount of value is not fully 
reflected in current prices. Researchers attributed this observation, without testing it, 
either to market inefficiency (i.e. investors underreact to R&D information) or to an 
additional market risk associated with the R&D capital. 
 
Contrary to the full expensing rule of R&D costs (SFAS No. 2), software 
development costs are allowed to be capitalised when the software product reaches 
the stage of technological feasibility (SFAS No. 86). Using a sample of 163 software 
firms for the period 1987-1995, Aboody and Lev (1998) provide results that software 
capitalisation costs are value relevant, as both their annual amounts and their 
cumulative values are significantly related to returns and share prices, respectively. 
Further results indicate that software capitalisation values, which represent costs after 
 104
the technological feasibility point, are reliable estimates and provide valuable 
information to investors that can aid them in predicting future earnings. 
 
4.3.2 Non-US – Empirical Studies 
The non-banking, non-US empirical studies are presented under this section. 
Evidence on tangible assets relates to three jurisdictions, the U.K., Germany, and 
Australia. The U.K. and Australia allowed upward and downward revaluations of the 
tangible assets. Germany allowed only the use of historical cost accounting for 
tangible assets.   
 
Easton et al. (1993) examine a sample of 100 Australian firms from 1981-1990 to 
conclude whether tangible assets’ revaluations are associated to share prices and 
returns. Their model builds on the notion that value is captured by two accounting 
measures that of book value of equity and earnings. The findings support the view 
that the asset revaluation reserve and the increment to the asset revaluation reserve 
have significant explanation power over the earnings variables, suggesting that asset 
revaluations capture real changes of the values of tangible assets.       
 
Another interesting study using Australian data is that of Barth & Clinch  (1998). 
This study provides evidence on the relevance, reliability and timeliness of financial, 
tangible, and intangible assets’ revaluations for a sample of 350 publicly traded 
Australian firms. The sample represents approximately the 81% of the total market 
capitalisation of the ASX (Australian Securities Exchange). Barth & Clinch (1998) 
use a model where equity value is captured by two accounting constructs, namely: the 
book value of equity and the net income (Ohlson, 1995). They use two measures of 
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equity as the dependent variable, namely: the market value of equity and estimates of 
equity values based on analysts forecasted earnings per share. Given that earnings 
drive value, the later measure of equity provides a direct link between asset 
revaluations and expected future earnings. 
 
The sample of Barth & Clinch (1998) is separated in three general industries, namely: 
non-financial, mining, and financial firms. Assets’ revaluations of investments are 
disaggregated into investment in associates and other investments (listed investments); 
Property, Plant, and Equipment, into property (land and buildings), and plant and 
equipment; and intangible assets into goodwill and other intangibles. 
 
Evidence on the revaluation of asset classes is mixed and not the same for the three 
industries in the sample. The only revaluations that are found significant in explaining 
share prices, across all the three industries, are the listed investments and the 
intangible assets other than goodwill. Investments in associates are value relevant 
only for the mining industry. With respect to tangible assets, revaluations of property 
are only significant for non-financial firms, whist plant and equipment revaluations 
are significantly related to prices merely for the mining industry. 
 
Australian GAAP do not require firms to revalue assets every year. Thus, asset 
revaluations are related not only to current year revaluations but also to previous 
years. Barth & Clinch (1998) investigate also the timeliness of assets’ revaluations 
separating the total amount of assets in current year, before two years, and over than 
three years’ revaluations. Results are as follows: investments are value relevant more 
for current years; intangible assets are significantly related to share prices under all 
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years; tangible assets are value relevant for mining firms (for the current and over 
than three years’ revaluations) and for financial firms (for two years before 
revaluations). Non-financial firms’ revaluations are found not to be significantly 
related to share prices for all years. The results, using as a dependent variable 
analysts’ implied equity values are consistent with market values model. 
 
Given that asset values are determined by discounting expected cash flows and that 
fair values of assets are a good approximation of ‘real’ value, then a positive 
correlation should be observed between fair values and future performance. Using a 
sample of UK firms, Aboody et al. (1999) investigate whether upward revaluations of 
fixed assets are reflected to changes in future performance over the three subsequent 
years of the revaluation date. Future performance is measured as 1) operating income, 
before depreciation, amortisation, and gains on asset disposals and 2) operating cash 
flows.  In addition to the results on the direct relation between fixed asset revaluations 
and future performance, they also provide evidence on the relation between asset 
revaluations and share prices and returns.  
 
Findings indicate that current year revaluations of fixed assets are positively and 
significantly related to three years ahead operating income and cash flows, suggesting 
that upward revaluations of fixed assets are a good approximation of their ‘real’ 
values. However, due to the long-term nature of fixed assets, upward revaluations are 
only partially reflected to the short period of future performance (only three years 
ahead). Findings on share prices and returns are consistent with the results of future 
performance. 
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Aboody et al. (1999) perform also a number of robustness tests. In particular, they 
control for the acquisition activity of firms that may resulted in finding positive 
associations between upward revaluations of fixed assets and future performance. The 
results reveal that the acquisition activity does not affect the primary findings. Finally, 
Aboody et al. (1999) provide evidence that firms with higher debt-to-equity ratios 
tend to have weaker associations between upward revaluations of fixed assets and 
future performance, suggesting that these firms use revaluations to manipulate debt-
to-equity ratios and not to present true and fair financial statements. 
 
Another study that examines long-lived assets is that of Dietrich et al. (2001). They 
test the reliability of fair value estimates for a sample of 76 UK investment property 
firms from 1988-1996. Taking for benchmark the realised selling prices of investment 
properties, Dietrich et al. (2001) provide evidence on the accuracy of fair value 
estimates as compared to historical costs. They find that fair value estimates 
understate realised selling prices by six percent and that they are less biased and more 
accurate measures of the realised selling prices than historical costs. 
 
So & Smith (2009) also analysed investment property for a sample of firms from 
Hong Kong. Their aim is to study the change in reporting the unrecognised changes 
of the fair values of investments properties from the revaluation reserve (SSAP 13) to 
the income statement (HKAS 40). Hong Kong has adopted HKAS 40 as a part of a 
project to converge national accounting standards to IFRS from 2005. HKAS 40 is a 
word-for-word equivalent standard to IAS 40 “Investment Property”. So & Smith 
(2009) following an event study methodology, they implement two empirical models. 
One is based on short-window and the other on long-window abnormal returns. In 
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particular, each model regresses the buy-and-hold abnormal returns on a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one if HKAS 40 applies for the first time and zero 
otherwise. Furthermore, the models control for earnings before gains and losses, 
changes in earnings, gains and losses in fair values of investment properties, three 
interaction terms between the dummy variable and the earnings, changes in earnings, 
and gains and losses variables, firm size, and leverage. Findings of So & Smith (2009) 
indicate that the market has a higher respond when changes in fair values of 
investment property recognised in income statement (required by HKAS 40) than in 
revaluation reserve (required by SSAP 13). These findings are opposite to the results 
provided by Owusu & Yeoh (2006) for a sample of New Zealand firms. The results 
do not support the view that recognising unrealised gains in income statement have 
greater explanatory power than recognising them in a revaluation reserve.                      
 
In another recent study, Danbolt & Rees (2008) examine the market valuation of 
historical cost accounting as compared to fair value accounting for a sample of UK 
real estate firms and investment fund firms. The period of their study is from 1993-
2002. Their model follows the RIVM described in Chapter 3. It regresses price 
changes on net income per share, changes in net income per share, changes in equity 
per share, and changes in the revaluation component of equity. Their results, under a 
model controlling only for earnings, indicate that fair value earnings have higher 
explanatory power than historical cost earnings. However, expanding the model to 
include the changes in the equity of fair value accounting, they do not find any 
significant difference in the explanatory power between the fair value and the 
historical cost income measures. This finding is consistent with the statement of Barth 
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& Landsman (1995) that in a full fair value accounting system, which is the case with 
investment fund firms, 
‘… (2) a fair value-based balance sheet reflects all value relevant information; (3) a 
fair value-based income statement is redundant to valuation’.   
 
Finally, Christensen & Nikolaev (2009) provide evidence about why firms choose to 
use fair value accounting instead of historical cost accounting, and vice versa, for a 
number of non-financial assets, when accounting standards permit either of these two 
measurement methods. They focus on i) investment property, ii) property, plant and 
equipment, and iii) intangible assets. Their sample includes firms from two major 
European economies, the UK and the German economy, that were required to swap 
from national accounting standards to the IFRS in 2005. They found that only just 3% 
of sample firms use fair values for owner-occupied property and 47% for investment 
property. They explain that the initiative of a firm to use fair value accounting is 
related to contracting: firms that choose fair values rely more on debt financing than 
equity. Christensen & Nikolaev (2009) argue that the use of fair values by these firms 
is a demand of their creditors and not of the investors. Contrary to previous studies 
(e.g. Barth & Clinch, 1998), Christensen & Nikolaev (2009) support the contracting 
view of using fair values as compared to the valuation view. Their findings resemble 
most the findings of Aboody et al. (1999) who they found that firms with higher debt-
to-equity ratios use fixed asset revaluations to manipulate this ratio. 
 
 4.4 Conclusion 
The aim of the chapter was to review the value relevance empirical studies on fair 
value estimates. Value relevance studies were separated between banking and non-
banking empirical studies. This distinction was made because the focus of this thesis 
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is commercial banks and thus empirical findings on banks are of particular interest. 
The value relevance literature on banks focuses solely on financial instruments. The 
literature on non-banks covers a variety of financial statement elements, such as such 
fair value estimates of tangible and intangible assets. The literature is separated 
further between US and non-US studies. 
 
Overall, the empirical findings on banks support the view that fair value estimates of 
most financial instruments are value relevant. In particular, investment securities’ fair 
values are found significant in explaining share prices in most of the studies (Barth, 
1994; Ahmed & Takeda, 1995; Barth et al., 1996; Eccher et al., 1996; Nelson, 1996). 
Evidence on the fair values of derivatives indicates that they are relevant in equity 
valuation (see, Venkatachalam, 1996; Seow & Tam, 2002). Ahmed et al. (2006) also 
find that recognised fair values of derivatives are significantly related to share prices, 
whilst derivatives’ disclosures are not. This result suggests that market participants do 
not perceive fair value disclosures as being substitutes for fair value recognitions. 
Barth et al. (1996), Eccher et al. (1996), and Nelson (1996) find the fair values of off-
balance sheet instruments (including derivatives) insignificant. They explain that their 
results are biased by ambiguities in banks’ financial statements due to SFAS No. 107. 
These ambiguities have been considered by SFAS No. 119 and No. 133. Apart from 
fair values, banks report in the notes the notional amounts of derivatives which 
provide further information on banks’ risk. Studies by Venkatachalam (1996), Riffe 
(1997), and Wang et al. (2005) provide evidence that notional amounts of derivatives 
are important in determining share prices. 
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Fair value estimates of loans are regarded as being more subjective than the fair 
values of investment securities. However, Barth et al. (1996) found significant the fair 
values of loans under all model specifications. In contrast, Eccher et al. (1996) and 
Nelson (1996) do not provide similar results. The different results can be attributed to 
methodological approaches and to the research design that each study follows. For 
example, Barth et al. (1996, p. 517) explain these differences as follows: 
‘...Because the sample banks and time periods are similar across the three studies, the 
difference in findings is likely attributable to research design. As discussed more fully 
in Section III, the primary difference between this study’s research design and those 
in ERT (1996) and Nelson (1996) relates to the explanatory variables in the 
estimating equation in addition to the SFAS No. 107 variables.’ 
 
With respect to other financial instruments, such as deposits and long-term debt, fair 
value accounting does not seem to provide relevant information to investors. A 
plausible explanation for deposits is that SFAS No. 107 requires that the fair values of 
all deposits with no stated maturities equal their amounts payable on demand. 
 
Recent studies of Song et al. (2010), Goh et al. (2009), and Kolev (2008) provide 
evidence that SFAS No. 157’s classification of fair value estimates in three Levels is 
value relevant. In addition, they found that fair value estimates based on direct 
observable market inputs (Level 1) are more value relevant than indirect observable 
inputs of comparable items (Level 2) and mark-to-model estimates (Level 3). 
 
Although there is plenty of evidence for the value relevance of financial instruments 
of US banks, such evidence for non-US samples is rare. An exception is the study of 
Bernard et al. (1995) who reported that price adjustments to investment securities 
represented reliable estimates. 
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There is also considerable evidence concerning the value relevance of financial 
instruments of firms other than banks. Carroll et al. (2003) provide evidence for 
mutual funds; they report that all types of investment securities’ fair values are 
reliable enough to be reflected in share prices. On the other hand, Petroni & Wahlen 
(1995) find that for property-liability insurers only investment securities traded in 
active and liquid markets, such as equity and US Treasury investments, are 
significantly related to market values, whilst other types of securities, such as 
municipal and corporate bonds are not value relevant. Findings on a sample of 
nonfinancial firms (Simko, 1999) indicate that only the fair values of financial 
liabilities are significant. 
 
Apart from financial instruments, researchers test the value relevance of intangible 
and tangible assets. Lev & Sougiannis (1996) and Aboody & Lev (1998), respectively, 
found significant the R&D capitalisations and the software capitalisation costs. 
Regarding tangible assets, Easton et al. (1993) and Aboody et al. (1999) provide 
evidence that tangible asset revaluations for a sample of Australian and UK firms, 
respectively, are value relevant. In another study using Australian data, Barth & 
Clinch (1998) found that revaluations of property were only significant for non-
financial firms, whilst plant and equipment revaluations were significantly related to 
share prices merely for the mining industry. 
 
Studies on UK investment properties, such as Dietrich et al. (2001), support the view 
that fair values are more accurate estimates of the realised selling prices than 
historical cost estimates. The results of Danbolt & Rees (2008) on UK real estate 
firms and investment fund firms indicate that fair value earnings are value relevant, 
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whilst historical cost earnings are not. Finally, findings from a Hong Kong sample 
reveal that recognising in income statement the unrealised profit and losses of 
investment properties (required under HKAS 40) are relate more to abnormal returns 
than recognising unrealised profit and losses in a revaluation reserve (So & Smith, 
2009). However, this later finding is not supported by Owusu & Yeoh (2006) for a 
sample of New Zealand firms.  
 
Contrary to all studies above, that take the valuation point of view to explain the use 
of fair values, Christensen & Nikolaev (2009) adopted the contracting point of view. 
Specifically, they provide evidence that the UK and German firms, that choose to use 
fair values for their property, are debt financing firms that intend to signal the current 
values of their property more to their creditors and less to the investors. 
 
Overall, most of value relevance studies on fair values relate to US GAAP. However, 
studies on the IFRS and specifically, on the value relevance of banks’ financial 
instruments’ fair values do not exist. Taking advantage of this gap in the literature, 
the aim of this thesis is to provide further evidence on the relevance and reliability of 
fair value accounting under IAS 39 and IAS 32. The sample of the thesis is a number 
of European commercial banks from the 27 EU member-states including two more 
large European economies, Switzerland and Norway. 
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Chapter 5: Review of the Cost of Equity Empirical Studies  
 
5.1 Introduction 
The second empirical part of this thesis examines the impact of the mandatory 
adoption of IFRS on banks’ CE. The purpose of this chapter is to review the empirical 
literature on the relationship between increased disclosure and the CE. Increased 
disclosure could be either the result of an initiative by some firms to communicate 
more information to the financial markets or an imposition by a law as it is the case 
with the adoption of IFRS by all European listed firms from 2005 onwards. The level 
of disclosure has been a constant issue in accounting standard-setters’ agenda as the 
benefits of providing financial information to the investment community is closely 
related to the fundamental economic problem of the optimum wealth allocation; firms 
that perform better than their peers should receive more of the available funds of the 
society (Healy & Palepu, 2001). 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3 (Section 3.2.2), CE is an important input in equity 
valuation procedure as it is used extensively in equity valuation formulae to discount 
firms’ expected future cash flows (Pastor & Stambaugh, 1999). Two of the valuation 
models explored in Chapter 3, namely, the RIVM and the Ohlson & Juettner (2005) 
models have been used extensively by the accounting literature to estimate the CE. 
Hence, most of the empirical studies analysed in this chapter use these two models to 
derive estimates for the CE. 
 
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.2 analyzes the empirical studies on the 
relationship between the level and quality of financial disclosures and the CE. 
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Empirical studies are separated between the non-IFRS and the IFRS literature. Finally, 
Section 5.3 concludes. 
 
5.2 Review of the empirical studies 
This section examines the empirical literature pertaining to the relationship between 
firms’ disclosure level and the CE. The studies are separated between the non-IFRS 
and the IFRS literature. This distinction was necessary given the fact that this thesis 
deals with the IFRS and the CE. 
  
5.2.1 The Non-IFRS literature 
The empirical studies analysed below represent the most important studies on the 
relationship between increased disclosure and the CE. Early studies in the literature 
examined the impact of increased disclosure on firms’ CE using proxies for the CE. 
These studies used asset pricing theory (e.g. CAPM) to derive measures for the CE.  
For example, Dhaliwal (1979) provides evidence on whether the requirement of the 
SEC for multi-product firms to disclose revenues and profits in further analysis, i.e., 
by line-of-business, had an impact on the CE (which was based on proxies derived 
from the CAPM, such as the dispersion of the returns of a firm i, ( )iR~σ ). 
 
The sample of Dhaliwal (1979) was based on two groups of firms. 25 firms that 
constituted the experimental group (firms that were affected by the new regulation by 
having to report additional information) and 26 firms that constituted the control 
group (firms that were not affected). Dhaliwal (1979) developed an empirical model 
that regresses the proxies for the CE on a number of control variables and a dummy 
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variable that takes the value of one if a firm belongs to the experimental group, and 
the value of zero if a firm belongs to the control group16. The results indicate that 
firms in the experimental group (that reported additional information) had lower CE 
than firms in the control group. 
 
A complementary study to Dhaliwal (1979) is that of Dhaliwal et al. (1979) who also 
examined the requirement of the SEC for disclosing revenue and profits by the type 
of product (segmental disclosure). Their results support again the findings of 
Dhaliwal (1979) that the CE is decreased for those firms that extended the disclosure 
of revenue and profits by type of product.  
 
Later empirical studies, instead of proxing for the CE, they estimated it using equity 
valuation models, such as the RIVM and the Ohlson & Juettner (2005) model (see, 
Chapter 3, Sections 3.2.1.2 and 3.2.1.5). These models derive the CE as the implied 
required rate of return that equates share price to the discounted expectations of future 
earnings. 
 
Both RIVM and Ohlson & Juettner (2005) model are theoretical models and one 
needs to make specific assumptions in order to apply them. Thus, Gebhardt et al. 
(2001) and Claus & Thomas (2001) provide an empirical implementation of the 
RIVM, and Gode & Mohanram (2003) and Easton (2004) provide an empirical 
implementation of the Ohlson & Juettner (2005) model (for the detailed discussion of 
these methods see, Chapter 7). These implementations of the two theoretical models 
above have been used extensively by most of the empirical studies discussed below.  
                                                 
16 The control variables are the payout ratio, a growth variable, the leverage ratio, the current liquidity 
ratio, a size variable (total assets), and the earnings variability (measured as the standard deviation of 
the E/P ratio). 
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Using a sample of 122 US manufacturing firms, Botosan (1997) examines whether 
firms’ with increased disclosure experience lower CE. She approximated the CE 
using a derivation of the RIVM based on analysts’ forecasted earnings per share. She 
also developed an index to measure the level of disclosure that each firm provides 
through its annual report based on five attributes of financial reporting, such as the 
background information, summary of historical results, key non-financial statistics, 
projected information, and management discussion and analysis. 
 
Botosan’s (1997) primary results indicate that for the full sample although the 
coefficient of the disclosure index is found negative as predicted, it is insignificant 
which means that increased disclosure is not related to lower CE. Further analysis 
reveals that there is a significant inverse relationship between the level of disclosure 
and the CE, however, only for firms with low analyst following but not for firms with 
high analyst following. Usually, firms with high analyst following keep financial 
community well informed by disclosing a substantial amount of financial information.  
On the other hand, the benefits of increased disclosure are more profound to firms 
with low analyst following. 
  
Similar results with that of Botosan (1997) are also provided by Richardson & 
Welker (2001). Their study examines a sample of 87 Canadian firms for 225 firm-
year observations (The period of the study was 1990 – 1992). They used the Gebhardt 
et al. (2001) method to estimate the CE which is the implied required rate of return. 
Richardson & Welker (2001) document a negative association between higher levels 
of disclosure and CE for their full sample model. They also found that analyst 
following play an important role in the magnitude of the reduction in the CE, with 
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firms with low analyst following to experience lower CE. However, although these 
results hold for the financial disclosures of firms, they do not also hold for the social 
disclosures. 
 
Two other studies that found a negative relationship between the level of disclosure 
and the CE are those of Botosan & Plumlee (2002) and Hail (2002). Contrary to 
Botosan (1997), who developed her own measure of disclosure level, Botosan & 
Plumlee (2002) used a disclosure level index found in a report of the Association for 
Investment Management and Research (AIMR) and Hail (2002) relied on a study 
conducted by the Swiss Banking Institute (SBI). 
 
The focus of Botosan & Plumlee (2002) is a sample of 668 US firms from a wide 
range of industries for the period 1986 – 1996. Contrary to previous studies that used 
the RIVM (e.g. Richardson & Welker, 2001), Botosan & Plumlee (2002) 
implemented a DDM to estimate the CE which is regressed on four measures of 
disclosure level under four separate models. The four measures of disclosure level are: 
i) the total disclosure level, ii) the annual report score, iii) other publication score, and 
iv) investor relations score (where, the last three measures of disclosure are the 
disaggregation of the total disclosure measure). Furthermore, in a fifth model they 
also included all the last three disclosure measures.  
 
Controlling for market beta and firm size, Botosan & Plumlee (2002) fail to find 
significant results for the coefficient of the total disclosure level measure. However, 
examining the disclosure level by type, they find significant negative relationship for 
the ‘annual report score’, indicating that firms which voluntarily disclose more in 
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annual reports tend to have lower CE. Contrary to the expectations, the ‘other 
publication score’ is found to have a significant positive impact on the CE. Botosan & 
Plumlee (2002) attribute this positive association to managers’ concerns that greater 
disclosure in quarterly reports (a major component of ‘other publication score’) could 
increase the CE through greater share price volatility. Finally, the results for the 
‘investor relations score’ are insignificant suggesting that greater investor relations 
services do not have any impact on the CE. 
 
Another study supporting the view that increased disclosure decreases CE is that of 
Hail (2002). The findings are based on 73 non-financial firms listed on the Swiss 
Exchange. Hail (2002) estimated the CE using a derivation of the RIVM provided by 
Gebhardt et al. (2001). Similar to other studies (Botosan, 1997; Botosan & Plumlee, 
2002), Hail (2002) regressed the CE estimates on the primary variable of interest, 
namely: the proxy variable for the disclosure level, and a number of control variables, 
such as market beta, leverage, and a variable to control for firm size (the natural 
logarithm of market value). As it is predicted the coefficient of the primary variable 
of interest is found to be negative supporting the view that higher level of disclosure 
results in lower CE.     
 
A later study on the relationship between voluntary disclosure and the CE is that of 
Francis et al. (2008) who examined a sample of 677 US firms. Similar to Botosan 
(1997) the researchers proxy for firms’ voluntary disclosure by developing a self-
constructed index using information from annual reports and K-10 filings17. Francis et 
                                                 
17 Francis et al. (2008) index on voluntary disclosure is an equally weighted index of the scores of four 
separate categories of corporate information found on annual reports and K-10 filings, namely: 
summary of historical results, other financial measures, non-financial measures, and projected 
information.    
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al. (2008) used a number of different ways to calculate the CE. Their primary way is a 
model that imposes dividends to be reinvested at firm’s CE. They also used several 
other measures of the CE in their sensitivity analysis tests. In particular, they 
calculated the CE as: i) the realized portfolio returns, ii) the realized firm-specific 
returns, iii) other implied cost of debt, and iv) the implied cost of equity (i.e. Easton, 
2004).   
 
The primary results of Francis et al. (2008) indicate that there is a significant inverse 
relationship between increased disclosure and the measures of CE. However, this 
significance disappeared when they controlled for earnings quality (e.g., accruals 
quality and earnings variability). They show that firms with high earnings quality 
select to disclosure more information to the financial community in order to 
communicate the good news to the market. This means that the lower CE that has 
been observed is related more to higher earnings quality and less to the increased 
disclosure per se. 
 
All of the studies discussed above relate to non-financial firms. In contrast, 
Poshakwale & Coutris (2005) performed an empirical test to examine the impact of 
voluntary disclosures of 135 world-wide banks on their CE18. The estimates of the CE 
were based on a transformation of the dividend growth model (see, Chapter 3, Section 
3.2.1.1). They also constructed an index to proxy for banks’ voluntary disclosures 
based on 29 key financial and non-financial performance measures that relate to the 
banking industry. Controlling for a number of risk-related factors, such as beta, bank-
                                                 
18 Poshakwale & Coutris (2005) sample consisted of 135 banks, 73 European banks and 62 non-
European banks from the US, Canada, and Australia. The period of this study was the 1995 – 1999. 
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size, Price-to-Book ratio, and the P/E ratio, Poshakwale & Coutris (2005) found 
significant lower CE for banks with increased disclosure. Further evidence indicates 
that disclosures with respect to risk management activities, contribute the most to the 
reduction of banks’ CE. Finally, European banks with high levels of disclosure 
experienced lower CE than their peers in non-European countries. 
 
In summary, the non-IFRS literature supports the view that increased disclosure 
results in a lower CE (see, Table 5.1). This conclusion holds irrespective of which 
proxy or method is used to approximate the CE (e.g., Dhaliwal, 1979; Botosan, 1997; 
Hail, 2002; Poshakwale & Coutris, 2005). 
 
Table 5.1 
Summary of the non-IFRS literature 
 
Study Sample  CE Estimate Impact on CE 
Decrease (D) / 
Increase (I)
1 
Dhaliwal (1979) US firms Proxies derived  
from CAPM 
D 
Dhaliwal et al. (1979) US firms Proxies derived  
from CAPM 
D 
Botosan (1997) US firms RIVM D2 
Richardson & Welker 
(2001) 
Canadian firms Gebhardt et al. (2001) D 
Botosan & Plumlee 
(2002) 
US firms DDM D/I3 
Hail (2002) Swiss firms Gebhardt et al. (2001) D 
Poshakwale & 
Coutris (2005) 
European, US,  
Canadian, Australian 
banks 
DDM 
 D 
Francis et al. (2008) US firms 
• A model that imposes 
dividends to be 
reinvested at firm’s 
CE. 
• Realized portfolio 
returns. 
• Realized firm-specific 
returns. 
• Implied cost of debt. 
• Easton (2004). 
D4 
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Notes:. 
1. The last column indicates the impact of increased disclosure on the CE. (D) for Decreased and 
(I) for Increased. 
2. Although the study found a reduction in CE, this holds only for firms with low analyst 
following. 
3. With respect to disclosure in annual reports the CE has decreased. For quarterly disclosures 
the CE has increased and for disclosures relating to investor relations there is no impact on the 
CE. 
4. The negative relationship between increased disclosure and CE disappears conditional on 
earnings quality. 
 
5.2.2 The IFRS Literature 
This section discusses the empirical studies that relate to the IFRS literature. The 
transition of an increasing number of countries from national accounting standards to 
the IFRS is an ideal context to examine whether increased disclosure and 
comparability affect the CE. In general, IFRS require firms to disclose a substantial 
amount of information in annual reports usually much more than the national 
accounting standards (Ashbaugh & Pincus, 2001). Moreover, IFRS are regarded as a 
set of high quality accounting standards providing more timely financial information 
while at the same time diminish earnings management (Barth et al., 2008). 
Comparability, through the adoption of one set of accounting standards, such as the 
IFRS, eliminates adjustments in making financial accounts, prepared under different 
accounting standards, comparable.  
 
Accounting literature, long before the mandatory adoption of IFRS provided some 
first evidence on the impact of IFRS on the CE using samples of early-adopter firms 
(see Section 5.2.2.1). Evidence is also provided by later studies, after the mandatory 
adoption of IFRS (see Section 5.2.2.2).  
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5.2.2.1 Voluntary disclosures of IFRS 
Leuz & Verrecchia (2000) examine whether increased disclosure decreases the 
information asymmetry between insiders and investors, and as a consequence 
decreases the CE. They developed proxies for the information asymmetry component 
of the CE using the bid-ask spreads; trading volumes of share prices; and share price 
volatility. 
 
Consistent with their expectations, Leuz & Verrecchia (2000) found significant lower 
bid-ask spreads and higher trading volumes for a sample of German firms that 
switched from German GAAP to international reporting standards (IFRS or US 
GAAP) as compared to a sample of German firms that continued to report under the 
German GAAP (their full sample consists of 102 German firms). These findings 
support the argument that increased disclosure benefits firms by decreasing the 
information asymmetry component of the CE. However, results with respect to share 
price volatility indicate none economic benefit for firms. Finally, the differences in 
economic benefits between firms that report under IFRS and firms that report under 
US GAAP are found to be small and insignificant. This last finding is consistent with 
the study of Leuz (2003) which examined the differences in economic consequences 
between adopting the IFRS or the US GAAP for a sample of firms in the German 
New Market.   
 
Cuijpers & Buijink (2005) examined 114 non-financial EU firms that voluntarily 
adopted IFRS or the US GAAP. They implemented only one estimate of the CE that 
derived from Easton et al. (2002). Their analysis indicates that firms following 
IFRS/US GAAP exhibit higher CE than a comparable sample of firms that reported 
 124
under national GAAP. The comparable sample was selected on a firm-by-firm basis 
in order to match the risk characteristics and the country origination of the IFRS/US 
GAAP firms. Thus, Cuijpers & Buijink (2005) using a matched sample design control 
for country origination and for specific risk characteristics, such as beta, size 
(measured as the natural logarithm of market capitalisation), and the likelihood of a 
firm to have adopted the IFRS/US GAAP. Cuijpers & Buijink (2005) provided two 
explanations for the higher CE of the IFRS/US GAAP firms: i) either that firms need 
time to familiarize themselves with the IFRS/US GAAP, or ii) investors need time to 
understand better and interpret correctly the financial results. They tested the later 
statement by separating the sample into two groups of ‘early’ and ‘late’ adopters. 
Again the results do not support a lower CE for IFRS/US GAAP firms. However, the 
differences in the CE between the IFRS/US GAAP firms and the national GAAP 
firms for ‘early’ adopters were smaller. 
 
The findings of Cuijpers & Buijink (2005) are in conformity with those of Daske 
(2006). Using a sample of 735 German firms, Daske (2006) examines whether the 
voluntary adoption of globally recognised accounting standards, such as the IFRS and 
the US GAAP, is related to a decrease in CE for the period 1993-2002. His full 
sample consists of 24,359 monthly observations of German firms that use IFRS 
(4,567 observations), US GAAP (3,542 observations), and German GAAP (16,250 
observations). 
 
Daske (2006), in order to derive estimates for the CE, used the Gebhardt et al. (2001) 
model and the Gode & Mohanram (2003) model which are an implementation of the 
RIVM and the Ohlson & Juettner (2005) model, respectively. These two models 
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require subjective assumptions regarding the long-term growth of earnings that may 
add bias to CE estimations (see, Chapter 7, Section 7.3.1). Thus, Daske (2006) also 
calculated the CE by simultaneously estimating the CE and the growth of earnings 
using Easton et al. (2002) and Easton (2004) models. However, the simultaneous 
estimation of the CE can be applied only at a portfolio level and not at an individual 
firm level. 
 
The descriptive statistics of Daske (2006) indicate that the CE is higher for firms that 
report under IFRS and the US GAAP than for firms that report under German GAAP. 
These results apply for the full sample (24,359 observations) as well as for firms that 
switched from German GAAP to IFRS/US GAAP within the sample’s period. 
Similarly, the results from the multivariate regression models indicate that firms 
reporting under IFRS (or the US GAAP) hold on average higher CE than firms 
reporting under German GAAP. This is evidenced by the positive coefficient of a 
dummy variable that takes the value of one for firms that follow IFRS (or the US 
GAAP) and the value of zero otherwise (i.e. firms that follow German GAAP). 
However, this dummy variable is not found to be significant under all model 
specifications (e.g. using the Gode & Mohanram (2003) model to estimate CE). 
 
Finally, Daske (2006) performed a time-series test. Under this test he examined the 
CE for a maximum period of three years before and three after German firms have 
switched from German GAAP to IFRS/US GAAP. He found again that the CE has 
increased when German firms switched from national accounting standards to 
globally accepted accounting standards (e.g., IFRS and US GAAP).   
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Another study on the voluntary adoption of IFRS (and the US GAAP) is that of 
Dargenidou et al. (2006). They examined the economic consequences on the CE for a 
sample of firms from 16 European countries (EU countries and Switzerland and 
Norway) that switched from national accounting standards to either IFRS or US 
GAAP. Dargenidou et al. (2006) estimated the CE using one equity valuation model, 
the Ohlson & Juettner (2005) model for the period 1995 to 2004. Their results 
indicate that the CE has increased for firms that switched from national accounting 
standards to the IFRS/US GAAP. This result is in conformity with the findings of 
Daske (2006) above that also reported an increased CE for a sample of German firms 
that were reporting under globally accepted accounting standards (i.e. IFRS and US 
GAAP). However, Dargenidou et al. (2006) found that the increase in the CE is 
smaller for larger firms with already increased disclosure.  
 
Daske et al. (2007) used a large sample from 24 countries around the world (e.g., 
Hungary, Switzerland, Italy, Germany, China) to examine the economic 
consequences of the adoption of IFRS by firms that voluntarily adopted the standards 
in 1988-2004. The valuation models used to estimate the CE are the Claus & Thomas 
(2001) model, Gebhardt et al. (2001) model, Ohlson & Juettner (2005) model, and the 
Easton (2004) model. Overall, they find little evidence that the adoption of IFRS 
reduce CE or increase liquidity. In additional tests, they split the sample into ‘serious’ 
adopters (i.e., firms that voluntarily adopted IFRS as a commitment to greater 
transparency) and ‘label’ adopters (i.e., firms that voluntarily adopted IFRS as a label 
without making serious changes to their reporting policies). Under this analysis, their 
results indicate that the CE and the liquidity for ‘serious’ adopter firms have been 
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decreased and increased, respectively. In contrast, they do not provide any evidence 
for the ‘label’ adopters.    
 
Finally, Christensen et al. (2007) examined the economic consequences of the likely 
adoption of IFRS by a sample of UK firms before they become mandatory in 2005. 
UK legislation precluded the use of IFRS before the mandatory adoption date. Thus, 
Christensen et al. (2007) based on the German experience, where some firms had 
adopted voluntarily the IFRS before they became mandatory, they constructed a 
counter-factual proxy for the probability that the UK firms would have adopted IFRS 
voluntarily if they had been permitted to do so. 
 
Christensen et al. (2007) tested the economic consequences in two ways: First, they 
implemented an ‘event-study’ based on announcements (i.e. events) that were in 
favour (or not in favour) of mandating IFRS in the UK. Second, they examined the 
long-term changes in UK firms’ CE between a period where the mandatory adoption 
of IFRS was not certain (January 1996 – December 1998, the pre-announcement 
period) and a period where the mandatory adoption of IFRS was certain (September 
2001 – October 2004, the post announcement period). With respect to the ‘event 
study’, findings reveal that the counter-factual proxy for UK firms (i.e. firms that 
were more likely to have voluntarily adopted the IFRS) is positively (negatively) 
related to the reactions of share prices to favourable (unfavourable) events of 
mandating IFRS. Regarding the second test, results indicate that the CE has increased 
from the pre-announcement period to the post announcement period. However, 
Christensen et al. (2007) found that the counter-factual proxy is inversely related to 
changes in CE. This last finding indicates that UK firms that were more likely to have 
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adopted the IFRS, if they were permitted, experienced lower increases in the CE 
which is translated in greater benefits for these firms. Christensen et al. (2007) 
estimated the CE using the Gode & Mohanram (2003) and the Easton (2004) model 
(see, Chapter 7).         
 
5.2.2.2 Mandatory disclosures of IFRS 
This section analyses recent studies that examine the economic consequences of the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS. As a rule, these studies implement empirical models 
which regress the CE estimates on a dummy variable which takes the value of one for 
periods after the mandatory adoption of IFRS and zero for periods prior to the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS. 
 
The first study under this category is that of Lee et al. (2008) that used a maximum 
sample of 18,900 non-financial firm-year observations from 17 European countries. 
They estimate an implied CE using the Ohlson & Juettner (2005) model and the 
Easton (2004) model in unadjusted and adjusted forms. The unadjusted CE is derived 
directly from the valuation formulae of the Ohlson & Juettner (2005) model and the 
Easton (2004) model. The adjusted CE is the residuals from the regression of the 
unadjusted CE on company-specific characteristics that are found in the literature to 
be correlated with the CE19. Therefore, the adjusted CE includes only the portion of 
the unadjusted CE that it is not affected by the changes in the company-specific 
characteristics. 
 
                                                 
19 The company-specific characteristic used in the regression to derive the adjusted CE are: the log of 
market value, the book-to-market ratio, the debt-to-equity ratio, sales growth, R&D expenses, % of 
closely held shares of the company, and years dummy variables.  
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The authors control for the institutional environment of the different countries after 
considering two competing theories which relate to the benefits of mandatory 
adoption of high quality accounting standards, such as IFRS. The first ‘school of 
thought’ suggests that accounting standards determine accounting quality. 
Consequently the benefits relating to the adoption of high quality accounting 
standards, such as IFRS, will be greater for countries with previously low quality 
national accounting standards, such as Portugal. This school of thought is referred to 
as the pro-standard school. The second ‘school of thought’ suggests that as long as 
IFRS are developed as equity-based standards and not as debt-oriented standards, the 
benefits from their adoption should be more obvious in equity-based economies, such 
as the UK and Ireland than in debt-based economies such as Germany. Moreover, 
preparers’ incentives to use discretion techniques when applying IFRS will be lower 
for equity-based economies, since the benefits of compliance will be higher for these 
firms. Hence, the second ‘school of thought’ suggests that both the institutional 
context and preparer’s incentives determine the accounting quality. They refer to this 
‘school of thought’ as the pro-incentive school. 
 
On the basis of the above arguments Lee et al. (2008) classify the European countries 
into high financial reporting incentive and low financial reporting incentive countries. 
They base their classification on Leuz et al (2003). They use five institutional 
characteristics to each of which they give a score of one: outsider rights (based on La 
Porta et al., 1998), the importance of the equity market (La Porta et al., 1997), 
ownership concentration (La Porta et al., 1998), disclosure quality (based on, La Porta 
et al., 1998), and earnings management (Leuz et al., 2003). Thus, countries that have 
a score of five (only the UK falls into this category) are regarded as the countries with 
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the highest financial reporting incentives, and those with a score of zero (such as 
Austria, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, and the Netherlands) as the ones with the 
lowest incentives. 
 
In addition, they control for a number of variables which are considered as 
explanatory of a firm’s CE, (i.e., market value, book-to-market ratio, debt-to-equity 
ratio, sales growth, R&D expenses, % of closely held shares of the company, and 
years dummy variables).  
 
Lee et al. (2008) report that their results provide support to the pro-incentive ‘school 
of thought’ that firms in high financial reporting incentive countries (i.e. the U.K.) 
experience lower CE after the mandatory adoption of IFRS than firms in countries 
with low financial reporting incentives. The lower CE for UK firms is surprising 
given the fact that UK GAAP and IFRS could be seen as equivalent in terms of 
quality. Further analysis of Lee et al. (2008) revealed that only the UK firms with 
greater demand for foreign capital (as measured by the annual growth in foreign to 
total revenue) experienced the lower CE. This finding implies that the combination of 
equity-based economies (such as the UK), higher disclosure incentives and greater 
demand for foreign capital leads to a reduction in CE due to cross-border 
comparability following the adoption of IFRS. Such observation does not hold for the 
other European countries. 
 
The second study, Daske et al. (2008), examined the economic consequences of the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS using a world-wide sample of firms from 26 countries. 
The study covered the period 2001 – 2005. However, a shorter period is used in the 
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univariate analysis (2004 – 2005, see below). Their objective was to test whether the 
adoption of IFRS results in economic benefits for firms, in the form of: 
i) increased liquidity; proxied by zero returns, price impact, total trading costs, and 
bid-ask spreads. 
ii) lower CE; calculated using the average of four CE methods derived by Claus & 
Thomas (2001), Gebhardt et al., (2001), Ohlson & Juettner (2005), and Easton (2004). 
iii) increased market valuation; measured by Tobin’s q which is defined as (Total 
Assets – Book Value of Equity + Market Value of Equity)/Total Assets. 
 
Daske’s et al. (2008) analysis involved a univariate comparison of the CE, liquidity, 
and the market valuation between a sample of firms that required to adopt IFRS in 
2005 (the mandatory group) and a sample of firms that were not reporting under IFRS 
(the benchmark group) during the period 2004 – 2005. The number of observations 
differs as to which dependent variable is used. For example, the number of 
observations for the CE is 688 observations for the mandatory group and 599 
observations for the benchmark group. Thus, comparing the changes in the liquidity, 
the CE, and the market valuation between 2004 and 2005 (a year before the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS and a year after) they found that liquidity increased 
more for the mandatory group (IFRS adopters) than the benchmark group (non-IFRS 
adopters) which indicates that the adoption of IFRS results in more economic benefits. 
In contrast, results on CE indicate that the mandatory group experienced a greater 
increase in the CE than the benchmark group. This finding does not support the 
argument that increased disclosure resulted by the IFRS, decreases information 
asymmetries and as a consequence the CE. Results on market valuation reveal that the 
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benchmark group had more economic benefits (i.e. market valuation increased) than 
the mandatory group. 
  
Daske et al. (2008) also test three separate regression models, one for each of the 
economic benefits presented above: CE, liquidity, and market valuation. These three 
economic benefits constitute the dependent variables. The independent variables 
include a series of dummy variables (i.e. binary variables) such mandatory adopters: 
firms that mandatory adopted IFRS, and voluntary adopters (early and late voluntary): 
firms that voluntarily adopted IFRS. Daske et al. (2008) also included the interaction 
terms between these dummy variables. Apart from dummy variables, they controlled 
also for industry-year-fixed effects, US cross-listing, US GAAP reporting, being a 
member of a major stock index, firm size, financial leverage, the risk-free rate, return 
variability, and forecast bias. The results of the regression tests indicate that the 
market liquidity increased for all firms reporting under IFRS. In particular, firms that 
mandatory adopted IFRS experienced the smallest increase in liquidity as compared 
to firms that voluntarily adopted the IFRS where they experienced greater increase. 
Results with respect to the CE are in conformity with the findings in the difference-
in-difference analysis, the univariate analysis (see previous paragraph). The CE 
increased for firms that mandatory adopted the IFRS. Daske et al. (2008) attributed 
this increase to the anticipation effect: investors given the assumption that IFRS 
reduce CE, they might have assigned a lower CE to discount the expected earnings, 
quite before the date where the IFRS became mandatory in 2005. Hence, they 
specified the regression model in order to account for the anticipation effect. In 
particular, Daske et al. (2008) excluded the observations immediately before the IFRS 
adoption date (observations of 2004) and in a separate model they assumed as the 
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mandatory date the year before the official mandatory adoption (i.e. 2004 instead of 
2005). Under these two models, the CE of the mandatory adopters decreased. With 
respect to voluntary adopters, findings are found to be similar but stronger than the 
findings of the mandatory adopters above. Findings regarding market valuation 
indicate that mandatory firms do not experience economic benefits: market valuation 
decreased for firms that reported under IFRS. Similar to the CE, when researchers 
controlled for the anticipation effect the market valuation is found to be increased. 
 
Given the cross-country sample of Daske et al. (2008), it is likely that institutional 
differences between countries have affected the magnitude of the economic 
consequences of the mandatory adoption of IFRS. Thus, they further include dummy 
variables to capture the effect of institutional differences. They found that the 
liquidity increases only for firms domiciled in countries with strong enforcement 
rules as well as for firms domiciled in EU countries where governments forced 
additional rules, simultaneously with the IFRS rules, such as corporate governance 
enforcement and auditors oversight. Moreover, liquidity increases for firms that 
domiciled in countries that the national accounting standards differ significantly from 
the IFRS. However, Daske et al. (2008) discuss (without reporting the results) that 
findings for market valuation are consistent with the liquidity results (e.g. firms 
domiciled in strong enforcement countries experienced greater increase in market 
valuation). Finally, results with respect to the CE are weak. Thus, Daske et al. (2008) 
only found the CE to be decreased when they control for the anticipation effect. In all 
other circumstances the CE increased for mandatory adopters.    
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The third study relating to the mandatory adoption of IFRS is that of Li (2010). The 
objective of this study is to examine whether there is a significant reduction in CE 
after the mandatory adoption of IFRS in 2005. Her research includes 1,084 firms 
from 18 EU countries and covers the period from 1995 – 2006. Similar to Daske et al. 
(2008), she measures the CE by using the average of four CE methods: the Claus & 
Thomas (2001), the Gebhardt et al. (2001), the Ohlson & Juettner (2005), and the 
Easton (2004) method. This average of the CE constitutes the dependent variable of 
her study. The independent variables of primary interest were two dummy variables; 
the first controlled for voluntary adopters and the second for pre-IFRS and the post-
IFRS period. The other independent variables were control variables that are 
commonly used in the CE literature, e.g., U.S. cross-listing, country-specific inflation 
rates, firm size, return variability, financial leverage, and dummy variables for 
industry and country fixed-effects. 
 
Li’s (2010) findings indicate that the CE has decreased significantly for mandatory 
adopters after the mandatory adoption of IFRS in 2005 by 47 basis points. Contrary to 
Daske et al. (2008), she failed to find a significant decrease in the CE for the 
voluntary adopters after 2005. The CE was significantly higher for mandatory 
adopters than for voluntary adopters prior to 2005. But, this difference disappeared 
after the mandatory adoption of IFRS in 2005. This finding is consistent with the 
argument that the adoption of IFRS will induce convergence of financial reporting 
between firms in the EU. 
 
The view that economic benefits for firms are higher in countries with strong 
enforcement rules is also supported by Li (2010). Similar to Daske et al. (2008), she 
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run an additional model which included an interaction dummy variable that takes the 
value of one if a firm is domiciled in strong enforcement rule countries and the value 
of zero if a firm is domiciled in weak enforcement rule countries. The findings reveal 
that the reduction in the CE for mandatory adopters is only significant for firms 
domiciled in countries with strong enforcement rules. In contrast, firms domiciled in 
weak enforcement rule countries did not experience a significant change in their CE. 
Li (2010) also provides evidence on whether increased disclosure and information 
comparability were responsible for the reduction in the CE. She operationalised 
increased disclosure by the number of additional disclosures the IFRS require 
(compared to national accounting standards), identified by Nobes (2001). She also 
used as a proxy for increased disclosure the number of analysts multiplied by firm 
size in 2004, the year before the mandatory adoption of IFRS. Information 
comparability is measured by the number of inconsistencies between the IFRS and 
the national accounting standards (Nobes, 2001). Her findings indicate that increased 
disclosure and increased comparability are two important attributes of the reduction 
in the CE due to the adoption of IFRS. 
 
Finally, Li (2010) implemented a number of additional tests. Similar to Leuz & 
Verrecchia (2000), her first test examines whether the information asymmetry 
(measured by the bid-ask spread) reduced after the adoption of IFRS. For this 
purposed, she regressed the natural logarithm of the bid-ask spread to the mandatory 
dummy variable (mandatory vs. voluntary disclosers), the post-adoption dummy 
variable, and their interaction. Her model also controlled for the U.S. cross-listing, the 
natural logarithm of market value, return variability, share turnover, and industry and 
country fixed effects. The results indicate that they are only significant in the 10% 
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significance level which provides weak support that the information asymmetry 
decreased. Her second model excluded countries with no voluntary adopters. Under 
this model, findings support the primary findings that the CE decreased. Her third and 
final model controlled for the self-selection bias. She argues that the differences in the 
results between the voluntary and mandatory adopters could be attributed to 
heterogeneities between the two groups. To test this argument, Li (2010) 
implemented a two-stage regression procedure. In the first stage she estimated a 
probit model which regressed an indicator variable that takes the value of one for 
voluntary adopters and the value of zero for mandatory adopters on a number of 
factors that increase the likelihood for a firm to have adopted the IFRS before the 
mandatory adoption. These factors are firm size, U.S. cross-listing, earnings growth, 
return-on-assets (ROA), country’s legal origin, and industry and year fixed effect. In 
the second stage, Li (2010) included the inverse Mills Ratio from the first stage as an 
additional variable in her primary model. The primary results remain unchanged, i.e., 
the CE decreased. However, Li (2010) argues that the method that controls for the 
self-selection bias using an instrumental variable is problematic (Larcker & Rusticus, 
2010).          
 
Overall, the results from the mandatory IFRS literature indicate that the adoption of 
IFRS benefits firms either by increasing liquidity (Daske et al., 2008) or by 
decreasing the CE (Lee et al., 2008, and Li, 2010) (see, Table 5.2). However, the 
early studies, undertaken prior to the mandatory adoption of IFRS and used samples 
of firms that voluntarily adopted IFRS, reported conflicting results. Some reported 
that the CE of such firms has increased significantly (see, Daske, 2006; Cuijpers & 
Buijink, 2005; and, Dargenidou et al., 2006), whilst others reported that they 
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experienced a reduction in their CE (see, Daske et al., 2007; and, Leuz & Verrecchia, 
2000). Table 5.2 summarises the IFRS literature discussed above. The four most 
common methods in the literature to estimate CE are the Gebhardt et al. (2001); the 
Claus & Thomas (2001); the Gode & Mohanram (2003) (which is the Ohlson & 
Juenttner, 2005 model); and the Easton (2004). Hence, these four studies are also 
implemented by this thesis to derive estimates for the CE (see, Chapter 7). 
  
 Table 5.2 
Summary of the IFRS literature 
 
Studies Sample Method used for CE Impact on CE 
Decrease (D) / 
 Increase (I)
1 
Voluntary studies    
Leuz & Verrecchia (2000) German firms 
They used proxies such as bid-
ask spreads, trading volumes, 
and share price volatility. 
D 
Cuijpers & Buijink (2005) 
Non-financial EU 
firms 
• Easton et al. (2002) I 
Daske (2006) German firms 
• Gebhardt et al. (2001) 
• Gode & Mohanram (2003) 
• Easton et al. (2002) 
• Easton (2004) 
I 
Dargenidou et al. (2006) European firms 
• Ohlson & Juettner (2005) 
I 
Daske et al. (2007) World-wide firms 
Average of: 
• Gebhardt et al. (2001)  
• Claus & Thomas (2001) 
• Ohlson & Juettner (2005) 
• Easton (2004) 
D 
Christensen et al. (2007) UK firms • Gode & Mohanram (2003) 
•  Easton (2004) 
D 
Mandatory studies    
Lee et al. (2008) European firms • Ohlson & Juettner (2005) 
• Easton (2004) 
D 
Daske et al. (2008) World-wide firms 
Average of: 
• Claus & Thomas (2001) 
• Gebhardt et al. (2001) 
•  Ohlson & Juettner (2005) 
• Easton (2004) 
D (when 
controlling for 
the anticipation 
effect) 
Li (2010) EU firms 
Average of: 
• Claus & Thomas (2001) 
• Gebhardt et al. (2001) 
•  Ohlson & Juettner (2005) 
• Easton (2004) 
D 
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Notes: 
1. This column indicates whether the study found a Decreased (D) or Increased (I) CE after the 
adoption of IFRS. However, due to the fact that some of the studies found mixed results, this 
column presents the outcomes of the primary findings. For more information see the analysis 
in the main text of the thesis.   
 
5.3 Conclusion 
The purpose of this Chapter is to review the empirical literature on the relationship 
between disclosure and CE. Given that one of the main objectives of this thesis is to 
examine whether the mandatory adoption of IFRS had an impact on the CE of 
European banks, the emphasis is on studies which test the relationship between the 
adoption of IFRS (either voluntarily or mandatory) and CE.  
 
The non-IFRS studies examine whether increased disclosure results in lower CE. 
Early evidence finds a negative correlation between CE proxies, such as CAPM’s 
beta, and increased disclosure (see, Dhaliwal, 1979; and, Dhaliwal et al., 1979). Later 
studies provide direct evidence by approximating the CE using equity valuation 
models (Botosan, 1997; Richardson & Welker, 2001; and, Botosan & Plumlee, 2002). 
Botosan (1997) calculated the CE as the model-implied required rate of return derived 
by the RIVM. She found that the CE is lower for a sample of US firms that disclose 
more. However, this finding holds only for firms with low analyst following. Similar 
results are provided by Richardson & Welker (2001) using a sample of Canadian 
firms. Botosan & Plumlee (2002) tested the type of disclosures. Their findings 
suggest that only increased annual report disclosures reduce CE, whilst other 
disclosures, such as quarterly disclosures, increase the CE through greater share price 
volatility. Hail (2002) found that the CE is lower for a sample of Swiss firms with 
increased levels of disclosure and Francis et al. (2008) highlighted the importance of 
controlling for earnings quality when examining the relationship between increased 
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disclosure and CE. Finally, Poshakwale & Coutris (2005), using a sample of world-
wide banks, found that the CE is lower for banks with increased disclosure. 
 
The second part of the review relates to the IFRS literature, and therefore, is directly 
related to the empirical part of this thesis. Leuz & Verrecchia (2000) examined the 
impact of the voluntary adoption of IFRS or US GAAP by a sample of German firms 
on the information asymmetry component of CE. They found that these firms 
experienced lower bid-ask spreads and higher trading volumes which implies greater 
economic benefits for these firms. Other studies did not provide support for the 
proposition that firms which voluntarily adopted IFRS experience a reduction in their 
CE (see, Cuijpers & Buijink, 2005; Daske, 2006; and, Dargenidou et al., 2006). They 
found instead that the CE has increased. However, Dargenidou et al. (2006) found 
that this result is more prominent for smaller firms, with already lower disclosures, 
than for larger firms. This implies that smaller firms face higher adoption costs to 
comply with increased disclosure required by IFRS. In another study, Daske et al. 
(2007) found that only ‘serious’ voluntary adopters experience more economic 
benefits (i.e. higher volatility and lower CE) than ‘label’ voluntary adopters. 
 
Finally, recent evidence from the mandatory adoption of IFRS supports the notion 
that high quality accounting standards reduce uncertainty and as a consequence the 
CE. Lee et al. (2008) found that firms from high financial incentive countries (e.g. the 
UK) experience greater reduction in their CE than firms from low financial incentive 
countries, (e.g. Austria, Greece, and Italy). This evidence is surprising given the fact 
that the UK GAAP is perceived as similar to the IFRS. In another study, taking 
account the anticipation effect, Daske et al. (2008) report significant economic 
 140
benefits for firms that mandatorily have adopted the IFRS, namely: higher liquidity, 
lower CE, and higher valuation. Contrary to Lee et al. (2008), Daske et al. (2008) 
report more economic benefits for firms that are domiciled in countries where the 
differences between national accounting standards and the IFRS are significant. 
Furthermore, they document more economic benefits for firms that are domiciled in 
countries with strong enforcement rules than in countries with weak enforcement 
rules. This last finding is also supported by Li (2010), who used a large sample of EU 
firms. In addition, Li (2010) reported a decrease of 47 basis points for the CE of 
mandatory adopters after the adoption of IFRS in 2005. In contrast, she did not 
provide evidence that the CE also decreased for the voluntary adopters after 2005. 
 
Up to now, the value relevance and the CE literature have been reviewed in Chapter 4 
and 5, respectively. The next two chapters present the methodology of this thesis on 
the value relevance of fair value accounting and the economic consequences from the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS.         
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Chapter 6: Research Methodology on the Value Relevance 
 
6.1 Introduction  
This chapter develops the research methodology of the value relevance tests. The 
analysis distinguishes between the value relevance of fair value disclosures and the 
value relevance of derivatives’ fair value recognitions.  
 
The first research objective of the thesis is to provide further evidence on the 
relevance and reliability of fair value accounting using a cross-country sample (see, 
Chapter 1, Section 1.2). Prior studies provide evidence for the value relevance of fair 
value disclosures using US GAAP (Barth, 1994; Barth et al., 1996; Vankatachalam, 
1996). This thesis extends this literature by providing evidence from a sample of 
European commercial banks that report under IFRS. Moreover, given the cross-
country sample, the study also investigates whether institutional differences between 
countries affect the reliability of fair value estimates. In particular, it is examined 
whether the level of countries’ enforcement rule (strong vs. weak enforcement) gives 
the latitude to banks to manipulate fair value estimates. However, the need of each 
firm to manipulate fair values depends on some incentives. This study explores 
banks’ financial health as the incentive to manipulate fair value of loans (Barth et al., 
1996) and banks’ earnings variability as the incentive to manipulate fair value of 
derivatives (Barton, 2001). Countries’ enforcement rule is combined with these 
incentives to develop interaction terms in the empirical models.    
 
Value relevance research is based on valuation models that link accounting numbers 
to market values (Barth, 2000). For the purposes of this study, the value relevance of 
fair value disclosures is examined using the BSM analyzed in Chapter 3 (Section 
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3.2.1.6). This is consistent with previous studies (Barth et al., 1996). In contrast, the 
value relevance of derivatives’ fair value recognition is examined using the Ohlson 
(1995) model, similar to Wang et al. (2005). Other studies on derivatives used the 
BSM for their analysis (Venkatachalam, 1996; Ahmed et al., 2006). The decision to 
use the Ohlson (1995) model instead of the BSM as the primary model specification 
was based on high collinearity (over 99%) between two variables in the BSM, the 
aggregated fair values of financial assets and liabilities. However, results are also 
provided by a BSM for completeness.  
 
The Chapter is organised as follows: Section 6.2 discusses the hypotheses. Section 
6.3 develops the empirical models. Sample selection and data issues are presented in 
Section 6.4, and finally, Section 6.5 concludes. 
 
6.2 Development of Hypotheses 
6.2.1 Fair value disclosures 
Fair value accounting has been proposed as an alternative measurement system to 
historical cost accounting and has been used extensively by the IASB and the FASB 
in their accounting standards. For example, the IASB requires the use of fair values in 
measuring financial instruments (IAS 39), post-employment benefits (IAS 19), and 
tangible assets’ revaluations (IAS 16). However, the use of fair values in financial 
reporting did not found unanimous support in the financial and the academic 
community. Fair value estimates have been criticised that provide unreliable numbers, 
especially, when assets and liabilities are unique and their measurement is based on 
subjective assumptions. Thus, there is an argument in the accounting literature and 
practice regarding the merits and limitations of fair value accounting. 
 143
Advocates of fair value accounting argue that fair values are relevant as they provide 
more up-to-date information to users of financial statements than historical cost. They 
observe that the historical cost value of an asset becomes irrelevant sometimes even 
immediately after the first date of its recognition and thus is of little importance to 
investors. Ball (2006, p. 12) argues that, 
“the fundamental case in favour of fair value accounting seems obvious to most 
economists: fair value incorporates more information into the financial statements.” 
 
Other benefits of fair values are timeliness and comparability. Timeliness because 
changes in the economic conditions of assets and liabilities are reflected in the 
financial statements when they occur and comparability because fair value estimates 
are based on specific characteristics of an asset (or liability) and not on unique 
characteristics of an entity (Barth, 2006a; Barth, 2007; Penman, 2007).  The criticism 
of fair values is summarized by Barth (2007, p. 11) as follows: 
‘lack of a clear definition of fair value, lack of verifiability, the ability for 
management to affect fair value estimates, and the potential circularity of reflecting 
fair values in financial statements when the objective is to provide financial statement 
users with information to make economic decisions that include assessing the value of 
the equity’.  
 
Motivated by the argument above, this thesis aims to provide further evidence on the 
relevance and reliability of fair values incrementally to historical costs (or in the 
context of IAS 39, the amortized costs). The study uses a sample of European 
commercial banks for the first two years of the mandatory adoption of IFRS, the 2005 
and 2006. 
 
US studies support the view that fair value disclosures, for specific types of financial 
instruments, are quite relevant and reliable enough to be reflected in share prices 
incrementally to their historical costs. For example, Barth et al. (1996) examine the 
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value relevance of SFAS No. 107 and provide evidence for the relevance of fair value 
disclosures of loans. However, up to date, we do not have any evidence with respect 
to the value relevance of IAS 32 disclosures required by the IASB. 
 
Hence, the first research objective is directly related to the value relevance literature 
that examines the relevance and reliability of fair value measures. For the purposes of 
this thesis, value relevance is defined as to what extent fair value estimates are related 
to a measure of market value, such as the market value of equity or the differences 
between the market value and the book value of equity. The first research objective of 
this thesis is examined under Hypothesis H1 stated in the null form: 
H1: The IAS 32 fair value disclosures for financial instruments are not incrementally 
value relevant over and above their recognised amortised costs. 
 
The null hypothesis H1 is examined against the alternative hypothesis that IAS 32 fair 
value disclosures are value relevant incrementally to amortised costs. In order to test 
H1 two values of banks’ assets and liabilities are required, namely: the fair values and 
the amortized costs. IAS 39 requires the recognition of loans and advances, held-to-
maturity investments, deposit liabilities, and other debt to amortised cost, whilst IAS 
32 requires the disclosure of their fair values. Thus, for those four categories of 
financial instruments two values are available through the annual reports, the 
recognised amortized values (required under IAS 39) and the disclosed fair values 
(required under IAS 32). 
 
The explanatory power of the fair values of a bank’s financial instruments is likely to 
be related to the bank’s financial condition. Barth et al. (1996) report a higher 
coefficient for the fair value of loans of banks that have relatively higher capital 
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adequacy ratios. This may be due to the greater incentives that less healthy banks 
have to manipulate fair value estimates. Irrespective of these incentives, however, 
such banks’ ability to manipulate estimates depends to a great extent on the 
regulatory environment in which they operate. In general, firms in countries where 
the mechanisms for enforcing accounting standards are weak are more likely to abuse 
the discretion afforded by accounting rules and engage in earnings manipulation 
(Burgstahler et al., 2006). Therefore, banks domiciled in countries with weak legal 
enforcement of accounting rules will be more able to influence fair value estimates 
than banks domiciled in countries with strong legal enforcement. This argument leads 
to the second hypothesis: 
H2: The IAS 32 fair value disclosures of banks with low capital adequacy ratios in 
countries with weak enforcement of accounting rules are less value relevant than the 
disclosures of banks with high capital ratios in countries with strong enforcement of 
accounting rules. 
 
Given, the fact that loans are the most important asset in terms of book value (consist 
more than 50% of the total assets) and that the difference between the fair values and 
the book values of loans is the highest of all the differences between the fair values 
and the book values of the other financial instruments, H2 is examined only for the 
fair value estimates of loans (see also, Barth et al., 1996). 
 
6.2.2 Recognition of derivatives’ fair values 
Most European national accounting standards do not require the recognition or even 
the disclosure of derivative financial instruments. Thus, the values of derivatives 
under most national GAAP are hidden from the financial statements. On the other 
hand, the IFRS and specifically IAS 39 requires the recognition of all derivatives in 
fair values either as an asset if the derivative has a positive value or as a liability if the 
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derivative has a negative value. Furthermore, IAS 39 separates between trading 
derivatives and hedging derivatives. 
 
Under historical cost accounting, which is the standard measurement method of most 
national GAAP, derivatives had negligible or even zero cost upon initial recognition 
(Whittington, 2005, p. 139). In contrast, under fair value accounting, that both the 
IASB and the FASB have adopted, an estimate can be provided for the value of the 
contract which can either be recognised or disclosed in the financial statements. 
 
The Triennial Central Bank Survey (BIS, 2007) reveals that the OTC derivatives 
market was expanded to $516 trillion in notional amounts, an increase of 135% to the 
previous survey in 2004 (see Table 1 in Appendix E)20. The rapid development of 
derivatives market and the increasing use of derivatives by commercial banks make 
interesting the examination of the value relevance of derivatives’ fair values and 
notional amounts. 
 
The US literature on derivatives found relevant the disclosures of derivatives’ fair 
values in explaining share prices (Venkatachalam, 1996). In a later study, Ahmed et 
al. (2006) provide evidence that derivatives’ fair value recognition are value relevant, 
whilst derivatives’ disclosures are not. Although there is evidence in the US literature 
that supports the value relevance of derivatives’ fair values, evidence under the IFRS 
is not existed. Thus, the second test of value relevance deals with the examination of 
the relevance and reliability of recognised fair values of derivatives under the IFRS. 
 
                                                 
20 The Triennial Central Bank Survey is conducted by 54 central banks and monetary authorities and 
coordinated by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). 
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Commercial banks disclose also the notional amounts of derivatives (i.e. contractual 
amounts) which represent the reference amounts to calculate the cash flows of a 
derivative contract. These amounts are not being exchanged between the related 
parties and usually are much higher in value than the fair values. Ryan (2007) 
suggests that, 
‘although the notional amounts of derivatives usually far exceed their fair values, 
these amounts generally do indicate the risk transferred by derivatives’. 
 
Furthermore, the FASB argues in its SFAS No. 105 that the, 
‘notional principal amount of financial instruments… provides a useful basis for 
assessing the extent to which an entity has open or outstanding contracts’. 
 
Given that the two values of derivatives (the fair values and the notional amounts) 
may convey different kind of information to the market this study also examines the 
information content of fair values of derivatives incrementally to their notional 
amounts. Thus, two more hypotheses are examined in null form: 
 
H3 = The IAS 39 fair value recognitions of derivatives are not value relevant.  
 
 
H4 = The IAS 39 fair value recognitions of derivatives are not incrementally value 
relevant over and above their notional amounts. 
 
 Hypothesis H3 tests whether the recognition of derivatives in fair values (required 
under IAS 39) is reflected in share prices and hypothesis H4 examines the value 
relevance of derivatives’ fair value recognitions incrementally to their notional 
amounts. 
 
Similar to fair values of loans (discussed in the previous section), it is likely that 
managers may also have incentives to manipulate the fair values of derivatives. For 
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example, Barton (2001) provides evidence that firms use derivatives to smooth 
earnings. If this is also the case for the sample of this thesis then it is expected that 
derivatives’ fair values of banks with greater earnings volatility will be less value 
relevant than derivatives’ fair values of banks with lower earnings volatility. However, 
the ability of banks to manipulate fair values of derivatives is restricted by countries 
enforcement rules (weak versus strong enforcement rule countries).  Hence, a fifth 
hypothesis is examined: 
H5 = Fair values of derivatives’ recognition of banks with high earnings volatility in 
countries with weak enforcement rules are less value relevant than the fair values of  
derivatives’ recognition of banks with low earnings volatility in countries with strong 
enforcement rules. 
 
The next section discusses the primary model specifications and a number of 
alternative model specifications for robustness. 
 
6.3 Empirical Methodology 
This section is separated into two parts. The first part (Section 6.3.1) develops the 
empirical models that test the value relevance of fair value disclosures (e.g. banks’ 
disclosures on loans and advances, held-to-maturity investments, deposit liabilities, 
and other debt). The second part (Section 6.3.2) presents the empirical models that 
test the value relevance of derivatives’ fair value recognition.  
 
6.3.1 Fair value disclosures 
6.3.1.1 Primary model specification 
The methodology described below is based on the BSM which has been discussed 
extensively in Chapter 3. Value relevance studies usually develop a primary 
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specification model, which is expressed in price level, and alternative specification 
models, including a changes model. The same procedure is also followed by this 
thesis. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3 (Section 3.2.1.6), the BSM can be found in many versions 
depending on the purpose of the research. This study aims to examine the value 
relevance of fair value disclosures over and above their book values. Thus, Equation 
(3.16) is used to test Hypotheses H1 and H2. In particular, the differences between the 
fair values and book values of assets and liabilities in Equation (3.16) are substituted 
by the specific differences between the fair values and book values of: loans and 
advances (LNS); held-to-maturity investments (HTM); deposit liabilities (DEP); and 
other debt (DT). This model specification tests whether the disclosed fair values are 
value relevant incrementally to the amortized costs, and as a consequence are useful 
in determining market values. 
 
For all other financial instruments that IAS 39 requires recognition in fair values, 
namely: ‘financial assets and liabilities at fair value through profit or loss’, ‘available-
for-sale assets’, and ‘hedging derivatives’ the empirical model (6.1) below implicitly 
assumes that the differences between their fair values and book values are zero. The 
fact that banks recognise these financial instruments at fair value in the balance sheet, 
results in fair values coincide with book values. 
 
Apart from financial instruments, banks also have other assets and liabilities that are 
recognised at historical cost, such as property, plant and equipment, and deferred 
taxes. The definition of the BSM model in Chapter 3 requires the inclusion of all 
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assets and liabilities in the model. Failing to incorporate these elements in the model 
can bias the estimated coefficients of the primary variables of interest. Thus, the book 
value of these assets and liabilities are aggregated into two separate variables, the 
NON39AS and the NON39LI. The primary model specification is defined as follows: 
MBit = a0 + a1 LNSit + a2 HTMit + a3 DEPit + a4 DTit +    
+  a5 NON39ASit + a6 NON39LIit + εit       (6.1) 
Where, i and t refer to a specific commercial bank at a specific point in time, 
respectively. According to the literature, in perfect and complete markets the 
theoretical values of the coefficients in Equation (6.1) are 1 and -1 for assets and 
liabilities, respectively and the theoretical values for the intercept and the error term 
are zero (Landsman, 1986). In more realistic settings the estimated coefficients of 
assets and liabilities are likely to differ from their theoretical values. Therefore, the 
empirical model (Equation 6.1) provides evidence on whether the estimated 
coefficients of each asset and liability is statistically different from zero and have the 
expected signs, positive for assets and negative for liabilities. The results are from a 
two-tailed test when no sign is predicted for the coefficients of variables and from a 
one-tailed test when the sign is predicted. 
 
Control variables 
As it is, Equation (6.1) suffers from correlated omitted variables, unless it controls for 
factors that according to the literature can explain significantly the market values. 
These can be grouped into two categories. First, a group of potential competitors 
variables to the IAS 39 variables, such as the interest rate risk (denoted as GAP), the 
default risk (NPL), and the core deposit intangible (CORE). Second, a group of non-
IAS 39 variables, such as the notional amounts of derivatives (NADER) and the 
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credit-related off-balance sheet items (OFF). The detailed definition and justification 
of the control variables is discussed below. 
 
Potential competitors to IAS 39 
i) Interest rate risk 
Interest rate risk is probably the most important risk of banks. However, it does not 
affects all banks in the same way as they hold different mixes of rate-sensitive assets 
and liabilities (Casu et al., 2006, p. 262). 
 
Ryan (2007) separates between two interest rate risks, namely: variability in value 
and variability in cash flows. Variability in value arises when future cash flows of a 
financial instrument do not vary in perfect proportion with interest rate changes. 
Thus the values of fixed-rate assets are more vulnerable to interest rate changes than 
the values of floating-rate assets. In contrast, variability in cash flows implies that 
fixed-rate assets have zero interest rate risk as opposed to floating-rate assets. Hence, 
no matter how the interest rate risk is conceptualized, banks are vulnerable to the 
unexpected changes of interest rates, affecting both the values and the expected cash 
flows of their financial instruments. 
  
Previous studies examined the relationship between interest rate changes and price 
returns (see Flannery & James, 1984a, 1984b). These studies provide evidence that 
banks’ interest rate sensitivity of share prices is positively related to the nominal 
maturities of net assets, suggesting the importance of maturity mismatch of assets 
and liabilities in the valuation of banks. This thesis operationalizes the interest rate 
risk as the maturity gap of interest-sensitive assets and interest-sensitive liabilities 
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(GAP). Specifically, the variable of interest rate risk is defined as the difference 
between the interest-sensitive assets (ISAS) and the interest-sensitive liabilities 
(ISLI). Interest-sensitive assets are financial assets that mature or reprised in more 
than a year, and interest-sensitive liabilities are financial liabilities that mature or 
reprised in more than a year. Financial assets and liabilities with maturities over a 
year are regarded as the most sensitive to interest rate changes. 
  
Contrary to this thesis, Barth et al. (1996) include two variables in order to control for 
the interest rate risk, the ISAS and ISLI. This thesis considers a single variable (GAP) 
for two reasons: i) banks manage their interest rate risk based on the maturity 
mismatch of interest-sensitive assets and liabilities over specific time-horizons. Casu 
et al. (2006) suggest that, 
‘Interest rate risk derives from mismatching the maturities of assets and liabilities, as 
part of a bank asset transformation function’. 
 
ii) The interpretation of a single variable (GAP) is more straightforward than the 
interpretation of two separate variables (ISAS and ISLI). For the sample of this thesis 
European commercial banks have on average positive maturity gaps with interest-
sensitive assets exceeding interest-sensitive liabilities (i.e. ISAS – ISLI > 0). Thus, 
European commercial banks for the period of the thesis (2005 and 2006) are ‘asset 
sensitive’. Adopting the variability in value concept of interest rate risk (Ryan, 2007, 
p. 64-66), an increase in interest rates should have a inverse impact on the value of 
banks’ assets. During the period of the study, interest rates were in upward trend (see, 
Figure 6.1). Figure 6.1 presents the bond yields of three key European 10-years 
government bonds that have positive correlations with interest rate changes. The 
positive maturity gap of European commercial banks and the upward trend in interest 
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rates results in expecting a negative sign for the proxy variable of interest rate risk 
(GAP).  
Figure 6.1 
Bond yields of key European 10-years government bonds 
 
 
ii) Default risk 
Default risk is the other important risk of banks. It arises when a counterparty of a 
bank defaults and thus it can not fulfil its obligations. A measure of default risk is the 
non-performing loans of banks which are loans that do not perform according to their 
contractual terms (Beaver et al., 1989). This, however, does not constitute these loans 
necessarily impaired (Casu et al., 2006). 
 
A substantial number of banks in the sample disclose the amount of non-performing 
loans, and thus this variable is used to control for banks’ default risk. Beaver et al. 
(1989) argue that non-performing loans provide incremental information content to 
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that of loan loss allowance, and thus investors are better-off having this information 
in the notes of the financial statements. They conclude that non-performing loans 
capture the default risk of financial institutions and predict a negative effect on their 
market values. Thus, similar to other studies (Barth et al., 1996; Venkatachalam, 1996) 
the variable of non-performing loans (NPL) is also added to Equation (6.1) to control 
for the default risk. Based on the discussion above a negative sign is predicted for the 
NPL. 
 
iii) Core deposit intangibles 
Core deposits are an important intangible asset of banks. Demand deposits and saving 
accounts even though they are payable on demand, they tend to be stable over time, 
usually over many years, as deposit withdrawals are replaced by new deposits. Core 
deposits constitute an intangible asset for banks because they represent customers’ 
loyalty. Flannery & James (1984b) provide evidence that the effective maturities of 
the liabilities with a demand feature or a short notice (e.g., demand deposits, saving 
accounts, and small denomination time deposits) are comparable to those of long-
term items, suggesting a core deposit behavior for these liabilities. Banks usually pay 
zero or a negligible interest rate on these deposits that constitutes a cheap finance for 
banks usually available to them for many years.  
 
Ryan (2007, p. 61) argues that depositors are willing to preserve their funds in 
deposits if they believe that the economy will continue to be steady and if their 
desirability to invest in riskier alternative investments is low. Deposit insurance 
schemes are also another important reason for depositors to continue keeping their 
funds in deposits. The US was the first country to establish such a scheme through an 
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independent body the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) created in 1934 
after the massive bank failures of 1930-1933. The FDIC insures an amount of up to 
$100,000 per depositor per insured bank which constitutes the basic insurance 
amount21. EU does not have a single deposit insurance body to guarantee deposits. 
Directive 94/19/EEC of European Commission requires each EU member state to 
establish its own deposit insurance scheme in order to protect depositors from bank 
failures. This Directive requires a minimum guarantee level of €20,000. On average, 
the 27 EU member states (excluding Bulgaria and Romania) guarantee a minimum of 
€27,036 as of in 200422. 
 
Core deposits are unobservable to researchers and thus a proxy variable is needed. 
Barth et al. (1996) based on the study of Flannery & James (1984b) define core 
deposits as domestic deposits minus time deposits in excess of $100,000. Barth et al. 
argue that foreign deposits are not insured by the FDIC and thus were excluded from 
core deposits’ calculations. They also use an alternative proxy defined as domestic 
deposits minus time deposits, without affecting the results. 
 
This study proxies core deposits as deposits with no stated maturities (CORE) (e.g., 
demand deposits, current accounts, savings accounts, and generally deposits with a 
demand feature). Due to data availability for European banks on account sizes 
breakdown it was not possible to exclude time deposits over a specific amount, as it is 
the case of Barth et al. (1996). Furthermore, the fact that EU member-states do not 
have consistent deposit insurance schemes and that every member-state excludes 
                                                 
21 Information regarding the FDIC is retrieved via its website, Available from http://www.fdic.gov/ 
[Accessed 24 October 2008]. 
22 Data regarding minimum deposit guarantees in the EU are retrieved from the “Report on the 
minimum guarantee level of Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive 94/19/EC”. Available from 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/guarantee/report_en.pdf [Accessed 24 October 2008].   
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different depositors from the deposit insurance scheme, foreign deposits are not 
excluded from the calculations of core deposits. For example under the French 
deposit insurance scheme foreign deposits are covered (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2005). 
The discussion above indicates a positive sign for the core deposit variable (CORE). 
 
Non-IAS 39 variables 
iv) Notional amounts of derivatives  
A number of previous studies found that the notional amounts of derivatives explain 
significantly market values. In particular, Riffe (1997) reports a positive relation 
between the notional amounts of market-related instruments and market value of 
equity, whilst Venkatachalam (1996) and Eccher et al. (1996) report a negative 
relation. These opposite results can be attributed to the way investors interpret 
notional amounts. In Riffe’s (1997) study, investors perceive notional amounts as an 
indicator of future benefits (net expected claims of derivative contracts). In 
Venkatachalam (1996) study, investors value more the risk related to the magnitude 
of the involvement of banks in derivative contracts. The fact that investors do not 
interpret consistently the notional amounts of derivatives, the sing of this variable 
(NADER) is not predicted. 
 
v) Credit-related off-balance sheet instruments 
Banks apart from engaging in derivative contracts, they also involve in credit-related 
instruments, such as commitment to extent credits, guarantees, and other contingent 
liabilities. With loan commitments banks agree to lend funds to their customers and 
receive a commitment fee on undrawn amounts (see Fabozzi, 2002). Other credit-
related instruments are standbys and commercial letters where banks guarantee to pay 
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the underlying amount in behalf of their costumers in case of a default. Thus, banks 
expect to have a cash inflow from credit-related instruments which is the interest 
earned on the contractual notional amount, and a cash outflow in case one or more of 
their customers default. The sign of the coefficient of credit-related instruments will 
depend on whether the present value of the expected cash inflows is greater than the 
present value of the potential cash outflows (Riffe, 1997). Previous studies found that 
the credit-related instruments are positively related to share prices (Riffe, 1997). The 
same results are also provided by Eccher et al. (1996).           
 
Loan Commitments and other contingent liabilities are excluded from IAS 39 but are 
covered under IAS 37 “Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets” 
(IASB, 1998)23. Thus, banks are required to disclose in the notes the notional amounts 
of these instruments24. Following Riffe (1997) and Eccher et al. (1996), the notional 
amounts of credit-related off-balance sheet items are also included in the model 
(OFF). 
 
                                                 
23 
An exception is loan commitments that are described in para 4 of IAS 39. 
24 An example on how banks disclose information of off-balance sheet items is extracted from the 
annual report of Fortis in 2005. The text follows is taken out of Note 50. “Credit-related financial 
instruments include acceptances, commitments to extend credit, letters of credit and financial 
guarantees. Fortis’s exposure to credit loss in the event of non-performance by the counterparty is 
represented by the contractual notional amounts of those instruments. Fees received from these credit-
related instruments are recorded in the income statement when the service is delivered”… “The 
following is a summary of the notional amounts (principal sums) of Fortis’s credit-related financial 
instruments with off-balance-sheet risk at 31 December. 
             2005                    2004 
Guarantees and standby letters of credit            15,141.7                5,886.6 
Commercial letters of credit                                                                    581.0                 7,183.5 
Documentary credits                                                                            7,048.9                 4,168.1 
Commitments to extend credit                                                          156,932.7               84,628.9 
Total                                                                                                 179,704.3             101,867.1 
Of these commitments some EUR 17,617.8 million have a maturity of more than one year (2004: EUR 
8,477.8 million)”. 
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Including in Equation (6.1) the control variables described above and the interaction 
term of loans that tests H2, the primary model arises: 
MBit = a0 + a1 LNSit + a2 LNSit*WEAK*LOWC + a3 HTMit + a4 DEPit  
+ a5 DTit + a6 NON39ASit + a7 NON39LIit + a8 NADERit + a9 NPLit+ a10 GAPit   (6.2) 
+ a11 COREit + a12 OFFit + εit   
 
Where, 
MB = the differences between market value (MVE) and book value of equity 
(BVE) at the end of each year. Market values are as of the last trading date of 
December. 
 
LNS = the difference between the fair value disclosed and the book value 
recognised for net loans and advances. 
 
WEAK  a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a bank is domiciled in a 
country with a rule of law score below or equal the sample median, and zero 
otherwise.  
 
LOWC   a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the capital adequacy ratio of a 
bank is below the sample median, and zero otherwise. 
 
HTM = the difference between the fair value disclosed and the book value 
recognised for ‘held-to-maturity investments’. 
 
DEP = the difference between fair value disclosed and book value recognised for 
‘deposit liabilities’. 
 
DT = the difference between the fair value disclosed and the book value 
recognised for ‘other debt’, other than deposits. 
 
NON39AS = Non-IAS 39 assets: total assets less IAS 39 financial assets.  
 
NON39LI = Non-IAS 39 liabilities: total liabilities less IAS 39 financial liabilities.  
 
NADER = The notional amounts of derivative financial instruments. 
 
NPL  = The Non-performing loans. 
 
GAP = The gap between financial assets and financial liabilities with maturities 
over a year. 
 
CORE = A proxy variable for the core deposit intangible, defined as deposits with 
no stated maturities, i.e. demand deposits. 
 
OFF  = The Credit-related off-balance sheet instruments. 
 
ε  = The residual term 
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Equation (6.2) is used to test both Hypotheses H1 and H2 and it is in undeflated form 
similar to Barth et al. (1996). According to Barth & Kallapur (1996) deflating the 
model by a variable (e.g., book value of equity) can increase coefficient bias and 
often does not reduce heteroscedasticity.   
 
The codification of the WEAK dummy variable is performed based on countries’ rule 
of law scores provided by Kaufmann et al. (2009). According to this study the Rule 
of Law measures the, 
‘perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules 
of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the 
police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence’. 
 
Although the definition above does not refer explicitly to accounting rules, however, 
it gives the general attitude in each country towards every rule within its jurisdiction. 
Other studies in the literature used the classification provided by La Porta et al. 
(1997;1998) (see Daske et al., 2008; Hail & Leuz, 2006; Lee et al., 2008; Li, 2010). 
However, the classification of La Porta et al. (1997;1998) does not apply to this thesis 
as it does not provide information for the rule of law of all countries in the sample. 
Moreover, La Porta’s scores may be considered outdated as countries’ institutional 
characteristics change over time. Table 6.1 below presents the codification of WEAK. 
Countries with scores below or equal to the sample median are classified as weak 
enforcements (one values) and those with scores above the sample median are 
classified as strong enforcements (zero values). 
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Table 6.1 
Classification of countries according to Kaufmann et al. (2009) Rule of Law Score 
 
Country 
 
Score 2006 
WEAK variable 
Classification 
 
Score 2005 
WEAK variable 
Classification 
Austria            1.85  0            1.81  0 
Belgium             1.39  1            1.39  1 
Cyprus            0.92  1            0.84  1 
Czech Republic            0.75  1            0.76  1 
Denmark            1.95  0            1.97  0 
Finland            1.96  0            1.94  0 
France            1.38  1            1.37  1 
Germany            1.73  0            1.68  0 
Greece            0.74  1            0.70  1 
Hungary            0.80  1            0.75  1 
Ireland            1.65  0            1.56  0 
Italy            0.34  1            0.50  1 
Lithuania            0.45  1            0.48  1 
Luxemburg            1.81  0            1.90  0 
Malta            1.46  0            1.39  1 
Netherlands            1.72  0            1.70  0 
Norway            2.00  0            1.92  0 
Poland            0.28  1            0.36  1 
Portugal            0.94  1            1.09  1 
Slovakia            0.41  1            0.44  1 
Spain            1.04  1            1.07  1 
Sweden            1.88  0            1.81  0 
Switzerland            1.91  0            1.93  0 
UK            1.70  0            1.56  0 
Mean        1.29   1.29  
Median        1.43   1.39  
Std Dev        0.59   0.56  
 
The interaction term LNS*WEAK*LOWC is included in Equation (6.2) to test 
whether the reliability of fair value estimates differs with respect to banks’ financial 
health and countries’ ability to enforce their rules. Barth et al. (1996) find that the 
market assigns a lower coefficient of fair values of loans to those banks with low 
capital adequacy ratios. As the authors explain, less healthy banks may have more 
incentives to overstate unrealised gains or to understate unrealised losses. However, 
in a cross-country study as this one, it is likely that manager’s efficacy to manipulate 
fair value estimates is a function of countries’ ability to enforce their rules. Banks 
domiciled in weak enforcement rule countries have more latitude to manipulate fair 
value estimates than banks domiciled in strong enforcement rule countries. 
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Combining financial health and countries enforcement rules, banks can be separated 
into four groups, namely: banks with low capital adequacy ratios domiciled in weak 
enforcement rule countries (group A), banks with high capital adequacy ratios 
domiciled in weak enforcement rule countries (group B), banks with low capital 
adequacy ratios domiciled in strong enforcement rule countries (group C), and banks 
with high capital adequacy ratios domiciled in strong enforcement rule countries 
(group D).  
 
From the four groups, it is expected that the market will assign the lowest coefficient 
of fair value of loans to banks in group A. Banks in group A not only have the 
incentives to manipulate fair value estimates, due to the low capital adequacy ratio, 
but also have the latitude to do it as they domiciled in weak enforcement countries. 
For all other groups, group B, C, and D, there is at least one reason to expect higher 
coefficients. For example, banks in group B have high capital adequacy ratios and 
thus less incentive to manipulate fair value estimates. Banks in group C, although 
have low capital adequacy ratios, do not have flexibility to manipulate fair values as 
they domiciled in strong enforcement rule countries. Finally, banks in group D are 
expected to have the highest coefficient as they have high capital adequacy ratios and 
their ability to manipulate fair values is restricted due to strong enforcement rules 
(Table 6.2 below presents a summary of the expected levels of coefficients for each 
group). 
 
Equation (6.2) tests whether the market assigns a lower coefficient to group A than to 
groups B, C, and D in aggregate. Thus, the model implicitly assumes that groups B, 
C, and D have the same loans’ coefficient which equal to a1 (one at least of the 
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dummy variables of LOWC and WEAK is zero). Coefficient of group A (the case 
where both LOWC and WEAK are ones) equals to a1 + a2. Finding a significant 
negative coefficient for the interaction term LNS*WEAK*LOWC is an indication that 
the market perceives that banks in group A are more likely to manipulate fair value 
estimates of loans than banks in groups B, C, and D. 
 
Table 6.2 
Expected levels of coefficients for the four Groups of banks 
 
 Weak Enforcement  Strong Enforcement 
Low CAR1 
 
Group A: is expected to hold the 
lowest coefficient 
 
Group C: is expected to hold high 
coefficient 
High CAR 
 
Group B: is expected to hold high 
coefficient 
 
Group D: is expected to hold the 
highest coefficient 
 
1. CAR = Capital Adequacy Ratio. 
 
6.3.1.2 Alternative model specification 
This section develops alternative model specifications in order to test the robustness 
of the primary findings. The following alternative models are developed. 
 
i) A first-difference model or changes model. Equation (6.2) is stated in price levels: 
it regresses prices (e.g. equity values) on prices (e.g. the values of assets and 
liabilities). In contrast, a changes model regresses returns or price changes of 
equity values on returns or changes of the values of assets and liabilities (see 
Christie, 1987; Landsman & Magliolo, 1988). A changes model mitigates the 
problem of correlated omitted variables given that the omitted variables remain 
constant over time. Skinner (1996) argues that,  
‘of particular interest is whether the results are robust to estimating the regression 
in 'changes' form, since this reduces the likelihood of correlated omitted variable 
problems’. 
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The notion behind using a first-difference model is quite straight-forward. 
Unobserved factors can be separated into two types, those that have a fixed effect 
on the dependent variable which are constant over time, and those that vary over 
time (see Wooldridge, 2006, p. 461). Hence, the changes model of this thesis 
takes the differences in values of the variables in Equation (6.2) between 2006 
and 2005 (See, equation below). The Greek letter ∆ denotes the difference.  
∆MBit = a0 + a1 ∆LNSit + a2 ∆LNSit*WEAK*LOWC + a3 ∆HTMit + a4 ∆DEPit  
+ a5 ∆DTit + a6 ∆NON39ASit + a7 ∆NON39LIit + a8 ∆NADERit + a9 ∆NPLit                             
+ a10 ∆GAPit + a11 ∆COREit + a12 ∆OFFit + εit   
  
ii) Following Barth et al. (1996), Eccher et al. (1996) and Nelson (1996), the second 
alternative specification model is a model which includes the BVE as a separate 
independent variable instead of incorporating it in the formulation of the 
dependent variable. Thus, this model regresses the MVE on the BVE and the 
primary variables of interest, LNS, HTM, DEP, and DT (control variables are 
included). 
 
iii) A model that uses March market values instead of December market values in the 
dependent variable (values are as of the last trading dates of March). Semi-strong 
efficient markets incorporate almost instantaneously the published information 
from financial statements in share prices. However, given that the financial 
statements are available to the public a few months after the year end (until the 
end of March), and not immediately at the date of the financial statements (31st of 
December) this model tests for the possibility that the market reacts belatedly. 
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iv) Similar to Barth et al. (1996) a model which includes a growth variable. This 
variable is operationalised using the changes in the book values of net loans for 
the last 5-years before 2005 and 2006. 
 
v) A small number of banks, 14 in total, adopted the IFRS before they became 
mandatory. These banks are likely more familiar with the standards and the fair 
value measures than banks that did not have adopted the IFRS until 2005. 
Furthermore, investors may value differently the early adopters assigning greater 
market values. Hence, a dummy variable (EARLY) is also included in Equation 
(6.2) to control for early adopters. The dummy variable EARLY takes the value 
of one for those banks that have adopted the IFRS before they became mandatory 
in 2005 and the value of zero otherwise. 
 
 
vi) A model that controls for banks’ pension fund status. Pension plans are separated 
between defined contribution schemes and defined benefit schemes. Moreover, 
they separated between funded plans, where a firm establishes an independent 
entity (a pension fund) with separate assets and liabilities and an independent 
management (trustees), and unfunded plans where a firm operates internally the 
pension plan. Defined contribution plans are by definition funded. The firm 
makes regular contributions to the pension fund and bears no risk on the level of 
the pensions to be paid in the future. Defined benefit plans can be either funded or 
unfunded. Contrary to defined contribution plans, firm’s liability is not limited 
only to regular contributions, but also extends to employees’ benefits. Thus, if the 
assets of a plan cannot cover its pension liability then the firm needs to make 
additional payments to the scheme. US studies support the view that the fair value 
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of pension assets and the present value of pension liability are priced by the 
market and thus are reflected to share prices (Barth, 1991; Landsman, 1986). 
Most European banks in this thesis operate defined benefit plans. Other banks 
operate more than one type of pension scheme, such as a defined contribution 
plan, a funded defined benefit plan, and an unfunded defined benefit plan. The 
different types of pension plans operated by European commercial banks 
precluded the use of a consistent variable for the pension obligation. Thus, similar 
to other studies (Barth et al., 1996) the pension variable (PENS) is defined as the 
‘fair values of plan assets less the present value of pension obligation’. For banks 
that do not have a funded schemes this variable is set to be zero. 
 
6.3.2 Recognition of derivatives’ fair values 
6.3.2.1 Primary model specification  
Value relevance studies on derivatives used the BSM as the primary specification 
model. For example, Ahmed et al. (2006) regressed the market value of equity on the 
fair values of the aggregated financial assets, the fair values of the aggregated 
financial liabilities, the non-financial assets and liabilities, the fair values of 
derivatives and a number of other control variables. However, due to high collinearity 
in this thesis (more than 0.99) between the aggregated fair values of financial assets 
and financial liabilities, the primary specification model on derivatives is based on 
Ohlson (1995) model (See, Wang et al., 2005). For completeness, in an alternative 
specification test results are also provided by a BSM model.  
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Equation (6.3) tests the value relevance of derivatives’ fair value recognition. 
Consisted with Wang et al. (2005) the estimation model is based on Ohlson (1995) 
(see, Chapter 3, Section 3.2.1.3).   
 
MVEit = β0  + β1 BVit + β2 NOIit + β3 NSIit + β4 NTDERit + β5 NTDERit*WEAK*VARIN +  
+ β6 NHDERit + β7 NHDERit*WEAK*VARIN + β8 NADERit + β9 NPLit + β10 GAPit  (6.3) 
+β11COREit + β12 OFFit  + εit        
Where: 
 
MVE = Market value of equity as of the last trading date of December of 2005 and 
2006. 
 
BV = Book value of equity before net trading derivatives and net hedging 
derivatives. 
 
NOI  = Net operating Income: Interest Income (from loans) less Interest expense 
(from deposits). 
 
NSI  = Net Securities Income: Net Gains (Losses) on Trading and Derivatives, Net 
Gains (Losses) on Other Securities, and Net Gains (Losses) on Assets at FV 
through Income Statement. 
 
NTDER = Net trading derivatives defined as fair values of trading derivative assets 
less fair values of trading derivative liabilities. 
 
NHDER = Net hedging derivatives defined as fair values of hedging derivative assets 
less fair values of hedging derivative liabilities. 
 
VARIN = Variability in earnings, defined as the natural logarithm of the coefficient 
of variation of net income in the last five years. (For 2005 the period was 
2001-2005 and for 2006 the period was 2002-2006). When data was not 
available for the full five year period, the variable is calculated with the 
available data. 
 
All other variables: NADER, NPL, GAP, CORE and OFF, are defined as above (see, 
under Equation (6.2)). 
 
Ohlson (1995), apart from book value of equity and the earnings variable, includes in 
his model a third variable, the ‘other information’ (ν), which captures information not 
yet incorporated in current and past abnormal earnings but it will affect future 
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abnormal earnings. This study assumes other information to equal zero (ν = 0). Barth 
(2006b) argues that, 
‘…if all assets, including intangible assets, were recognised at fair value, NI [Net 
Income] is simply gains and losses and ν = 0 ...because, in this setting, the persistence 
of abnormal earnings equals zero’. 
 
Commercial banks recognise a substantial amount of assets and liabilities at fair value, 
and thus this provides support to the operationalization of ν as equal to zero. 
 
Coefficients β4 and β6 test hypothesis H3. Positive and significant values for these 
coefficients reject H3 against the alternative hypothesis that fair values of derivatives 
are value relevant (Ahmed et al., 2006).  
 
Hypothesis H4 aims to test whether fair values of derivatives are value relevant over 
and above the notional amounts of derivatives. This hypothesis is tested by examining 
the significance of β4 and β6 coefficients incrementally to the coefficient of notional 
amounts of derivatives, the β8. 
 
Finally, coefficients β5 and β7 test Hypothesis H5: whether banks domiciled in weak 
enforcements rule countries with higher earnings variability have lower derivatives’ 
coefficients than banks domiciled in strong enforcement countries with lower 
earnings variability. A significant and negative coefficient for β5 and β7 supports H5.  
 
6.3.2.2 Alternative model specification 
Similar to the value relevance of fair value disclosures (Section 6.3.1.2), robustness 
tests are also carried out for the value relevance of derivatives’ fair value recognition. 
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The alternative model specification includes: i) a changes model. Similar to Ahmed et 
al. (2006), the model has been deflated by the beginning market value of equity, ii) a 
March model, iii) a growth model, iv) an early adopters model, v) a model that 
controls for banks’ pension fund status, vi) a model that disaggregates the NADER in 
notional amounts of trading derivatives (NATDER) and notional amounts of hedging 
derivatives (NAHDER), and vii) a model based on the BSM that regresses the market 
value of equity on the aggregated fair values of financial assets and liabilities, the 
non-financial assets and liabilities, the fair values of net trading and hedging 
derivatives, their interaction terms and a number of control variables, as in Equation 
(6.3). 
 
6.4 Sample Selection 
The objective of the study is to assess the value relevance of fair value estimates over 
the first two years of the mandatory adoption of IFRS, i.e., 2005 and 2006, for the 
European banking sector. Banking sector is an ideal context to examine the value 
relevance of fair value accounting as the majority of banks’ assets and liabilities are 
financial instruments, such as loans, investment securities, deposits, and derivatives, 
all measured at fair values. The tests are performed cross-sectionally. 
 
The concurrent adoption of the IFRS by a large number of firms across Europe 
provides a unique sample to test the value relevance of fair value accounting. For the 
first time in financial reporting history more than 100 countries have adopted one set 
of accounting standards, the IFRS, which have substituted the national accounting 
standards (at least for the listed firms).  
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The population of the study was drawn from BankScope as at 6th September 2007 
and consisted of banks which met all of the following three criteria: (i) they were 
classified as Commercial Banks, Cooperative Banks, Savings Banks, Bank Holding 
and Holding Companies, or Real Estate and Mortgage Banks (ii) they were domiciled 
in one of the 27 EU member-states, or in Switzerland or Norway; (iii) they were listed 
on a stock exchange in one of the 27 EU member-states, or in Switzerland or 
Norway25. 196 firms met the above criteria. 
 
For 2005 (and 2006), 20 (21) banks were excluded due to the unavailability of their 
annual report. A further 55 (53) banks were excluded due to lack of, or very poor, 
information in relation to a number of variables of interest (e.g., the fair values of 
financial instruments, non-performing loans). For both years a further three banks 
were excluded because they did not grant loans or collect deposits. In addition, for 
2005 (2006) three (one) banks were excluded because they were not listed in that year. 
Finally, eight banks were excluded (for both years) because their financial year ended 
on a date other than 31 December. This resulted in a sample of 107 banks for 2005 
and 110 for 2006 (see, Table 6.3). The large missing values in the population result in 
some countries not being represented in the final sample by any bank, such as 
Bulgaria.   
 
 
                                                 
25 
Although Norway is not an EU member, it is a member of the European Economic Area (EEA) and 
as such Regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 July 2002 
applies equally to the EEA members. Thus, Norwegian listed firms, similar to the EU listed firms, 
were required to adopt the IFRS from 2005. Switzerland belongs neither to EU nor to EEA. However, 
the standard setting body in Switzerland, the Swiss Foundation for Accounting and Reporting, required 
all listed firms to report their accounts by 2005 either in IFRS or in US GAAP, but not in Swiss GAAP. 
(Available from: http:// www.iasplus.com / country / norway.htm and http:// www.iasplus.com / 
country / switzerl.htm [Accessed 12 January 2008]).          
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Table 6.3 
Sample selection 
 
 2005 2006 
 
Population 
 
196 
 
196 
   
The annual reports weren’t available on-line and even if they were asked from 
banks’ investor relations departments, via e-mail, there was no reply 
 
 
-20 
 
-21 
Poor information in the annual report regarding some variables in the models 
 
-55 -53 
The institution even though is classified as a bank holding company does not 
grant loans and collect deposits 
 
 
-3 
 
-3 
The bank wasn’t listed in the related year 
 
-3 -1 
The bank has as a year end a date other than the 31st of December 
 
-8 -8 
Total Sample 107 110 
 
The market capitalisation of the sample represents more than 90% of the total market 
capitalisation of all listed banks in the 27 EU member-states and Switzerland and 
Norway. The fact that the number of the sample banks represents less than 60% of all 
listed banks (107 and 110 out of 196 banks) means that the sample consists of the 
largest European commercial banks. Caution, should therefore be exercised in 
generalising the study’s results to all European banks. 
 
A variety of sources were used to collect the data. In particular, on-balance sheet 
items were hand-collected by annual reports. The majority of banks provide sufficient 
and detailed information regarding the classification of financial assets and liabilities, 
according to IAS 39. Non-performing loans, off-balance sheet items, and capital 
adequacy ratios were taken directly from BankScope (however when these variables 
were not available at BankScope they retrieved from annual reports). Other data, such 
as the maturities of financial assets and liabilities, notional amounts of derivatives, 
demand deposits, and pension fund information were hand-collected by the annual 
reports. Similar, the disclosed fair values of loans, held-to-maturity investments, 
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deposits, and other debt, were hand-collected by the annual reports. Finally, 
information related to market-based data, such as share prices and number of shares 
outstanding were collected from BankScope and when not available from DataStream 
(for more information on data collection, see Table 6.4). 
 
All the amounts in the sample are in million of Euros. Bank accounts that were 
reported in a different currency were translated into Euros using the exchange rates 
provided by the ECB on the last available date of each year. Data on exchange rates 
are retrieved from DataStream (See, Appendix E, Table 2, for the exchange rates). 
 
Table 6.4 
Data Availability and Data Sources for key variables 
 
Data description Variables Source 
 
On-balance sheet items AFS, BHTM, FAFVPL, BLNS, 
NON39AS, FLFVPL, BDEP, BDT, 
NON39LI, BVE 
 
Banks’ Annual Reports or 
BankScope  
Non-performing loans NPL BankScope 
 
Interest-sensitive assets 
and liabilities 
 
ISAS, ISLI, GAP Banks’ Annual Reports 
Fair values of derivatives NTDER, NHDER 
 
Banks’ Annual Reports 
 
Notional amounts of 
derivatives 
 
NADER Banks’ Annual Reports 
Fair values of on-balance 
sheet items 
 
FLNS, FHTM, FDEP, FDT 
 
Banks’ Annual Reports 
Core deposit intangible 
proxy 
 
CORE Banks’ Annual Reports 
Capital adequacy ratios CAR 
 
BankScope 
 
 
Pension fund status PENS Banks’ Annual Reports 
 
Off-balance sheet items OFF BankScope 
 
Market-based data MVE, MB BankScope or DataStream 
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6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter analysed the methodology to test the value relevance of fair value 
disclosures and the value relevance of derivatives’ fair value recognition. The 
objective is to provide further evidence on the relevance and reliability of fair value 
estimates using a sample of European commercial banks that report in IFRS. The 
analysis is performed cross-sectionally for the first two years of the mandatory 
adoption of the IFRS, i.e., 2005 and 2006. 
 
Previous studies provide evidence that fair value disclosures are value relevant (Barth 
et al., 1996; Eccher et al., 1996; Nelson, 1996). Other studies find derivatives’ fair 
value recognitions significant in explaining market values (Ahmed et al., 2006). 
However, these results are based on US GAAP, such as the SFAS Nos. 107, 109, and 
133. Up to now there is no evidence for the value relevance of banks’ fair value 
disclosures under IFRS (e.g. IAS 32) and derivatives’ fair value recognition (e.g. IAS 
39). Thus, the purpose of this thesis is to fill this gap. 
 
The thesis also aims to shed some light on whether banks’ financial health and 
earnings variability affect the reliability of fair value estimates of loans and 
derivatives, respectively. Banks with low capital adequacy ratios have more 
incentives to manipulate fair value estimates of loans (Barth et al., 1996). Moreover, 
banks with high earnings volatility have more incentives to manipulate fair value 
estimates of derivatives in order to smooth earnings (Barton, 2001). However, the 
latitude of banks to manipulate fair value estimates is likely to depend on institutional 
differences between the sample countries, and specifically on their efficacy to enforce 
their rules. The rule of law scores, provided by Kaufmann et al. (2009) are used to 
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classify the sample countries in strong enforcement rules and weak enforcement rules. 
The dummy variables of capital adequacy ratio and earnings variability were 
interacted in the empirical models (see, Equations 6.2 and 6.3) with the variables of 
loans and derivatives, respectively, and with a dummy variable that indicates whether 
a bank is domiciled in a weak enforcement rule country or in a strong enforcement 
rule country.    
 
The empirical model of the fair value disclosures test is based on the BSM, which has 
been a standard valuation model in the value relevance research (see, Landsman, 
1986; Eccher et al., 1996; Venkatachalam, 1996; Ahmed et al., 2006). The model 
controls for a series of variables that have been found significant in the literature in 
explaining the market values of equity of banks. These variables include non-
performing loans (Beaver et al., 1989), the maturity gap between interest-sensitive 
assets and liabilities, core deposits (Barth et al., 1996), notional amounts of 
derivatives (Riffe, 1997), and credit-related off balance sheet instruments (Eccher et 
al., 1996). Apart from the primary model specifications, results are also provided 
using alternative models for robustness (e.g. changes model). 
 
Similar to Wang et al. (2005), the empirical model of the derivatives test follows the 
Ohlson (1995) model. The reason for not using again as the primary specification 
model the BSM is that two of the variables in the model (i.e. BSM) were highly 
correlated with each other (more than 99% correlations in both years). However, the 
BSM model is run as a robustness test for completeness.  
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The next chapter develops the methodology of the second empirical part of this thesis, 
the economic consequence test (i.e. cost of equity test). The findings of the value 
relevance part and the economic consequence part are presented in chapters 8 and 9, 
respectively. 
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Chapter 7: Research Methodology on the Cost of Equity Capital 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the research methodology relating to the second main research 
objective of this thesis which is to examine whether the mandatory adoption of IFRS 
had an impact on the CE of European banks (see, Chapter 1, Section 1.2). As 
discussed in Chapter 3 (Section 3.3), transparent accounting standards and increased 
disclosure reduce information asymmetries between managers and shareholders, 
reduce uncertainty, and as a consequence they lower the CE. Moreover, the adoption 
of uniform accounting standards across countries reduce firms’ CE through the 
reduction in adjustment costs that usually arise when comparing financial statements 
prepared under different accounting standards (IASCF, 2002). 
 
As discussed in Chapter 5, which reviewed the empirical evidence on this issue, early 
studies documented the existence of an inverse relationship between increased 
disclosure and the CE (Botosan, 1997; Dhaliwal et al., 1979; Diamond & Verrecchia, 
1991). Studies using samples of IFRS early adopters (firms that adopted the IFRS 
before they became mandatory) report mixed results (Cuijpers & Buijink, 2005; 
Daske, 2006; Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000). However, empirical studies relating to the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS found that this adoption led to a reduction in the CE 
under some model specifications (Daske et al., 2008) and for some groups of IFRS 
adopters, such as the mandatory adopters (e.g. Li, 2010).  
 
This thesis uses empirical tests to investigate the impact of mandatory adoption of 
IFRS on European commercial banks’ CE. Banks are highly affected by the adoption 
of IFRS through the accounting standards IAS 32 and IAS 39 as most of their assets 
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and liabilities are financial instruments. Under these two standards, banks are 
required to disclose a substantial amount of information regarding the risk of their 
financial instruments. Important requirements that relate to banks’ risk are: i) either 
the recognition or disclosure of fair values of all financial instruments, ii) the 
recognition of previously off-balance sheet items, such as derivatives, iii) the use of 
hedge accounting, and iv) relevant disclosures relating to the risk of financial 
instruments (i.e. market risk, credit risk and liquidity risk) (See, Chapter 2 for more 
analysis of the requirements of IAS 32 and IAS 39). 
 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 7.2 develops the hypotheses. Based on 
the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 3 (Section 3.3), it is expected that the 
adoption of IFRS will reduce banks’ CE. However, this statement needs to be tested 
empirically under certain hypotheses. Section 7.3 discusses the methods used by this 
thesis to estimate the CE and develops the empirical models. Four methods are used 
to estimate the CE based on the theoretical models of RIVM (Gebhardt et al., 2001; 
Claus & Thomas, 2001) and the EGM (Gode & Mohanram, 2003; Easton, 2004). 
Section 7.4 presents the sample procedures and the data collection process. Finally, 
Section 7.5 concludes. 
 
7.2 Development of Hypotheses 
Literature on the mandatory adoption IFRS provided some first results on whether the 
CE has decreased after the adoption of IFRS in 2005. For example, Li (2010) found 
lower CE for mandatory adopter firms. Daske et al. (2008) also reported lower CE for 
firms but only when they control for the anticipation effect. In another study, Lee et al. 
(2008) found greater reduction in the CE of firms domiciled in high financial 
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incentive countries (e.g. the UK) than firms domiciled in low financial incentive 
countries, (e.g. Austria, Greece, and Italy). However, these studies analyze either 
many industries in aggregate including banks (Daske et al., 2008) or they exclude 
financial firms from the analysis because they are highly regulated and their balance 
sheets are structured differently from the balance sheets of the industrial firms (Lee et 
al., 2008). Thus, there is a need to examine financial institutions separately under a 
homogenous sample in order to avoid the industry-effect in the model. Hence, the 
sample of this thesis is a set of European commercial banks that were required to 
adopt the IFRS from 2005 onward. Based on the discussion above, the first 
hypothesis of the CE part is stated in its null form as follows: 
 
H6: The mandatory adoption of IFRS did not have any material impact on banks’ CE. 
   
As it is stated in the introduction of this Chapter, banks are mostly affected by two 
IASB standards, the IAS 32 and IAS 39. Hence, this test can also be regarded with 
caution as an indirect test of the relevance of these two standards in assessing banks’ 
risk.  
 
Complementary to Hypothesis H6, three other hypotheses are examined to test 
whether the effects on the CE vary with specific characteristics of banks. Specifically, 
it is examined whether the level of analyst following, the classification of national 
accounting standards, and countries’ enforcement rules have a particular effect in 
determining the impact of IFRS on the CE. 
 
Previous research has shown that the reduction in CE differs with the number of 
analysts following a firm (Botosan, 1997; Richardson & Welker, 2001). Low analyst 
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following is associated with higher reduction in the CE. On the other hand, firms with 
high analyst following tend to have less reduction in their CE, as analysts used to 
have access to more information, before the mandatory adoption of IFRS. Hence, the 
second hypothesis of the CE in its alternative form: 
H7: Banks with low analyst following experienced a higher reduction in their CE than 
banks with high analyst following. 
 
The study’s sample consists of banks from all EU countries and Norway and 
Switzerland. Nobes (2008) classified these countries into those that fall within the 
Anglo-Saxon accounting system (Cyprus, Denmark, Ireland, Malta, Netherlands, 
Norway, and the UK) and the Continental accounting system (Austria, Belgium, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxemburg, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland). Furthermore, Nobes (2008) argues that IFRS, as a reporting system, is 
more closely related to the Anglo-Saxon one. Therefore, it is reasonable to suggest 
that banks domiciled in countries which have an Anglo-Saxon accounting system are 
less likely to be affected by the adoption of IFRS, because they are already using 
accounting standards which are similar to the IFRS. The effects, however, on banks 
domiciled in Continental countries are likely to be more pronounced because for them 
IFRS represents a very different reporting system. Hence the third hypothesis of the 
CE in its alternative form: 
 H8: Banks domiciled in ‘Continental’ countries experienced a higher reduction in 
their CE than banks domiciled in ‘Anglo-Saxon’ countries. 
 
 
The final hypothesis relates to the effect of countries’ enforcement rules on the CE. 
There is evidence in the literature supporting the view that countries with strong 
enforcement rules are likely to experience a higher reduction in the CE (Daske et al., 
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2008; Li, 2010) due to significant less earnings management undertaking by the firms 
in such countries (Burgstahler et al., 2006). This observations leads to the forth 
hypothesis: 
 H9: Banks domiciled in ‘strong enforcement rule’ countries experienced a higher 
reduction in their CE than banks domiciled in ‘weak enforcement rule’ countries. 
 
The next section discusses the methods used by this thesis in the estimation of the CE 
(the dependent variable of the empirical models) (Section 7.3.1). It also discusses the 
development of the empirical models based on which hypotheses H6 – H9 are tested 
(Sections 7.3.2 and 7.3.3). 
 
7.3 Empirical Analysis 
7.3.1 Estimation of cost of equity 
Following the discussion in Chapter 3 (Section 3.2.2) four methods are used to 
estimate banks’ CE. Two of these methods are based on an implementation of the 
RIVM as provided by Gebhardt et al. (2001) and Claus & Thomas (2001) and two are 
based on the Ohlson & Juettner (2005) model as implemented by Gode & Mohanram 
(2003) and Easton (2004). 
 
7.3.1.1 The Gebhardt et al. (2001) method 
The Gebhardt et al. (2001) method is an implementation of the RIVM. Due to the fact 
that the RIVM involves infinite horizon periods, Gebhardt et al. (2001) made 
assumptions regarding the growth of earnings in the long-term (i.e. beyond the period 
of the explicit estimation of earnings). The GLS method is defined as follows: 
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Where, 
Pt  = Market value per share, i.e. share price at time t 
 
BVEt   = Book value of equity per share at time t  
 
FROEt+i   = Forecasted Return on Equity (ROE) for period t+i. Calculated using the 
forecasted EPS (FEPS) for year t+i, acquired from the I/B/E/S database, 
divided by the book value per share for year t+i-1, BVEt+i-1. 
 
BVEt+i  = BVEt+i-1 + FEPSt+i - FDPSt+i, where FDPSt+i denotes forecasted dividends 
per share for year t+i, estimated by multiplying the current dividend payout 
ratio (k) at time t with the FEPSt+i. 
 
TV = The Terminal Value after year t+2, was calculated by assuming that the 
FROE at period t+3 reverted to the industry specific median ROE. 
 
rGLS = The implied cost of equity capital derived from the GLS method. 
 
The terminal value (TV) in equation (7.1) is calculated using the formulae below: 
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The GLS method uses explicitly the forecasted analysts’ earnings per share for the 
first three years, while for the periods beyond the third year and up to twelfth year  
(T=12) the model assumes that the forecasted Return on Equity (ROE) of the third 
year reverts to the industry median ROE through simple linear interpolation. The 
industry median ROE is a moving median of the historic ROEs of banks in the 
population. For the calculation of the industry median ROE a maximum of ten years 
are used. The industry median is used because in the long run and in a competitive 
environment the ROE of firms in the same industry tends to be closer to the ROE of 
their peers. The value beyond the twelfth year (T=12) is approximated by computing 
the present value of abnormal earnings at period T as a perpetuity. 
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7.3.1.2 The Claus & Thomas (2001) method 
Claus & Thomas (2001) method, hereafter the CT method, follows a different 
approach to operationalise RIVM than Gebhardt et al. (2001). Instead of assuming 
that in the long-run firms’ ROE reverts to the industry’s median, they explicitly 
calculate earnings per share for the first five years, using forecasted analysts’ 
estimates, and beyond year five they impose abnormal earnings to grow at a steady 
percentage, the expected inflation rate ( aeg ). This steady percentage is the 10-year 
risk free rate of US Treasury bonds less the real risk-free rate, which is assumed to be 
3 percent.  
 
Given the fact that this thesis deals with a non-US sample (European banks), the 
approach to estimate expected inflation rates needs to be different. Thus, the expected 
inflation rate ( aeg ) is approximated by using the median of country-specific 
annualized one year ahead monthly inflation rates as in Daske et al. (2008). The index 
used is the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICPs) which ‘gives comparable 
measures of inflation in the euro-zone, the EU, the European Economic Area and for 
other countries including accession and candidate countries’26. Hence, the second 
method to estimate the CE is the CT method: 
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Where, AE denotes the Abnormal Earnings calculated using the formula of abnormal 
earnings as: 1* −+++ −= itCTitit BVErFEPSAE . Again itFEPS +  is the forecasted 
analysts’ earnings per share, 1−+itBVE  is the forecasted book value per share 
                                                 
26  Available from: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/hicp/introduction [Accessed 23 
August 2008].  
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calculated using the clean surplus relation as itititit FDPSFEPSBVEBVE ++−++ −+= 1 , 
and CTr  is the implied CE as derived under the CT method. Similar to the GLS 
method, the itFDPS + is calculated by applying the current dividend payout ratio on 
the forecasted earnings per share for the period t+i ( itFEPS + ).  
 
7.3.1.3 The Gode & Mohanram (2003) method 
Apart from the RIVM, some other studies use also an Earnings Growth Model to 
derive the CE (see, Daske et al., 2008; Dhaliwal et al., 2007). Gode & Mohanram 
(2003) provide an empirical implementation of the Ohlson & Juettner (2005) model 
which defines market value per share in terms of next-period’s expected earnings per 
share; next-period’s expected dividends per share; short-term growth in earnings; 
long-term perpetual growth in earnings (γ); and the CE. The model builds on the 
Gordon growth model (see, Chapter 3, Section 3.2.1.1) which is based on a dividend 
measure of value and the assumption of a constant dividend growth in perpetuity. The 
model of Ohlson & Juettner (2005) is a parsimonious equity valuation model that 
does not require the consideration of expected book values and the expected earnings 
per share beyond the second year. Formula (7.4) below is the Gode & Mohanram 
(2003) model which is based on Ohlson & Juettner (2005) model solved as for OJr . 
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The inputs used to estimate the rOJ are the following: The forecasted analysts’ 
earnings per share for the following and the next year, 1FEPS and 2FEPS , 
respectively; the one year ahead forecasted dividend per share calculated as in the 
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previous two methods ( 1FEPS *k); the current share price (P0) the short-term growth 
on earnings (g2) calculated as the average of the percentage change in forecasted 
analysts’ earnings per share ( 2FEPS / 1FEPS -1) and the five years growth in earnings 
per share provided by analysts; and the long-term perpetual growth (γ-1) which is set 
to be equal to the expected inflation rate which is the median of country-specific 
annualized one year ahead monthly inflation rate (similar to the CT method).  
 
7.3.1.4 The Easton (2004) method 
Easton (2004) presents a modified price-earnings growth model (PEG) which is a 
special case of the Ohlson & Juettner (2005) model analysed above (see also Chapter 
3, Section 3.2.1.5). The model imposes next year’s dividend per share to be equal to 
zero (FDPS1=0) and the long-term perpetual growth in earnings to be equal to one 
(γ=1). Under these assumptions the model requires only three parameters, namely: 
two years ahead earnings per share (the next year’s earnings per share and the year’s 
following), as provided by analysts’ forecasts, and the current share price. The FEPS1 
and FEPS2 are restricted to be positive and the FEPS2 to be greater or equal to FEPS1. 
The Easton (2004) model is defined as follows and denoted as rPEG: 
( ) 012 / PFEPSFEPSrPEG −=      (7.5) 
The different theoretical approaches and assumptions, underpinning the four CE 
methods explained above, result in providing different estimates for the CE. Each 
method is competitive to the other methods. Thus, the empirical analysis below 
provides the findings under each of the four CE methods. In addition, the average CE 
values of these methods are also calculated. The average CE is denoted using the 
notation AVGr . 
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7.3.2 Primary analysis 
The impact of the mandatory adoption of IFRS on banks’ CE is examined under a 
univariate analysis, by observing the change of the CE through time, and under a 
multivariate analysis using a multiple regression model similar to the one used by Lee 
et al. (2008), Li (2010) and by Dhaliwal et al. (2007)27.  
 
The period of the study covers six financial years from 2002 to 2007. Given the fact 
that the official adoption of the IFRS by European firms is the year 2005, the CE 
estimates in years 2002, 2003, and 2004 are regarded as the pre-IFRS period, and the 
CE estimates in years 2005, 2006, and 2007 are regarded as the post-IFRS period. 
 
The results provided under the univariate analysis should be interpreted with caution 
as they do not take into account other factors, apart from the IFRS adoption, that may 
have affected the CE around that time. Thus, a more complete way to test the impact 
of the IFRS is to control in a regression model for other observable factors that 
according to the literature are found to explain significantly the expected returns. The 
primary empirical model is defined as follows: 
 
CEit = γ0 + γ1 POSTit + γ2MANDit + γ3POST*MANDit + γ4CARit +γ5LDit + γ6BETAit + γ7VARERNit + 
γ8BMit + γ9 LOG(ASSET)it + γ10 LEV + γ11RFit + γ12USLISTit+ ∑
18
k
kikCOUNTRYδ  + ωit        (7.6) 
Where, 
CE  = the implied cost of equity capital from the GLS method, the CT method, 
the OJ method, the PEG method, and the average of all the aforementioned 
methods (AVG). 
 
POST  = a dummy variable that takes the value of one for post-IFRS periods (on 
and after 2005) and the value of zero for pre-IFRS periods (before 2005). 
 
                                                 
27 However, Dhaliwal et al. (2007) examine the expectation that the 2003 Tax Act reduced the cost of 
equity capital after the new tax law came into effect in May 2003. 
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MAND  = a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a commercial bank did not 
adopt IFRS until 2005, and zero otherwise. 
 
POST*MAND = the interaction term between POST and MAND. 
 
CAR = capital adequacy ratio. 
 
LD = net Loans to Deposits ratio. 
 
BETA = market beta, derived by regressing commercial banks’ weekly returns for 
the past five years on the weekly returns of the pan-European index, DJ 
STOXX 600. 
  
VARERN = variability in earnings, defined as the standard deviations in earnings over 
the past five year divided the mean earnings over the same period.  
 
BM = Book to Market ratio. 
 
LOG(ASSET) = a control for banks’ size, defined as the natural logarithm of the total 
assets.  
 
LEV = financial leverage, defined as the long-term debt to the book value of 
equity ratio. 
 
RF = country specific risk-free rate of return. 
 
USLIST = a dummy variables that takes the value of one when a bank is listed in the 
US market and zero otherwise.  
 
COUNTRY = dummy variables to control for the country-effect. 
  
The coefficient of POST (γ1) is the coefficient of interest in examining the impact of 
IFRS on the CE. A significant positive coefficient indicates that the IFRS reveal 
additional risk for banks that previously (before 2005) was unknown to investors. 
Risk overcomes the benefits provided by increased disclosure. On the other hand, a 
negative coefficient supports the view that high quality in financial information and 
increased disclosure, as it is the case with IFRS, decrease the CE. Finding the γ1 
coefficient significant rejects hypothesis H6 that the mandatory adoption of IFRS did 
not have any material impact on banks’ CE. 
 
The interaction term POST*MAND tests whether there is any difference between 
banks that have adopted IFRS only when they became mandatory (in 2005) and early 
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adopters, banks that voluntarily adopted IFRS prior to 2005. Coefficient γ3 aims to 
capture this difference. 
 
The remaining variables are included in equation (7.6) to control for other factors that 
were found in the literature to explain significantly the variations in the CE. 
 
Control variables 
i) This study uses two industry specific control variables, the capital adequacy ratio 
(CAR) and the Loans to Deposits ratio (LD). An extensive discussion of the CAR 
is provided in Chapter 2, Section 2.3. According to Basel Committee, banks 
should keep this ratio above the 8% in order to have adequate funds to cover 
unexpected losses. Thus, whenever this ratio falls below the 8%, supervisors 
demand from banks to increase capital or to liquidate some risky assets. The 
higher this variable is, the lower are the regulatory costs and hence the lower the 
risk for a bank28. The sign for this variable is expected to be negative (Karels et al., 
1989). The other industry specific variable, is the loans to deposit ratio (LD), 
which is the control variable for banks’ liquidity and credit risk (Mansur et al., 
1993). Commercial banks use public deposits to finance their loan activity which 
are regarded (the deposits) as a cheap source of finance. A high ratio of Loans to 
Deposits, usually well above the unity, increases the liquidity risk of banks in the 
unexpected event of significant deposit withdrawals. Moreover, high levels of 
loans, as compared to deposits, increase credit risk if an important number of 
banks’ clients default. Hence, based on the argument above, the sign for the 
coefficient of LD is predicted to be positive.  
                                                 
28 Regulatory costs arise when the capital adequacy ratio of a bank falls below the minimum capital 
requirement which is set to be 8% for the Total Adequacy Ratio (Tier 1 and Tier 2).  
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ii) The BETA is the market beta derived by regressing banks’ weekly returns over 
the past five years on the weekly returns of the pan-European index, DJ STOXX 
600. Following the CAPM a positive relationship is expected between the market 
beta and the CE. Market beta is widely used in the CE literature to control for 
market volatility, e.g., Hail (2002), Botosan & Plumlee (2002), Daske (2006), and 
Poshakwale & Courtis (2005). Other studies use other measures for market 
volatility, such as last year’s return variability (Daske et al., 2008). For 
completeness in a separate robustness test the return variability variable is used 
instead of the market beta (see Section, 7.3.4 below). 
 
iii) Earnings variability (VARERN) is cited in the literature as an important source of 
risk in equity valuation (Beaver et al., 1970; Collins & Kothari, 1989; Easton & 
Zmijewski, 1989). Thus, a variable that controls for earnings variability is 
included in the empirical model. Following Gebhardt et al. (2001) the VARERN 
is defined as the standard deviation of annual net earnings for the past five years 
divided by the mean over the same period. In a robustness test this variable is also 
operationalized with analysts’ earnings coefficient (see Section, 7.3.4). 
 
iv) Apart from market beta, Fama and French (1993) introduced two other types of 
risk, the firm size and the book-to-market ratio. Thus, the BM variable in equation 
(7.6) stands for the ratio of the book value to the market value of equity. Firm size 
is proxied by the LOG(ASSET) which is the natural logarithm of total assets. The 
BM and the LOG(ASSET) have been used extensively as control variables in the 
CE literature (see, Daske, 2006; Francis et al., 2008). Given the fact that there is 
more than a single way to measure size, an alternative measure is used in a 
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robustness test, namely: the natural logarithm of the market value of equity (see 
Section 7.3.4). 
 
v) LEV denotes the financial leverage. According to Modigliani & Miller (1958), 
financial leverage is inversely related to the required rate of return (i.e. the CE). 
Similar to other studies (e.g. Daske et al., 2008; Lee et al., 2008; and Li, 2010), 
this variable is defined as the long-term debt to the book value of equity of banks.  
 
 
vi) The RF is the risk-free rate of return. Similar to Hail & Leuz (2006) and Daske et 
al. (2008), Equation (7.6) controls for the time-series variation in country-specific 
risk-free interest rates. RF aims to capture the differences in the level of interest 
rates between countries which are a reflection of local savings rates and the 
quality of institutional structures. High interest rates in a country should be related 
to higher CE for the banks in this country. The RF variable is constructed using 
country-specific local yields of short-term treasury bills, central bank papers, or 
interbank loans. 
 
vii) The USLIST is a dummy variable taking the value of one if a commercial bank 
has securities listed in the New York Stock Exchange and zero otherwise. The 
rationale for including this variable is that banks, which file registration 
statements with the SEC, disclose a substantial amount of financial information. 
Therefore, the disclosure requirement of IFRS would not affect them as much as 
the banks which do not have a US listing. 
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viii) Finally, a set of dummy variables are included in the empirical model to control 
for the country-effect. 
 
7.3.3 Additional analysis  
The empirical models in this section test hypotheses H7, H8, and H9 of the CE test. 
Each of these models includes three dummy variables: the POST, the MAND, and a 
dummy variable that relates to each of the hypotheses above. They also include the 
interaction terms between these dummies and the same set of control variables as in 
Equation (7.6). Hence, the theoretical model for H7 is as follows:  
CEit = γ0 + γ1 POSTit + γ2MANDit + γ3LOWFit  
+ γ4 POSTit* MANDit + γ5 POSTit* LOWFit+ γ6 MANDit* LOWFit   (7.7) 
+ γ7 POSTit* MANDit*LOWFit+∑
9
l
litlCTRLω  +∑
18
k
kik COUNTRYδ  + ωit 
Where, LOWF is a dummy variable indicating the level of analyst following (low vs. 
high analyst following). The codification of the LOWF variable in low and high 
analyst following is performed by taking for each bank the average number of analyst 
of the three years before the mandatory adoption of IFRS (i.e. 2002 – 2004). Based on 
these estimates, the LOWF takes the value of one for banks with analyst following 
below the sample’s median (low analyst following) and the value of zero otherwise 
(high analyst following). 
 
∑
9
l
litlCTRLω is the set of control variables as in Equation (7.6). The interaction term 
POST*LOWF in equation (7.7) tests hypothesis H7. A significant negative coefficient 
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(γ5<0) indicates that banks with low analyst following have a higher reduction in the 
CE than banks with high analyst following.  
  
Hypotheses H8 and H9 are examined under two separate empirical models. The 
theoretical model for H8 is Equation (7.8): 
CEit = γ0 + γ1 POSTit + γ2MANDit + γ3CONTit  
+ γ4 POSTit* MANDit + γ5 POSTit* CONTit+ γ6 MANDit* CONTit   (7.8) 
+ γ7 POSTit* MANDit*CONTit+∑
9
l
litlCTRLω  +∑
18
k
kik COUNTRYδ  + ωit 
Where, CONT is a dummy variable taking the value of one for banks domiciled in 
countries classified as Continental and the value of zero for banks domiciled in 
countries classified as Anglo-Saxon (see, earlier discussion in the development of 
Hypothesis H8). 
 
The theoretical model for H9 is Equation (7.9) 
CEit = γ0 + γ1 POSTit + γ2MANDit + γ3STRNGit  
+ γ4 POSTit* MANDit + γ5 POSTit*STRNGit+ γ6 MANDit* STRNGit   (7.9) 
+ γ7 POSTit* MANDit*STRNGit+∑
9
l
litlCTRLω  +∑
18
k
kik COUNTRYδ  + ωit 
Where, STRNG is a dummy variable taking the value of one for banks domiciled in 
strong enforcement rule countries and zero for banks domiciled in weak enforcement 
rule countries. 
 
Estimating equations (7.8) and (7.9) as it is, using the Eviews statistical package, 
gives an error message “near singular matrix”. Agung (2009, p. 105) explains that, 
‘This error message indicates that the independent variables of the model have 
(almost) a perfect multicollinearity based on the data sets used. However, there might 
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be nothing wrong with the model, since it could be an estimable model based on other 
data sets’. 
 
Hence, given the small sample of this thesis (i.e. it involves only one industry) it is 
likely that the observations are not sufficient to estimate the full theoretical models 
(7.8) and (7.9). Agung (2009, p. 106) argues that the researcher, in order to solve this 
problem, can use a trial-and-error method to delete some of the independent variables 
that causing the problem. Thus, using the trial-and-error method, Eviews gives results 
under the two empirical models below, with lower interaction terms than those 
included in the theoretical models (7.8) and (7.9).  
  CEit = γ0 + γ1 POSTit + γ2MANDit + γ3 POSTit* CONTit 
+ γ4 POSTit* MANDit*CONTit+∑
9
l
litlCTRLω  +∑
18
k
kik COUNTRYδ  + ωit  (7.10) 
CEit = γ0 + γ1 POSTit + γ2MANDit + γ3 POSTit* STRNGit 
+ γ4 POSTit* MANDit*STRNGit+∑
9
l
litlCTRLω  +∑
18
k
kik COUNTRYδ  + ωit  (7.11) 
Model specifications with lower interaction terms than the full interaction terms 
between the dummy variables are also used by previous studies (Daske et al., 2008; 
Li, 2010). A significant negative coefficient for the interaction term POST*CONT in 
equation (7.10) indicates that banks domiciled in Continental countries experienced a 
greater reduction in their CE, after the mandatory adoption of IFRS, than banks 
domiciled in Anglo-Saxon countries. Similarly, a significant negative coefficient for 
the interaction term POST*STRNG in equation (7.11) is an evidence that banks 
domiciled in strong enforcement rule countries experienced a higher reduction in their 
CE than banks domiciled in weak enforcement rule countries.  
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Similar to the value relevance test (see, Chapter 6, Table 6.1), the classification of 
countries in strong and weak enforcement rule is performed using the scores provided 
by Kaufmann et al. (2009) and it is presented in Table 7.129. This table provides the 
scores of the ‘Rule of Law’ index for the first three years following the mandatory 
adoption of IFRS. The last column in Table 7.1 provides the codification of the 
dummy variable STRNG which is common for all years30. Countries with scores 
above (or equal) to the median are classified as strong enforcement rule countries 
(value of one) and countries with scores below the median are classified as weak 
enforcement rule countries (value of zero). 
Table 7.1 
Codification of Countries according to the Rule of Law 
Score in Kaufmann et al. (2009) 
 
 
 
Country 
 
 
Score 2007 
 
 
Score 2006 
 
 
Score 2005 
Dummy  
variable  (STRNG) 
Codification 
Austria 1.89 1.85 1.81 1 
Belgium  1.48 1.39 1.39 0 
Czech Republic 0.76 0.75 0.76 0 
Denmark 2.04 1.95 1.97 1 
Finland 1.89 1.96 1.94 1 
France 1.35 1.38 1.37 0 
Germany 1.74 1.73 1.68 1 
Greece 0.69 0.74 0.70 0 
Hungary 0.77 0.80 0.75 0 
Ireland 1.75 1.65 1.56 1 
Italy 0.41 0.34 0.50 0 
Netherlands 1.74 1.72 1.70 1 
Norway 1.98 2.00 1.92 1 
Poland 0.31 0.28 0.36 0 
Portugal 0.95 0.94 1.09 0 
Spain 1.09 1.04 1.07 0 
Sweden 1.93 1.88 1.81 1 
Switzerland 1.98 1.91 1.93 1 
UK 1.69 1.70 1.56 1 
Mean 1.39 1.37 1.36  
Median 1.69 1.65 1.56  
Std Dev 0.58 0.58 0.53  
                                                 
29 Li (2010) using both the La Porta et al. (1998) codification and the Kaufmann codification provides 
qualitatively similar results.  
30 Results in Table 7.1 are different from the results in Table 6.1 because it includes different countries.  
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7.3.4 Robustness tests 
A number of robustness tests are carried out in order to test the validity of the primary 
findings and the findings of the additional analysis, using alternative model 
specifications. Four robustness tests have been developed. 
 
i) A number of control variables in Equation (7.6) are operationalised differently 
by using different proxies. In particular, instead of using BETA, as a proxy for 
market volatility, the model uses the annual return variability (RVAR) which is 
defined as the standard deviation of the monthly returns at year end (see, 
Gebhardt et al., 2001). VARERN is substituted by the coefficient of variation of 
all the FY1 analysts’ earnings per share estimates, denoted as VARCOEF. 
Finally, banks’ size is controlled by using the natural logarithm of the market 
value of equity, LOG(MVE), instead of the natural logarithm of the total assets, 
LOG(ASSET). 
 
ii) A model that controls for outliers, by taking the natural logarithms of the 
continuous independent variables (Wooldridge, 2006, p. 330).  
 
iii) A model that controls for the long-term growth potential of banks (LTG). This 
is proxied by the five-year consensus growth rate provided by equity analysts in 
the I/B/E/S. When the growth rate is not available it is calculated from analysts’ 
forecasted earnings per share, using the formula (FY2/FY1-1). Gebhardt et al. 
(2001) explain that analysts tend to be over-optimistic for the high long-term 
growth firms which is translated to higher share prices and as a consequence to 
an abnormally lower CE. 
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iv) A model that uses the risk premium for the dependent variable instead of the 
implied CE (Hail & Leuz, 2006). Risk premium is calculated by subtracting 
from the implied CE the risk-free rate. This model aims to test whether the 
results are sensitive to other measures of the required rate of return. When the 
risk premium is used as the dependent variable, the risk-free interest rate 
variable (RF) is excluded from the right-hand side of the equation.  
 
7.4 Sample procedure 
The study’s population consists of European listed banks in the 27 EU member-states 
and two major European economies, Switzerland and Norway. This is the same 
population used in the value relevance tests, i.e., 196 European listed commercial 
banks as provided by BankScope at 06/09/2007. However, due to the fact that 
analysts (in I/B/E/S) do not provide estimates of the expected earnings per share (EPS) 
and the growths for all banks in the population, the final sample was reduced to 88 
commercial banks. For these 88 banks, data was sufficient to calculate the CE for 
every year in the sample (2002 – 2007) which gives a total of 528 bank-year 
observations for the CE. Excluding 108 banks from the population, some of the 29 
European countries remain with zero banks and thus are not represented in the final 
sample (such countries are, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, 
Malta, Romania, Slovenia, and Slovakia). 
 
Three major databases were used to collect the data for the calculation of the CE 
(DataStream, WorldScope and I/B/E/S). Analysts’ forecasted EPS, the growth in EPS, 
the actual values of EPS, and the actual values of Dividend per Share (DPS) were 
taken from the I/B/E/S database. Book values per shares (BPS) and ROE ratios were 
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retrieved from WorldScope, and data on share prices from the I/B/E/S. Finally, the 
information regarding country-specific inflation rates was downloaded from 
Eurostat’s web site. Panel A in Table 7.2 provides a summary for the sources of the 
data used to calculate the dependent variable (CE). 
Table 7.2 
Data Sources 
 
Panel A: 
Inputs in the CE estimates 
  
Source 
Earnings per Share forecasts  I/B/E/S 
Earnings per Share growths  I/B/E/S 
Actual Earnings per Share  I/B/E/S 
Actual Dividend per Share  I/B/E/S 
Actual Book value per Share  WorldScope 
Return on Equity (ROE)  WorldScope 
Share Prices (P)  I/B/E/S 
Inflation rates  EuroStat 
Panel B: 
Independent variables 
 
Description 
 
Source 
ASSET Total Assets DataStream 
MVE Market value of Equity DataStream 
BETA  Market beta Estimated 
RVAR Return Variability Estimated 
LD Net Loans to Total Deposits ratio Estimated 
BM Book to Market ratio DataStream 
VARERN Earnings Variability Estimated 
VARCOEF Coefficient of the Variation of FY1 EPS I/B/E/S 
CAR Capital Adequacy Ratio BankScope or  
Annual Reports 
LTG Long-Term Growth in earnings I/B/E/S 
LEV Financial Leverage Estimated 
RF Risk-Free Rate DataStream 
FOLLOW Analysts’ Follow I/B/E/S 
 
 
Panel B presents a summary of the sources for the independent variables. Data 
relating to some of the independent variables was not directly observable and 
therefore was estimated. Specifically, Market Values of Equity (MVE), Total Assets 
(ASSET), Book-to-Market ratios (BM), and Risk-Free rates (RF) are retrieved from 
DataStream. Capital adequacy ratios (CAR) are found on BankScope. When the CAR 
was not available on BankScope the ratio was hand-collected from banks’ annual 
reports or from other sources found in banks’ web sites. 
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The Loan to Deposit ratios (LD) are calculated using data from WorldScope on 
Banks Net Loans and Total Deposits. Similarly, the variable of financial leverage 
(LEV) is calculated using data from WorldScope dividing the Long-Term Debt with 
the Book Value of Equity. The BETA, the RVAR, and the VARERN were estimated 
using raw data from the DataStream, such as banks’ share price returns, returns of the 
DJ STOXX 600 index, and net income data. 
 
As with the value relevance empirical tests, all figures stated in other currencies are 
converted into Euros using the exchange rates provided by the DataStream as of the 
same date with the measurement date of the related variable (see, Appendix E). 
 
7.5 Conclusion 
This chapter provided the research methodology of the second empirical test of this 
thesis, the economic consequence test. The chapter develops four hypotheses. The 
first hypothesis tests whether the mandatory adoption of IFRS had any material 
impact on banks’ CE. The other three hypotheses examine whether the decrease in the 
CE is higher for specific groups of banks. These groups are banks that experience low 
analyst following, domiciled in countries with Continental accounting standards, and 
domiciled in Strong enforcement rule countries. 
 
The CE is not directly observable and therefore it needs to be estimated. Similar to 
Daske et al. (2008) and Li (2010), this thesis uses four methods to estimate the CE. 
Two of these methods are based on an implementation of the RIVM as provided by 
Gebhardt et al. (2001) and Claus & Thomas (2001) and two are based on the 
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implementation of the EGM (the Ohlson & Juettner (2005) model) as developed by 
Gode & Mohanram (2003) and by Easton (2004). 
 
The analysis involves a univariate test and a multivariate test. The univariate test 
simply examines the change of the CE from 2002 to 2007. The multivariate analysis 
provides a more powerful test by controlling for a number of factors that are likely to 
impact on CE, i.e., the capital adequacy ratio; the ratio of loans to deposits; the 
market beta; earnings variability; a size variable; the book-to-market ratio; the 
financial leverage; the risk-free rate; and the US listing. 
 
For robustness, four alternative specification models are developed: i) a model that 
uses alternative variables to the variables of the primary model, ii) a model that 
controls for outliers by taking the natural logarithms of the continuous independent 
variables, iii) a model that controls for the growth expectations of banks by including 
a long-term growth variable in the primary model, and iv) a model that uses the risk 
premium as the dependent variable instead of the CE. 
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Chapter 8: Findings on the value relevance 
  
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the findings of the first empirical research, namely: the value 
relevance of fair value accounting under IFRS. The findings are presented into two 
separate sections. A section for the value relevance of fair value disclosures, such as 
loans and advances, held-to-maturity investments, deposits, and other debt, and a 
section for derivatives’ fair value recognition (net trading and hedging derivatives). 
 
In particular, this chapter is organized as follows: Section 8.2 presents the descriptive 
statistics for the dependent and the independent variables. Section 8.3 provides the 
results of the regression models that test the value relevance of fair value disclosures. 
The analysis begins with a discussion of the results of the primary specification 
model and follows with the alternative specification models. Section 8.4 discusses the 
findings on derivatives’ fair value recognition under a primary specification model 
and under alternative specification models for robustness. Finally, Chapter 8.5 
concludes.   
 
8.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 8.1 reports the descriptive statistics for the variables in 2005 and 2006. On 
average the market value of equity (MVE) is almost double that of its book value 
(BVE). In particular, the market-to-book value ratio for 2005 is 1.73 (€13,103/7,557) 
and that for 2006 is 1.84 (€15,860/8,630). Therefore, the differences between MVE 
and BVE (i.e. MB), that this study attempts to explain, represent both in absolute and 
relative terms, very material amounts. 
 199
Table 8.1 
Descriptive statistics for the variables 
 
 Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev. 
 2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006 
Value of Equity 
MVE 13,103 15,860 3,889 5,120 154,183 159,025 10 28 23,347 25,797 
BVE 7,557 8,630 2,165 2,527 83,263 87,265 46 54 13,292 14,675 
MB 5,546 7,230 1,456 2,493 70,920 71,760 -2,148 -3,837 10,857 12,217 
Book value of assets and liabilities 
BLNS 101,762 111,893 22,220 24,376 743,635 810,540 131 295 164,915 176,711 
BHTM 1,640 1,437 29 14 19,769 18,007 0 0 3,567 3,431 
AFS 17,685 17,881 1,621 1,983 179,020 188,378 0 0 36,446 39,183 
FAFVPL 48,074 56,314 2,346 2,758 700,525 754,800 0 0 119,743 143,430 
OAS 16,693 17,454 3,036 3,081 229,350 252,601 17 20 34,875 37,929 
TA 185,854 204,979 30,158 33,248 1,348,836 1,491,388 250 401 327,714 363,542 
           
BDEP 94,282 100,649 17,851 21,497 727,693 821,291 193 177 161,898 172,427 
BDT 34,548 39,750 5,728 6,330 254,490 302,817 0 0 54,769 63,746 
FLFVPL 31,577 36,396 469 536 610,681 653,328 0 0 91,302 103,321 
OLI 17,890 19,554 1,829 1,676 230,389 251,727 4 10 37,390 42,697 
Income statement variables 
NOI 2,194 2,279 620 618 26,692 26,443 5 10 3,839 4,020 
NSI 702 862 39 61 13,571 10,489 -213 -184 1,902 2,122 
Fair Value of assets and liabilities 
FLNS 102,467 112,228 22,247 24,762 743,372 807,604 131 295 165,696 176,944 
FHTM 1,716 1,466 35 14 21,164 18,960 0 0 3,773 3,524 
FDEP 94,331 100,363 17,851 21,481 727,693 821,291 193 177 161,913 172,146 
FDT 34,762 39,802 5,767 6,347 258,107 303,185 0 0 55,146 63,855 
Differences between Fair Values and Book Values  
LNS 705 334 66 12 15,099 7,734 -262 -2,936 1,817 1,179 
HTM 76 29 0 0 1,395 953 -25 -148 239 137 
DEP 49 -286 0 0 5,749 282 -5,177 -19,566 825 1,923 
DT 214 52 2 0 3,617 1,985 -3,624 -2,176 805 465 
Derivative values 
NTDER -309 -584 0 -2 8,844 5,831 -15,839 -22,744 2,068 2,735 
NHDER -254 -230 0 0 2,570 1,718 -9,062 -7,140 1,521 1,147 
NADER 1,494,698 1,920,331 41,090 56,651 26,097,245 31,246,745 0 0 4,284,178 5,567,135 
NATDER 1,149,810 1,291,451 16,887 36,629 25,981,270 31,104,624 0 0 3,915,660 4,466,608 
NAHDER 52,853 59,834 2,218 2,865 1,437,382 1,774,780 0 0 175,129 206,209 
Other Control Variables 
NON39AS 15,864 16,731 2,932 2,852 229,106 246,682 -932 20 34,253 37,119 
NON39LI 16,807 18,601 1,266 1,450 224,782 247,482 4 10 36,710 41,976 
NPL 2,251 2,218 541 496 32,812 22,547 0 0 4,637 4,156 
GAP 39,395 40,236 6,779 6,432 309,184 353,175 -8,166 -29,994 71,174 77,076 
CORE 40,414 42,288 7,191 8,611 418,736 429,236 20 2 77,533 75,938 
OFF 46,497 54,561 4,241 6,342 627,115 618,027 48 0 96,075 110,787 
ISAS 76,572 81,627 13,161 15,270 670,497 757,450 5 17 128,994 142,611 
ISLI 37,177 41,391 6,201 7,921 365,870 404,275 5 3 62,513 69,729 
CAR 12.17 11.68 11.50 11.10 27.40 22.90 7.60 7.30 2.99 2.27 
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Notes to table 8.1: 
1. All the amounts are in millions of euros. 
2. The maximum number of observations are N=107 in 2005 and N=110 in 2006. 
3. The observations for NATDER and NAHDER are 83 banks in 2005 and 89 banks in 2006 due to poor 
information regarding the disaggregated values of the notional amounts of derivatives, NADER. 
4. MVE = market value of equity, BVE = Book value of equity, MB = MVE - BVE, BLNS = Loans and advances, 
BHTM = Held-to-maturity investments, AFS = Available for sales, FAFVPL = Financial assets at fair value through 
P/L, OAS = Other Assets, the remaining value of assets, TA = Total Assets, BDEP = Deposits, BDT = Short and 
Long-term debt, FLFVPL = Financial liabilities at fair value through P/L, OLI = Other liabilities, the remaining 
values of liabilities, NOI = Net operating income, NSI = Net securities income, FLNS = Fair values of Loans and 
advances, FHTM = Fair values of Held-to-Maturity investments, FDEP = Fair values of Deposits, FDT = Fair values 
of short and long-term debt, LNS = FLNS-BLNS, HTM = FHTM-BHTM, DEP = FDEP - BDEP, DT = FDT-BDT, 
NTDER = Net trading derivatives, NHDER = Net hedging derivatives, NADER = Notional amounts of derivatives, 
NATDER = notional amounts of trading derivatives, NAHDER = notional amounts of hedging derivatives, 
NON39AS = non-IAS 39 assets, NON39LI = non-IAS 39 liabilities, NPL = Non-performing loans, GAP = ISAS - 
ISLI, CORE = Deposits with no stated maturities, on demand deposits, OFF = Notional amounts of credit-related 
off-balance sheet items, ISAS = Interest-sensitive assets, ISLI = Interest-sensitive liabilities, and CAR = Capital 
adequacy ratio.  
 
The market-to-book value ratio of more than one can be attributed to the partial use of fair values 
in the financial statements of banks: IAS 39 requires the recognition of loans and advances, held-
to-maturity investments, deposits, and other debt in amortized cost instead of fair values. 
Adjusting the BVE for the fair value differences results in a market-to-book value ratio of 1.52 
(13,103/8,601) for 2005 and 1.81 (15,860/8,759) for 2006 31 . These market-to-book ratios 
although are lower than the original ratios (1.73 for 2005 and 1.84 for 2006) there are still far 
away from unity. An explanation for this difference is the unrecorded goodwill of banks (e.g. 
core deposit intangibles).  
 
Loans, in terms of their book value (BLNS), are by far the asset with the highest value and 
represent over 50% of total assets. On average, LNS, the difference between the fair value of 
loans (FLNS) and their book value (BLNS), was €705 million in 2005 and €334 million in 2006. 
These differences represent 9.3% of the book value of equity for 2005 and 3.9% for 2006. The 
difference between the fair value and the book value of loans is the highest of all of the 
differences between fair values and book values (for both 2005 and 2006), and this provides 
                                                 
31 The adjusted BVE for the fair value differences have been calculated as the BVE from Table 8.1 plus the LNS, 
HTM, DEP, DT.   
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support for the operationalisation of the importance of capital adequacy ratio and weak 
enforcement environment using, LNS*WEAK*LOWC.  
 
Financial assets at fair value through profit or loss (FAFVPL) are the asset with the second 
highest value, at 26% (27%) in 2005 (2006), followed by the available-for-sale assets (AFS), at 
10% (9%). The assets with the lowest value are held-to-maturity investments. For example, for 
2005 their book value (BHTM) and their fair value (FHTM) represent less than 1% of the total 
assets. Moreover, the difference between their fair values and book values is, relative to that 
relating to loans, small for both 2005 and 2006 (€76 million and €29 million, respectively). 
  
With respect to the liability variables, book value of deposits (BDEP) are clearly the most 
important as they represent the 53% of all liabilities (51% for 2006). However, whilst the 
difference between their fair values and their book values (DEP) for 2005 is only 49 million, it is 
286 million in 2006. Debt, in terms of its book value (BDT) represents only 19% (20%) of the 
total liabilities. However, in contrast to DEP, the difference between the fair value and the book 
value of debt (DT) is €214 million in 2005 and €52 million in 2006. The financial liabilities at 
fair value through profit or loss (FLFVPL) represent the 18% (19%) of total liabilities. 
 
Income statement variables (NOI and NSI) indicate that the majority of banks’ earnings relate to 
their core business, the loan – deposit activity. For example, for 2005 the average net operating 
earnings (NOI) were 2,194 million, whilst the average net securities earnings (NSI) were 702 
million. Descriptive statistics regarding fair values of derivatives reveal that the net position of 
trading and hedging derivatives is negative with trading derivative liabilities and hedging 
derivative liabilities overcoming trading derivative assets and hedging derivative assets, 
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respectively. In particular, the net trading derivatives are -309 (-584) million in 2005 (2006) and 
the net hedging derivatives are -254 (-230) million in 2005 (2006).   
 
The descriptive statistics for control variables show that the notional amounts of derivatives 
(NADER) represent very substantial amounts - an average of €1,494,698 million for 2005. The 
notional amounts of derivatives are much higher than their fair values as they represent the 
contractual amounts based on which the cash flows of a derivative contract are calculated. The 
magnitude of notional amounts cannot be underestimated. For example, for Barclays plc in 
Annual Report 2005, whilst its total assets amounted to £924.36 billion, the notional amount of 
its derivatives was £17,884.44 billion. Descriptive statistics also show that, on average, the 
interest sensitivity assets (ISAS) are almost double the size of interest sensitivity liabilities (ISLI) 
for both years: e.g., for 2005, ISAS were €76,572 as opposed to €37,177 million for ISLI. GAP, 
which represents the difference between these two variables, is the excess amount of ISAS over 
ISLI. It is also noteworthy that off-balance sheet items (OFF) are relatively substantial: for both 
years, they exceed the fair value of debt. 
 
The standard deviation for all variables is large, revealing a high dispersion in the sample. 
Therefore, although on average the differences between the fair value and book value of some of 
the variables of interest may not be particularly large, for many banks these differences represent 
very large amounts. For example, for 2005 the maximum difference between fair value and book 
value for debt (DT) is €3,617 million, whilst the average difference is only €214 million. The 
high dispersion in the sample may result in outliers which are a common dataset problem when 
estimating the model using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method. Outliers can affect the 
results of the regression model because they minimize the sum of squared residuals (Wooldridge, 
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2006). Given the small population of this thesis and the fact that the sample consists of very large 
banks that usually domicile in developed countries, such as the U.K., and of very small banks 
that domicile in developing countries, such as Lithuania, outliers are also present in the dataset of 
this thesis. Dropping some of the outliers out of the model may decrease further the sample of 
the thesis and this will affect the estimated coefficients, given the smaller sample. Thus, the 
regression models below were run without taking any action for outliers.          
 
8.3 Fair value disclosures 
This section provides the findings regarding the value relevance of fair value disclosures. 
Evidence is provided for loans and advances, held-to-maturity investments, deposit liabilities, 
and other debt. Section 8.3.1 presents the results from the primary specification model and 
Section 8.3.2 discusses the results from the alternative specification models. 
 
8.3.1 Results from the primary specification model 
The correlation matrix for the regression variables indicates that some of the independent 
variables are highly correlated with each other (Table 8.2, Panel A). Although it is preferable for 
the correlations of the independent variables to be as low as possible, it is not clear when 
multicollinearity is a problem in the dataset (Wooldridge, 2006, p. 102-103). A standard solution 
is to drop one or more variables from the model: the variables that are highly correlated. 
However, excluding an important variable from the model results in model misspecification and 
as a consequence in bias (Greene, 2002; Wooldridge, 2006). Thus, many researchers run the 
model including all variables, ignoring multiciollinearity. 
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Multicollinearity is also present in previous value relevance studies (Barth et al., 1996). In this 
study, researchers examine (apart from the primary specification model that suffers from high 
collinearity) other model specifications, such as a first-difference specification model where the 
correlations between the explanatory variables are less prevalent. Similar, to Barth et al. (1996) 
the multicollinearity for the first-difference model of this study is much less of an issue (see, 
Table 8.2, Panel B). 
 
Table 8.3 reports the results of the regression analysis based on the primary specification model, 
Equation (6.2). As indicated by the White (1980) chi-square test the null hypothesis of correct 
model specification and the homoskedasticity assumption is not rejected for either of the two 
years. White’s chi-squares are 0.0825 and 0.0656, respectively. Failing to reject the null 
hypotheses of White’s test (1980) is an indication that the primary specification model, Equation 
(6.2), is well specified. The model has high explanatory power: the adjusted R2 shows that in 
total the independent variables explain 91% and 85% of the variation of the dependent variable 
in 2005 and 2006, respectively. 
 
The results reject the null hypothesis H1 against the alternative hypothesis that the fair values are 
value relevant over and above the amortized costs. This observation holds for the disclosures of 
the fair value of loans (LNS) and debt (DT). The loans variable (LNS), which represents the most 
important financial asset for banks, is significant at the 0.01 level with the expected positive sign 
in both years. There is also strong support for the value relevance of debt (DT) whose coefficient 
is significant and negative (as hypothesized) for both years under study. The significant positive 
coefficient of the loan variable (LNS) supports the findings of Barth et al. (1996) where they also 
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found significant the coefficient of loans for a sample of US banks. In addition, Barth et al. (1996) 
found significant the proxy variables for the interest rate risk and the default risk, which they 
both act as competitive variables to the fair value of loans. Under this thesis, the variables of 
GAP and NPL, which control for the interest rate risk and the default risk, respectively are found 
significant only in 2006 with the expected signs. 
Table 8.3 
Primary regression results for the primary specification model, Equation (6.2) 
 
  2005    2006   
   
Variables Predict 
-ed sign 
Coeff. t-value p-valuesa  Coeff. t-values p-valuesa 
Intercept ? 266.689 0.69 0.4918  1078.653 2.02 0.0458 
LNS + 2.263 3.32 0.0007  2.276 4.86 0.0001 
LNS*WEAK*LOWC - -4.392 -4.96 0.0001  -3.200 -2.98 0.0018 
HTM + -4.405 -2.13 0.9822  -13.604 -3.19 0.9991 
DEP - -0.596 -1.29 0.0993  -0.319 -1.18 0.1202 
DT - -4.239 -3.92 0.0001  -4.140 -2.71 0.0040 
NON39AS + 0.307 14.77 0.0001  0.199 7.71 0.0001 
NON39LI - -0.095 -4.43 0.0001  -0.129 -5.77 0.0001 
NADER ? -0.001 -8.55 0.0001  -0.001 -0.07 0.9418 
NPL - 0.045 0.46 0.6785  -0.397 -2.12 0.0182 
GAP - 0.015 1.14 0.8715  -0.031 -1.90 0.0297 
CORE + 0.052 4.36 0.0001  0.211 10.56 0.0001 
OFF ? 0.051 5.21 0.0001  -0.023 -2.15 0.0340 
         
Adj. R2  0.91    0.85   
White’s  
Chi-Square 
  
0.0825 
    
0.0656 
  
N  107    110   
a p-values are based on one-tailed t-tests when the coefficient sign is predicted, and two-tailed t-tests otherwise. 
 
Consistent with previous studies (Barth et al., 1996; Eccher et al., 1996; and Nelson 1996), the 
deposit variable (DEP) is found to be insignificant. A plausible explanation for this result may lie 
in the estimates of the deposits’ fair value by the sample banks. IAS 39, similarly to SFAS No. 
107, requires that the fair value of deposit liabilities with a demand feature should not to be 
stated at less than the amount payable on demand (IAS 39, para. 49)32. Most European banks 
                                                 
32 Indicative extracts from two annual reports (2005) of sample banks follows: Lloyds TSB Group states that “the 
fair value of deposits repayable on demand is considered to be equal to their carrying value. The fair value for all 
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appear to state the fair value of deposits with no stated maturities at this minimum amount which 
is required by the standard, i.e., their carrying amount, which may not reflect their true fair value. 
Finally, held-to-maturity investments (HTM) are insignificant for both 2005 and 2006, but not in 
the hypothesised direction. The negative sign of the coefficient suggests that the market 
penalizes banks that classify financial assets as held-to-maturity. This may be due to the riskiness 
of these investments. Held-to-maturity investments do not qualify as hedged instruments in terms 
of interest rate risk (IAS 39, para. 79). Potential material variations in the value of these 
investments that are not hedged, coupled with the uncertainty surrounding management’s 
intention and ability to hold these instruments until maturity, may lead the market to take a 
conservative stance on them, anticipating potential future losses. This is also consistent with the 
view of Ryan (1999) that the long maturity and low marketability of these investments may lead 
to ‘greater incompleteness, noise, and discretion’ relating to their disclosed fair values. 
 
H2 is also strongly supported: the interaction variable (LNS*WEAK*LOWC), which permits the 
fair value of loans coefficient to vary with the financial health of commercial banks and the 
strength of countries’ enforcement rules, is significant for both years. The negative coefficient 
for this interaction term supports the hypothesis that the market assigns a lower coefficient to the 
fair value of loans of commercial banks that have a low capital adequacy ratio and domicile in 
countries with weak enforcement of accounting rules (banks in group A of Table 6.2). 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
other deposits and customer accounts is estimated using discounted cash flows applying either market rates, where 
applicable, or current rates for deposits of similar remaining maturities”. Bank Austria Creditanstalt AG states also 
that “To the extent that market prices were available from exchanges or other efficient markets, these were stated as 
fair values. For the other financial instruments, internal valuation models were used, in particular the present value 
method (discounting future cash flows on the basis of current yield curves). For fixed-rate loans and advances to, 
and amounts owed to, banks and customers with a remaining maturity of, or regular interest rate adjustment within 
a period of, less than one year, amortised cost was stated as fair value”.  
 209
The findings with respect to the control variables are broadly consistent with those of past 
studies. For both years the coefficients for both assets and liabilities other than those covered by 
IAS 39 (NON39AS and NON39LI) are statistically different from zero at p<0.01, with the 
predicted sign: positive for assets, and negative for liabilities. There is also support for the 
importance of the notional amounts for derivatives (NADER), which are found significant, with 
a negative sign, in 2005. This confirms the findings of past studies (e.g., Eccher et al., 1996 and 
Venkatachalam, 1996), that investors associate the notional amount of derivatives with an 
additional risk for banks. The results also strong support the importance of core deposits (CORE), 
which are found significant in both years. This reinforces the findings of Barth et al. (1996) that 
core deposits constitute an important unrecognized intangible asset which is reflected in the 
market value of banks. Also, similarly to previous studies (Eccher et al., 1996 and Riffe, 1997), 
the variable for credit-related off-balance sheet items (OFF) is found significant, with a positive 
sign in 2005 and a negative sign in 2006. This change in sing can be attributed to a number of 
factors, e.g., changes in the general financial outlook of banks might have led investors to take a 
more negative stance on off-balance sheet items. Default risk, proxied by non-performing loans 
(NPL), also has the predicted negative sign, supporting the view that investors interpret non-
performing loans as having a negative effect on market values (Beaver et al., 1989); but it is only 
significant for 2006. Moreover, the results support the importance of interest rate risk, proxied by 
GAP (i.e., the difference between financial assets and financial liabilities with maturities over a 
year), which is significant for 2006. As predicted, because interest rates were in an upward trend 
from the second half of 2005 and on, this variable had a negative sign, indicating that the market 
had indeed taken a negative view on banks which were ‘asset sensitive’ (whose interest-sensitive 
assets exceeded their interest-sensitive liabilities).  
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8.3.2 Results from the alternative specification models  
This section tests the robustness of the primary findings using a number of alternative models. 
Getting consistent findings under different model specifications strengthens the validity of the 
primary results and increases researcher’s confidence for the relationship between the cause and 
the effect, in this case the relationship between the differences in assets and liabilities’ values (i.e. 
fair values less book values) and the differences in equity values (i.e. market value less book 
value of equity).     
 
i) Table 8.4 presents the results from the first-difference model that implicitly controls for 
correlated omitted variables to the extent the omitted variables are constant over time. 
According to White’s test the model is well specified and do not suffer from 
heteroscedasticity (chi-square 0.2026). The model’s explanatory power is lower than that 
of the primary model, but at 32% it is still substantial. The results with respect to the 
significance of the variables of interest are substantially the same. LNS and the interaction 
variable (LNS*WEAK*LOWC) are both significant at the 1% level, with the predicted 
sign: positive for LNS, and negative for LNS*WEAK*LOWC. DT also continues to be 
significant, with p-value of 0.0290. As in the primary model, deposits (DEP) and held-to-
maturity investments (HTM) are not significant. There are, however, some differences 
concerning the significance of the control variables. CORE is still significant, as is 
NADER. In contrast, GAP and NPL, which were significant for 2006 in the primary model, 
are no longer significant. Finally, credit-related off-balance sheet items (OFF), and both 
assets and liabilities other than those covered by IAS 39 (NON39AS and NON39LI), 
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which were significant for both 2005 and 2006, are no longer significant though their signs 
are in the hypothesized direction. 
Table 8.4 
Regression results from the first-difference specification model 
 
     
   
Variables Predict 
-ed sign 
Coeff. t-value p-valuesa 
Intercept ? 1272.257 4.68 0.0001 
∆LNS + 1.296 3.37 0.0006 
∆LNS*WEAK*LOWC - -1.245 -2.41 0.0090 
∆HTM + -2.351 -1.01 0.8417 
∆DEP - -0.120 -0.93 0.1763 
∆DT - -1.256 -1.92 0.0290 
∆NON39AS + 0.034 1.44 0.0771 
∆NON39LI - -0.016 -0.46 0.3227 
∆NADER ? 0.001 4.48 0.0001 
∆NPL - 0.029 0.16 0.5636 
∆GAP - 0.005 0.35 0.6375 
∆CORE + 0.057 4.24 0.0001 
∆OFF ? -0.012 -0.80 0.4270 
     
Adj. R2  0.32   
White’s Chi-Square  0.2026   
N  100   
 
a p-values are based on one-tailed t-tests when the coefficient sign is predicted, and two-tailed t-tests 
otherwise. 
 
ii) The results of the March market values model were markedly similar to those reported in 
Table 8.3 (See Appendix B, Section 1, Table A). The adjusted R2 of this model was 
substantially the same (92% for 2005 and 85% for 2006), and both the variables of interest 
and the control variables retained their signs and significance, e.g., LNS, the interaction 
term (LNS*WEAK*LOWC), DT, NPL, GAP, CORE, and OFF continued to be significant. 
 
iii) The results from the model treating BVE as an independent variable instead of 
incorporating in the dependent variable provides qualitative similar results to those 
reported in Table (8.3) (See Appendix B, Section 1, Table B). In particular, the coefficient 
of LNS in 2005 (2006) is found to be 1.444 (1.755) and its p-value 0.0216 (0.0001). DT 
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and the interaction term (LNS*WEAK*LOWC) are also significant with the expected 
sings, e.g., for 2006, DT coefficient = -7.39 and p-value = 0.0001, and interaction term 
coefficient = -2.881 and p-value = 0.0020. One difference from the primary model results 
was that the deposits variable (DEP) was significant in the hypothesised direction for both 
years: for 2005, coefficient of -1.036 and p-value = 0.0139; and for 2006 co-efficient of -
0.869 and p-value = 0.0010. 
 
iv) With respect to the growth model, the growth variable (the five years change in net loans) 
is found marginally significant in 2005 with a coefficient of 0.014 and a p-value of 0.0575, 
and insignificant in 2006 (coefficient = 0.010, p-value = 0.2110). However, there was no 
variation in the results relating to the primary variables of interest (See Appendix B, 
Section 1, Table C).   
 
 
v) A small number of banks (fourteen in 2005) have adopted the IFRS before the introduction 
of their mandatory use in 2005. The longer experience that the market had had in dealing 
with the fair value estimates of these banks could have resulted to different valuation 
between the early adopters and the mandatory adopters. The dummy variable of early 
adopters (EARLY) is found insignificant in both years and did not have any effect on 
either the signs or the significance of the other variables (See Appendix B, Section 1, Table 
D). 
  
vi) Finally, the model that controls for banks’ pension fund status supports again the view that 
the fair values of loans and the fair values of other debt are value relevant over and above 
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their amortized cost (e.g., for 2005 the coefficient of LNS is 2.192 with a p-value of 0.0010 
and the coefficient of DT is -4.223 with a p-value of 0.0001). The interaction term 
(LNS*WEAK*LOWC) continues to support Hypothesis H2 (coefficient = -4.298 and p-
value = 0.0001) and the results with respect to the control variables are consistent with 
those reported in Table 8.3 (See Appendix B, Section 1, Table E). 
 
Overall, the results indicate that the LNS, its interaction term (LNS*WEAK*LOWC), and the 
DT are significant under all model specifications with the expected signs. Consistent to previous 
studies (Barth et al., 1996), fair values of loans are found value relevant.  Fair values of banks’ 
debt are also found significant with a negative sign. Moreover, the significant and negative 
coefficient for the interaction term of loans (LNS*WEAK*LOWC) indicates that the market 
assigns lower coefficient to those banks that hold low capital adequacy ratios and domicile in 
countries with weak enforcement rules. As explained in the methodology chapter (Chapter 6, 
Section 6.3.1.1), banks in group A have higher incentives to manipulate the fair values of loans 
due to low capital adequacy ratios. Moreover, they also have the latitude to do it as they domicile 
in weak enforcement rule countries.         
 
 
8.4 Derivatives’ fair value recognitions 
This section reports the findings regarding the value relevance of derivatives’ fair value 
recognition. Section 8.4.1 presents the results from the primary specification model and Section 
8.4.2 the results from the alternative specification models. 
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8.4.1 Results from the primary specification model 
Correlation matrixes for the derivatives’ test indicate that the correlations between some of the 
independent variables are high in the primary model (Table 8.5, Panel A). For example, the 
correlation between the GAP and the NOI is 0.87 for 2005. However, the correlations are 
substantial lower in the changes model (Table 8.5, Panel B). For the same variables (GAP and 
NOI) the correlation fell to 0.34. 
 
Table 8.6 reports the findings of the primary specification model, Equation (6.3). White’s chi-
square indicates that the model is well specified and does not suffer from heteroskedasticity (chi-
square = 0.0940 in 2005 and 0.0653 in 2006). Similar to previous studies (Ahmed et al., 2006) 
the explanatory power of the model is high with an adjusted R-squared of 98% (97%) in 2005 
(2006). 
 
The fair values of net trading derivatives (NTDER) and net hedging derivatives (NHDER) are 
found to be value relevant. Specifically, in 2005 (2006) the coefficient of NHDER is 2.804 
(1.045) and its p-value is 0.0001 (0.0359). NTDER is significant in 2005 (coefficient = 2.012, p-
value = 0.0001). These findings reject the null hypothesis H3 that the fair values of derivatives 
are not value relevant. Ahmed et al. (2006) provide similar results for the net fair values of 
recognised derivatives. 
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Table 8.6 
Primary regression results for the primary specification model, Equation (6.3) 
 
  2005    2006   
   
Variables Predict 
-ed sign 
Coeff. t-value p-valuesa  Coeff. t-values p-valuesa 
C ? 385.342 0.88 0.3800  1050.158 1.95 0.0533 
BV + 2.155 15.24 0.0001  1.614 9.85 0.0001 
NOI + 0.809 1.84 0.0340  1.723 3.68 0.0002 
NSI + 1.284 4.59 0.0001  2.415 5.33 0.0001 
NTDER + 2.012 4.62 0.0001  0.153 0.30 0.3821 
NTDER*WEAK*VARIN - -1.128 -3.66 0.0002  -1.036 -2.06 0.0209 
NHDER + 2.804 7.91 0.0001  1.045 1.82 0.0359 
NHDER*WEAK*VARIN - 0.373 0.99 0.8379  1.204 1.19 0.8832 
NADER ? 0.000 1.41 0.1589  -0.001 -2.78 0.0064 
NPL - -0.682 -5.52 0.0001  -0.782 -3.93 0.0001 
GAP - 0.002 0.18 0.5728  -0.021 -1.43 0.0771 
CORE + -0.073 -4.45 0.9999  0.007 0.25 0.4009 
OFF ? -0.037 -2.77 0.0066  -0.047 -3.28 0.0014 
         
Adjusted R-squared  0.98    0.97   
N  107    110   
White’s chi-square  0.0940    0.0653   
         
a p-values are based on one-tailed t-tests when the coefficient sign is predicted, and two-tailed t-tests otherwise. 
 
Null hypothesis H4 tests the statement that derivatives’ fair values are not incrementally value 
relevant over and above their notional amounts. The coefficient of the notional amounts of 
derivatives (NADER) is only significant in 2006 with a negative sign. This finding is consistent 
with previous studies (Venkatachalam, 1996) and the results presented in Table 8.3 of this thesis 
(the value relevance disclosures). The concurrent significance of the NADER with the NTDER 
and NHDER in 2006 indicates that the fair values of derivatives are value relevant over and 
above their notional amounts. This leads to a rejection of the null hypothesis, H4. Investors 
regard fair values of derivatives, which represent the current values of derivative contracts, as 
providing additional information content to their notional (contractual) amounts. Fair values 
show whether derivative contracts are a value-added activity for banks (positive fair values of 
derivatives) or whether they decrease banks’ market value of equity (negative fair values). In 
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contrast, the notional amounts of derivatives only provide the magnitude of the involvement of a 
bank in derivative contracts without revealing whether the bank is better-off from this activity.              
 
The interaction term of trading derivatives (NTDER*WEAK*VARIN) is found negative and 
significant in both years, e.g., for 2005 the coefficient = -1.128 and the p-value = 0.0002. This 
result supports Hypothesis H5 that the market assigns a lower coefficient to the fair values of 
derivatives of banks with high earnings volatility, domiciled in weak enforcement rule countries. 
This finding is consistent with Barton (2001) that reports evidence that firms use derivatives to 
smooth earnings. Thus, investors are more concern with the fair value estimates of derivatives of 
banks that experience high earnings volatility. However, this result does not hold for hedging 
derivatives (e.g. for 2005 the p-value of the interaction term NHDER*WEAK*VARIN is 
0.8379). 
 
As predicted the book value of equity before trading and hedging derivatives (BV), the net 
operating income (NOI), and the net securities income (NSI) are all significant for both years 
with positive signs. These findings are consistent with those of Wang et al. (2005) who also 
found the book value of equity and the earnings variables significant with positive coefficients. 
Regarding the other control variables only non-performing loans (NPL) and off-balance sheet 
items (OFF) are found value relevant in both years. NPL also holds the expected negative 
coefficient. NADER is only found significant in 2006 with a negative sign. Contrary to the 
results from the value relevance disclosure test (see, Table 8.3) the CORE variable is 
insignificant. 
 
219 
 
8.4.2 Results from the alternative specification models 
i) Table 8.7 reports the results from the changes model. The White’s test can not be rejected 
as the chi-square equals 0.2051 which is higher than that of the primary model. The 
adjusted R-squared is lower but still substantial (Adjusted R2 = 39%). The primary 
variables of interest, the fair values of trading and hedging derivatives, continue to be 
significant and positive as predicted. Specifically, the coefficient of NTDER is 2.615 with 
a p-value of 0.0064 and that of NHDER is 1.441 with a p-value of 0.0410. However, their 
interaction terms are no longer significant (e.g., p-value of NTDER*WEAK*VARIN 
equals 0.7425). Under the changes model, the notional amounts of derivatives (NADER) 
are found insignificant. The fact that the fair values of derivatives remain significant, 
whilst the notional amounts do not, indicates that investors regard fair values as providing 
more valuable information than their notional amounts. With the exception of the book 
value of equity (BV) and the net securities income (NSI), all other control variables are 
found insignificant. 
Table 8.7 
Regression results for the changes model 
 
   
Variables Predict 
-ed sign 
Coeff. t-value p-valuesa 
C ? 0.152 2.11 0.0376 
∆BV + 1.222 5.40 0.0001 
∆NOI + 0.392 0.77 0.2195 
∆NSI + 4.585 4.11 0.0001 
∆NTDER + 2.615 2.54 0.0064 
∆NTDER*WEAK*VARIN - 0.531 0.65 0.7425 
∆NHDER + 1.441 1.76 0.0410 
∆NHDER*WEAK*VARIN - 0.594 0.57 0.7154 
∆NADER ? 0.001 0.93 0.3542 
∆NPL - -0.028 -0.06 0.4733 
∆GAP - -0.038 -0.89 0.1869 
∆CORE + -0.028 -0.44 0.6711 
∆OFF ? -0.003 -0.25 0.8012 
Adjusted R-squared  0.39   
N  100   
White’s chi-square  0.2051   
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ii) The results of the March model show that the fair values of trading (NTDER) and hedging 
(NHDER) derivatives are only significant in 2005 (See, Appendix B, Section 2, Table A). 
The interaction term of trading derivatives (NTDER*WEAK*VARIN) is significant and 
negative in both years supporting again the view that the market assigns a lower coefficient 
to the fair values of trading derivatives of banks with high earnings volatility, domiciled in 
weak enforcement rule countries. NADER is found concurrently significant with the fair 
values of derivatives. This rejects hypothesis H4, which means that fair values of 
derivatives are value relevant incrementally to their notional amounts. Consistent with the 
results of the primary model (Table 8.6) the variables of BV, NOI, NSI, NPL, and OFF are 
significant. 
 
iii) The results of the model which incorporates the growth variable (LNS_5YR_CH) show 
that this variable is found to be positive but insignificant in both years (e,g., for 2005 
coefficient = 0.004, p-value = 3440). The inclusion of this variable in the primary model do 
not changes the results with respect to the other variables (See, Appendix B, Section 2, 
Table B). 
 
iv) The early adopters’ dummy variable is also found insignificant under the derivatives’ 
model (See, Appendix B, Section 2, Table C). For 2005 its coefficient is 1,084.55 and p-
value = 0.3450 and for 2006 coefficient = 945.72 and p-value = 0.5286. Fair values of 
hedging derivatives (NHDER) continue to be significant in both years and fair values of 
trading derivatives (NTDER) are only significant in 2005 (coefficient = 2.014 and p-value 
= 0.0001). Consistent with the findings of the primary model (Table 8.6) only the 
interaction term of trading derivatives is found significant, supporting again Hypothesis H5. 
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NADER is concurrently significant with the fair values of derivatives in 2006, whilst the 
NPL and the OFF are found significant with a negative coefficient in both years. 
 
v) The model that controls for the pension fund status of banks (PENS) indicates that 
investors do not regard the pension fund deficit or surplus of banks as an equity related 
figure (See Appendix B, Section 2, Table D). For example, the coefficient of PENS in 
2005 is positive and amounts to 0.558 with a p-value = 0.1926. The findings with respect 
to the other variables are similar to that of the primary model specification. 
 
vi) A model that disaggregates the notional amounts of derivatives (NADER) into notional 
amounts of trading (NATDER) and notional amounts of hedging derivatives (NAHDER) 
has also been tested (See Appendix B, Section 2, Table E)33. Similar to Venkatachalam 
(1996), this model supports the view that investors are better-off having available the 
disaggregated information for the notional amounts of derivatives. The adjusted R-squared 
has increased from 97% to more than 99%. Another important finding is that the White’s 
chi-square is also found to be extremely high, 0.99 in 2005 and 0.98 in 2006. The fair value 
of trading derivatives (NTDER) and hedging derivatives (NHDER) are found value 
relevant in both years (e.g., for 2006 the coefficient of NTDER equals 1.725 and the p-
value = 0.0001, and the coefficient of NHDER equals 1.507 and the p-value = 0.0027). The 
interaction term of trading derivatives (NTDER*WEAK*VARIN) for 2005 is significant 
and negative as in the previous model, whilst the interaction term of hedging derivatives 
(NHDER*WEAK*VARIN) is found insignificant in both years. With respect to the 
                                                 
33 This model results in a substantial smaller sample (for 2005, N = 83, and for 2006, N = 88) due to lack of the 
disaggregated information regarding the notional amounts of total derivatives (NADER) in trading and hedging 
notional amounts.  
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disaggregated values of trading (NATDER) and hedging (NAHDER) derivatives, only the 
notional amounts of trading derivatives have a significant negative relationship to the 
market value of equity (p-value = 0.0078 in 2005, and p-value = 0.0001 in 2006). These 
results provide additional support to the findings of the previous models which show that 
the fair values of derivatives are incrementally value relevant over and above their notional 
amounts. Consistent with the results of the previous models the coefficient of NPL is 
negative and significant in both years. OFF is found insignificant, whilst core deposits 
(CORE) are value relevant only in 2006 with the expected sign (coefficient = 0.051 and p-
value = 0.0083). Finally, as expected, the book value of equity before derivatives’ fair 
values (BV) is significantly related to the market value of equity. Regarding the earnings 
variables, only the net securities income (NSI) is found significant and positive in 2005, 
whilst the net operating income (NOI) is no longer value relevant. 
 
vii) Venkatachalam (1996) and Ahmed et al. (2006) used the BSM to provide results for 
derivatives’ fair values. As discussed in Chapter 6 (Section 6.3.2.1), due to the fact that 
two variables in the BSM, the aggregated fair values of financial assets (FVFAS) and the 
aggregated fair values of financial liabilities (FVFLI) were highly correlated (more than 
99% correlation in both years), a decision was taken not to use the BSM as the primary 
specification model. Instead, a model based on Ohlson (1995) model served as the study’s 
primary model. However, for completeness a model based on the BSM is also tested (See, 
Appendix B, Section 2, Table F). Fair values of hedging derivatives (NHDER) continue to 
be significant in both years (for 2005 coefficient = 2.277 and p-value = 0.0001 and for 
2006 coefficient = 2.897 and p-value = 0.0001). In contrast, fair values of trading 
223 
 
derivatives (NTDER) are no longer significant. For both years, the coefficient of the 
notional amounts of derivatives (NADER) has a negative sign and it is significant. The 
other control variables have the expected signs. The non-performing loans (NPL) continue 
to be significant with a negative sing in both years. The maturity gap (GAP) is value 
relevant in 2006 with a coefficient of -0.038 and a p-value of 0.0019. Similar to previous 
studies (Barth et al., 1996), the core deposits (CORE) have a positive impact on market 
values. Finally, the aggregated fair values (FVFAS) of financial assets and financial 
liabilities (FVFLI) had the predicted signs, positive for assets and negative for liabilities. 
The same observation also holds for non-IAS 39 assets and liabilities. 
 
Overall, the derivatives’ tests indicate that the recognised fair values of trading and hedging 
derivatives are value relevant, which means that investors incorporate the new information 
provided by the fair values in their investment decisions. In addition, fair values of derivatives 
have incremental explanatory power over and above their notional amounts. Results also support 
the view that investors assign a lower coefficient to the fair values of trading derivatives for 
those banks with high earnings volatility that domiciled in weak enforcement rule countries. This 
finding provides support to the results of Barton (2001) that firms use derivatives to smooth 
earnings. However, this last result does not hold for hedging derivatives. 
 
8.4.3 The use of hedging derivatives by European banks  
As shown in the previous section, European banks do not use hedging derivatives to smooth 
earnings. In order to investigate further the role of hedging derivatives, this study examines 
whether banks use hedging derivatives solely for their primary purpose, which is to hedge their 
224 
 
positions. Carter & Sinkey (1998) provide evidence that interest-rate derivatives of a sample of 
US banks are positively related to the maturity gap of financial assets and liabilities. This finding 
indicates that US banks use derivatives to reduce the interest rate risk related to the maturity gap 
of net financial assets. Hence, this thesis also examines whether European banks use hedging 
derivatives solely to hedge their maturity gap. 
 
A multivariate regression model is operated to test whether banks use hedging derivatives to 
hedge the maturity gap between financial assets and liabilities, given earnings volatility. In 
particular, the model regresses the notional amounts of hedging derivatives (NAHDER) on the 
maturity gap between financial assets and liabilities (GAP), the credit related off-balance sheet 
items (OFF), the notional amounts of trading derivatives (NATDER), the natural logarithm of 
the coefficient of variation of earnings (VARIN), and a size variable, the market value of equity 
(MVE). The results of this model are provided in Table 8.8 below. 
 
Findings in Table 8.8 reveal that the independent variables in the model explain more than the 
70% of the variation of the notional amounts of hedging derivatives. The maturity mismatch of 
interest-rate sensitive financial assets and liabilities (GAP) is found to be significantly and 
positively correlated to the notional amounts of hedging derivatives (NAHDER). This result 
indicates that banks use hedging derivatives to hedge the maturity gap of interest-rate sensitive 
assets and liabilities (Carter & Sinkey, 1998). The same result can also be observed for off-
balance sheet instruments (OFF). This is consistent with the IAS 39 statement that a fair value 
hedge relationship is, 
‘a hedge of the exposure to changes in fair value of a recognised asset or liability or an 
unrecognised firm commitment, or an identified portion of such an asset, liability or firm 
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commitment, that is attributable to a particular risk and could affect profit or loss’ (IAS 39, para. 
86) (emphasis added). 
 
 
Thus, banks use hedging derivatives not only to hedge the on-balance sheet positions, but also to 
hedge off-balance sheet activities, such as unrecognised banks commitments.   
 
Table 8.8 
The use of hedging derivatives by European banks 
 
Variables 2005    2006   
        
 Coeff. t-values p-values  Coeff. t-values p-values 
Intercept -6,806.87 -0.46 0.6401  14,985.06 0.95 0.3415 
GAP 2.55 7.83 0.0001  2.26 7.82 0.0001 
OFF 3.11 9.58 0.0001  2.64 12.71 0.0001 
NATDER -0.03 -7.70 0.0001  -0.02 -7.78 0.0001 
VARIN -296.21 -2.40 0.0188  -41.46 -0.32 0.7431 
MVE -14.05 -10.10 0.0001  -10.19 -10.14 0.0001 
        
N 83    88   
Adj. R-squared 0.72    0.77   
 
The control variable for the variability in earnings (VARIN) is only found significant in 2005 
with a negative sign (coefficient = -296.21 and p-value = 0.0188). In 2006 this variable is highly 
insignificant (p-value = 0.7431). The negative sign of earnings variability is opposite to what 
expected. For example, Geczy et al. (1997) suggest that firms use currency hedging derivatives 
to reduce earnings variability. Finally, with respect to the notional amounts of trading derivatives 
(NATDER), the model indicates that there is an inverse relation between the hedging and the 
trading derivatives. This means that banks that make high use of hedging derivatives, in order to 
hedge the maturity mismatch between financial assets and liabilities and the off-balance sheet 
items, use less derivatives for speculation (e.g. trading derivatives). Thus, banks that use more 
trading derivatives are the ‘risk lover’ banks and those that use more hedging derivatives the 
‘risk averse’ banks.   
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 8.5 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the findings of the value relevance of fair value disclosures and fair value 
recognition of derivatives of European banks under IFRS. The first test examines fair value 
disclosures for a number of banks’ financial assets and liabilities that according to IAS 39 are 
recognised in amortized costs. These items are loans and advances, held-to-maturity investments, 
deposit liabilities, and other debt. IAS 32 requires the disclosure of these items in fair values. 
The second test investigates the market valuation of derivatives’ fair value recognition.  
 
Overall, the results support the view that fair value of loans are value relevance incrementally to 
amortized costs. In all of the empirical models (primary and alternative specification models) the 
variable of loans is found significant with the expected positive sign. This finding is consisted 
with the results of previous studies that also found fair value of loans significant over and above 
their book values (Barth et al., 1996). Apart from loans, fair values of other debt (other than 
deposits) are also found significant in explaining market values. Their sign is estimated to be 
negative as predicted.  
 
The coefficients of the other variables of interest: the fair value of held-to-maturity investments 
and the fair value of deposits are found to be insignificant. The coefficient of held-to-maturity 
investments was always negative and insignificant. The negative coefficient indicates that 
investors penalize banks that hold held-to-maturity investments as they do not qualify for the 
interest rate hedging relationship (IAS 39, para. 79) and due to the uncertainty surrounding 
management’s intention and ability to hold these instruments to maturity. The variable of 
deposits is also found insignificant in most of the models, however with the expected negative 
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sign. A plausible explanation is the restriction imposed by IAS 39 that the fair value of a liability 
with a demand feature can not be less than the amount payable on demand (IAS 39, para. 49). 
This restriction forced many banks to equal the fair value of demand deposits with their carrying 
amounts.       
 
The chapter also provided evidence that investors assign lower coefficient to the fair value of 
loans of those banks that hold low capital adequacy ratios and domicile in Weak enforcement 
rule countries. Previous studies provide evidence that banks with low capital adequacy ratios 
have more incentives to manipulate fair value estimates of loans (Barth et al., 1996). This study 
extended this literature by relating banks’ incentives to manipulate fair values to countries 
enforcement rules. In particular, it is argued that the latitude of banks to manipulate fair values 
depends on country-specific institutional factors, such as the ability of each country to enforce its 
rules. Thus, banks domiciled in Weak enforcement rule countries have more freedom to 
manipulate fair values than banks domiciled in Strong enforcement rule countries. Countries 
classified into Weak enforcement and Strong enforcement rule countries based on the rule of law 
scores provided by Kaufmann et al. (2009).    
 
The control variables supported the findings of previous studies. Specifically, core deposit 
intangible (CORE) is found positive and significant (Barth et al., 1996). This result supports the 
view that investors consider core deposits as having a positive impact on banks market values. 
This is logical given the fact that core deposits proxy for the long-term relationship of banks with 
their customers. Non-performing loans (NPL) had a negative impact on the market value of 
equity (Beaver et al., 1989). Although non-performing loans do not necessarily indicate 
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impairment of these loans, they do indicate the level of banks’ default risk. The variable that 
controlled for interest rate risk: the maturity gap of interest-sensitive assets and liabilities (GAP) 
was found significant with the expected negative coefficient. European banks in the sample were 
‘asset sensitive’ (i.e. interest-sensitive assets exceeded interest-sensitive liabilities). Given the 
fact that interest rates were in an upward trend during 2005 – 2006 (see, Figure 6.1), the value of 
net interest-sensitive assets decreased. Consistent with Venkatachalam (1996) and Eccher et al. 
(1996), the coefficient of notional amounts of derivatives (NADER) is estimated to be negative. 
This result indicates that the higher the involvement of a bank in derivative contracts the lower 
its marker value of equity.  
 
Results regarding derivatives indicate that the fair values of derivatives’ recognition (trading and 
hedging derivatives) are value relevant over and above their notional amounts in most of the 
empirical models. Investors consider fair value of derivatives as providing additional information 
content to the notional amounts of derivatives. Although notional amounts of derivatives provide 
the magnitude of derivative contracts, they do not provide the current values of these contracts, 
which is what fair values represent. Fair values can aid investors to conclude on whether 
derivatives are a value-added activity for banks or an activity that increases the overall risk of 
banks. These findings are consistent with the results reported by Venkatachalam (1996) who 
found the fair values of derivative disclosures value relevant incrementally to their notional 
amounts. Moreover, they are consistent with the results of Ahmed et al. (2006) that they found 
value relevant the recognised fair values of derivatives.  
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The chapter also provided evidence that the market assigns lower coefficient to derivatives’ fair 
value estimates of banks with high earnings volatility. As predicted, banks with high earnings 
volatility have more incentives to manipulate the fair value estimates of derivatives in order to 
smooth earnings (Barton, 2001). However, the latitude of banks to manipulate fair value 
estimates will depend again on the ability of countries to enforce their rules. Hence, the market 
will assign lower coefficient to banks with high earnings volatility that also domicile in Weak 
enforcement rule countries. However, this result holds only for trading derivatives but not for 
hedging derivatives. Further analysis revealed that banks use hedging derivatives for their 
primary purpose that is to hedge the maturity gap of interest-sensitive assets and liabilities.   
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Chapter 9: Findings on the Cost of Equity Capital 
 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides the empirical results of the impact of the mandatory adoption of IFRS on 
banks’ CE. The univariate analysis involves comparisons between the level of CE for the three 
years before the official adoption of IFRS in 2005 and the level of CE for the first three years 
after their adoption. The results of the univariate analysis are provided for the full sample, and 
separately, i) for banks with low analyst following vs. high analyst following, ii) for banks 
domiciled in ‘Anglo-Saxon’ countries vs. ‘Continental’ countries, and iii) for banks domiciled in 
‘Strong Enforcement rule’ countries vs. ‘Weak Enforcement rule’ countries. 
 
Given the fact that the univariate analysis does not take into account other factors (apart from the 
IFRS adoption) that have affected the CE, results are also provided from a multivariate model 
that controls for a number of risk-related variables. The chapter also reports the findings from a 
number of additional tests in order to assess whether the effects on the CE vary with the level of 
analysts following (low following vs. high following), the countries’ legal enforcement 
environment (Weak enforcement rule vs. strong enforcement rule countries), and the 
classification of the national accounting standards (Continental vs. Anglo-Saxon accounting 
standards). Finally, findings are also provided under alternative model specifications for 
robustness. 
  
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 9.2 presents the descriptive statistics, Section 9.3 
discusses the findings of the univariate analysis, Section 9.4 reports the findings of the primary 
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multivariate models as well as the findings of the additional analysis which relates to the 
influence on the CE of: the level of analysts following; the countries’ enforcement rules, and 
national accounting standards. Section 9.5 reports the findings of the robustness tests, and 
Section 9.6 concludes. 
 
9.2 Descriptive statistics 
The number of banks in the sample of the cost of equity tests differs substantially from that of 
the value relevance test due to the availability of some variables. For example, for the cost of 
equity test, analysts’ forecasted earnings per share (provided via I/B/E/S) was a vital input in the 
calculations of the CE. The fact that analysts cover only a small fraction of the population of this 
thesis results in a smaller sample for the cost of equity test (88 banks) as compared to the sample 
of the value relevance test (110 banks in 2006). 
 
Panel A in Table 9.1 reports the descriptive statistics for the independent continuous variables 
and Panel B for the dummy variables. The results indicate that the sample includes different 
types of bank sizes with the smallest bank having a value of total assets (market value of equity) 
of 317.00 million (29.42 million) and the biggest bank a value of 2.64 trillion (154.21 billion). 
The average ASSET is 208,710.80 million and the median 43,599.89 million, indicating that the 
series of ASSET is positively skewed. The same observation can be made for MVE with average 
and median values of 14,779.71 million and €5,290.09 million, respectively. 
 
The average book value of net loans is higher than the average book value of deposits which 
gives an average LD ratio of 1.78. The LD ratio combined with the Long-term debt to Equity 
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ratio (LEV), which is on average over 3, indicates that European commercial banks are highly 
leveraged. However, given the minimum capital requirements which are set to be 8% by the 
Basel Committee, European commercial banks are in a safe territory with an average CAR of 
12%.  
Table 9.1 
Descriptive statistics for the Independent variables 
 
Panel A: Continuous variables (for all years, 2002 – 2007) 
 
       
 Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev. Number of 
Observations 
CAR 12% 11% 35% 8% 3% 444 
LD 1.78 1.46 56.48 0.00 2.85 514 
BETA 0.76 0.70 2.20 0.03   0.41 522 
VARERN 1.16 0.39 113.51 0.02 5.75 522 
BM 0.74 0.57 9.09 0.06 0.80 528 
ASSET 208,710.80 43,599.89 2,640,839.00 317.00 349,551.00 522 
LEV 3.11 2.53 20.63 0.00 3.00 521 
RF 3.14% 2.85% 11.56% 0.10% 1.40% 528 
RVAR 0.07 0.06 0.29 0.02 0.04 522 
VARCOEF 11.52 7.20 215.13 0.00 19.96 500 
MVE 14,779.71 5,290.09 154,205.80 29.42 23,075.28 517 
LTG 0.15 0.10 14.00 -3.55 0.69 522 
FOLLOW 11.39 9.00 37.00 0.00 8.18 522 
 
Panel B: Dummy variables 
 
     Number 
of banks 
(One) 
Number of 
banks 
(Zero) 
Total 
number of 
banks 
MAND    76 12 88 
USLIST    10 78 88 
LOWF    43 45 88 
STRNG    58 30 88 
CONT    47 41 88 
Notes: 
1. Values are in million of Euros. The maximum number of observations is 528 bank-years, 88 banks for a 6 years 
period. The explanation of the continuous variables are as follows: CAR = capital adequacy ratio, LD = ratio of 
Total Net Loans to Total Deposits, BETA = market beta, VARERN = earnings variability, BM = ratio of Book-
to-Market value, ASSET = Total Assets, LEV = financial leverage, RF = nominal local risk-free rate, RVAR = 
annual return variability, VARCOEF = coefficient of variation of all the FY1 analysts’ earnings per share 
estimates, MVE = market value of equity, LTG = long-term growth, FOLLOW = number of analysts covering 
bank. 
2. MAND takes the value of one for banks that have adopted the IFRS only when they became mandatory and the 
value of zero for banks that voluntarily have adopted the IFRS before the official adoption in 2005.  
USLIST takes the value of one for banks that are cross-listed in the US market and the value of zero for banks 
that do not have US listings. 
LOWF takes the value of one for banks that have low analyst following and the value of zero for banks that 
have high analyst following. 
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STRNG takes the value of one for banks that domicile in strong enforcement rule countries and zero for banks 
that domicile in weak enforcement rule countries. 
CONT takes the value of one for banks that used to follow Continental accounting standards, before the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS, and zero for banks that used to follow Anglo-Saxon accounting standards.         
 
The average BETA of the sample is 0.76. This number indicates that share prices of European 
commercial banks fluctuate less to the variations of the market index DJ STOXX 600. The 
alternative measure of market variability (RVAR) is found to be 0.07 (or 7%). The higher it is 
the higher the risk of a bank. The variables that control for earnings variability, the VARERN 
and the VARCOEF have a value of 1.16 and 11.52, respectively. Higher values for these 
variables indicate higher variability in banks’ earnings. The below the unity BM variable reveals 
that commercial banks are priced quite above their book values with an average book-to-market 
ratio of 0.74. The average long-term growth (LTG) of earnings per share is approximately 15%, 
while on average each European commercial bank in the sample is covered by 11 analysts. 
Finally, the average risk-free rate (RF) is found 3.14% implying an average risk premium for 
commercial banks of 6.26% (calculated as the average CE, 9.40%, from Table 9.3 below, less 
the risk-free rate of 3.14%). 
 
Panel B in Table 9.1 presents the descriptive statistics of the dummy variables which take the 
value of ‘one’ or ‘zero’. MAND shows that only 12 out of 88 banks have voluntarily adopted the 
IFRS before they became mandatory and USLIST reveals that only 10 banks have US listing. 
STRNG indicates that most of the sample banks domicile in strong enforcement rule countries 
(58 banks); in contrast, CONT shows that there is no material difference between the number of 
banks from Continental countries (47) and the number of banks from Anglo-Saxon reporting 
countries (41). No material difference can also be observed between banks with low and high 
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analyst following (e.g., 43 banks with low analyst following and 45 banks with high analyst 
following).  
 
Table 9.2 presents the descriptive statistics of the independent variables by country. The UK is 
the country with the largest banks on average when the criterion of size is the market value of 
equity (MVE). The average MVE for UK commercial banks is approximately €41.63 billion. 
However, when the criterion of size is the variable of total assets (ASSET), French banks have 
an average of €661.13 billion, while the UK banks fell in the second position, with an average of 
482.18 billion. The countries with the smallest banks are Norway and Poland (in terms of MVE). 
 
Germany is the country with the most sensitive banks to market volatilities as indicated by the 
high values of BETA (1.30) and the RVAR (11%). It is also the country with the most leveraged 
banks as it holds an average of 3.60 loans-to-deposits ratio (LD) and an average of 7.61 long-
term debt to equity ratio (LEV). The earnings volatility variables (VARERN and VARCOEF) 
indicate again that Germany is the country with the most earnings volatile banks.   
 
All countries in the sample hold a capital adequacy ratio well above the minimum capital 
requirements of 8% imposed by the Basel Committee. Commercial banks in Switzerland 
experience the highest CAR of 20%. All the remaining countries have a CAR equal or below the 
13%. Regarding, the LTG variable, Netherland, Poland, and Greece are the three countries with 
the highest future potential growths. Finally, the country with the lowest risk-free rates is 
Switzerland with 0.87% value. On the other hand the country with the highest risk-free rates is 
Hungary with 8.36% value. 
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Table 9.3 presents the descriptive statistics by year and by country for the average CE. Panel A 
presents the classification of the average CE by year and Panel B by country. However, 
Appendix C also presents the results for each of the four CE methods (Gebhardt et al., 2001; 
Claus & Thomas, 2001; Gode & Mohanram, 2003; and Easton, 2004). The number of 
observations in Panel A represents the number of banks included in each year and the number of 
observations in Panel B represents the number of bank-years observations. The calculations of 
the CE are as of the last date of each year (31st December). 
Table 9.3 
Descriptive statistics for the Cost of Equity Capital 
 
Panel A: By Year      
 Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev. Number of 
Observations 
2002 11.35% 10.45% 24.88% 6.08% 3.47% 88 
2003 9.33% 9.17% 15.74% 1.11% 2.43% 88 
2004 9.42% 9.05% 27.72% 5.70% 2.68% 88 
2005 8.44% 8.47% 13.12% 5.01% 1.49% 88 
2006 8.54% 8.63% 12.69% 4.94% 1.50% 88 
2007 9.30% 9.42% 14.28% 5.64% 1.73% 88 
All 9.40% 9.15% 27.72% 1.11% 2.51% 528 
       
Panel B: By Country (for all years, 2002 – 2007)  
 Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev. Number of 
Observations 
Austria 10.25% 10.26% 11.49% 9.06% 0.77% 6 
Belgium 8.94% 9.28% 11.56% 5.64% 1.39% 24 
Czech Republic 7.78% 7.62% 11.48% 5.01% 2.09% 6 
Denmark 9.30% 8.64% 24.88% 5.25% 3.63% 30 
Finland 8.36% 7.87% 11.50% 6.17% 1.73% 12 
France 9.70% 9.35% 14.98% 6.49% 1.82% 30 
Germany 11.65% 9.95% 27.72% 5.91% 4.97% 36 
Greece 10.94% 10.80% 13.99% 7.24% 1.38% 30 
Hungary 10.10% 10.21% 11.05% 8.72% 0.92% 6 
Ireland 9.50% 9.22% 12.66% 7.95% 1.22% 24 
Italy 9.51% 9.42% 21.64% 1.11% 2.92% 60 
Netherland 9.00% 8.81% 12.72% 5.98% 1.79% 24 
Norway 9.83% 9.52% 15.74% 7.03% 1.78% 42 
Poland 10.89% 10.37% 16.91% 6.32% 3.21% 24 
Portugal 8.49% 8.30% 10.91% 6.32% 1.12% 18 
Spain 8.70% 8.81% 11.56% 5.67% 1.36% 48 
Sweden 7.80% 7.65% 10.39% 6.41% 1.02% 24 
Switzerland 8.18% 7.92% 11.94% 5.89% 1.57% 24 
UK 8.62% 8.58% 11.80% 5.90% 1.36% 60 
All 9.40% 9.15% 27.72% 1.11% 2.51% 528 
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The descriptive statistics indicate that the average CE has decreased from 2002 to 2005. 
Specifically, the average CE is at the highest point at the first year of the sample in 2002 with a 
value of 11.35%, and takes the lowest value in 2005 where the IFRS became mandatory, 8.44%. 
After 2005 the CE started to increase again and in 2007 returned above nine percent at 9.30%, 
however quite below the highest value observed in 2002. Hence, the analysis indicates that the 
CE is lower for the post-IFRS period than the pre-IFRS period. The results for the medians are 
qualitative similar to the averages. Similar findings can also be observed for each of the four CE 
methods (see, Appendix C). 
 
The banks with the five highest average CE are those domiciled in Germany, 11.65%, Greece, 
10.94%, Poland 10.89%, Austria, 10.25%, and Hungary, 10.10%. On the other hand, the banks 
with the five lowest average CE are those domiciled in Czech Republic, 7.78%, Sweden, 7.80%, 
Switzerland, 8.18%, Finland, 8.36%, and Portugal, 8.49%. German banks are found to hold the 
highest average CE (11.65%) due to a number of extreme observations. The examination of the 
medians, which are not affected by extreme values, reveals that German banks fall to the fifth 
position with a median CE of 9.95%, quite below Greek banks with a median CE of 10.80%, 
Polish banks with a median of 10.37%, Austrian banks with 10.26%, and Hungarian banks with 
a median of 10.21%. The results of the medians for banks domicile in countries with the lowest 
CE do not change materially from the averages. Findings from each of the four CE methods (see, 
Appendix C) reveal that German banks hold the highest CE only under the Easton (2004) 
method (i.e. 14.04%). For all other methods, although German banks still hold high CE are not in 
the first position. Unexpectedly, banks domicile in Greece and Poland that are found to hold one 
of the highest CE under the average CE, under the GLS method they hold one of the lowest CE 
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(Appendix C, Table C1). With respect to the other CE methods (see, Appendix C, Tables C2-C4), 
both Greece and Poland hold high CE. 
 
9.3 Univariate analysis 
The univariate analysis involves the examination of the changes in the CE over the period, 2002 
to 2007. Exhibit 9.1 lists all the hypotheses developed in section 7.2 relating to the cost of equity 
tests. 
Exhibit 9.1 
List of hypotheses of the cost of equity tests 
 
 
H6: The mandatory adoption of IFRS did not have any material impact on banks’ CE. 
  
 
H7: Banks with low analyst following experienced a higher reduction in their CE than banks with 
high analyst following. 
 
 
H8: Banks domiciled in ‘Continental’ countries experienced a higher reduction in their CE than 
banks domicile in ‘Anglo-Saxon’ countries. 
 
 
H9: Banks domiciled in ‘strong enforcement rule’ countries experienced a higher reduction in 
their CE than banks domiciled in ‘weak enforcement rule’ countries. 
 
 
Table 9.4 shows the level of CE for these six years using four different methods (see, Section 
7.3.1.), as well as the average of these methods. Figure 9.1 presents these data graphically. The 
examination of the four CE methods (see columns GLS, CT, OJ, and PEG method in Table 9.4) 
indicates that the CE has decreased from the pre-IFRS period to the post-IFRS period under all 
methods. The GLS, the CT, and the PEG methods clearly reveal that the CE has slightly 
increased again during 2007, which is also reflected in the average CE (rAVG). The only method 
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under which the CE is decreasing for the whole sample period is the OJ method. This method 
gives the lowest CE estimates, 8.21%, whilst the method that gives the highest CE is the CT 
method, which gives an average CE of 10.09%. The increase in the CE that is observed in 2007 
can be attributed to the financial crisis of 2008 with the first signs of the crisis having emerged in 
2007. That year a great number of financial institutions made huge losses in financial assets, 
including subprime loans and CDOs. 
 
 
Table 9.4 
Cost of equity capital – Full Sample 
 
 
Quarter 
 
GLS method 
  
CT Method 
  
OJ Method 
  
PEG Method 
  
Average 
 N rGLS  N rCT  N rOJ  N RPEG  N rAVG 
 
 
Pre-IFRS 
              
2002 88 10.66%  88 11.71%  82 10.18%  84 12.61%  88 11.35% 
2003 88 8.93%  87 10.02%  85 8.55%  80 10.16%  88 9.33% 
2004 88 8.88%  87 9.98%  81 8.71%  76 10.40%  88 9.42% 
Average 
 
Post-IFRS 
 9.49%   10,57%   9.15%   11.06%   10.04% 
2005 88 8.43%  87 9.04%  80 7.34%  74 8.93%  88 8.44% 
2006 88 8.72%  88 9.24%  80 7.13%  72 8.79%  88 8.54% 
2007 88 9.84%  88 10.54%  80 7.28%  71 9.12%  88 9.30% 
Average  9.00%   9.61%   7.25%   8.95%   8.76% 
All 528 9.24%  525 10.09%  488 8.21%  457 10.00%  528 9.40% 
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Figure 9.1 
Cost of Equity Capital by Estimation Method 
 
 
 
Table 9.5 reports the average CE for 2002 – 2007 for the different groups of banks that are used 
in the testing of Hypotheses H7, H8 and H9, i.e., those banks that are followed by Low and High 
number of analysts; those that are domiciled in Continental and Anglo-Saxon countries, and 
those domiciled in Strong and Weak enforcement environments.  
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Table 9.5 
Cost of equity capital 
Low following vs. High following analyst 
Continental vs. Anglo-Saxon  
Strong vs. Weak Enforcement 
  
 
Years 
 
Low 
  
High 
   Anglo-
Saxon 
  
Continental 
  
Strong 
  
Weak 
 N rAVG  N rAVG   N rAVG N rAVG  N rAVG  N rAVG 
Pre-IFRS                 
2002 43 0.1203  45 0.1071   30 0.1079 58 0.1165  47 0.1159  41 0.1109 
2003 43 0.0957  45 0.0912   30 0.0909 58 0.0947  47 0.0919  41 0.0950 
2004 43 0.0961  45 0.0924   30 0.0868 58 0.0981  47 0.0916  41 0.0973 
Average  0.1040   0.0969    0.0952  0.1031   0.0998   0.1011 
                  
Post-IFRS                 
2005 43 0.0834  45 0.0855   30 0.0813 58 0.0861  47 0.0807  41 0.0888 
2006 43 0.0850  45 0.0858   30 0.0877 58 0.0842  47 0.0844  41 0.0866 
2007 43 0.0904  45 0.0955   30 0.0968 58 0.0911  47 0.0929  41 0.0931 
Average  0.0863   0.0889    0.0886  0.0871   0.0860   0.0895 
All  0.0952   0.0929    0.0919  0.0951   0.0929   0.0953 
 
Figures 9.2 - 9.4 present these data graphically. 
Figure 2 
Cost of Equity – Low analyst following vs. High analyst following 
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Figure 3 
Cost of Equity – Continental vs. Anglo Saxon 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 
Cost of Equity – Strong Enforcement vs. Weak Enforcement rule 
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Figure 9.2 indicates that before the mandatory adoption of IFRS banks with low analyst 
following had higher CE than banks with high analyst following (e.g., in 2003 banks with low 
analyst following had a CE of 9.57%, whilst banks with high analyst following had a CE of 
9.12%). However, this discrepancy almost disappears after the mandatory adoption of IFRS in 
2005. Figure 9.3 depicts the CE of banks domiciled in Continental and Anglo-Saxon countries. 
On average, banks in the Anglo-Saxon group, for 2002 – 2007, had lower CE than banks in the 
Continental group. However, during the post-IFRS period and especially in 2006 – 2007, 
Continental banks experienced lower CE than Anglo-Saxon banks (e.g., in 2006 Continental 
banks hold a CE of 8.42%, whilst Anglo-Saxon banks a CE of 8.77%). Figure 9.4 presents the 
CE of banks domiciled in Strong enforcement vs. Weak enforcement rule countries. For most of 
the post-IFRS period, banks domiciled in Strong enforcement rule countries experienced lower 
CE. 
 
Table 9.6 reports the difference-in-difference analysis for the CE around the mandatory adoption 
period of IFRS. The data is taken from Tables 9.4 and 9.5, and are the average CE for the pre-
IFRS period and post-IFRS period for the full sample (Section A of the Table) and for the 
different groups of interest (i.e., banks with high vs. low analyst following (Section B); banks 
from Continental vs. Anglo-Saxon countries (Section C); and banks in Strong vs. Weak 
enforcement environments, (Section D)). 
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Table 9.6 
Difference-in-differences analysis for the cost of equity  
Around the mandatory adoption period of IFRS 
 
 
A) Full Sample 
 
 
 
 
 
B) Low vs. High Analyst Following  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C) Anglo-Saxon vs. Continental sample  
 
 
 
 
 
 
D) Strong vs. Weak Enforcement sample 
 
 
 
  
1. The CE data is that from the average CE (rAVG). 
2. The three stars (***) indicate statistical significance of the differences in means, with p-values < 0.01 based 
on two-tailed t-tests. The two stars (**) indicate statistical significance of the differences in means, with 
0.01<p-value<0.05 based on two-tailed t-tests. The one star (*) indicates statistical significance of the 
differences in means, with 0.1>p-value>0.05. 
 
 Pre-IFRS period Post-IFRS period Diff 
 
Full sample, N = 528 bank-years 
10.04% 8.76% -1.28%*** 
 Pre-IFRS period Post-IFRS period Diff 
 
Low Analyst, N = 258 bank quarters 
 
 
10.40% 
  
8.63%% -1.77%*** 
 
High Analyst, N = 270 bank-quarters 
 
 
9.69% 8.89% -0.80%*** 
 
Diff 
 
0.71% 
 
-0.26 
 
-0.97%** 
 Pre-IFRS period Post-IFRS period Diff 
 
Continental, N = 348 bank quarters 
 
 
10.31% 
 
8.71% -1.60%*** 
 
Anglo-Saxon, N = 180 bank-quarters 
 
 
9.52% 8.86% -0.66% 
 
Diff 
 
0.79% 
 
-0.15% 
 
-0.94%** 
** 
 Pre-IFRS period Post-IFRS period Diff 
 
Strong, N = 282 bank-quarters 
 
 
9.98% 8.60% -1.38%*** 
 
Weak, N = 246 bank quarters 
 
 
10.11% 
 
8.95% -1.16%*** 
 
Diff 
 
-0.13% 
 
-0.35% 
 
-0.22%* 
** 
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The results show that the average CE for the full sample of European commercial banks has 
decreased from 10.04% in the pre-IFRS period to 8.76% in the post-IFRS period which is a 
decrease of 1.28%. This difference is significant based on the equality test of means (p-
value<0.01). This finding rejects Hypothesis H6 that the mandatory adoption of IFRS did not 
have a material impact on the CE. 
 
Further results support Hypothesis H7 that banks with low analyst following experienced a 
higher reduction in their CE after the mandatory adoption of IFRS (1.77% as compared to 0.80% 
for high analyst following). The difference in the mean reductions (-0.97%) is significant at the 
5% level of significance. Hypothesis H8 is also supported. but in the 10% level. Banks from 
Continental countries experienced 1.60% reduction in their CE, whilst banks from Anglo-Saxon 
countries experienced only a 0.66% reduction, which is a difference of 0.94%. This difference is 
significant at the 10% level. With respect to Hypothesis H9, banks from Strong enforcement rule 
countries experienced 1.38% reduction in their CE as opposed to a reduction of 1.16% that banks 
in Weak enforcement rule countries experienced. This finding indicates a difference in the mean 
reductions of 0.22, which based on the equality test of means is not significant.  
 
9.4 Multivariate analysis 
9.4.1 Primary analysis 
The univariate analysis above indicates that the CE of European commercial banks has decreased 
after the mandatory adoption of IFRS. This section reports the findings of the multivariate 
analysis which involves the testing of Equation (7.6):  
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CEit = γ0 + γ1 POSTit + γ2MANDit + γ3POST*MANDit + γ4CARit +γ5LDit + γ6BETAit + γ7VARERNit + γ8BMit + γ9 
LOG(ASSET)it + γ10 LEV + γ11RFit + γ12USLISTit+ ∑
18
k
kikCOUNTRYδ  + ωit         
 Table 9.7 reveals that the issue of multicollinearity is not present among the independent 
variables. The correlations between the independent variables are low with just a few values over 
the fifty percent. Table 9.8 reports the primary findings that test Hypothesis H6. The explanatory 
power of the model depends on the CE method. The GLS method gives the highest adjusted R-
squared, 68%, while the CT method provides the lowest adjusted R-squared, 31%. The adjusted 
R-squared of the average CE method is 45%, indicating that the independent variables explain a 
significant proportion of the variation of the dependent variable, the average CE. This 
explanatory power is higher than that of Li (2010) but lower than that reported by Daske et al. 
(2008). For example, Li (2010) reports an adjusted R-squared of 22% in her primary analysis, 
while Daske et al. (2008) report an adjusted R-squared of around 80%.  
 
The coefficient of the primary variable of interest, POST, is found significant with a negative 
sign under all the CE estimation methods. This finding rejects the null Hypothesis H6 that the CE 
has not been affected by the mandatory adoption of IFRS. The coefficient of POST indicates a 
reduction of 111 to 383 basis points in the CE from the pre-IFRS period to the post-IFRS period, 
depending on the method of the CE. The average reduction in the CE is 291 basis points. 
 
This finding is in conformity with that of Daske et al. (2008), who reported a significant 
reduction in the CE for a sample of worldwide firms from different industries. However, the 
findings of that study held only when the researchers took into account the anticipation effect 
(See, literature review, Chapter 5, Section 5.2.2.2). 
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Under all CE methods, the interaction term, MAND*POST, is positive, which means that banks 
that did not adopt the IFRS before 2005 (the year of mandatory adoption) experienced a lower 
reduction in the CE as compared to banks that voluntarily adopted IFRS prior to 2005. However, 
it is only significant under the OJ, the PEG, and importantly, under the AVG method. The 
relevant coefficients reported in Table 9.8 were used to calculate the implied CE for the 
mandatory and voluntary adopters, before and after the mandatory adoption of IFRS. The results 
are presented in Table 9.9 using the average CE. Mandatory adopters experienced a CE of 
0.0606 in the pre-IFRS period which has decreased by 0.0127 to 0.0479 in the post-IFRS period. 
On the other hand, voluntary adopters had a CE of 0.0723 in the pre-IFRS period and a CE of 
0.0432 in the post-IFRS period, implying a reduction of 0.029134. This result is opposite to the 
findings of Li (2010) who found that mandatory adopters experienced a higher decrease in the 
CE than voluntary adopters. However, consistent with Li (2010), the findings also show that the 
difference in the CE between the mandatory adopters and the voluntary adopters in the pre-IFRS 
period (0.0606 and 0.0723, respectively) has been eliminated in the post-IFRS period (0.0479 
and 0.0432, respectively). 
Table 9.9 
CE of Mandatory and Voluntary adopters  
based on the coefficients of the AVG method in Table 9.8 
 
 Pre-IFRS Post-IFRS Diff. 
Mandatory Adopters 0.0606 0.0479 -0.0127*** 
Voluntary Adopters 0.0723 0.0432 -0.0291*** 
Diff. -0,0117 0,0047  
 
*** indicates p-values < 0.01. 
                                                 
34 The CE estimates of the mandatory and the voluntary adopters have been calculated by the rAVG model in Table 
9.8 by setting the two dummy variables of POST and MAND equal zero or one. For example, the CE of the 
mandatory adopters in the pre-IFRS period (i.e. 0.0606), is calculated by setting the POST variable equal to zero and 
the MAND variable equal to one. Thus, the CE of this group is the sum of the intercept of the model (0.0723) with 
the coefficient of MAND (-0.0117).  
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The findings in this thesis can be interpreted as follows. In contrast to voluntary adopters, firms 
which adopted IFRS only when they became mandatory did not expect substantial benefits, such 
as a reduction in the CE, and this is why they did not adopt IFRS earlier. In fact, as the post-
IFRS results show, the mandatory adoption of IFRS resulted in the elimination of the CE 
advantage (a 0.0117 lower CE) they had during the pre-IFRS period over the voluntary adopters. 
As Li (2010, p. 623) explains this finding is: 
‘consistent with the assertion that a uniform set of high-quality accounting standards improves 
financial reporting convergence across the EU member states’.  
 
The significance of the control variables vary depending on which CE estimation method is used. 
The results of the bank specific variables are mixed. The capital adequacy ratio (CAR) is found 
to be insignificant under all the CE methods. The LD variable is found to be significant in all CE 
models with a negative coefficient. Mansur et al. (1993) predict a positive association between 
this ratio and measures of risk (e.g. CE). As discussed in the methodology (Chapter 7, Section 
7.3.2), a high net loans-to-deposits ratio should be associated with higher liquidity risk. However, 
the negative coefficient of LD is supported by Wetmore (2004, p. 100) who argues that, 
‘One argument in favor of high level of loan activity is banks securitize their loans thus reducing 
risk by removing them from the balance sheet. This permits them to make additional loans 
without having to increase the deposit base’. 
 
However, whether the activity of securitization is a plausible explanation to support a negative 
coefficient for the LD ratio is an empirical testable question. 
 
BETA is found to be significant with the expected positive sign only under the GLS method 
(coefficient = 0.0070, p-value = 0.0029). This finding indicates that banks with higher betas have 
a higher risk which is reflected in their CE. The variable that controls for the variability of 
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earnings (VARERN) has a significant positive sign in two out of the five methods, the OJ 
method (coefficient = 0.0005, p-value = 0.0203) and the average CE method (coefficient = 
0.0003, p-value = 0.0122), indicating that the CE increases as the variability in earnings 
increases.  
 
In conformity with the literature, the BM ratio is found to be significant and positive (Daske, 
2006; Gebhardt et al., 2001; Gode & Mohanram, 2003) while the variable controlling for size, 
LOG(ASSET) is found significant (p-value = 0.0302) only under the CT method with a positive 
sign. The significant coefficient (p-value = 0.0057 for the average CE method) of the leverage 
ratio, LEV supports the view that there is a positive relationship between leverage and CE. 
 
 The variable of time-series variation in risk-free rates, the RF, is highly significant with a 
positive sign under all CE methods. This finding suggests that the higher a country’s risk-free 
rates are, the higher are the rates of return that investors demand from their investments in that 
country, which is translated into higher CE for firms domiciled in that country. Finally, the US 
cross-listing variable is insignificant under all methods. 
 
9.4.2 Additional analysis 
This section reports the results of tests relating to Hypotheses: H7, H8 and H9. Additional analysis 
examines whether the impact on the CE by the mandatory adoption IFRS vary with: i) analyst 
following, ii) the classification of accounting standards, and iii) countries’ legal enforcement 
rules.  
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The results on whether analyst following affects the impact of the IFRS on the CE are reported 
on Table 9.10 (Hypothesis H7 in Chapter 7). The coefficient of POST is still significant with a 
negative sign under all CE methods. This indicates again that the CE has decreased in the post-
IFRS period for the full sample. However, the coefficient of the interaction term, POST*LOWF, 
is not found to be significant except under the GLS model. Thus, there is little support for 
Hypothesis H7, that banks with low analyst following experienced lower reduction in their CE. 
This finding contradicts the results of Botosan (1997) and Botosan & Plumlee (2002) who 
reported a higher reduction in the CE of firms with low analyst following. However, with respect 
to mandatory and voluntary adopters, results indicate that the three-way interaction term, 
POST*MAND*LOWF, is significant and negative under two out of five CE methods (i.e. the 
GLS and the CT method). This reveals that mandatory adopters with low analyst following had a 
greater reduction in their CE after the mandatory adoption of IFRS than the voluntary adopters. 
With respect to the other control variables, the results are similar to those relating to the primary 
regression model (see Table 9.8). An exception is the LEV variable which is significant in less 
models (GLS and AVG model) and the LOG(ASSET) which is insignificant under all models. 
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The interaction term POST*CONT in Table 9.11 tests hypothesis H8. The significant and negative 
coefficient indicates that, compared to banks domiciled in Anglo-Saxon countries, banks 
domiciled in Continental countries experienced a higher reduction in their CE. This result provides 
support for Hypothesis H8. The differences between the Anglo-Saxon accounting systems and 
IFRS are regarded to be small which means that the benefits of adopting IFRS should be greater 
for banks domiciled in countries with Continental accounting systems. Under the average CE 
method, the negative coefficient of POST*CONT indicates that the CE of banks in Continental 
countries decreased by 180 basis points more than the CE of banks in Anglo-Saxon countries. This 
decrease ranges from 76 to 231 basis points depending on which CE method is used. The three-
way interaction term, POST*MAND*CONT, is significant and positive under the OJ, the PEG, 
and the AVG method (e.g., for the AVG method, coefficient = 0.0157 and p-value = 0.0001). This 
indicates that mandatory adopters domiciled in Continental countries experienced a lower 
reduction in their CE after the mandatory adoption of IFRS than voluntary adopters. 
 
Finally, the findings regarding the influence of countries’ enforcement rules support hypothesis H9 
(Table 9.12). The interaction term POST*STRNG is significant and negative which suggests that 
banks domiciled in strong enforcement countries have a higher reduction in their CE than banks 
domiciled in weak enforcement countries. This finding is in conformity with the results of 
previous studies, such as those of Li (2010). The reduction in the average CE is 136 basis points 
for banks in weak enforcement countries and 371 basis points (136 + 235 basis points) for banks 
in strong enforcement countries. The difference in the reduction of the CE varies from 79 to 341 
basis points based on the CE method. The three-way interaction term, POST*MAND*STRNG, 
gauges the difference in the reduction of CE between the mandatory adopters
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and the voluntary adopters. The results indicate that mandatory adopters domiciled in strong 
enforcement rule countries had a lower reduction in their CE (for the AVG method, the 
coefficient of POST*MAND*STRNG equals 0.0264, p-value = 0.0001). On the other hand, 
voluntary adopters had a greater reduction in their CE when the IFRS became mandatory. 
 
Overall, the results regarding the control variables, of the additional models, do not differ 
materially from those of the primary regression model (Table 9.8). The BETA variable is found 
significant only under the GLS method. The variability in earnings (VARERN) is found 
significant with the expected positive sign in the GLS, the OJ and the AVG method. Again, the 
ratio of Loans to Deposits (LD) is significant under all CE methods, however with the opposite 
sign of the expected. The LEV variable is found significant in only one of the four CE methods 
and in the average CE. Finally, the BM and the RF variables are also significant with the 
expected signs, while the size variable, the natural logarithm of ASSET is significant in only one 
of the CE methods. 
 
9.5 Robustness tests 
9.5.1 Primary analysis 
The primary findings reported above indicate that the CE has significantly decreased after the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS in 2005. Based on the average CE estimates this reduction is 291 
basis points (Table 9.8). In order to test whether these findings are affected by model 
specification issues this section provides further evidence using alternative specification models. 
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Table 9.13 presents the results of the model that operationalizes a number of control variables in 
a different way by using alternative variables (as explained in the methodology, Chapter 7, these 
variables are: RVAR instead of BETA, VARCOEF instead of VARERN, LOG(MVE) instead of 
LOG(ASSET)). The coefficient of POST is found to be significant and negative again (for the 
AVG model, coefficient = -0.0186; p-value = 0.0001). The average CE model indicates a 
reduction of 186 basis points from the pre to the post-IFRS period. The control variables, RVAR, 
VARCOEF, and LOG(MVE), continue to be significant with the expected signs. Specifically, 
the return variability (RVAR) is significant with a positive sign under the GLS (p-value = 
0.0019), the PEG (p-value = 0.0002), and the AVG (p-value = 0.0053) models. The coefficient 
of the alternative variable to earnings variability (VARCOEF) is significant and positive as 
expected (e.g., for the AVG model, coefficient = 0.0002; p-value = 0.0001). The size variable, 
LOG(MVE), is only significant under the OJ method with a coefficient of -0.0036 and a p-value 
of 0.0118. The results with respect to all of the other variables are not different from those of the 
primary regression model (Table 9.8). 
 
Table 9.14 reports the findings of a model that controls for outliers by taking the natural 
logarithms of the continuous independent variables. Under all the CE methods, the results show a 
reduction in the CE after the mandatory adoption of IFRS. The coefficient of the POST variable 
for the AVG method is -0.0276 with a p-value of 0.0001. A notable difference between the 
model that controls for outliers and the primary estimation model in Table 9.8 is that the 
explanatory power of the former model increases significantly up to 73% for the GLS model.  
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The significance of most of the control variables is similar to the findings in Table 9.8. 
VARERN, BM, and the RF are found significant with positive coefficients and LD has a 
negative coefficient. For the first time the CAR is found significant with a negative sign, 
however only under the GLS method (coefficient = -0.0093; p-value = 0.0049). As discussed in 
Chapter 7 the higher it is the capital adequacy ratio the lower the CE which is supported by the 
negative sign. 
 
Table 9.15 reports the findings of the growth model which includes a proxy for the long-term 
growth in earnings per share. Consistent with the findings of the primary model and the other 
robustness tests, the coefficient of POST, shows that the CE has decreased after the mandatory 
adoption of IFRS, under all CE methods. The results regarding the LTG are mixed. Although, it 
is found significant under two CE methods, its coefficient is estimated to be positive under the 
CT method (coefficient = 0.0098) and negative under the PEG method (coefficient = -0.0173). 
 
Finally, Table 9.16 reports the results of the model that uses as the dependent variable the risk 
premium instead of the CE. As explained in the methodology chapter (Chapter 7), this model 
aims to test whether the results are sensitive to other measures of the required rate of return.   
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Similar, to the models that use the CE as the dependent variable, the coefficient of POST 
continues to be negative and significant. For example, for the AVG model the coefficient is -
0.0293 (p-value = 0.0001) indicating a reduction of 293 basis points after the mandatory 
adoption of IFRS. Regarding the control variables the findings do not change materially from 
those presented above (Table 9.8). CAR is still insignificant and LD is significant with a 
negative sign.  BETA and the size variable LOG(ASSET) are only significant under the GLS (p-
value = 0.0158) and the CT (p-value = 0.0298) method, respectively. Overall, the VARERN, the 
BM, and the LEV variables continue to be significant and positive as before. 
 
9.5.2 Additional analysis 
This section provides the robustness tests for the addition analysis performed under Section 9.4.2. 
Four robustness tests are used for each of the additional tests. The robustness tests are similar to 
the ones used in the primary analysis (See, Section 9.5.1). 
 
Findings of the analyst following analysis are presented in Tables D1-D4 of Appendix D. Results 
indicate again that banks with low analyst following do not experience lower reduction in their 
CE after the mandatory adoption of IFRS than banks with high analyst following. The interaction 
term POST*LOWF is insignificant almost in all the robustness tests and under all CE methods. 
This finding do not supports Hypothesis H7. However, the POST variable that examines whether 
the CE has decreased for the full sample after the mandatory adoption of IFRS is highly 
significant in most of the models. For example, the coefficient of the AVG method for the model 
that controls for outliers indicates that the CE has significantly decreased by 309 basis points (t-
stastistic = 4.8286, see Table D2 in Appendix D). 
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Tables D5-D8 in Appendix D report the robustness tests that examine whether banks domiciled 
in Continental countries experienced higher reduction in their CE after the mandatory adoption 
of IFRS. Contrary to the findings in Table 9.11, where most of the models clearly support the 
view that the CE of Continental banks has decreased more than the CE of Anglo-Saxon banks 
(POST*CONT is significant in four out of five CE methods), results from the robustness tests are 
mixed. The interaction term POST*CONT that tests Hypothesis H8 is significant in only half of 
the robustness tests. For example, the coefficient of POST*CONT under the average CE method 
(i.e. AVG) of the robustness test in Table D5 in Appendix D is significant with a negative sign 
(coefficieint -0.0121, p-value = 0.0298). In contrast, under the CT method in Table D7 the 
coefficient of POST*CONT is insignificant (t-value = -1.3535, p = 0.1766). However, it should 
be noted that under all the robustness tests the average CE method gives a significant and 
negative coefffient for the interaction term POST*CONT. This is important given the fact that 
non of the CE methods (i.e. GLS, CT, OJ, and PEG) is proved to be superior in the literature, and 
thus the average CE is likely to provide a more accurate estimate of the CE. Moreover, most of 
previous studies use solely in their analysis the results from the average CE (Daske et al., 2008; 
Li, 2010).        
 
Finally, Tables D9 – D12 in Appendix D report the findings of the test that examines whether 
banks domiciled in strong enforcement rule countries experienced higher reduction in their CE, 
from the pre-IFRS period to the post-IFRS period, than banks domiciled in weak enforcement 
rule countries. Under this test the POST variable continues to be significant and negative, as 
expected, indicating that European commercial banks hold a lower CE in the post-IFRS period. 
The interaction term POST*STRNG is significant and negative under all the robustness tests and 
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in almost all the CE method, with the only exception the GLS, the OJ, and the PEG method in 
Table D9. In all other Tables (i.e. Tables D10 – D12) the POST*STRNG is always significant 
(e.g. in Table D12 under the AVG method, coefficient = -0.0248, and t-value = -4.0693). These 
findings support Hypothesis H9 that banks domiciled in strong enforcement rule countries 
experienced lower reduction in their CE after the mandatory adoption of IFRS.   
 
9.6 Conclusion 
This chapter reports the findings of the economic consequences part of the thesis that examines 
the impact of the mandatory adoption of IFRS on European commercial banks’ CE. Unlike 
previous studies (Daske et al., 2008; Lee et al., 2008; Li, 2010), which examined the CE using 
heterogeneous samples in terms of firms’ industry, this thesis deals with only one industry the 
European commercial banking. 
 
A major finding of the study is that the mandatory adoption of IFRS has reduced European 
banks’ CE. The primary regression model indicates that the average CE of European banks has 
decreased by 291 basis points after the mandatory adoption of IFRS in 2005. This finding is also 
supported by several robustness tests: i) a robustness test that controlled for a number of 
alternative variables to the explanatory variables in the primary model (i.e. alternative proxies), 
ii) a model that controlled for outliers by taking the natural logarithms of the continuous 
independent variables, iii) a model that controlled for the growth expectations of banks, and iv) a 
model that used the risk premium as the dependent variable instead of the CE. 
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Additional analysis provided support to the view that institutional differences between countries 
affect the magnitude of the reduction in the CE. In particular, the primary results show that banks 
domiciled in countries with Continental accounting systems and Strong enforcement rules tend to 
have greater reduction in their CE. Banks domiciled in Continental countries experienced a 
greater reduction in their CE than banks domiciled in Anglo-Saxon countries. However, results 
from the robustness analysis provided mixed results. Specifically, half of the robustness test 
models and CE methods did not provide significant differences between banks domiciled in 
Continental and Anglo-Saxon countries. 
 
Finally, banks domiciled in Strong enforcement rule countries had more reduction in their CE, 
after the mandatory adoption of IFRS, than banks in Weak enforcement rule countries. These 
findings hold both for the primary findings as well as for most of the robustness tests. With 
respect to analyst following, the results do not provide support for the hypothesis that banks with 
low analyst following experience a higher reduction in their CE than banks with high analyst 
following. 
 
Overall, the findings of this chapter support the view that increased disclosure and transparent 
accounting standards (such as the IFRS) reduce the CE. The mandatory adoption of IFRS reveals 
benefits for the European commercial banks as it reduces the required rate of return that 
investors demand when they invest in such kind of institutions. This results in lower CE for the 
funds banks obtain from the capital markets.  
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Chapter 10: Synopsis and Conclusion 
10.1 Introduction 
This Chapter provides the conclusion of the thesis. The study deals with two major streams of 
accounting research, the value relevance research and the economic consequences research. The 
context of the study is the IFRS as has been applied by a single industry, the European banking 
sector. The research objective of the value relevance part is to explore the relevance of fair value 
estimates under IFRS. Evidence is provided on the value relevance of fair value disclosures of 
European banks for the fair value of loans and advances, held-to-maturity investments, deposits, 
and other debt. Moreover, in a separate empirical test, evidence is provided for derivatives’ fair 
value recognition. The period of the study for the value relevance tests covers the first two years 
of the mandatory adoption of IFRS, namely: 2005 and 2006. 
 
The research objective of the economic consequences part is to examine whether the mandatory 
adoption of IFRS resulted in net benefits for European commercial banks, such as a reduction in 
their cost of equity capital. The period for the economic consequences tests covers three years 
before the mandatory adoption of IFRS, the pre-IFRS period (i.e., 2002, 2003, and 2004) and 
three years after the mandatory adoption of IFRS, the post-IFRS period (i.e., 2005, 2006, and 
2007). 
 
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 10.2 summarizes the first seven Chapters of the 
thesis; Section 10.3 summarizes the main findings, reported in Chapters 8 and 9; Section 10.4 
reflects on the limitations of the study; Section 10.5 makes recommendations for future research; 
finally, Section 10.6 draws the conclusion by summarising the study’s contribution to knowledge. 
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10.2 Summary of the Chapters 1-7 
Chapter 1 was the introductory chapter of the thesis. Its aim was to introduce the reader to the 
topics of the study and to set the research objectives. 
 
Chapter 2 presented the regulatory environment within which European commercial banks 
operate. All European listed firms were required to adopt IFRS from 2005 onwards. The 
accounting standards that were expected to have profound effects on banks’ financial reporting 
where those relating to the accounting for financial instruments (i.e. IAS 32, IAS 39, IFRS 7, and 
the new adopted IFRS 9). Hence, the discussion on accounting regulatory rules focuses solely on 
financial instruments which constitute the majority of banks’ assets and liabilities. Commercial 
banks play an important role in an economy which is to collect public funds (i.e. deposits) and to 
allocate them to productive activities of the economy. Due to this role, banks are required to 
comply with capital adequacy rules. The capital adequacy rules that apply to European banks 
were the Capital Accord which has been replaced by Basel II. Both of these regulatory rules 
were analyzed in this chapter (Chapter 2).  
 
Chapter 3 presented the theoretical framework of the thesis. The research methodology of the 
value relevance part and the economic consequences part was based on equity valuation theory 
which provided the theoretical underpinning of the study. Value relevance research examines the 
relationship between accounting numbers and market values. This link is provided by equity 
valuation models. The valuation models analysed in this chapter where the DDM, the RIVM,  the 
Ohlson (1995) model, the Feltham & Ohlson (1995) model, the Ohlson & Juettner (2005) model, 
and the BSM. The value relevance of fair value disclosures (e.g. fair value of loans and advances) 
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was examined under the BSM model. The value relevance of derivatives’ fair value recognition 
was examined under the Ohlson (1995) model. With respect to the economic consequences test, 
valuation models were used to derive banks’ cost of equity capital. Specifically, based on the 
RIVM and the Ohlson & Juettner (2005) model, four methods were used to provide estimates for 
the dependent variable of the economic consequence test (i.e. the cost of equity capital). Chapter 
3 also discussed the relationship between accounting standards and cost of equity capital, which 
provides a justification about why increased disclosure and financial statements’ comparability 
may decrease cost of equity capital. Finally, the chapter provided a critical view on the value 
relevance research.  
  
Chapter 4 reviewed the value relevance literature on fair values. It was separated between 
banking and non-banking literature. Empirical studies on banks solely deal with the value 
relevance of financial instruments’ fair values. Most of these studies focus on US GAAP and on 
US banks (Barth et al., 1996; Wang et al., 2005; Ahmed et al, 2006). The literature with respect 
to non-US data is rare. Moreover, there is no up-to-date literature that examines the value 
relevance of fair value disclosures of European banks that report under the IFRS. The non-
banking literature includes different industries, such as industrial firms, mutual funds, property-
liability insurers, software firms, investment property firms. This literature examines apart from 
financial instruments, other elements in financial statements such as tangible and intangible 
assets.  
  
Chapter 5 provided the literature review of the economic consequences test. Empirical studies 
were separated between non-IFRS literature and IFRS literature. The non-IFRS literature deals 
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with empirical studies that examine the impact of increased disclosure on cost of equity capital 
(Botosan, 1997; Richardson & Welker, 2001; Hail, 2002). The IFRS literature is separated 
further into voluntary and mandatory adoption of IFRS. Empirical studies on the voluntary 
adoption explore the economic consequences of the adoption of IFRS in a period where the IFRS 
where not required to be applied for financial reporting purposes (Daske, 2006; Daske et al., 
2007). In contrast, mandatory empirical studies, which are related the most to this thesis, 
examined the impact of the adoption of IFRS on the cost of equity capital in a period where the 
IFRS were mandatory for financial reporting purposes (Lee et al., 2008; Daske et al., 2008; Li, 
2010).  
 
Chapter 6 developed the research methodology with respect to the value relevance of fair value 
disclosures and derivatives’ fair value recognition. First, the chapter presented the hypotheses of 
the value relevance research. Second, the empirical models were developed. Similar to Barth et 
al. (1996), the value relevance of fair value disclosures of banks (i.e. fair value of loans and 
advances, held-to-maturity investments, deposits, and other debt) were examined under the BSM 
which is a standard valuation model in the value relevance literature of banks. Under this model 
the differences between market values and book values of equity are regressed on the changes 
between the fair values and book values of the financial assets and liabilities. Similar to Wang et 
al. (2005), derivatives’ fair value recognition were tested under the Ohlson (1995) model. Under 
this model market value of equity is regressed on the book value of equity before trading and 
hedging derivatives, the net operating income, the net securities income, the fair values of 
trading and hedging derivatives, and a series of control variables. Apart from the primary 
specification models, a series of alternative specification models were developed for robustness.           
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Chapter 7 developed the research methodology of the economic consequences of the mandatory 
adoption of IFRS on the cost of equity capital. In the first step, four methods were analysed for 
the calculation of the cost of equity capital, which serves as the dependent variable in the 
economic consequences tests. These four methods are: the Gebhardt et al. (2001) and the Claus 
& Thomas (2001) methods which are based on the RIVM, and the Gode & Mohanram (2003) 
and Easton (2004) methods which are based on Ohlson & Juettner (2005) model. In the second 
step, cost of equity capital estimates were regressed on a dummy variable that indicated whether 
an observation was before or after the mandatory adoption of IFRS, a dummy variable for 
mandatory adopters and a series of other control variables. Similar to the value relevance part, a 
series of alternative models were developed for robustness.   
 
10.3 Main findings 
The empirical findings of this thesis are reported in Chapters 8 and 9. This section is separated 
into three sections: i) value relevance of fair value disclosures, such as fair values of loans and 
advances, held-to-maturity investments, deposits, and other debt; ii) value relevance of 
derivatives’ fair value recognition; and iii) the economic consequences of the mandatory 
adoption of IFRS on banks’ CE. 
 
10.3.1 Value relevance of fair value disclosures  
The results of the study support the view that the disclosures of fair values of loans and of other 
debt are significant in explaining market values over and above their amortised costs. The 
estimated signs for these instruments are in conformity with the predictions, positive for loans 
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and negative for debt. This finding indicates that investors regard fair values as providing value 
relevant information, incrementally to amortized costs, which are priced by the market.  
 
Fair values of held-to-maturity investments are not found to be value relevant. Their coefficients 
are estimated to be negative. The negative coefficient for the held-to-maturity investments 
indicates that investors penalize banks that hold such kind of instruments. This is because IAS 39 
precludes the use of held-to-maturity assets for the interest rate hedging and thus any material 
change in their values that is not hedged by banks may result in losses. Furthermore, the 
uncertainly, surrounding the ability and intention of the management to hold these financial 
assets to maturity, leads investors to take a conservative stance on held-to-maturity investments. 
Fair value of deposits is also found insignificant. A plausible explanation can be the restriction 
imposed by IAS 39 that the fair values of financial liabilities with a demand feature (i.e. demand 
deposits) cannot be less than the amount payable on demand. 
 
This study also provided evidence that the reliability of fair values of loans is subject to banks’ 
financial health and to the legal environment in which banks are domiciled. In particular, low 
capital adequacy ratios as combined with weak enforcement rule countries result in lower 
coefficient for the fair value of loans. Banks with low capital adequacy ratios have more 
incentives to manipulate fair value estimates of loans in order to affect this ratio. Furthermore, 
the ability of banks to make any manipulation is subject to the legal environment in which they 
domicile. Thus, banks from weak enforcement rule countries have more freedom to manipulate 
fair value estimates than banks from strong enforcement countries. These results hold under 
different model specifications. 
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10.3.2 Value relevance of derivatives’ fair value recognition 
Findings indicate that fair values of net trading and hedging derivatives are value relevant 
incrementally to their notional amounts. Although notional amounts of derivatives give the 
magnitude of the involvement of banks in derivative contracts, they do not provide any clue on 
the current values of these instruments. In contrast, fair values of derivatives aid investors to 
conclude on whether these instruments are a value-added operation for banks.  
 
Results also support the view that the coefficient of fair value estimates of derivatives is lower 
for banks with high earnings volatility (with the exception of the changes model). As predicted, 
banks with high earnings volatility have more incentives to manipulate the fair values of 
derivatives to smooth earnings. This statement holds only for trading derivatives but not for 
hedging derivatives. Further analysis indicates that hedging derivatives are used by banks to 
hedge the maturity gap between interest-sensitive assets and liabilities.   
 
10.3.3 Economic consequences 
Findings on the economic consequences test reveal that European commercial banks have 
benefited by the mandatory adoption of IFRS. The results indicate that their CE has decreased by 
291 basis points from the pre-IFRS to the post-IFRS period. This observation also holds under 
different model specifications (i.e. robustness tests). Another important finding is that the 
reduction in the CE is higher for banks domiciled in strong enforcement rule countries than weak 
enforcement rule countries. Banks domiciled in weak enforcement countries apply IFRS more in 
a ‘box-tick’ way than banks from strong enforcement countries that are forced to apply IFRS in 
detail. This resulted in higher reduction in the CE of the later group of banks. 
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The primary findings also support the hypothesis (Hypothesis H8) that banks that were using 
Continental accounting standards, before the mandatory adoption of IFRS, experienced greater 
reduction in their CE than banks using Anglo-Saxon accounting standards. Continental 
accounting standards (e.g. the German and French) have more differences with IFRS than 
Anglo-Saxon accounting standards (e.g. the U.K. and Irish). These differences resulted in higher 
reduction in the CE of banks using Continental accounting standards. However, the results of the 
robustness tests are mixed and thus this hypothesis is only supported by half of the robustness 
test models. Finally, findings provide no support that the CE of banks with low analyst following 
has decreased more than the CE of banks with high analyst following.  
 
10.4 Limitations of the study 
i) An important limitation of the study relates to data availability. A large number of banks do 
not provide detailed information in their financial statements regarding vital variables in the 
analysis. For example, some European banks do not provide clear information regarding fair 
value disclosures. Other banks do not report non-performing loans and the notional amounts of 
derivatives. Data limitations resulted in losing something less than the fifty per cent of the 
population for the value relevance test. However, even with this sample the number of banks is 
comparable to the samples of other studies (Barth et al., 1996). 
 
ii) Another limitation of the value relevance tests is the measurement of some variables. For 
example, due to the fact that ‘core deposits’ (the CORE variable in the value relevance) are not 
observable, a proxy variable used which equals deposit liabilities with no stated maturities (i.e. 
demand deposits). Non-performing loans, NPL, which control for default risk, is another proxy 
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variable. The fact that there is some measurement error in these proxy variables makes the 
interpretation of the findings of the value relevance part a more difficult task.    
 
With respect to the economic consequence test data availability was more of an issue. 
Calculations of the CE were based on analysts’ forecasted earnings per share that they cover only 
a limited number of banks. Thus, the sample of the economic consequences test is determined by 
the availability of analysts’ earnings per share estimates. 
  
iii) This thesis calculated the CE using four methods. Given that each method has its advantages 
and drawbacks, it is not clear in the literature which of these methods provide accurate estimates 
of the CE. Thus, most of previous studies (Daske et al., 2008; Li, 2010) used the average CE of a 
number of CE methods. Moreover, the estimation of the CE is based on subjective assumptions 
regarding the growth in earnings: the horizon period of the short-term growth in earnings and the 
long-term growth in earnings. Small changes in the assumptions may result in significant 
differences in the calculations of the CE. For example, even that the Gebhardt et al. (2001) and 
the Claus & Thomas (2001) methods are both based on the RIVM their different assumptions 
regarding the growth in earnings per share resulted in different amounts of CE. Thus, given the 
aforementioned  limitations of the CE, the results of the economic consequences test should be 
interpreted with caution.       
 
iv) Another limitation of the thesis is the short period of the analysis for the value relevance test. 
The relevance and reliability of fair values is examined for the first two years of the mandatory 
adoption of IFRS, 2005 and 2006. Most of the variables in the analysis have been hand-collected 
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from annual reports. This procedure was time-consuming precluding the inclusion of more years 
in the analysis. 
   
10.5 Recommendations for future research 
i) This thesis deals only with European countries. However, IFRS have been adopted by over 
100 countries around the world. An interesting study would be to extend the research to a world-
wide sample including as many countries as possible.  
 
ii) Furthermore, the analysis can be extended to more years to test whether the results sustain in 
the long-run. For, example a future study may examine whether fair values under the IFRS 
remained value relevant during the period of the financial crisis of 2008. Fair values have been 
accused of not reflecting the ‘true’ values of the financial assets when the markets are in disorder 
and sometimes inactive.  
 
iii) The results of this thesis apply only to banks. However, a future study can test whether the 
results apply to other industries of the economy such as insurance companies or mutual funds. 
These firms also hold a large number of financial assets and liabilities in their balance sheets 
recognised in fair values. Results can also be provided for the economic consequences of the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS on insurance companies. 
 
iv) The methodology of this thesis involved the use of empirical models to statistically test the 
hypotheses. However, an alternative research methodology could be a combination of 
quantitative and qualitative approach. For example, questionnaires could be sent to both banks’ 
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CFO and Analysts asking them to comment on the perceived relevance and reliability of fair 
values estimates, using for example Likert scales. Moreover, they could be asked for the 
perceived economic consequences of the mandatory adoption of IFRS on banks’ cost of equity 
capital. 
 
v) Finally, given that the book value of equity of banks incorporates a significant amount of fair 
values (e.g., financial assets at fair value through profit or loss), another avenue for future 
research is to examine indirectly the value relevance of fair values by developing a model that 
regresses market values on banks’ book value of equity. Moreover, similar to Kousenidis et al. 
(2010), this type of study can be extended to test the change in the value relevance of the book 
value of equity of banks from the pre-IFRS to the post-IFRS period. 
 
10.6 Conclusion 
The findings of this study contribute to our knowledge and understanding of the relevance and 
reliability of fair value accounting. A plethora of studies in the literature examined the value 
relevance of financial instruments’ fair values. However, all these studies deal with US GAAP. 
For example, Barth et al. (1996) examined the value relevance of SFAS No. 107 for a number of 
US banks and found the fair values of loans significant over and above their book values. Other 
studies, such as Venkatachalam (1996) investigated the value relevance of SFAS No. 109 and 
found the fair values of derivative disclosures value relevant incrementally to the notional 
amounts. Moreover, Ahmed et al. (2006) provided evidence for SFAS No. 133. Their results 
indicate that fair value recognitions of derivatives are value relevant, whilst fair value disclosures 
are not. 
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Assuming that the results of the US studies hold also for European banks and for different 
accounting standards may lead to incorrect conjectures. For example, US market is regarded as 
highly efficient, whereas many European markets, such as the Polish and the Portuguese, may be 
less efficient or even inefficient. Thus, this study extends the results of the US literature to 
European banks and the IFRS context. The findings support the value relevance of fair value 
disclosures (required under IAS 32) of loans and other debt over their amortised costs (required 
under IAS 39). In addition, findings also support the value relevance of the fair values of 
derivative recognition. For the first time, many European banks have recognised derivatives in 
the financial statements.    
 
Given that the sample of this thesis is a cross-country product it is likely that the relevance and 
reliability of fair values is subject to the institutional differences of European countries. Thus, 
this study contributes also to international accounting literature that examines the impact of 
institutional differences between countries on the information content of accounting numbers 
(Alford et al., 1993; Ali & Hwang, 2000; Hung, 2001). In particular, the scores provided by 
Kaufmann et al. (2009) are used to classify countries into strong enforcement rule and weak 
enforcement rule countries. It is argued that banks from weak enforcement countries have more 
freedom to manipulate fair values. This combined with low capital adequacy ratios and high 
earnings variability result in lower coefficients for the fair values of loans and trading derivatives, 
respectively. 
 
280 
 
This thesis also enhances our understanding of the risk management policies of European banks. 
Findings reveal that banks make wise use of hedging derivatives which is to hedge the maturity 
gap of financial assets and liabilities with maturities over a year. 
 
With respect to the economic consequence test, this thesis contributes to the literature in at least 
two ways. i) Three recent studies provided evidence on the economic consequences of the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS (Daske et al, 2008; Lee et al., 2008; Li, 2010). However, all of 
these studies examined a mixture of different industries. For example, Li (2010) examines firms 
from 18 EU countries including financial institutions as one more industry in the analysis. Lee et 
al. (2008) exclude financial institutions from their analysis. In contrast, this thesis focuses in a 
single and important industry of the economy, that of commercial banking. It is possible that the 
economic consequences from the mandatory adoption of IFRS differ from sector to sector. 
Moreover, banks are a vital industry in an economy and a decrease in their cost of equity capital 
may leads to a reduction in interest rates with which they charge their customers, other things 
being equal. ii) Due to data availability at the time of their studies, Daske et al. (2008), Lee et al. 
(2008), and Li (2010) cover only limited number of years after the mandatory adoption of IFRS. 
For example, Baske et al. (2008) cover 2001 – 2005 periods with just one year after the 
mandatory adoption. Lee et al. (2008) and Li (2010) both cover 1995 – 2006 periods. In contrast, 
this thesis covers a balanced period with three years before (2002 – 2004) and three years after 
(2005 – 2007) the mandatory adoption of IFRS. Covering more years in the post-IFRS period 
strengthens the findings of the study showing that the economic consequences sustain in the 
long-run. 
2
8
1
 
 
A
p
p
en
d
ix
 A
 
L
it
er
a
tu
re
 r
ev
ie
w
 s
u
m
m
a
ry
 
 
S
ec
ti
o
n
 1
: 
S
tu
d
ie
s 
in
 t
h
e 
v
a
lu
e 
re
le
v
a
n
ce
 l
it
er
a
tu
re
 c
o
n
ce
rn
in
g
 f
in
a
n
ci
a
l 
in
st
ru
m
en
ts
 
 
A
u
th
o
r(
s)
 
R
es
e
a
rc
h
 O
b
je
ct
iv
e 
S
a
m
p
le
 
M
et
h
o
d
o
lo
g
y 
P
ri
m
a
ry
 v
a
ri
a
b
le
(s
) 
o
f 
in
te
re
st
 
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
va
ri
a
b
le
s 
P
ri
m
a
ry
 F
in
d
in
g
s 
A
h
m
ed
 &
 T
a
k
ed
a
 
(1
9
9
5
) 
H
o
w
 t
h
e 
m
ar
k
et
 
v
al
u
es
 i
n
v
es
tm
en
t 
se
cu
ri
ti
es
’ 
re
al
is
ed
 
an
d
 u
n
re
al
is
ed
 g
ai
n
s 
an
d
 l
o
ss
es
. 
 
U
S
 b
an
k
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
se
co
n
d
 q
u
ar
te
r 
o
f 
1
9
8
6
 t
o
 t
h
e 
fo
u
rt
h
 
q
u
ar
te
r 
o
f 
1
9
9
1
. 
N
=
1
5
2
 b
an
k
s.
 
U
se
 a
 r
et
u
rn
s 
le
v
e
l 
m
o
d
el
 
R
ea
li
se
d
 G
/L
, 
an
d
 t
h
e 
ch
an
g
es
 i
n
 u
n
re
al
is
ed
 G
/L
 
E
ar
n
in
g
s 
b
ef
o
re
 r
ea
li
se
d
 G
/L
, 
ch
an
g
es
 o
f 
is
su
an
ce
 n
ew
 e
q
u
it
y
, 
th
e 
v
al
u
e 
o
f 
as
se
ts
 b
ef
o
re
 i
n
v
es
tm
en
t 
se
cu
ri
ti
es
 l
es
s 
li
ab
il
it
ie
s 
th
at
 m
at
u
re
 
in
 m
o
re
 t
h
an
 1
 y
ea
r,
 m
u
lt
ip
li
ed
 b
y
 
th
e 
ch
an
g
es
 i
n
 i
n
te
re
st
 r
at
es
. 
C
h
an
g
es
 i
n
 u
n
re
al
is
ed
 G
/L
 a
n
d
 
re
al
is
ed
 G
/L
 a
re
 p
o
si
ti
v
el
y
 a
n
d
 
si
g
n
if
ic
an
tl
y
 r
el
at
ed
 t
o
 r
et
u
rn
s.
  
A
h
m
ed
 e
t 
a
l.
 
(2
0
0
6
) 
W
h
et
h
er
 r
ec
o
g
n
it
io
n
s 
v
er
su
s 
d
is
cl
o
su
re
s 
o
f 
d
er
iv
at
iv
es
’ 
fa
ir
 
v
al
u
es
 a
re
 v
al
u
e 
re
le
v
an
t.
 
U
S
 b
an
k
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
p
er
io
d
 1
9
9
5
-2
0
0
0
, 
N
=
1
4
6
 b
an
k
s.
 
B
al
an
ce
 s
h
ee
t 
m
o
d
el
, 
in
 l
ev
el
 
an
d
 c
h
an
g
es
 f
o
rm
. 
N
et
 f
ai
r 
v
al
u
es
 o
f 
d
is
cl
o
su
re
 a
n
d
 r
ec
o
g
n
is
ed
 
d
er
iv
at
iv
es
. 
N
o
n
-p
er
fo
rm
in
g
 l
o
an
s,
 c
o
re
 
d
ep
o
si
ts
. 
D
er
iv
at
iv
es
’ 
fa
ir
 v
a
lu
e 
re
co
g
n
it
io
n
s 
ar
e 
v
al
u
e 
re
le
v
an
t 
b
u
t 
d
is
cl
o
su
re
s 
ar
e 
n
o
t.
 
B
a
rt
h
 (
1
9
9
4
) 
If
 d
is
c
lo
se
d
 
in
v
es
tm
en
t 
se
cu
ri
ti
es
’ 
fa
ir
 v
al
u
es
 a
n
d
 t
h
ei
r 
re
la
te
d
 G
/L
 a
re
 
re
fl
ec
te
d
 i
n
 s
h
ar
e 
p
ri
ce
s 
in
cr
em
en
ta
ll
y
 
to
 h
is
to
ri
ca
l 
co
st
 
v
al
u
es
. 
U
S
-B
an
k
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
p
er
io
d
 1
9
7
1
-1
9
9
0
. 
N
=
1
0
0
 b
an
k
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
p
ri
ce
 l
ev
e
l 
m
o
d
e
l,
 
an
d
 N
=
8
7
 b
an
k
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
re
tu
rn
s 
le
v
e
l 
m
o
d
el
. 
U
se
 a
 p
ri
ce
 l
ev
el
 m
o
d
el
 t
o
 t
es
t 
th
e 
v
al
u
e 
re
le
v
an
ce
 o
f 
in
v
es
tm
en
t 
se
cu
ri
ti
es
’ 
fa
ir
 
v
al
u
es
 a
n
d
 a
 r
et
u
rn
s 
le
v
el
 
m
o
d
el
 t
o
 t
es
t 
th
e 
v
a
lu
e 
re
le
v
an
ce
 o
f 
in
v
es
tm
en
t 
se
cu
ri
ti
es
’ 
G
/L
. 
 
F
o
r 
th
e 
p
ri
ce
 l
ev
el
 m
o
d
el
, 
in
v
es
tm
en
t 
se
cu
ri
ti
es
’ 
fa
ir
 
v
al
u
es
, 
an
d
 f
o
r 
th
e 
re
tu
rn
s 
le
v
e
l 
m
o
d
e
l,
 i
n
v
es
tm
en
t 
se
cu
ri
ti
es
’ 
fa
ir
 v
al
u
e 
G
/L
. 
 
F
o
r 
th
e 
p
ri
ce
 l
ev
el
 m
o
d
el
, 
h
is
to
ri
ca
l 
co
st
 o
f 
in
v
es
tm
en
t 
se
cu
ri
ti
es
 a
n
d
 
b
o
o
k
 v
al
u
e 
o
f 
eq
u
it
y
 b
ef
o
re
 
in
v
es
tm
en
t 
se
cu
ri
ti
es
. 
F
o
r 
th
e 
re
tu
rn
s 
le
v
el
, 
b
o
o
k
 v
al
u
e 
o
f 
se
cu
ri
ti
es
 G
/L
 a
n
d
 e
ar
n
in
g
s 
b
ef
o
re
 
se
cu
ri
ti
es
 G
/L
. 
In
v
es
tm
en
t 
se
cu
ri
ti
es
’ 
fa
ir
 v
al
u
es
 
ar
e 
fo
u
n
d
 v
al
u
e-
re
le
v
an
t 
in
cr
em
en
ta
ll
y
 t
o
 h
is
to
ri
ca
l 
v
a
lu
es
, 
b
u
t 
fa
ir
 v
al
u
e 
g
ai
n
s 
an
d
 l
o
ss
es
 d
o
 
n
o
t.
 
B
a
rt
h
 &
 C
li
n
ch
 
(1
9
9
8
) 
T
o
 p
ro
v
id
e 
ev
id
en
ce
 
o
n
 t
h
e 
re
le
v
an
ce
, 
re
li
ab
il
it
y
 a
n
d
 
ti
m
el
in
es
s 
o
f 
fi
n
an
ci
al
, 
ta
n
g
ib
le
, 
an
d
 i
n
ta
n
g
ib
le
 a
ss
et
s’
 
re
v
al
u
at
io
n
s 
A
u
st
ra
li
an
 f
ir
m
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
p
er
io
d
 1
9
9
1
-1
9
9
5
. 
N
=
3
5
0
 f
ir
m
s.
 E
v
id
en
ce
 
p
ro
v
id
ed
 s
ep
ar
at
el
y
 f
o
r 
n
o
n
-f
in
an
ci
al
, 
m
in
in
g
, 
an
d
 f
in
an
ci
al
 
in
d
u
st
ri
es
. 
 
U
se
 t
h
e 
th
eo
re
ti
ca
l 
fr
am
ew
o
rk
 
o
f 
O
h
ls
o
n
 (
1
9
9
5
).
 
R
ev
al
u
ed
 a
m
o
u
n
ts
 o
f 
in
v
es
tm
en
ts
; 
p
ro
p
er
ty
, 
p
la
n
t,
 a
n
d
 e
q
u
ip
m
en
t;
 a
n
d
 
in
ta
n
g
ib
le
 a
ss
et
s.
 
F
u
rt
h
er
m
o
re
 a
ss
et
s’
 
re
v
al
u
at
io
n
s 
ar
e 
d
is
ag
g
re
g
at
ed
 f
u
rt
h
er
 i
n
to
 
tw
o
 s
u
b
cl
as
se
s 
as
 f
o
ll
o
w
s:
 
in
v
es
tm
en
ts
 a
re
 
d
is
ag
g
re
g
at
ed
 i
n
to
 
in
v
es
tm
en
t 
in
 a
ss
o
ci
at
es
 
an
d
 o
th
er
 i
n
v
es
tm
en
ts
 
(p
ri
m
ar
il
y
 l
is
te
d
 
in
v
es
tm
en
ts
);
 P
P
E
 i
n
to
 
p
ro
p
er
ty
 (
p
ri
m
ar
il
y
 l
an
d
 
an
d
 b
u
il
d
in
g
s)
 a
n
d
 p
la
n
t 
an
d
 e
q
u
ip
m
en
t;
 a
n
d
 
in
ta
n
g
ib
le
 a
ss
et
s 
in
to
 
g
o
o
d
w
il
l 
an
d
 o
th
er
 
in
ta
n
g
ib
le
s.
 
H
is
to
ri
ca
l 
co
st
 o
f 
in
v
es
tm
en
ts
; 
p
ro
p
er
ty
, 
p
la
n
t,
 a
n
d
 e
q
u
ip
m
en
t;
 a
n
d
 
in
ta
n
g
ib
le
 a
ss
et
s.
  
N
et
 o
p
er
at
in
g
 i
n
co
m
e 
an
d
 a
 
v
ar
ia
b
le
 t
h
at
 r
ep
re
se
n
ts
 t
h
e 
d
is
cl
o
se
d
 v
al
u
at
io
n
 i
n
cr
em
en
ts
 o
r 
d
ec
re
m
en
ts
 o
f 
th
e 
p
ri
m
ar
y
 v
ar
ia
b
le
s 
o
f 
in
te
re
st
. 
 
T
h
e 
re
v
al
u
at
io
n
s 
th
at
 a
re
 f
o
u
n
d
 
si
g
n
if
ic
an
t 
in
 e
x
p
la
in
in
g
 s
h
ar
e 
p
ri
ce
s 
ac
ro
ss
 a
ll
 t
h
e 
th
re
e 
in
d
u
st
ri
es
 
ar
e 
th
e 
li
st
ed
 i
n
v
es
tm
en
ts
 a
n
d
 
in
ta
n
g
ib
le
 a
ss
et
s 
o
th
er
 t
h
an
 
g
o
o
d
w
il
l.
 I
n
v
es
tm
en
ts
 i
n
 a
ss
o
ci
at
ed
 
co
m
p
an
ie
s 
ar
e 
v
al
u
e-
re
le
v
an
t 
o
n
ly
 
fo
r 
th
e 
m
in
in
g
 i
n
d
u
st
ry
. 
R
eg
ar
d
in
g
 
ta
n
g
ib
le
 a
ss
et
s,
 r
es
u
lt
s 
in
d
ic
at
e 
th
at
 
re
v
al
u
at
io
n
s 
o
f 
p
ro
p
er
ty
 a
re
 o
n
ly
 
si
g
n
if
ic
an
t 
fo
r 
n
o
n
-f
in
an
ci
al
 f
ir
m
s,
 
w
h
il
st
 p
la
n
t 
an
d
 e
q
u
ip
m
en
t 
re
v
al
u
at
io
n
s 
ar
e 
si
g
n
if
ic
an
tl
y
 
re
la
te
d
 t
o
 p
ri
ce
s 
m
er
el
y
 f
o
r 
th
e 
m
in
in
g
 i
n
d
u
st
ry
. 
 
2
8
2
 
 
B
a
rt
h
 e
t 
a
l.
 (
1
9
9
6
) 
If
 f
ai
r 
v
al
u
e 
d
is
cl
o
su
re
s 
u
n
d
er
 
S
F
A
S
 N
o
. 
1
0
7
 a
re
 
v
al
u
e-
re
le
v
an
t.
 
U
S
 b
an
k
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
y
ea
rs
 1
9
9
2
 a
n
d
 1
9
9
3
. 
N
=
1
3
6
 b
an
k
s.
 
U
se
 t
h
e 
B
a
la
n
ce
 s
h
ee
t 
m
o
d
el
, 
re
g
re
ss
 t
h
e 
d
if
fe
re
n
ce
s 
b
et
w
ee
n
 m
ar
k
et
 a
n
d
 b
o
o
k
 
v
al
u
e 
o
f 
eq
u
it
y
 o
n
 t
h
e 
d
if
fe
re
n
ce
s 
b
et
w
ee
n
 f
ai
r 
v
al
u
es
 a
n
d
 b
o
o
k
 v
al
u
es
 o
f 
fi
n
an
ci
al
 i
n
st
ru
m
en
ts
. 
 
F
ai
r 
v
al
u
es
 o
f 
In
v
es
tm
en
t 
se
cu
ri
ti
es
, 
lo
an
s,
 d
ep
o
si
ts
, 
lo
n
g
-t
er
m
 d
eb
t,
 a
n
d
 o
ff
-
b
al
an
ce
 s
h
ee
t 
in
st
ru
m
en
ts
. 
B
o
o
k
 v
al
u
e 
o
f 
o
th
er
 t
h
an
 S
F
A
S
 N
o
. 
1
0
7
 a
ss
et
s 
an
d
 l
ia
b
il
it
ie
s,
 C
o
re
 
d
ep
o
si
ts
, 
fa
ir
 v
al
u
e 
o
f 
n
et
 p
en
si
o
n
s,
 
n
o
n
-p
er
fo
rm
in
g
 l
o
an
s,
 a
n
d
 i
n
te
re
st
-
se
n
si
ti
v
e 
as
se
ts
 a
n
d
 l
ia
b
il
it
ie
s.
  
F
ai
r 
v
al
u
es
 o
f 
in
v
es
tm
en
t 
se
cu
ri
ti
es
 
an
d
 l
o
an
s 
ar
e 
fo
u
n
d
 v
al
u
e 
re
le
v
an
t.
 
L
o
n
g
-t
er
m
 d
eb
t’
s 
fa
ir
 v
al
u
e 
o
n
ly
 i
n
 
so
m
e 
m
o
d
el
 s
p
ec
if
ic
at
io
n
. 
W
h
il
e 
d
ep
o
si
ts
 a
n
d
 o
ff
-b
al
an
ce
 s
h
ee
t 
it
em
s 
n
o
t 
v
al
u
e
-r
el
ev
an
t.
 
B
e
rn
a
rd
 e
t 
a
l.
 
(1
9
9
5
) 
W
h
et
h
er
 D
an
is
h
 
b
an
k
s 
an
d
 T
h
ri
ft
s 
m
an
ip
u
la
te
 p
ri
ce
 
ad
ju
st
m
en
ts
 t
o
 
in
v
es
tm
en
ts
 a
n
d
 l
o
an
 
lo
ss
 p
ro
v
is
io
n
s.
 
D
an
is
h
 b
an
k
s 
an
d
 
th
ri
ft
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
p
er
io
d
 
1
9
7
6
-1
9
8
9
. 
N
=
7
8
 
b
an
k
s.
 
U
se
 t
w
o
 t
im
e 
se
ri
es
 m
o
d
el
s.
 
T
h
ey
 r
eg
re
ss
 s
ep
ar
at
el
y
 t
h
e 
tw
o
 p
ri
m
ar
y
 v
ar
ia
b
le
s 
o
f 
in
te
re
st
 o
n
 t
h
ei
r 
la
g
g
ed
 
v
al
u
es
. 
If
 t
h
er
e 
is
 e
v
id
en
ce
 o
f 
m
an
ip
u
la
ti
o
n
 t
h
ey
 a
ss
u
m
e 
th
at
 a
d
ju
st
m
en
ts
 s
h
o
u
ld
 b
e 
re
la
te
d
 o
v
er
 t
im
e.
 
P
ri
ce
 a
d
ju
st
m
en
ts
 a
n
d
 l
o
an
 
lo
ss
 p
ro
v
is
io
n
s.
  
N
o
 o
th
er
 c
o
n
tr
o
ll
in
g
 v
ar
ia
b
le
s.
 
M
an
ag
er
s 
te
n
d
 n
o
t 
to
 m
an
ip
u
la
te
 
p
ri
ce
 a
d
ju
st
m
en
ts
. 
F
o
r 
th
e 
lo
an
 l
o
ss
 
al
lo
w
an
ce
 a
lt
h
o
u
g
h
 t
h
er
e 
is
 s
o
m
e 
ev
id
en
ce
 o
f 
m
an
ip
u
la
ti
o
n
, 
th
is
 
at
ti
tu
d
e,
 c
o
n
tr
ar
y
 t
o
 t
h
e 
co
n
ce
rn
s,
 i
s 
n
o
t 
re
la
te
d
 t
o
 b
an
k
s’
 i
n
te
n
ti
o
n
 t
o
 
re
d
u
ce
 r
eg
u
la
to
ry
 i
n
te
rv
en
ti
o
n
. 
C
a
r
ro
ll
 e
t 
a
l.
 
(2
0
0
3
) 
If
 i
n
v
es
tm
en
t 
se
cu
ri
ti
es
’ 
fa
ir
 v
al
u
es
 
an
d
 t
h
ei
r 
re
la
te
d
 f
ai
r 
v
al
u
e 
g
ai
n
s 
an
d
 l
o
ss
es
 
ar
e 
v
al
u
e-
re
le
v
an
t.
 
U
S
 c
lo
se
d
-e
n
d
 f
u
n
d
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
p
er
io
d
 1
9
8
2
-
1
9
9
7
. 
N
=
1
4
3
. 
U
se
 t
h
e 
B
a
la
n
ce
 S
h
ee
t 
M
o
d
el
 
an
d
 a
n
 e
ar
n
in
g
s 
ca
p
it
a
li
sa
ti
o
n
 
m
o
d
el
. 
In
v
es
tm
en
t 
se
cu
ri
ti
es
’ 
fa
ir
 
v
al
u
es
, 
an
d
 f
ai
r 
v
al
u
e 
g
ai
n
s 
an
d
 l
o
ss
es
. 
H
is
to
ri
ca
l 
v
al
u
es
 o
f 
in
v
es
tm
en
t 
se
cu
ri
ti
es
, 
n
et
 a
ss
et
s 
o
th
er
 t
h
an
 
in
v
es
tm
en
t 
se
cu
ri
ti
es
. 
E
v
id
en
ce
 s
u
p
p
o
rt
 t
h
e 
v
ie
w
 t
h
at
 
in
v
es
tm
en
t 
se
cu
ri
ti
es
 f
ai
r 
v
al
u
es
 
an
d
 t
h
ei
r 
re
la
te
d
 g
ai
n
s 
an
d
 l
o
ss
es
 
ar
e 
v
al
u
e-
re
le
v
an
t 
an
d
 r
el
ia
b
le
. 
F
in
d
in
g
s 
ar
e 
al
so
 r
o
b
u
st
 f
o
r 
d
if
fe
re
n
t 
ty
p
es
 o
f 
in
v
es
tm
en
t 
se
cu
ri
ti
es
. 
E
c
ch
er
 e
t 
a
l.
 
(1
9
9
6
) 
If
 f
ai
r 
v
al
u
e 
d
is
cl
o
su
re
s 
u
n
d
er
 
S
F
A
S
 N
o
. 
1
0
7
 a
re
 
v
al
u
e-
re
le
v
an
t.
 
U
S
 b
an
k
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
y
ea
rs
 1
9
9
2
, 
N
=
2
9
3
 
b
an
k
s,
 a
n
d
 1
9
9
3
, 
N
=
3
1
9
 b
an
k
s.
 
U
se
 t
h
e 
b
al
an
ce
 s
h
ee
t 
m
o
d
el
, 
re
g
re
ss
 t
h
e 
m
ar
k
et
 t
o
 b
o
o
k
 
v
al
u
e 
ra
ti
o
 o
n
 t
h
e 
d
if
fe
re
n
ce
s 
b
et
w
ee
n
 f
ai
r 
v
al
u
es
 a
n
d
 b
o
o
k
 
v
al
u
es
 o
f 
fi
n
an
ci
al
 
in
st
ru
m
en
ts
. 
F
ai
r 
v
al
u
es
 o
f 
In
v
es
tm
en
t 
se
cu
ri
ti
es
, 
lo
an
s,
 d
ep
o
si
ts
, 
lo
n
g
-t
er
m
 d
eb
t,
 a
n
d
 o
ff
-
b
al
an
ce
 s
h
ee
t 
in
st
ru
m
en
ts
. 
N
o
ti
o
n
al
 v
al
u
es
 o
f 
cr
ed
it
-r
el
a
te
d
 
an
d
 m
ar
k
et
-r
e
la
te
d
 o
ff
-b
al
an
ce
 
it
em
s,
 a
 p
ro
x
y
 f
o
r 
co
re
 d
ep
o
si
ts
. 
In
v
es
tm
en
t 
se
cu
ri
ti
es
’ 
fa
ir
 v
al
u
es
 
v
al
u
e
-r
el
ev
an
t.
 L
o
an
s’
 f
ai
r 
v
al
u
e 
o
n
ly
 i
n
 s
o
m
e 
m
o
d
el
 s
p
ec
if
ic
at
io
n
s,
 
F
o
r 
d
ep
o
si
ts
, 
lo
n
g
-t
er
m
 d
eb
t 
an
d
 
o
ff
-b
al
an
ce
 s
h
ee
t 
it
em
s 
th
er
e 
is
 n
o
 
ev
id
en
ce
 o
f 
v
al
u
e 
re
le
v
an
ce
. 
G
ra
h
a
m
 e
t 
a
l.
 
(2
0
0
3
) 
W
h
et
h
er
 f
ai
r 
v
al
u
es
 o
f 
eq
u
it
y
 m
et
h
o
d
 
in
v
es
tm
en
ts
 a
re
 v
al
u
e 
re
le
v
an
t 
 
U
S
 f
ir
m
s,
 f
o
r 
th
e 
p
er
io
d
 1
9
9
3
-1
9
9
7
. 
N
=
5
5
 i
n
v
es
to
rs
. 
T
h
e 
m
o
d
el
 f
o
ll
o
w
s 
th
e 
th
eo
re
ti
c 
fr
am
ew
o
rk
 o
f 
O
h
ls
o
n
 (
1
9
9
5
).
 
F
ai
r 
v
al
u
es
 o
f 
eq
u
it
y
 
m
et
h
o
d
 i
n
v
es
tm
en
ts
. 
B
o
o
k
 v
al
u
e 
o
f 
eq
u
it
y
, 
In
co
m
e 
v
ar
ia
b
le
s.
  
F
ai
r 
v
al
u
es
 o
f 
eq
u
it
y
 m
et
h
o
d
 
in
v
es
tm
en
ts
 a
re
 v
al
u
e 
re
le
v
an
t.
 
G
o
h
 e
t 
a
l.
 (
2
0
0
9
) 
H
o
w
 i
n
v
es
to
rs
 p
ri
ce
 
fa
ir
 v
al
u
es
 d
u
ri
n
g
 t
h
e 
ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 c
ri
si
s 
o
f 
2
0
0
8
. 
U
S
 b
an
k
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
p
er
io
d
 o
f 
th
e 
fi
rs
t 
th
re
e 
q
u
ar
te
rs
 o
f 
2
0
0
8
. 
N
 =
 5
1
6
. 
T
h
e 
m
o
d
el
 f
o
ll
o
w
s 
th
e 
th
eo
re
ti
c 
fr
am
ew
o
rk
 o
f 
O
h
ls
o
n
 (
1
9
9
5
).
 
F
ai
r 
v
al
u
es
 o
f 
L
ev
el
 1
,2
, 
an
d
 3
 h
ie
ra
rc
h
y 
o
f 
S
F
A
S
 
N
o
. 
1
5
7
. 
N
et
 b
o
o
k
 v
al
u
e,
 e
ar
n
in
g
s 
p
er
 s
h
ar
e,
 
d
u
m
m
ie
s 
to
 c
o
n
tr
o
l 
fo
r 
th
e 
st
o
ck
 
ex
ch
an
g
e 
in
 w
h
ic
h
 s
h
ar
e 
p
ri
ce
s 
ar
e 
li
st
ed
 (
N
Y
S
E
 o
r 
A
M
E
X
).
  
 
M
ar
k
-t
o
-m
o
d
el
 (
le
v
e
l 
3
) 
fa
ir
 v
al
u
es
 
ar
e 
 p
ri
ce
d
 l
es
s 
th
an
 m
ar
k
-t
o
-
m
ar
k
et
 (
le
v
e
l 
1
 a
n
d
 2
).
 H
o
w
ev
er
, 
m
ar
k
-t
o
-m
o
d
el
 v
a
lu
es
 a
re
 p
ri
ce
d
 
h
ig
h
er
 f
o
r 
b
an
k
s 
w
it
h
 h
ig
h
 c
ap
it
al
 
ad
eq
u
ac
y 
ra
ti
o
s 
an
d
 t
h
at
 a
u
d
it
ed
 b
y
 
th
e 
b
ig
 f
o
u
r.
 
K
o
le
v
 (
2
0
0
8
) 
W
h
et
h
er
 m
ar
k
-t
o
-
m
o
d
el
 e
st
im
a
te
s 
ar
e 
m
o
re
 u
n
re
li
ab
le
 t
h
an
 
m
ar
k
-t
o
-m
ar
k
et
. 
U
S
 b
an
k
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
p
er
io
d
 o
f 
th
e 
fi
rs
t 
tw
o
 
q
u
ar
te
rs
 o
f 
2
0
0
8
. 
N
=
1
7
7
. 
A
n
 a
d
 h
o
c 
m
o
d
el
. 
F
ai
r 
v
al
u
es
 o
f 
L
ev
el
 1
,2
, 
an
d
 3
 h
ie
ra
rc
h
y 
o
f 
S
F
A
S
 
N
o
. 
1
5
7
. 
N
et
 b
o
o
k
 v
al
u
e,
 c
re
d
it
 r
at
in
g
s,
 
p
ro
x
ie
s 
fo
r 
si
ze
, 
g
ro
w
th
, 
p
ro
fi
ta
b
il
it
y
. 
A
ll
 l
ev
el
s 
o
f 
S
F
A
S
 N
o
. 
1
5
7
 a
re
 
v
al
u
e 
re
le
v
an
t.
 L
ev
el
 3
 h
as
 t
h
e 
lo
w
er
 a
ss
o
ci
at
io
n
 w
it
h
 s
h
ar
e 
p
ri
ce
s.
 
N
e
ls
o
n
 (
1
9
9
6
) 
If
 f
ai
r 
v
al
u
e 
d
is
cl
o
su
re
s 
u
n
d
er
 
S
F
A
S
 N
o
. 
1
0
7
 a
re
 
v
al
u
e-
re
le
v
an
t.
 
U
S
 b
an
k
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
y
ea
rs
 1
9
9
2
, 
N
=
1
4
6
 
b
an
k
s,
 a
n
d
 1
9
9
3
, 
N
=
1
3
3
 b
an
k
s.
 
U
se
 t
h
e 
b
al
an
ce
 s
h
ee
t 
m
o
d
el
, 
re
g
re
ss
 t
h
e 
d
if
fe
re
n
ce
s 
b
et
w
ee
n
 m
ar
k
et
 a
n
d
 b
o
o
k
 
v
al
u
e 
o
f 
eq
u
it
y
 o
n
 t
h
e 
d
if
fe
re
n
ce
s 
b
et
w
ee
n
 f
ai
r 
v
al
u
es
 a
n
d
 b
o
o
k
 v
al
u
es
 o
f 
fi
n
an
ci
al
 i
n
st
ru
m
en
ts
. 
  
F
ai
r 
v
al
u
es
 o
f 
In
v
es
tm
en
t 
se
cu
ri
ti
es
, 
lo
an
s,
 d
ep
o
si
ts
, 
lo
n
g
-t
er
m
 d
eb
t,
 a
n
d
 o
ff
-
b
al
an
ce
 s
h
ee
t 
in
st
ru
m
en
ts
. 
In
cl
u
d
e 
v
ar
ia
b
le
s 
to
 p
ro
x
y
 f
o
r 
fu
tu
re
 g
ro
w
th
 o
p
p
o
rt
u
n
it
ie
s,
 s
u
ch
 
as
 t
h
e 
h
is
to
ri
ca
l 
g
ro
w
th
 i
n
 t
h
e 
b
o
o
k
 
v
al
u
e 
o
f 
eq
u
it
y
 b
et
w
ee
n
 t
h
e 
p
re
v
io
u
s 
an
d
 t
h
e 
cu
rr
en
t 
ye
ar
, 
an
d
 
th
e 
cu
rr
en
t 
R
O
E
. 
O
n
ly
 i
n
v
es
tm
en
t 
se
cu
ri
ti
es
’ 
fa
ir
 
v
al
u
es
 v
al
u
e
-r
el
ev
an
t.
 L
o
an
s,
 
D
ep
o
si
ts
, 
L
o
n
g
-t
er
m
 d
eb
t,
 a
n
d
 o
ff
-
b
al
an
ce
 s
h
ee
t 
in
st
ru
m
en
ts
 n
o
t 
v
al
u
e
-r
el
ev
an
t.
  
2
8
3
 
 
P
a
rk
 e
t 
a
l.
 (
1
9
9
9
) 
If
 d
is
c
lo
su
re
s 
u
n
d
er
 
S
F
A
S
 N
o
. 
1
1
5
 a
re
 
v
al
u
e-
re
le
v
an
t.
 
U
S
 b
an
k
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
p
er
io
d
 1
9
9
3
-1
9
9
5
. 
N
=
2
2
2
 b
an
k
s.
 
U
se
 t
h
e 
B
a
la
n
ce
 S
h
ee
t 
M
o
d
el
 
ap
p
ro
ac
h
. 
R
eg
re
ss
 t
h
e 
d
if
fe
re
n
ce
s 
b
et
w
ee
n
 m
ar
k
et
 
an
d
 b
o
o
k
 v
al
u
e 
o
f 
eq
u
it
y
 o
n
 
th
e 
d
if
fe
re
n
ce
 b
et
w
ee
n
 f
ai
r 
v
al
u
es
 a
n
d
 b
o
o
k
 v
al
u
es
. 
In
 
an
o
th
er
 m
o
d
el
 t
h
e
y
 r
eg
re
ss
 
th
e 
st
o
ck
 r
et
u
rn
s 
(r
aw
 a
n
d
 
ab
n
o
rm
al
) 
o
n
 t
h
e 
sa
m
e 
ex
p
la
n
at
o
ry
 v
ar
ia
b
le
s.
  
F
ai
r 
v
al
u
es
 l
es
s 
b
o
o
k
 
v
al
u
es
 o
f 
A
F
S
 a
n
d
 H
T
M
 
in
v
es
tm
en
ts
. 
F
ai
r 
v
al
u
es
 l
es
s 
b
o
o
k
 v
al
u
es
 f
o
r 
lo
an
s,
 o
th
er
 a
ss
et
s,
 d
ep
o
si
ts
, 
o
th
er
 
li
ab
il
it
ie
s,
 o
ff
-b
a
la
n
ce
 d
er
iv
at
iv
es
. 
F
o
r 
th
e 
re
tu
rn
s 
m
o
d
e
l 
th
ey
 a
ls
o
 a
d
d
 
tw
o
 o
th
er
 v
ar
ia
b
le
s,
 n
am
el
y
: 
ea
rn
in
g
s 
an
d
 t
h
e 
lo
g
 o
f 
m
ar
k
et
 
v
al
u
e 
o
f 
eq
u
it
y
 t
o
 c
o
n
tr
o
l 
fo
r 
si
ze
. 
A
F
S
 a
n
d
 H
T
M
 d
if
fe
re
n
ce
s 
ar
e 
im
p
o
rt
an
t 
to
 i
n
v
es
to
rs
 i
n
 
d
et
er
m
in
in
g
 m
ar
k
et
 p
ri
ce
s 
in
 b
o
th
 
le
v
e
ls
 a
n
d
 c
h
an
g
es
 f
o
rm
. 
U
si
n
g
 a
s 
a 
d
ep
en
d
en
t 
v
ar
ia
b
le
 r
aw
 a
n
d
 
ab
n
o
rm
al
 r
et
u
rn
s 
re
su
lt
s 
ar
e 
si
g
n
if
ic
an
t 
o
n
ly
 f
o
r 
A
F
S
 s
ec
u
ri
ti
es
, 
w
h
il
e 
fo
r 
H
T
M
 r
es
u
lt
s 
ar
e 
o
n
ly
 
si
g
n
if
ic
an
t 
u
n
d
er
 t
h
e 
ra
w
 r
et
u
rn
 
m
o
d
el
. 
P
et
ro
n
i 
&
 W
a
h
le
n
 
(1
9
9
5
) 
If
 f
ai
r 
v
al
u
es
 o
f 
eq
u
it
y
 
an
d
 f
ix
ed
 m
at
u
ri
ty
 
d
eb
t 
se
cu
ri
ti
es
 a
re
 
re
fl
ec
te
d
 i
n
 s
h
ar
e 
p
ri
ce
s.
 T
es
t 
a
ls
o
 f
o
r 
th
e 
re
li
ab
il
it
y
 o
f 
d
if
fe
re
n
t 
ty
p
es
 o
f 
in
v
es
tm
en
ts
. 
U
S
 p
ro
p
er
ty
-l
ia
b
il
it
y
 
in
su
re
rs
 f
o
r 
th
e 
p
er
io
d
 1
9
8
5
-1
9
9
1
. 
 
N
=
5
6
. 
U
se
 t
h
e 
B
a
la
n
ce
 s
h
ee
t 
M
o
d
el
. 
F
ai
r 
v
al
u
es
 l
es
s 
b
o
o
k
 
v
al
u
es
 f
o
r 
eq
u
it
y
 
in
v
es
tm
en
ts
, 
fi
x
ed
 m
at
u
ri
ty
 
in
v
es
tm
en
ts
. 
U
n
p
ai
d
 c
la
im
s,
 n
et
 b
o
o
k
 v
al
u
e 
o
th
er
 t
h
an
 e
q
u
it
y
 i
n
v
es
tm
en
ts
, 
fi
x
ed
 
m
at
u
ri
ty
 i
n
v
es
tm
en
ts
 a
n
d
 u
n
p
ai
d
 
cl
ai
m
s,
 b
o
o
k
 v
al
u
e 
o
f 
eq
u
it
y
 
se
cu
ri
ti
es
 a
n
d
 f
ix
ed
 m
at
u
ri
ti
es
, 
an
d
 
th
e 
lo
g
 o
f 
as
se
ts
. 
E
q
u
it
y
 i
n
v
es
tm
en
ts
 a
n
d
 U
S
 
T
re
as
u
ry
 i
n
v
es
tm
en
ts
’ 
fa
ir
 v
a
lu
es
 
ar
e 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
it
h
 s
h
ar
e 
p
ri
ce
s,
 b
u
t 
o
th
er
 t
y
p
es
 o
f 
se
cu
ri
ti
es
, 
su
ch
 a
s 
m
u
n
ic
ip
al
 a
n
d
 c
o
rp
o
ra
te
 b
o
n
d
s 
an
d
 
o
th
er
 d
eb
t 
in
st
ru
m
en
ts
 p
ro
v
ed
 
in
si
g
n
if
ic
an
t.
 T
ra
d
ab
le
 s
ec
u
ri
ti
es
 
ar
e 
co
n
si
d
er
ed
 m
o
re
 r
el
ia
b
le
. 
R
if
fe
 (
1
9
9
7
) 
W
h
et
h
er
 n
o
ti
o
n
al
 
am
o
u
n
ts
 o
f 
o
ff
-
b
al
an
ce
 i
te
m
s 
ar
e 
v
al
u
e 
re
le
v
an
t.
 
U
S
 b
an
k
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
p
er
io
d
 S
ep
te
m
b
er
 
1
9
8
6
 t
h
ro
u
g
h
 
D
ec
em
b
er
 1
9
8
9
. 
N
=
2
4
2
. 
T
w
o
 e
st
im
at
io
n
 m
o
d
el
s:
 
B
al
an
ce
 s
h
ee
t 
m
o
d
el
 a
n
d
 
O
h
ls
o
n
 (
1
9
9
5
) 
N
o
ti
o
n
al
 a
m
o
u
n
ts
 o
f 
m
ar
k
et
 a
n
d
 c
re
d
it
-r
el
at
ed
 
o
ff
-b
al
an
ce
 s
h
ee
t 
it
em
s.
 
B
al
an
ce
 s
h
ee
t 
m
o
d
el
: 
B
V
E
, 
D
if
fe
re
n
ce
s 
b
et
w
ee
n
 m
ar
k
et
 a
n
d
 
b
o
o
k
 v
al
u
e 
o
f 
se
cu
ri
ti
es
, 
d
if
fe
re
n
ce
s 
b
et
w
ee
n
 n
o
n
-
p
er
fo
rm
in
g
 l
o
an
s 
an
d
 a
ll
o
w
an
ce
 f
o
r 
lo
an
 l
o
ss
es
. 
 
O
h
ls
o
n
 m
o
d
el
: 
B
V
E
, 
ea
rn
in
g
s 
b
ef
o
re
 t
ra
d
in
g
 G
/L
, 
a 
g
ro
w
th
 
v
ar
ia
b
le
, 
an
d
 b
et
a 
v
ar
ia
b
le
. 
N
o
ti
o
n
al
 a
m
o
u
n
ts
 o
f 
o
ff
-b
al
an
ce
 
sh
ee
t 
it
e
m
s 
ar
e 
si
g
n
if
ic
an
tl
y
 r
el
at
ed
 
to
 m
ar
k
et
 v
a
lu
es
. 
S
eo
w
 &
 T
a
m
 
(2
0
0
2
) 
W
h
et
h
er
 d
er
iv
at
iv
e-
re
la
te
d
 d
es
cl
o
su
re
s 
co
n
ta
in
 a
d
d
it
io
n
al
 
v
al
u
e-
re
la
te
d
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
. 
 
U
S
 b
an
k
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
p
er
io
d
 1
9
9
0
-1
9
9
6
. 
N
=
3
5
. 
A
n
 a
d
 h
o
c 
m
o
d
el
. 
D
is
cl
o
su
re
s 
o
n
 d
er
iv
at
iv
es
, 
su
ch
 a
s 
n
o
ti
o
n
al
 a
m
o
u
n
ts
, 
d
er
iv
at
iv
e-
re
la
te
d
 c
re
d
it
 
ex
p
o
su
re
, 
fa
ir
 v
a
lu
e 
g
ai
n
s 
an
d
 l
o
ss
es
 o
n
 t
ra
d
in
g
 a
n
d
 
n
o
n
tr
ad
in
g
 d
er
iv
at
iv
es
. 
 
E
ar
n
in
g
s,
 m
ar
k
et
 b
et
a.
 
A
ll
 d
er
iv
at
iv
e
-r
el
at
ed
 d
is
cl
u
o
su
re
s 
ar
e 
fo
u
n
d
 t
o
 c
o
n
v
ey
 n
ew
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
 t
o
 t
h
e 
m
ar
k
et
. 
(n
o
t 
fo
r 
n
o
ti
o
n
al
 a
m
o
u
ts
).
 
S
im
k
o
 (
1
9
9
9
) 
If
 h
o
ld
in
g
 g
ai
n
s 
o
f 
fi
n
an
ci
al
 i
n
st
ru
m
en
ts
 
ar
e 
v
al
u
e 
re
le
v
an
t.
 
U
S
 n
o
n
-f
in
an
ci
al
 
fi
rm
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
p
er
io
d
 
1
9
9
2
-1
9
9
5
. 
N
=
3
0
0
. 
U
se
 t
h
e 
F
el
th
am
 &
 O
h
ls
o
n
 
M
o
d
el
 (
1
9
9
5
).
 
N
et
 c
u
m
u
la
ti
v
e 
u
n
re
co
g
n
is
ed
 g
ai
n
s 
o
n
 
fi
n
an
ci
al
 a
ss
et
s,
 l
ia
b
il
it
ie
s,
 
an
d
 d
er
iv
at
iv
e 
co
n
tr
ac
ts
, 
m
ea
su
re
d
 a
s 
th
e 
d
if
fe
re
n
ce
 
b
et
w
ee
n
 t
h
e 
fa
ir
 v
al
u
es
 l
es
s 
th
e 
b
o
o
k
 v
al
u
es
. 
 
 
B
o
o
k
 v
al
u
e 
o
f 
n
o
n
-f
in
an
ci
al
 
in
st
ru
m
en
ts
, 
b
o
o
k
 v
a
lu
e 
o
f 
fi
n
an
ci
al
 i
n
st
ru
m
en
ts
, 
A
b
n
o
rm
al
 
ea
rn
in
g
s 
o
f 
th
e 
cu
rr
en
t 
ye
ar
, 
ab
n
o
rm
al
 e
ar
n
in
g
s 
o
f 
th
e 
p
re
v
io
u
s 
y
ea
r.
 
F
in
d
in
g
s 
ar
e 
in
 f
av
o
r 
o
n
ly
 f
o
r 
th
e 
fi
n
an
ci
al
 l
ia
b
il
it
ie
s 
cu
m
u
la
ti
v
e 
h
o
ld
in
g
 g
ai
n
s 
an
d
 o
n
ly
 f
o
r 
th
e 
ye
ar
s 
1
9
9
3
 a
n
d
 1
9
9
5
. 
F
in
an
ci
al
 a
ss
et
s’
 
an
d
 d
er
iv
at
iv
e 
co
n
tr
ac
ts
’ 
fa
ir
 v
al
u
es
 
ar
e 
fo
u
n
d
 i
n
si
g
n
if
ic
an
t 
S
o
n
g
 e
t 
a
l.
 (
2
0
1
0
) 
W
h
et
h
er
 S
F
A
S
 N
o
. 
1
5
7
 f
ai
r 
v
al
u
e 
h
ie
ra
rc
h
y 
is
 v
a
lu
e 
re
le
v
an
t.
 
U
S
 b
an
k
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
p
er
io
d
 o
f 
th
e 
fi
rs
t 
th
re
e 
q
u
ar
te
rs
 o
f 
2
0
0
8
. 
In
it
ia
l 
sa
m
p
le
 o
f 
N
=
4
3
1
. 
U
se
 t
h
e 
th
eo
re
ti
ca
l 
fr
am
ew
o
rk
 
o
f 
O
h
ls
o
n
 (
1
9
9
5
).
 
F
ai
r 
v
al
u
es
 o
f 
L
ev
el
 1
,2
, 
an
d
 3
 h
ie
ra
rc
h
y 
o
f 
S
F
A
S
 
N
o
. 
1
5
7
. 
N
o
n
-f
ai
r 
v
al
u
e 
as
se
ts
, 
N
o
n
-f
ai
r 
v
al
u
e 
li
ab
il
it
ie
s,
 N
et
 I
n
co
m
e.
 
A
ll
 l
ev
el
s 
ar
e 
v
al
u
e 
re
le
v
an
t.
 L
ev
el
s 
1
 a
n
d
 2
 h
o
ld
 c
o
ef
fi
ci
en
ts
 c
lo
se
 t
o
 
th
e 
th
eo
re
ti
ca
l 
v
al
u
es
 o
f 
o
n
e,
 w
h
is
t 
le
v
e
l 
3
 h
o
ld
 c
o
ef
fi
ci
en
ts
 l
es
s 
th
an
 
o
n
e.
 V
al
u
e 
re
le
v
an
ce
 o
f 
L
ev
e
ls
 
v
ar
ie
s 
w
it
h
 f
ir
m
’s
 s
tr
en
g
th
 o
f 
co
rp
o
ra
te
 g
o
v
er
n
an
ce
. 
 
2
8
4
 
 
V
e
n
k
a
ta
ch
a
la
m
 
(1
9
9
6
) 
If
 d
er
iv
at
iv
e 
d
is
cl
o
su
re
s 
u
n
d
er
 
S
F
A
S
 N
o
. 
1
1
9
 a
re
 
v
al
u
e 
re
le
v
an
t.
 I
f 
n
o
ti
o
n
a
l 
v
al
u
es
 o
f 
d
er
iv
at
iv
es
 h
av
e 
in
cr
em
en
ta
l 
ex
p
la
n
at
o
ry
 p
o
w
er
 
o
v
er
 f
ai
r 
v
al
u
es
. 
 
U
S
 b
an
k
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
y
ea
rs
 1
9
9
3
, 
N
=
9
8
 
b
an
k
s,
 a
n
d
 1
9
9
4
, 
N
=
9
9
 b
an
k
s.
 
U
se
 t
h
e 
b
al
an
ce
 s
h
ee
t 
m
o
d
el
, 
re
g
re
ss
 t
h
e 
m
ar
k
et
 v
al
u
e 
o
f 
eq
u
it
y
 o
n
 t
h
e 
fa
ir
 v
al
u
es
 o
f 
d
er
iv
at
iv
es
 u
se
d
 i
n
 A
L
M
, 
th
e 
fa
ir
 v
al
u
es
 o
f 
o
ff
-b
al
an
ce
 
sh
ee
t 
it
e
m
s,
 a
n
d
 t
h
e 
n
o
ti
o
n
al
 
v
al
u
es
 o
f 
d
er
iv
at
iv
es
. 
F
ai
r 
v
al
u
es
 o
f 
d
er
iv
at
iv
es
 
u
se
d
 i
n
 A
L
M
, 
th
e 
fa
ir
 
v
al
u
es
 o
f 
o
ff
-b
al
an
ce
 s
h
ee
t 
it
em
s,
 
an
d
 t
h
e 
n
o
ti
o
n
al
 v
al
u
es
 o
f 
d
er
iv
at
iv
es
. 
F
ai
r 
v
al
u
es
 o
f 
o
n
-b
al
an
ce
 s
h
ee
t 
fi
n
an
ci
al
 i
n
st
ru
m
en
ts
 u
n
d
er
 S
F
A
S
 
N
o
. 
1
0
7
, 
n
et
 a
ss
et
s 
o
f 
al
l 
o
th
er
 
it
em
s,
 f
ai
r 
v
al
u
e 
o
f 
n
et
 p
en
si
o
n
s,
 
n
o
n
-p
er
fo
rm
in
g
 l
o
an
s,
 a
n
d
 c
re
d
it
-
ri
sk
 v
a
lu
es
 f
o
r 
o
ff
-b
a
la
n
ce
 s
h
ee
t 
d
er
iv
at
iv
es
. 
F
ai
r 
v
al
u
es
 o
f 
d
er
iv
at
iv
es
 u
se
d
 i
n
 
th
e 
A
L
M
 a
re
 f
o
u
n
d
 v
al
u
e 
re
le
v
an
t.
 
N
o
ti
o
n
al
 v
al
u
es
 h
av
e 
in
cr
em
en
ta
l 
ex
p
la
n
at
o
ry
 p
o
w
er
 r
el
at
iv
e 
to
 
d
er
iv
at
iv
es
’ 
fa
ir
 v
al
u
es
 a
n
d
 v
is
e 
v
er
sa
. 
W
a
n
g
 e
t 
a
l.
 (
2
0
0
5
) 
If
 d
er
iv
at
iv
e 
d
is
cl
o
su
re
s 
u
n
d
er
 
S
F
A
S
 N
o
. 
1
1
9
 a
n
d
 
S
F
A
S
 N
o
. 
1
3
3
 a
re
 
v
al
u
e 
re
le
v
an
t.
 
U
S
 b
an
k
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
p
er
io
d
 1
9
9
4
-2
0
0
2
, 
N
=
1
6
1
 b
an
k
s.
 
T
h
ei
r 
m
o
d
el
 i
s 
b
as
ed
 o
n
 t
h
e 
O
h
ls
o
n
 (
1
9
9
5
) 
m
o
d
el
. 
N
o
ti
o
n
al
 a
m
o
u
n
ts
 o
f 
tr
ad
in
g
 a
n
d
 n
o
n
-t
ra
d
in
g
 
d
er
iv
at
iv
es
. 
E
ar
n
in
g
s,
 b
o
o
k
 v
a
lu
e 
o
f 
eq
u
it
y
, 
sa
le
s 
g
ro
w
th
 i
n
 t
h
e 
la
st
 t
h
re
e 
ye
ar
s.
 
In
 a
n
o
th
er
 m
o
d
el
 s
p
ec
if
ic
at
io
n
 t
h
ey
 
al
so
 c
o
n
tr
o
l 
fo
r 
d
er
iv
at
iv
es
’ 
fa
ir
 
v
al
u
es
. 
N
o
ti
o
n
al
 a
m
o
u
n
ts
 o
f 
d
er
iv
at
iv
es
 a
re
 
re
la
te
d
 t
o
 s
h
ar
e 
p
ri
ce
s.
 
 N
o
te
s:
 I
n
 t
h
e 
co
lu
m
n
 “
sa
m
p
le
” 
th
e 
le
tt
er
 N
 i
n
d
ic
at
es
 t
h
e 
m
ax
im
u
m
 n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
o
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s 
fo
r 
ev
er
y
 y
ea
r.
 
   
S
ec
ti
o
n
 2
: 
S
tu
d
ie
s 
in
 t
h
e 
v
a
lu
e 
re
le
v
a
n
ce
 l
it
er
a
tu
re
 c
o
n
ce
rn
in
g
 n
o
n
-f
in
a
n
ci
a
l 
in
st
ru
m
en
ts
 
  
A
u
th
o
r(
s)
 
R
es
ea
rc
h
 O
b
je
ct
iv
e 
S
a
m
p
le
 
M
et
h
o
d
o
lo
g
y 
P
ri
m
a
ry
 v
a
ri
a
b
le
(s
) 
o
f 
in
te
re
st
 
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
va
ri
a
b
le
s 
P
ri
m
a
ry
 F
in
d
in
g
s 
A
b
o
o
d
y
 e
t 
a
l.
 
(1
9
9
9
) 
W
h
et
h
er
 u
p
w
ar
d
 
re
v
al
u
at
io
n
s 
o
f 
fi
x
ed
 
as
se
ts
 a
re
 p
o
si
ti
v
el
y
 
re
la
te
d
 t
o
 c
h
an
g
es
 i
n
 
o
p
er
at
in
g
 i
n
co
m
e 
an
d
 
ca
sh
 f
lo
w
s 
fr
o
m
 
o
p
er
at
io
n
s.
 
U
K
 f
ir
m
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
p
er
io
d
 1
9
8
3
-1
9
9
5
. 
N
=
1
,3
3
4
 f
ir
m
-y
ea
r 
o
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s.
 
R
eg
re
ss
 c
h
an
g
es
 i
n
 o
p
er
at
in
g
 
p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 o
n
 t
h
e 
in
cr
ea
se
 
o
f 
th
e 
re
v
al
u
at
io
n
 r
es
er
v
e,
 
w
h
il
e 
co
n
tr
o
ll
in
g
 f
o
r 
o
th
er
 
v
ar
ia
b
le
s.
 
U
p
w
ar
d
 r
ev
al
u
at
io
n
 o
f 
fi
x
ed
 a
ss
et
s,
 u
si
n
g
 a
s 
a 
p
ro
x
y
 t
h
e 
in
cr
ea
se
 t
o
 t
h
e 
re
v
al
u
at
io
n
 r
es
er
v
e.
 
O
p
er
at
in
g
 i
n
co
m
e 
o
f 
th
e 
p
re
v
io
u
s 
p
er
io
d
, 
m
ar
k
et
-t
o
-b
o
o
k
 r
at
io
 (
b
o
o
k
 
v
al
u
e 
ex
cl
u
d
es
 t
h
e 
re
v
al
u
at
io
n
 
b
al
an
ce
),
 t
h
e 
lo
g
 o
f 
to
ta
l 
as
se
ts
 
(e
x
cl
u
d
in
g
 t
h
e 
re
v
al
u
at
io
n
 b
a
la
n
ce
),
 
an
d
 a
n
 i
n
d
ic
at
o
r 
v
ar
ia
b
le
 t
o
 c
o
n
tr
o
l 
fo
r 
ch
an
g
es
 i
n
 p
ro
p
er
ty
 v
al
u
es
. 
  
C
u
rr
en
t 
ye
ar
 r
ev
al
u
at
io
n
s 
o
f 
fi
x
ed
 
as
se
ts
 a
re
 p
o
si
ti
v
e
ly
 a
n
d
 
si
g
n
if
ic
an
tl
y
 r
el
at
ed
 t
o
 b
o
th
 
o
p
er
at
in
g
 i
n
co
m
e 
an
d
 o
p
er
at
in
g
 
ca
sh
 f
lo
w
s.
 
A
b
o
o
d
y
 a
n
d
 L
ev
 
(1
9
9
8
) 
E
x
am
in
e 
th
e 
v
a
lu
e 
re
le
v
an
ce
 o
f 
th
e 
ca
p
it
al
is
at
io
n
 o
f 
so
ft
w
ar
e 
d
ev
el
o
p
m
en
t 
co
st
s.
 
U
S
 s
o
ft
w
ar
e 
fi
rm
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
p
er
io
d
 1
9
8
7
-
1
9
9
5
. 
N
=
1
6
3
 f
ir
m
s.
 
1
. 
T
h
ey
 i
m
p
le
m
en
t 
a 
re
tu
rn
 
sp
ec
if
ic
at
io
n
 m
o
d
el
, 
2
. 
a 
p
ri
ce
 
sp
ec
if
ic
at
io
n
 m
o
d
el
, 
an
d
 3
. 
an
 
in
te
rt
em
p
o
ra
l 
m
o
d
el
, 
re
g
re
ss
in
g
 e
ar
n
in
g
s 
o
n
 
ca
p
it
al
is
at
io
n
 a
m
o
u
n
ts
. 
T
h
e 
an
n
u
al
 s
o
ft
w
ar
e 
ca
p
it
al
is
at
io
n
 a
m
o
u
n
t 
an
d
 
th
e 
cu
m
u
la
ti
v
e 
so
ft
w
ar
e 
as
se
t.
 
1
. 
F
o
r 
th
e 
re
tu
rn
 m
o
d
el
, 
ch
an
g
es
 i
n
 
th
e 
so
ft
w
ar
e 
d
ev
el
o
p
m
en
t 
ex
p
en
se
s 
(o
f 
th
e 
“e
x
p
en
se
rs
”)
, 
ch
an
g
es
 i
n
 
so
ft
w
ar
e 
d
ev
el
o
p
m
en
t 
ex
p
en
se
s 
(o
f 
th
e 
“c
ap
it
al
iz
er
s”
),
 c
h
an
g
e 
in
 t
h
e 
am
o
rt
is
at
io
n
 o
f 
so
ft
w
ar
e 
as
se
t 
(f
o
r 
th
e 
“c
ap
it
al
iz
er
s”
),
 n
et
 i
n
co
m
e 
in
 
le
v
e
ls
 a
n
d
 i
n
 c
h
an
g
es
 f
o
rm
 b
ef
o
re
 
so
ft
w
ar
e 
d
ev
el
o
p
m
en
t 
it
em
s.
 2
. 
F
o
r 
th
e 
p
ri
ce
 m
o
d
el
, 
E
P
S
 a
n
d
 b
o
o
k
 
v
al
u
e 
o
f 
eq
u
it
y
 b
ef
o
re
 t
h
e 
ca
p
it
al
iz
ed
 s
o
ft
w
ar
e 
as
se
t.
 3
. 
S
im
il
ar
 c
o
n
tr
o
l 
v
ar
ia
b
le
s 
w
it
h
 t
h
e 
re
tu
rn
 m
o
d
el
. 
 
C
ap
it
al
is
at
io
n
 a
m
o
u
n
ts
 a
re
 v
al
u
e 
re
le
v
an
t.
 
B
a
rt
h
 &
 C
li
n
ch
 
(1
9
9
8
) 
se
e 
ta
b
le
 1
 i
n
 t
h
is
 
ap
p
en
d
ix
. 
 
 
 
 
 
2
8
5
 
 
D
a
n
b
o
lt
 &
 R
ee
s 
(2
0
0
8
) 
W
h
et
h
er
 f
ai
r 
v
al
u
e 
in
co
m
e 
is
 m
o
re
 v
a
lu
e 
re
le
v
an
t 
th
an
 
h
is
to
ri
ca
l 
co
st
 
in
co
m
e.
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 r
ea
l 
es
ta
te
 a
n
d
 
in
v
es
tm
en
t 
fu
n
d
 
in
d
u
st
ri
es
. 
 S
tu
d
y
 
p
er
io
d
 i
s 
1
9
9
3
-2
0
0
2
. 
N
=
1
0
0
 r
ea
l 
es
ta
te
 
fi
rm
s 
an
d
 N
=
3
1
5
 
in
v
es
tm
en
t 
co
m
p
an
ie
s.
 
U
se
 a
 R
IV
M
. 
N
et
 i
n
co
m
e 
u
n
d
er
 f
ai
r 
v
al
u
e 
ac
co
u
n
ti
n
g
 a
n
d
 
h
is
to
ri
ca
l 
co
st
 a
cc
o
u
n
ti
n
g
. 
B
o
o
k
 v
al
u
e 
o
f 
eq
u
it
y
, 
re
v
a
lu
at
io
n
 
co
m
p
o
n
en
t 
o
f 
eq
u
it
y
. 
F
ai
r 
v
al
u
e 
in
co
m
e 
is
 m
o
re
 r
el
ev
an
t 
th
an
 h
is
to
ri
ca
l 
co
st
 i
n
co
m
e.
 
H
o
w
ev
er
, 
in
 t
h
e 
p
re
se
n
ce
 o
f 
fa
ir
 
v
al
u
e 
o
f 
eq
u
it
y
 t
h
e 
re
su
lt
s 
ar
e 
w
ea
k
. 
D
ie
tr
ic
h
 e
t 
a
l.
 
(2
0
0
1
) 
T
o
 i
n
v
es
ti
g
at
e 
th
e 
re
li
ab
il
it
y
 o
f 
fa
ir
 
v
al
u
e 
es
ti
m
at
es
 o
f 
in
v
es
tm
en
t 
p
ro
p
er
ti
es
. 
U
K
 i
n
v
es
tm
en
t 
p
ro
p
er
ti
es
 f
o
r 
th
e 
p
er
io
d
 1
9
8
8
-1
9
9
6
. 
N
=
7
6
 f
ir
m
s.
 
U
n
iv
ar
ia
te
 s
ta
ti
st
ic
al
 a
n
al
y
si
s.
 
A
p
p
ra
is
al
 e
st
im
at
es
 o
f 
in
v
es
tm
en
t 
p
ro
p
er
ti
es
. 
N
/A
 
F
ai
r 
v
al
u
es
 o
f 
in
v
es
tm
en
t 
p
ro
p
er
ty
 
u
n
d
er
st
at
e 
ac
tu
al
 s
e
ll
in
g
 p
ri
ce
s 
b
y
 
si
x
 p
er
ce
n
t,
 b
u
t 
ar
e 
le
ss
 b
ia
se
d
 a
n
d
 
m
o
re
 a
cc
u
ra
te
 m
ea
su
re
s 
th
an
 
h
is
to
ri
ca
l 
co
st
s.
  
E
a
st
o
n
 e
t 
a
l.
 (
1
9
9
3
) 
T
o
 e
x
am
in
e 
th
e 
as
so
ci
at
io
n
 o
f 
th
e 
re
v
al
u
at
io
n
 o
f 
lo
n
g
-
li
v
ed
 a
ss
et
s 
w
it
h
 
sh
ar
e 
p
ri
ce
s 
o
r 
re
tu
rn
s.
  
A
u
st
ra
li
an
 f
ir
m
s 
w
it
h
 
te
n
 y
ea
rs
 o
f 
fi
n
an
ci
al
 
st
at
em
en
ts
 f
ro
m
 
1
9
8
1
. 
N
=
1
0
0
 f
ir
m
s.
  
Is
 b
as
ed
 o
n
 t
h
e 
th
eo
re
ti
ca
l 
fo
u
n
d
at
io
n
 o
f 
O
h
ls
o
n
 (
1
9
9
5
).
 
A
ss
et
 r
ev
al
u
at
io
n
 r
es
er
v
e.
 
E
ar
n
in
g
s 
p
er
 s
h
ar
e.
 
A
ss
et
 r
ev
al
u
at
io
n
 r
es
er
v
e 
ex
p
la
in
s 
v
ar
ia
ti
o
n
s 
in
 m
ar
k
et
-t
o
-b
o
o
k
 r
at
io
s.
 
L
e
v
 a
n
d
 
S
o
u
g
ia
n
n
is
 (
1
9
9
6
) 
W
h
et
h
er
 R
&
D
 
ca
p
it
al
is
at
io
n
 i
s 
v
al
u
e 
re
le
v
an
ce
. 
T
h
ei
r 
re
se
ar
ch
 i
n
sp
ir
ed
 b
y
 
F
A
S
B
’s
 c
o
n
ce
rn
s 
o
n
 
th
e 
ca
p
it
al
is
at
io
n
 o
f 
R
&
D
 e
x
p
en
se
s.
 
A
 l
ar
g
e 
sa
m
p
le
 o
f 
U
S
 
p
u
b
li
c 
fi
rm
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
p
er
io
d
 1
9
7
5
-1
9
8
1
. 
1
. 
T
h
ey
 f
ir
st
 c
o
m
p
u
te
 R
&
D
 
ca
p
it
al
 a
n
d
 a
m
o
rt
is
at
io
n
 r
at
es
. 
2
. 
S
ec
o
n
d
 t
h
ey
 a
d
ju
st
 r
ep
o
rt
ed
 
ea
rn
in
g
s 
an
d
 b
o
o
k
 v
al
u
es
 f
o
r 
th
e 
R
&
D
 c
ap
it
al
is
at
io
n
. 
3
. 
F
in
al
ly
 t
h
ey
 i
m
p
le
m
en
t 
a 
le
v
e
l 
an
d
 a
 r
et
u
rn
 m
o
d
e
l 
to
 
te
st
 f
o
r 
th
e 
v
al
u
e 
re
le
v
an
ce
 o
f 
R
&
D
 c
ap
it
al
is
at
io
n
. 
   
A
d
ju
st
m
en
ts
 t
o
 r
ep
o
rt
ed
 
ea
rn
in
g
s 
an
d
 b
o
o
k
 v
al
u
es
 
as
 a
 r
es
u
lt
 o
f 
th
e 
R
&
D
 
ca
p
it
al
is
at
io
n
. 
 
In
 t
h
e 
le
v
el
 m
o
d
el
 t
h
ey
 u
se
 t
h
e 
re
p
o
rt
ed
 (
G
A
A
P
) 
ea
rn
in
g
s.
 I
n
 t
h
e 
re
tu
rn
 m
o
d
el
 t
h
ey
 u
se
 r
ep
o
rt
ed
 
(G
A
A
P
) 
ea
rn
in
g
s,
 t
h
e 
fi
rs
t-
d
if
fe
re
n
ce
 i
n
 r
ep
o
rt
ed
 e
ar
n
in
g
s,
 
re
p
o
rt
ed
 e
ar
n
in
g
s 
b
ef
o
re
 R
&
D
 
ex
p
en
se
s.
  
 
R
&
D
 a
d
ju
st
m
en
ts
 a
re
 h
ig
h
ly
 
co
rr
el
at
ed
 w
it
h
 s
h
ar
e 
p
ri
ce
s,
 i
n
 b
o
th
 
le
v
e
l 
an
d
 r
et
u
rn
 f
o
rm
s.
 
O
w
u
su
 &
 Y
eo
h
 
(2
0
0
6
) 
W
h
et
h
er
 u
n
re
al
is
ed
 
g
ai
n
s 
re
co
g
n
is
ed
 i
n
 
in
co
m
e 
st
at
em
en
t 
ar
e 
m
o
re
 v
al
u
e 
re
le
v
an
t 
th
an
 u
n
re
al
is
ed
 g
ai
n
s 
re
co
g
n
is
ed
 i
n
 t
h
e 
re
v
al
u
at
io
n
 r
es
er
v
e.
 
N
ew
 Z
ea
la
n
d
 
in
v
es
tm
en
t 
p
ro
p
er
ty
 
fi
rm
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
p
er
io
d
 
1
9
9
0
-1
9
9
9
. 
N
=
1
7
0
 f
ir
m
-y
ea
r 
o
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s.
 
U
se
 t
h
e 
B
S
M
. 
M
ar
k
et
 v
al
u
e 
o
f 
co
m
p
an
ie
s 
th
at
 r
ec
o
g
n
is
e 
u
n
re
al
is
ed
 
g
ai
n
s 
in
 i
n
co
m
e 
st
at
e
m
en
t,
 
an
d
 m
ar
k
et
 v
al
u
e 
o
f 
co
m
p
an
ie
s 
th
at
 r
ec
o
g
n
is
e 
u
n
re
al
is
ed
 g
ai
n
s 
in
 a
 
re
v
al
u
at
io
n
 r
es
er
v
e.
  
M
ar
k
et
 v
al
u
e 
o
f 
as
se
ts
, 
m
ar
k
et
 
v
al
u
e 
o
f 
li
ab
il
it
ie
s,
 m
ar
k
et
 v
a
lu
e 
o
f 
p
ro
p
er
ty
 i
n
te
n
d
ed
 f
o
r 
sa
le
, 
n
et
 
o
p
er
at
in
g
 c
as
h
 f
lo
w
s,
 a
 g
ro
w
th
 
v
ar
ia
b
le
. 
N
o
 e
v
id
en
ce
 t
h
at
 r
ec
o
g
n
it
io
n
 i
n
 
in
co
m
e 
st
at
e
m
en
t 
v
al
u
ed
 h
ig
h
er
 
th
an
 r
ec
o
g
n
it
io
n
 i
n
 a
 r
ev
al
u
at
io
n
 
re
se
rv
e.
 
S
o
 &
 S
m
it
h
 (
2
0
0
9
) 
W
h
et
h
er
 i
v
es
to
rs
 
v
al
u
e 
th
e 
ch
an
g
e 
in
 
re
co
g
n
is
in
g
 c
h
an
g
es
 
in
 t
h
e 
fa
ir
 v
al
u
e 
o
f 
in
v
es
tm
en
t 
p
ro
p
er
ti
es
 
fr
o
m
 a
 r
ev
al
u
at
io
n
 
re
se
rv
e 
to
 i
n
co
m
e 
st
at
em
en
t.
 
H
o
n
g
 K
o
n
g
 p
ro
p
er
ty
 
fi
rm
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
p
er
io
d
 
2
0
0
4
-2
0
0
6
. 
N
=
9
2
. 
A
 s
h
o
rt
- 
w
in
d
o
w
 a
n
d
 a
 l
o
n
g
-
w
in
d
o
w
 e
v
en
t 
st
u
d
y
. 
G
ai
n
s 
an
d
 l
o
ss
es
 i
n
 f
ai
r 
v
al
u
es
 o
f 
in
v
es
tm
en
t 
p
ro
p
er
ti
es
. 
E
ar
n
in
g
s 
b
ef
o
re
 g
ai
n
s 
an
d
 l
o
ss
es
, 
fi
rm
 s
iz
e,
 l
ev
er
ag
e,
 c
h
an
g
e 
in
 
C
en
ta
-C
it
y
 I
n
te
x
. 
P
re
se
n
ti
n
g
 c
h
an
g
es
 i
n
 f
ai
r 
v
al
u
es
 o
f 
in
v
es
tm
en
t 
p
ro
p
er
ti
es
 i
n
 i
n
co
m
e 
st
at
em
en
t 
ar
e 
m
o
re
 v
al
u
e 
re
le
v
an
t 
th
an
 p
re
se
n
ti
n
g
 t
h
e 
ch
an
g
es
 i
n
 a
 
re
v
al
u
at
io
n
 r
es
er
v
e.
 
   
2
8
6
 
 
S
ec
ti
o
n
 3
: 
S
tu
d
ie
s 
in
 t
h
e 
co
st
 o
f 
eq
u
it
y
 l
it
er
a
tu
re
 (
ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 c
o
n
se
q
u
en
ce
 t
es
t)
 
 
 
A
u
th
o
r(
s)
 
R
es
ea
r
ch
 O
b
je
ct
iv
e 
S
a
m
p
le
 
M
et
h
o
d
o
lo
g
y
 
 
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
v
a
r
ia
b
le
s 
F
in
d
in
g
s 
B
o
to
sa
n
 (
1
9
9
7
) 
E
x
am
in
es
 t
h
e 
ef
fe
ct
 o
f 
d
is
cl
o
su
re
 
le
v
el
 o
n
 t
h
e 
co
st
 o
f 
eq
u
it
y
. 
1
2
2
 U
S
 f
ir
m
s 
co
m
in
g
 
m
an
u
fa
ct
u
ri
n
g
 i
n
d
u
st
ry
. 
R
eg
re
ss
es
 t
h
e 
C
E
 o
n
 a
 s
e
lf
-c
o
n
st
ru
ct
ed
 p
ro
x
y
 
o
f 
d
is
c
lo
su
re
 l
ev
el
 a
n
d
 a
 n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
co
n
tr
o
l 
v
ar
ia
b
le
s.
 
F
ir
m
 s
iz
e 
an
d
 m
ar
k
et
 b
et
a.
 
O
n
ly
 f
o
r 
fi
rm
s 
th
at
 h
av
e 
lo
w
 
an
al
y
st
s 
fo
ll
o
w
in
g
, 
g
re
at
er
 
d
is
cl
o
su
re
 t
ra
n
sl
at
es
 i
n
to
 l
o
w
er
 
C
E
. 
 
 
B
o
to
sa
n
 &
 
P
lu
m
le
e 
(2
0
0
2
) 
E
x
am
in
es
 t
h
e 
as
so
ci
at
io
n
 b
et
w
ee
n
 
co
st
 o
f 
eq
u
it
y
 a
n
d
 l
ev
el
 a
n
d
 t
im
e
ly
 
d
is
cl
o
su
re
s,
 a
n
d
 i
n
v
es
to
r 
re
la
ti
o
n
s 
ac
ti
v
it
ie
s.
  
U
S
 f
ir
m
s 
co
m
in
g
 f
ro
m
 a
 w
id
e 
ra
n
g
e 
o
f 
in
d
u
st
ri
es
 f
o
r 
th
e 
p
er
io
d
 
1
9
8
5
/8
6
-1
9
9
5
/9
6
. 
Im
p
le
m
en
t 
a
 D
D
M
 t
o
 e
st
im
at
e 
C
E
. 
R
eg
re
ss
 t
h
e 
C
E
 o
n
 d
is
c
lo
su
re
 m
ea
su
re
 v
ar
ia
b
le
s,
 s
u
ch
 a
s 
an
n
u
al
 r
ep
o
rt
 s
co
re
, 
o
th
er
 p
u
b
li
ca
ti
o
n
 s
co
re
, 
an
d
 i
n
v
es
to
r 
re
la
ti
o
n
s 
sc
o
re
. 
M
ar
k
et
 b
et
a 
an
d
 f
ir
m
 s
iz
e 
(m
ar
k
et
 v
al
u
e)
. 
N
eg
at
iv
e 
as
so
ci
at
io
n
 b
et
w
ee
n
 
co
st
 o
f 
eq
u
it
y
 a
n
d
 l
ev
el
 o
f 
an
n
u
al
 d
is
cl
o
su
re
, 
an
d
 p
o
si
ti
v
e 
as
so
ci
at
io
n
 f
o
r 
ti
m
el
y
 
d
is
cl
o
su
re
s.
 N
o
 a
ss
o
ci
at
io
n
 f
o
r 
th
e 
in
v
es
to
r 
re
la
ti
o
n
s.
 
 
C
h
ri
st
en
se
n
 e
t 
al
. 
(2
0
0
7
) 
E
x
am
in
es
 t
h
e 
ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 
co
n
se
q
u
en
ce
s 
fo
r 
U
K
 f
ir
m
s 
fr
o
m
 
th
e 
m
an
d
at
o
ry
 a
d
o
p
ti
o
n
 o
f 
IF
R
S
. 
2
,5
3
8
 o
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s 
fo
r 
U
K
 
fi
rm
s.
 T
h
e 
p
er
io
d
 o
f 
st
u
d
y
 
co
v
er
s 
1
9
9
6
-2
0
0
4
. 
T
h
e 
m
o
d
el
 r
eg
re
ss
es
 t
h
e 
ch
an
g
e 
in
 C
E
 f
ro
m
 
th
e 
p
re
- 
to
 t
h
e 
p
o
st
-a
n
n
o
u
n
ce
m
en
t 
p
er
io
d
 o
n
 
th
e 
d
eg
re
e 
o
f 
si
m
il
ar
it
y
 o
f 
U
K
 f
ir
m
s 
to
 
G
er
m
an
 v
o
lu
n
ta
ry
 a
d
o
p
te
rs
. 
 
M
ar
k
et
 v
al
u
e,
 b
o
o
k
-t
o
-m
ar
k
et
 
v
al
u
e,
 d
eb
t-
to
-m
ar
k
et
 v
al
u
e,
 
sa
le
s 
g
ro
w
th
, 
o
p
er
at
in
g
 p
ro
fi
t 
m
ar
g
in
. 
U
K
 f
ir
m
s 
w
it
h
 i
n
cr
ea
se
d
 
p
ro
b
ab
il
it
ie
s 
to
 h
av
e 
ad
o
p
te
d
 
IF
R
S
 i
f 
th
e
y
 p
er
m
it
te
d
, 
ex
p
er
ie
n
ce
 g
re
at
er
 b
en
ef
it
s 
fr
o
m
 
th
e 
m
an
d
at
o
ry
 a
d
o
p
ti
o
n
 o
f 
IF
R
S
 
C
u
ij
p
er
s 
&
 
B
u
ij
in
k
 (
2
0
0
5
) 
W
h
et
h
er
 n
o
n
-l
o
ca
l 
G
A
A
P
 
ad
o
p
te
rs
 h
av
e 
lo
w
er
 l
ev
el
s 
o
f 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
 a
sy
m
m
et
ry
. 
1
1
4
 n
o
n
-f
in
an
ci
al
 E
U
 f
ir
m
s.
 
U
se
s 
th
e 
A
E
G
 m
o
d
el
 t
o
 e
st
im
at
e 
C
E
. 
C
o
m
p
ar
es
 t
h
e 
C
E
 o
f 
IF
R
S
/U
S
 G
A
A
P
 f
ir
m
s 
to
 
a 
co
m
p
ar
ab
le
 s
am
p
le
 (
in
 t
er
m
s 
o
f 
ri
sk
) 
o
f 
lo
ca
l 
G
A
A
P
 f
ir
m
s.
 
C
o
u
n
tr
y
 o
ri
g
in
at
io
n
, 
b
et
a,
 s
iz
e 
(m
ea
su
re
d
 a
s 
th
e 
n
at
u
ra
l 
lo
g
ar
it
h
m
 o
f 
m
ar
k
et
 
ca
p
it
al
is
at
io
n
),
 a
n
d
 t
h
e 
li
k
el
ih
o
o
d
 o
f 
IF
R
S
/U
S
 G
A
A
P
 
ad
o
p
ti
o
n
. 
IF
R
S
/U
S
 G
A
A
P
 f
ir
m
s 
ex
h
ib
it
 a
n
 
in
cr
ea
se
d
 C
E
 a
s 
co
m
p
ar
ed
 t
o
 
lo
ca
l 
G
A
A
P
 f
ir
m
s.
 
D
as
k
e 
(2
0
0
6
) 
W
h
et
h
er
 t
h
e 
v
o
lu
n
ta
ry
 a
d
o
p
ti
o
n
 o
f 
in
te
rn
at
io
n
al
ly
 r
ec
o
g
n
is
ed
 
fi
n
an
ci
al
 r
ep
o
rt
in
g
 s
ta
n
d
ar
d
s 
(I
F
R
S
/U
S
 G
A
A
P
) 
re
d
u
ce
s 
th
e 
co
st
 
o
f 
eq
u
it
y
. 
 
7
5
 s
w
it
ch
 a
n
d
 2
8
0
 i
n
it
ia
l 
in
te
rn
at
io
n
al
 r
ep
o
rt
in
g
 G
er
m
an
 
fi
rm
s.
 A
 t
o
ta
l 
sa
m
p
le
 o
f 
1
3
,0
0
0
 
H
G
B
, 
4
,5
0
0
 I
F
R
S
, 
an
d
 3
,0
0
0
 U
S
 
G
A
A
P
 f
ir
m
-m
o
n
th
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
p
er
io
d
 1
9
9
3
-2
0
0
2
. 
 
U
se
s 
th
e 
R
IV
M
 a
n
d
 t
h
e 
A
E
G
 t
o
 e
st
im
at
e 
C
E
. 
Im
p
le
m
en
ts
 a
 m
u
lt
iv
ar
ia
te
 a
n
al
y
si
s 
b
y
 
d
ev
el
o
p
in
g
 d
u
m
m
ie
s 
th
at
 t
ak
e 
th
e 
v
al
u
e 
o
f 
1
 
fo
r 
IF
R
S
 a
n
d
 U
S
 G
A
A
P
 a
n
d
 0
 f
o
r 
H
G
B
. 
  
  
P
ro
x
ie
s 
fo
r 
sy
st
e
m
at
ic
 (
b
et
a)
 a
n
d
 
u
n
sy
st
em
at
ic
 r
is
k
 (
v
o
la
ti
li
ty
),
 
le
v
er
ag
e,
 s
iz
e,
 a
n
al
y
st
s’
 
fo
ll
o
w
in
g
s,
 c
ro
ss
-l
is
ti
n
g
, 
B
/M
, 
In
d
u
st
ry
 a
n
d
 t
im
e.
 
N
o
 e
v
id
en
ce
 o
f 
lo
w
er
 c
o
st
 o
f 
eq
u
it
y
. 
In
 c
o
n
tr
as
t,
 t
h
e 
C
E
 h
as
 
b
ee
n
 i
n
cr
ea
se
d
. 
D
as
k
e 
et
 a
l.
 
(2
0
0
7
) 
E
x
am
in
e 
th
e 
ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 
co
n
se
q
u
en
ce
s 
o
f 
v
o
lu
n
ta
ry
 I
F
R
S
 
ad
o
p
ti
o
n
. 
D
at
a 
o
f 
7
3
,5
7
5
 f
ir
m
-y
ea
r 
o
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s 
fr
o
m
 2
4
 c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s 
w
o
rl
d
w
id
e.
 T
h
e 
p
er
io
d
 c
o
v
er
s 
1
9
8
8
-2
0
0
4
. 
U
se
 a
 m
o
d
el
 t
h
at
 r
eg
re
ss
es
 t
h
e 
C
E
 o
n
 a
 
d
u
m
m
y
 v
ar
ia
b
le
 t
h
at
 t
ak
es
 t
h
e 
v
al
u
e 
o
f 
1
 f
o
r 
fi
rm
s 
th
at
 a
p
p
ly
 I
F
R
S
 a
n
d
 0
, 
o
th
er
w
is
e.
 T
h
ey
 
u
se
 f
o
u
r 
m
et
h
o
d
s 
to
 c
al
cu
la
te
 C
E
. 
U
S
 L
is
ti
n
g
, 
ex
p
ec
te
d
 i
n
fl
at
io
n
, 
fi
rm
 s
iz
e,
 f
in
an
ci
al
 l
ev
er
ag
e,
 
re
tu
rn
 v
ar
ia
b
il
it
y
, 
fo
re
ca
st
 b
ia
s.
 
‘S
er
io
u
s’
 I
F
R
S
 a
d
o
p
te
rs
 
ex
p
er
ie
n
ce
 s
ig
n
if
ic
an
t 
d
ec
li
n
es
 
in
 t
h
ei
r 
C
E
 r
el
at
iv
e 
to
 ‘
la
b
el
’ 
ad
o
p
te
rs
. 
D
as
k
e 
et
 a
l.
 
(2
0
0
8
) 
E
x
am
in
e 
th
e 
ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 
co
n
se
q
u
en
ce
s 
(i
.e
. 
li
q
u
id
it
y
, 
C
E
, 
an
d
 t
h
e 
m
ar
k
et
 v
al
u
at
io
n
) 
o
f 
m
an
d
at
o
ry
 I
F
R
S
 d
is
c
lo
su
re
s.
  
A
 s
am
p
le
 o
f 
fi
rm
s 
co
m
in
g
 f
ro
m
 
2
6
 c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s 
ar
o
u
n
d
 t
h
e 
w
o
rl
d
 
th
at
 h
av
e 
m
an
d
at
o
ry
 a
d
o
p
te
d
 
IF
R
S
. 
 
E
st
im
a
te
 t
h
e 
C
E
 a
s 
an
 i
m
p
li
ed
 f
ig
u
re
 u
si
n
g
 
fo
u
r 
m
et
h
o
d
s.
 U
se
 u
n
iv
ar
ia
te
 a
n
d
 m
u
lt
iv
ar
ia
te
 
an
al
y
si
s.
  
F
ir
m
s 
th
at
 a
re
 n
o
t 
re
q
u
ir
ed
 t
o
 u
se
 
IF
R
S
, 
fi
rm
s 
th
at
 d
o
 n
o
t 
re
p
o
rt
 i
n
 
IF
R
S
 y
e
t 
b
u
t 
ar
e 
re
q
u
ir
ed
 t
o
 d
o
 
so
, 
In
d
u
st
ry
-y
ea
r-
fi
x
ed
 e
ff
ec
ts
, 
si
ze
, 
fi
n
an
ci
al
 l
ev
er
ag
e,
 r
is
k
-f
re
e 
ra
te
, 
re
tu
rn
 v
ar
ia
b
il
it
y
, 
fo
re
ca
st
 
b
ia
s.
 
F
in
d
in
g
s 
su
p
p
o
rt
 g
re
at
er
 
li
q
u
id
it
y
 a
ft
er
 t
h
e 
IF
R
S
 
ad
o
p
ti
o
n
, 
an
d
 c
o
rr
ec
ti
n
g
 f
o
r 
th
e 
an
ti
ci
p
at
io
n
 e
ff
ec
t 
th
e 
C
E
 h
as
 
b
ee
n
 d
ec
re
as
ed
 w
h
il
e 
th
e 
m
ar
k
et
 
v
al
u
at
io
n
 i
n
cr
ea
se
d
. 
D
h
al
iw
a
l 
(1
9
7
9
) 
 
W
h
et
h
er
 t
h
e 
re
q
u
ir
em
en
t 
to
 
d
is
cl
o
se
 r
ev
en
u
es
 a
n
d
 p
ro
fi
ts
 i
n
 
fu
rt
h
er
 a
n
al
y
si
s 
b
y
 l
in
e-
o
f-
b
u
si
n
es
s 
h
as
 a
n
 i
m
p
ac
t 
o
n
 t
h
e 
C
E
. 
2
5
 f
ir
m
s 
in
 t
h
e 
ex
p
er
im
en
ta
l 
g
ro
u
p
 (
af
fe
ct
ed
 b
y
 t
h
e 
re
g
u
la
ti
o
n
),
 a
n
d
 2
6
 i
n
 t
h
e 
co
n
tr
o
l 
g
ro
u
p
 (
n
o
n
-a
ff
ec
te
d
 b
y
 t
h
e 
re
g
u
la
ti
o
n
).
 
R
eg
re
ss
 t
h
e 
re
la
ti
v
e 
ch
an
g
es
 o
f 
th
re
e 
su
rr
o
g
at
es
 o
f 
C
E
 o
n
 s
ix
 c
o
n
tr
o
l 
v
ar
ia
b
le
s 
an
d
 a
 
d
u
m
m
y
 v
ar
ia
b
le
 t
h
at
 t
ak
es
 t
h
e 
v
al
u
e 
o
f 
1
 f
o
r 
fi
rm
s 
in
 t
h
e 
ex
p
er
im
en
ta
l 
g
ro
u
p
 a
n
d
 t
h
e 
v
al
u
e 
o
f 
0
 f
o
r 
fi
rm
s 
in
 t
h
e 
co
n
tr
o
l 
g
ro
u
p
. 
 
P
a
yo
u
t 
ra
ti
o
, 
g
ro
w
th
, 
le
v
er
ag
e 
ra
ti
o
, 
cu
rr
en
t 
li
q
u
id
it
y
 r
at
io
, 
si
ze
, 
ea
rn
in
g
s 
v
ar
ia
b
il
it
y
. 
R
es
u
lt
s 
su
p
p
o
rt
 t
h
e 
v
ie
w
 t
h
at
 
in
cr
ea
se
d
 d
is
cl
o
su
re
s 
fo
r 
re
v
en
u
es
 a
n
d
 p
ro
fi
ts
 i
n
 f
u
rt
h
er
 
an
al
y
si
s 
te
n
d
 t
o
 l
o
w
er
 C
E
. 
2
8
7
 
 
D
h
al
iw
a
l 
et
 a
l.
 
(1
9
7
9
) 
W
h
et
h
er
 t
h
e 
re
q
u
ir
em
en
t 
to
 
d
is
cl
o
se
 r
ev
en
u
es
 a
n
d
 p
ro
fi
ts
 i
n
 
fu
rt
h
er
 a
n
al
ys
is
 b
y
 l
in
e-
o
f-
b
u
si
n
es
s 
h
as
 a
n
 i
m
p
ac
t 
o
n
 t
h
e 
C
E
. 
2
5
 f
ir
m
s 
in
 t
h
e 
ex
p
er
im
en
ta
l 
g
ro
u
p
 (
fi
rm
s 
af
fe
ct
ed
 b
y
 t
h
e 
re
p
o
rt
in
g
 r
eq
u
ir
em
en
ts
) 
an
d
 2
6
 
fi
rm
s 
an
d
 2
7
 f
ir
m
s 
in
to
 t
w
o
 
co
n
tr
o
l 
g
ro
u
p
s.
  
U
se
 p
ro
x
ie
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
C
E
, 
th
e 
m
ar
k
et
 b
et
a,
 a
n
d
 
th
e 
st
an
d
ar
d
 d
ev
ia
ti
o
n
 o
f 
th
e 
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
 o
f 
st
o
ck
’s
 r
et
u
rn
s.
 U
se
 a
 r
eg
re
ss
io
n
 m
o
d
el
. 
p
ay
o
u
t 
ra
ti
o
, 
fr
im
s’
 g
ro
w
th
, 
le
v
er
ag
e 
ra
ti
o
, 
li
q
u
id
it
y
 o
f 
fi
rm
s,
 
as
se
t 
si
ze
, 
ea
rn
in
g
s 
v
ar
ia
b
il
it
y
. 
  
R
es
u
lt
s 
su
p
p
o
rt
 t
h
e 
v
ie
w
 t
h
at
 
in
cr
ea
se
d
 d
is
cl
o
su
re
s 
fo
r 
re
v
en
u
es
 a
n
d
 p
ro
fi
ts
 i
n
 f
u
rt
h
er
 
an
al
y
si
s 
te
n
d
 t
o
 l
o
w
er
 C
E
. 
F
ra
n
ci
s 
et
 a
l.
 
(2
0
0
8
) 
1
. 
W
h
et
h
er
 e
ar
n
in
g
s 
q
u
al
it
y
 r
el
at
es
 
to
 m
o
re
 d
is
cl
o
su
re
. 
2
. 
W
h
et
h
er
 
in
cr
ea
se
d
 d
is
cl
o
su
re
 r
el
at
es
 t
o
 
lo
w
er
 C
E
. 
  
6
7
7
 U
S
 f
ir
m
s 
fo
r 
a 
si
n
g
le
 y
ea
r,
 
2
0
0
1
. 
D
ev
el
o
p
 a
 s
el
f-
co
n
st
ru
ct
ed
 i
n
d
ex
 f
o
r 
th
e 
d
is
cl
o
su
re
 l
ev
el
. 
R
eg
re
ss
 t
h
is
 i
n
d
ex
 o
n
 a
 p
ro
x
y
 
o
f 
ea
rn
in
g
s 
q
u
al
it
y
. 
R
eg
re
ss
 t
h
e 
C
E
 e
st
im
at
es
 
o
n
 t
h
e 
se
lf
-c
o
n
st
ru
ct
ed
 i
n
d
ex
. 
  
M
ar
k
et
 b
et
a,
 s
iz
e 
(l
n
M
V
E
),
 
b
o
o
k
-t
o
-m
ar
k
et
 r
at
io
, 
an
al
y
st
 
fo
ll
o
w
in
g
, 
n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
se
g
m
en
ts
 
in
 w
h
ic
h
 t
h
e 
fi
rm
 o
p
er
at
es
, 
fi
rm
 
p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 (
R
O
A
).
  
E
ar
n
in
g
s 
q
u
al
it
y
 i
s 
p
o
si
ti
v
el
y
 
re
la
te
d
 t
o
 m
o
re
 d
is
cl
o
su
re
, 
in
cr
ea
se
d
 d
is
cl
o
su
re
 h
av
e 
a 
n
eg
at
iv
e 
ef
fe
ct
 o
n
 t
h
e 
C
E
, 
th
e 
n
eg
at
iv
e 
ef
fe
ct
 i
s 
el
im
in
at
ed
 
co
n
d
it
io
n
al
 o
n
 e
ar
n
in
g
s 
q
u
al
it
y
. 
H
ai
l 
(2
0
0
2
) 
E
x
am
in
es
 t
h
e 
re
la
ti
o
n
sh
ip
 b
et
w
ee
n
 
d
is
cl
o
su
re
 l
ev
el
 a
n
d
 c
o
st
 o
f 
eq
u
it
y
 
fo
r 
7
3
 S
w
is
s 
fi
rm
s.
  
7
3
 n
o
n
-f
in
an
ci
al
 f
ir
m
s 
li
st
ed
 o
n
 
th
e 
S
w
is
s 
E
x
ch
an
g
e.
 
U
se
 a
 d
er
iv
at
io
n
 o
f 
R
IV
M
 t
o
 e
st
im
at
e 
C
E
. 
R
eg
re
ss
 t
h
e 
C
E
 o
n
 a
 p
ro
x
y
 v
ar
ia
b
le
 f
o
r 
d
is
cl
o
su
re
 l
ev
el
 w
h
il
e 
co
n
tr
o
ll
in
g
 f
o
r 
o
th
er
 
v
ar
ia
b
le
s.
 
M
ar
k
et
 b
et
a,
 l
ev
er
ag
e,
 f
ir
m
 s
iz
e 
(t
h
e 
n
at
u
ra
l 
lo
g
 o
f 
m
ar
k
et
 v
al
u
e)
. 
S
ig
n
if
ic
an
t 
n
eg
at
iv
e 
re
su
lt
s.
 
L
ee
 e
t 
al
. 
(2
0
0
8
) 
E
x
am
in
e 
th
e 
im
p
ac
t 
o
f 
m
an
d
at
o
ry
 
IF
R
S
 a
d
o
p
ti
o
n
 o
n
 f
ir
m
s’
 C
E
. 
F
o
r 
a 
sa
m
p
le
 o
f 
n
o
n
-f
in
an
ci
al
 
fi
rm
s 
co
m
in
g
 f
ro
m
 1
7
 E
u
ro
p
ea
n
 
co
u
n
tr
ie
s.
 
E
st
im
a
te
 C
E
 b
as
ed
 o
n
 t
h
e 
A
E
G
 a
n
d
 P
E
G
 
m
o
d
el
s.
 F
o
r 
th
e 
an
al
y
si
s 
u
se
s 
t-
te
st
s 
an
d
 
re
g
re
ss
io
n
 a
n
al
y
si
s.
 U
se
 a
 d
u
m
m
y
 v
ar
ia
b
le
 
ta
k
in
g
 t
h
e 
v
al
u
e 
o
f 
1
 f
o
r 
th
e 
p
o
st
-I
F
R
S
 p
er
io
d
 
an
d
 0
 o
th
er
w
is
e.
 
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
fo
r 
in
st
it
u
ti
o
n
al
 
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
, 
m
ar
k
et
 v
al
u
e,
 
b
o
o
k
-t
o
-m
ar
k
et
, 
d
eb
t-
to
-e
q
u
it
y
 
ra
ti
o
, 
sa
le
s 
g
ro
w
th
, 
R
&
D
 
ex
p
en
se
, 
an
d
 %
 o
f 
cl
o
se
ly
 h
el
d
 
sh
ar
es
, 
co
u
n
tr
y 
an
d
 i
n
d
u
st
ry
 
v
ar
ia
b
le
s.
 
L
o
w
er
 C
E
 a
ft
er
 t
h
e 
IF
R
S
 
ad
o
p
ti
o
n
 f
o
r 
fi
rm
s 
co
m
in
g
 f
ro
m
 
h
ig
h
 f
in
an
ci
al
 r
ep
o
rt
in
g
 
in
ce
n
ti
v
e 
co
u
n
tr
ie
s.
 
L
eu
z 
&
 
V
er
re
cc
h
ia
 
(2
0
0
0
) 
W
h
et
h
er
 i
n
cr
ea
se
d
 d
is
cl
o
su
re
s 
h
av
e 
ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 b
en
ef
it
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
ad
o
p
te
rs
. 
F
o
r 
th
e 
cr
o
ss
-s
ec
ti
o
n
 t
es
t 
u
se
s 
1
0
2
 G
er
m
an
 f
ir
m
s 
in
cl
u
d
ed
 i
n
 
th
e 
D
A
X
 1
0
0
 i
n
d
ex
 d
u
ri
n
g
 1
9
9
8
. 
U
se
s 
p
ro
x
ie
s 
to
 d
es
cr
ib
e 
th
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
 
as
y
m
m
e
tr
y
 c
o
m
p
o
n
en
t 
o
f 
C
E
, 
su
ch
 a
s 
th
e 
b
id
-
as
k
 s
p
re
ad
, 
tr
ad
in
g
 v
o
lu
m
e 
an
d
 v
o
la
ti
li
ty
. 
R
eg
re
ss
es
 t
h
e 
p
ro
x
ie
s 
o
n
 a
 d
u
m
m
y
 v
a
ri
ab
le
 
ta
k
in
g
 t
h
e 
v
al
u
e 
o
f 
1
 i
f 
fi
rm
 f
o
ll
o
w
s 
IF
R
S
/U
S
 
G
A
A
P
 o
r 
0
 o
th
er
w
is
e.
 
P
er
fo
rm
an
ce
, 
fi
rm
 s
iz
e,
 f
o
re
ig
n
 
li
st
in
g
, 
fr
ee
 f
lo
at
, 
se
lf
-s
el
ec
ti
o
n
 
b
ia
s.
  
S
ig
n
if
ic
an
t 
lo
w
er
 b
id
-a
sk
 
sp
re
ad
s 
an
d
 h
ig
h
er
 t
ra
d
in
g
 
v
o
lu
m
es
 f
o
r 
fi
rm
s 
fo
ll
o
w
in
g
 
IF
R
S
/U
S
 G
A
A
P
. 
T
h
es
e 
re
su
lt
s 
ar
e 
ev
id
en
ce
 o
f 
ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 
b
en
ef
it
s.
  
R
es
u
lt
s 
o
n
 t
h
e 
v
o
la
ti
li
ty
 i
n
 s
h
ar
e 
p
ri
ce
s 
ar
e 
n
o
t 
su
p
p
o
rt
iv
e.
 
L
i 
(2
0
1
0
) 
W
h
et
h
er
 m
an
d
at
o
ry
 a
d
o
p
ti
o
n
 o
f 
IF
R
S
 r
ed
u
ce
s 
th
e 
C
E
. 
6
,4
5
6
 f
ir
m
-y
ea
r 
o
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s 
o
f 
1
,0
8
4
 E
U
 f
ir
m
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
p
er
io
d
 
1
9
9
5
-2
0
0
6
. 
R
eg
re
ss
 C
E
 e
st
im
at
es
 o
n
 a
 d
u
m
m
y
 v
ar
ia
b
le
 
th
at
 t
ak
es
 t
h
e 
v
al
u
e 
o
f 
1
 f
o
r 
p
er
io
d
s 
af
te
r 
th
e 
m
an
d
at
o
ry
 a
d
o
p
ti
o
n
 o
f 
IF
R
S
 a
n
d
 0
 b
ef
o
re
. 
W
h
et
h
er
 a
 f
ir
m
 i
s 
cr
o
ss
-l
is
te
d
 i
n
 
th
e 
U
.S
.,
 c
o
u
n
tr
y
-s
p
ec
if
ic
 
in
fl
at
io
n
 r
at
e,
 f
ir
m
 s
iz
e,
 r
et
u
rn
 
v
ar
ia
b
il
it
y
, 
fi
n
an
ci
al
 l
ev
er
ag
e,
 
in
d
u
st
ry
 a
n
d
 c
o
u
n
tr
y 
fi
x
ed
 
ef
fe
ct
s.
 
T
h
e 
re
su
lt
s 
d
o
cu
m
en
t 
a 
re
d
u
ct
io
n
 o
f 
4
8
 b
as
is
 p
o
in
ts
 f
o
r 
th
e 
C
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Appendix B 
 
Section 1: Tables of the alternative specification models for the value relevance test – fair value disclosures 
 
Table A. The March model 
 
  2005 2006 
 
Expect-
ed sign Coeff. t-values p-values Coeff. t-values p-values 
C ? 641.359 1.84 0.0679 997.973 1.79 0.0761 
LNS + 2.291 3.77 0.0002 2.342 4.69 0.0001 
LNS*WEAK*LOWC - -4.805 -6.08 0.0001 -3.186 -2.86 0.0026 
HTM + -2.683 -1.44 0.9237 -13.448 -3.05 0.9985 
DEP - -0.410 -0.99 0.1607 -0.292 -1.02 0.1536 
DT - -5.131 -5.32 0.0001 -4.391 -2.61 0.0052 
NON39AS + 0.352 18.39 0.0001 0.193 7.20 0.0001 
NON39LI - -0.094 -4.89 0.0001 -0.128 -5.56 0.0001 
NADER ? -0.001 -10.81 0.0001 -0.001 -0.27 0.7812 
NPL - 0.103 1.18 0.8812 -0.331 -1.66 0.0495 
GAP - 0.022 1.76 0.9594 -0.031 -1.75 0.0414 
CORE + 0.012 1.10 0.1371 0.211 9.82 0.0001 
OFF ? 0.064 7.30 0.0001 -0.022 -1.93 0.0562 
        
Adjusted R-squared  0.92   0.85   
N  105   107   
White’s chi-square  0.1047   0.0942   
 
Table B. The model that treats BVE as an independent variable instead of incorporating in the dependent 
variable  
   
  2005 2006 
 
Expect-
ed sign Coeff. t-values p-values Coeff. t-values p-values 
C ? 284.895 0.76 0.4434 678.369 1.37 0.1713 
BVE + 1.425 10.32 0.0001 1.818 10.28 0.0001 
LNS + 1.444 2.05 0.0216 1.755 3.98 0.0001 
LNS*WEAK*LOWC - -2.798 -2.82 0.0029 -2.881 -2.95 0.0020 
HTM + -5.517 -2.74 0.9964 -14.325 -3.69 0.9998 
DEP - -1.036 -2.23 0.0139 -0.869 -3.18 0.0010 
DT - -2.246 -1.84 0.0343 -7.390 -4.75 0.0001 
NON39AS + 0.234 7.56 0.0001 0.144 5.49 0.0001 
NON39LI - -0.072 -3.34 0.0006 -0.047 -1.77 0.0397 
NADER ? -0.001 -5.97 0.0001 -0.001 -0.99 0.3229 
NPL - -0.185 -1.54 0.9376 -0.876 -4.39 0.0001 
GAP - 0.003 0.26 0.6040 -0.012 -0.81 0.2074 
CORE + 0.027 1.95 0.0270 0.093 2.98 0.0018 
OFF ? 0.026 2.13 0.0352 -0.052 -4.48 0.0001 
        
Adjusted R-squared  0.98   0.97   
N  107   110   
White’s chi-square  0.1883   0.2115   
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Table C. The growth model 
The growth variable (LNS_5YR_CH) is the five years change in net loans. 
 
  2005 2006 
 
Expect-
ed sign Coeff. t-values p-values Coeff. t-values p-values 
C ? 344.507 0.89 0.3750 1109.887 2.06 0.0413 
LNS + 2.234 3.30 0.0007 2.204 4.50 0.0001 
LNS*WEAK*LOWC - -4.217 -4.77 0.0001 -3.139 -2.91 0.0023 
HTM + -4.766 -2.31 0.9885 -14.795 -3.28 0.9993 
DEP - -0.724 -1.56 0.0610 -0.343 -1.26 0.1049 
DT - -3.650 -3.22 0.0009 -4.656 -2.85 0.0027 
NON39AS + 0.301 14.34 0.0001 0.200 7.70 0.0001 
NON39LI - -0.085 -3.87 0.0001 -0.116 -4.14 0.0001 
NADER ? -0.001 -8.19 0.0001 -0.001 -0.08 0.9335 
NPL - 0.016 0.16 0.5648 -0.375 -1.93 0.0279 
GAP - 0.008 0.57 0.7168 -0.034 -2.04 0.0217 
CORE + 0.040 2.79 0.0032 0.201 7.60 0.0001 
OFF ? 0.054 5.46 0.0001 -0.024 -2.14 0.0344 
LNS_5YR_CH + 0.014 1.59 0.0575 0.010 0.80 0.2110 
        
Adjusted R-squared  0.91   0.85   
N  107   109   
White’s chi-square  0.2291   0.2314   
 
 
Table D. The early adopters’ model 
The EARLY variable is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for banks that have adopted the IFRS before 
they became available in 2005, and zero otherwise. 
 
  2005 2006 
 
Expect-
ed sign Coeff. t-values p-values Coeff. t-values p-values 
C ? 162.214 0.40 0.6875 898.929 1.60 0.1125 
EARLY ? 1015.062 0.95 0.3443 1549.545 1.02 0.3102 
LNS + 2.097 2.98 0.0019 2.262 4.83 0.0001 
LNS*WEAK*LOWC - -4.207 -4.64 0.0001 -2.956 -2.69 0.0042 
HTM + -4.594 -2.21 0.9853 -14.434 -3.32 0.9994 
DEP - -0.589 -1.27 0.1022 -0.295 -1.09 0.1388 
DT - -4.216 -3.90 0.0001 -4.020 -2.62 0.0051 
NON39AS + 0.302 14.00 0.0001 0.190 6.90 0.0001 
NON39LI - -0.092 -4.30 0.0001 -0.124 -5.41 0.0001 
NADER ? -0.001 -8.46 0.0001 -0.001 -0.04 0.9658 
NPL - 0.031 0.31 0.6238 -0.434 -2.27 0.0125 
GAP - 0.015 1.16 0.8756 -0.034 -2.04 0.0218 
CORE + 0.055 4.46 0.0001 0.214 10.60 0.0001 
OFF ? 0.051 5.18 0.0001 -0.021 -1.98 0.0505 
        
Adjusted R-squared  0.91   0.85   
N  107   110   
White’s chi-square  0.2510   0.2116   
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Table E. The model that controls for the pension fund status 
The pension fund status (PENS) is defined as the ‘fair value of plan assets less the present value of pension liability’.  
 
  2005 2006 
 
Expect-
ed sign Coeff. t-values p-values Coeff. t-values p-values 
C ? 301.972 0.77 0.4422 1273.557 2.40 0.0182 
LNS + 2.192 3.17 0.0010 2.025 4.28 0.0001 
LNS*WEAK*LOWC - -4.298 -4.78 0.0001 -3.640 -3.40 0.0005 
HTM + -4.080 -1.91 0.9708 -14.949 -3.53 0.9997 
DEP - -0.591 -1.27 0.1019 -0.196 -0.72 0.2348 
DT - -4.223 -3.89 0.0001 -5.168 -3.29 0.0014 
NON39AS + 0.305 14.35 0.0001 0.191 7.46 0.0001 
NON39LI - -0.096 -4.46 0.0001 -0.114 -5.02 0.0001 
NADER ? -0.001 -8.46 0.0001 0.001 0.32 0.7440 
NPL - 0.018 0.17 0.5678 -0.413 -2.25 0.0134 
GAP - 0.011 0.73 0.7678 -0.040 -2.42 0.0085 
CORE + 0.053 4.39 0.0001 0.200 9.96 0.0001 
OFF ? 0.052 5.24 0.0001 -0.022 -2.14 0.0341 
PENS + -0.363 -0.66 0.7461 -1.972 -2.21 0.9856 
        
Adjusted R-squared  0.91   0.86   
N  107   110   
White’s chi-square  0.2740   0.2540   
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Section 2: Tables of the alternative specification models from the value relevance test – derivatives’ fair 
values 
 
Table A. The March model 
The dependent variable is the market value of equity (March prices).   
 
  2005 2006 
 
Expect-
ed sign Coeff. t-values p-values Coeff. t-values p-values 
C ? 742.861 1.82 0.0707 1076.790 2.03 0.0445 
BV + 2.193 16.76 0.0001 1.632 10.01 0.0001 
NOI + 1.073 2.61 0.0052 1.856 4.03 0.0001 
NSI + 1.806 6.98 0.0001 2.594 5.71 0.0001 
NTDER + 2.462 6.12 0.0001 0.206 0.39 0.3470 
NTDER*WEAK*VARIN - -1.051 -3.70 0.0002 -0.951 -1.86 0.0328 
NHDER + 3.066 7.38 0.0001 0.535 0.76 0.2239 
NHDER*WEAK*VARIN - 0.602 1.50 0.9317 0.239 0.21 0.5868 
NADER ? 0.001 2.41 0.0177 -0.001 -3.41 0.0010 
NPL - -0.563 -4.83 0.0001 -1.085 -4.51 0.0001 
GAP - -0.015 -1.31 0.0967 -0.002 -0.13 0.4471 
CORE + -0.121 -7.93 0.9999 -0.016 -0.54 0.7080 
OFF ? -0.026 -2.13 0.0353 -0.040 -2.83 0.0057 
        
Adjusted R-squared  0.98   0.97   
N  105   107   
White’s chi-square  0.1184   0.0719   
 
   
Table B. The growth model 
The growth variable (LNS_5YR_CH) is the five years change in net loans. 
 
  2005 2006 
 
Expect-
ed sign Coeff. t-values p-values Coeff. t-values p-values 
C ? 406.461 0.91 0.3601 998.064 1.85 0.0669 
BV + 2.117 12.41 0.0001 1.639 8.95 0.0001 
NOI + 0.897 1.82 0.0355 1.756 3.78 0.0002 
NSI + 1.287 4.58 0.0001 2.499 5.54 0.0001 
NTDER + 1.952 4.22 0.0001 0.222 0.39 0.3481 
NTDER*WEAK*VARIN - -1.120 -3.62 0.0003 -0.931 -1.75 0.0414 
NHDER + 2.763 7.45 0.0001 0.844 1.44 0.0763 
NHDER*WEAK*VARIN - 0.394 1.03 0.8478 0.990 0.98 0.8369 
NADER ? 0.001 1.46 0.1471 -0.001 -2.86 0.0051 
NPL - -0.667 -5.14 0.0001 -0.978 -4.20 0.0001 
GAP - 0.001 0.07 0.5313 -0.016 -1.07 0.1435 
CORE + -0.074 -4.39 0.9999 0.003 0.10 0.4578 
OFF ? -0.037 -2.78 0.0065 -0.048 -3.25 0.0015 
LNS_5YR_CH + 0.004 0.40 0.3440 0.001 0.01 0.4922 
        
Adjusted R-squared  0.97   0.97   
N  107   109   
White’s chi-square  0.2510   0.2104   
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Table C. The early adopter model 
The EARLY variable is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for banks that have adopted the IFRS before 
they became available in 2005, and zero otherwise. 
  
  2005 2006 
 
Expect-
ed sign Coeff. t-values p-values Coeff. t-values p-values 
C ? 265.944 0.58 0.5601 953.133 1.70 0.0920 
EARLY ? 1084.547 0.94 0.3450 945.724 0.63 0.5286 
BV + 2.140 15.05 0.0001 1.598 9.60 0.0001 
NOI + 0.774 1.75 0.0410 1.734 3.69 0.0002 
NSI + 1.276 4.56 0.0001 2.378 5.19 0.0001 
NTDER + 2.014 4.63 0.0001 0.163 0.31 0.3756 
NTDER*WEAK*VARIN - -1.106 -3.58 0.0003 -0.985 -1.93 0.0282 
NHDER + 2.873 7.93 0.0001 1.107 1.89 0.0305 
NHDER*WEAK*VARIN - 0.388 1.02 0.8471 1.251 1.23 0.8907 
NADER ? 0.001 1.27 0.2057 -0.001 -2.77 0.0066 
NPL - -0.695 -5.58 0.0001 -0.797 -3.97 0.0001 
GAP - 0.003 0.27 0.6062 -0.020 -1.39 0.0827 
CORE + -0.071 -4.29 0.9999 0.010 0.34 0.3646 
OFF ? -0.035 -2.55 0.0123 -0.047 -3.23 0.0017 
        
Adjusted R-squared  0.97   0.97   
N  107   110   
White’s chi-square  0.2290   0.2115   
 
 
Table D. The model controls for pension fund status 
The pension fund status (PENS) is defined as the ‘fair value of plan assets less the present value of pension liability’.  
 
  2005 2006 
 
Expect-
ed sign Coeff. t-values p-values Coeff. t-values p-values 
C ? 340.329 0.77 0.4417 1085.772 1.98 0.0503 
BV + 2.184 15.00 0.0001 1.589 8.91 0.0001 
NOI + 0.778 1.76 0.0402 1.723 3.66 0.0002 
NSI + 1.351 4.65 0.0001 2.390 5.20 0.0001 
NTDER + 2.040 4.67 0.0001 0.122 0.23 0.4076 
NTDER*WEAK*VARIN - -1.178 -3.76 0.0002 -1.058 -2.08 0.0199 
NHDER + 2.871 7.91 0.0001 1.004 1.71 0.0451 
NHDER*WEAK*VARIN - 0.374 0.99 0.8380 1.113 1.07 0.8571 
NADER ? 0.000 1.51 0.1331 -0.001 -2.51 0.0135 
NPL - -0.657 -5.18 0.0001 -0.774 -3.86 0.0001 
GAP - 0.011 0.69 0.7554 -0.023 -1.44 0.0753 
CORE + -0.076 -4.53 0.9999 0.008 0.27 0.3920 
OFF ? -0.040 -2.90 0.0046 -0.045 -2.88 0.0048 
PENS + 0.558 0.87 0.1926 -0.338 -0.37 0.6452 
        
Adjusted R-squared  0.97   0.97   
N  107   110   
White’s chi-square  0.2739   0.2322   
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Table E. The model that disaggregates the notional amounts of derivatives in hedging and trading  
NATDER is the notional amounts of trading derivatives and NAHDER is the notional amounts of hedging 
derivatives. 
 
  2005 2006 
 
Expect-
ed sign Coeff. t-values p-values Coeff. t-values p-values 
C ? 64.0245 0.25 0.7957 649.100 2.26 0.0263 
BV + 1.779 12.22 0.0001 1.496 13.30 0.0001 
NOI + 0.240 0.84 0.2012 0.530 1.61 0.0554 
NSI + 0.865 3.98 0.0001 0.556 1.29 0.1005 
NTDER + 1.523 5.09 0.0001 1.725 5.29 0.0001 
NTDER*WEAK*VARIN - -0.924 -3.04 0.0017 0.079 0.16 0.5650 
NHDER + 1.905 6.18 0.0001 1.507 2.86 0.0027 
NHDER*WEAK*VARIN - -0.640 -1.19 0.1175 -0.350 -0.28 0.3883 
NATDER ? -0.001 -2.74 0.0078 -0.001 -3.76 0.0001 
NAHDER ? 0.001 0.28 0.7764 -0.004 -0.65 0.5144 
NPL - -0.471 -4.38 0.0001 -0.433 -3.64 0.0003 
GAP - 0.007 0.57 0.7170 0.019 1.66 0.9504 
CORE + -0.005 -0.29 0.6169 0.051 2.45 0.0083 
OFF ? 0.001 0.07 0.9377 -0.010 -0.98 0.3301 
        
Adjusted R-squared  0.99   0.99   
N  83   88   
White’s chi-square  0.99   0.98   
 
  
Table F. The balance sheet model 
Where, FVFAS is the aggregated fair values of the financial assets and FVFLI is the aggregated fair values of the 
financial liabilities.  
 
  2005 2006 
 
Expect-
ed sign Coeff. t-values p-values Coeff. t-values p-values 
C ? 274.343 0.81 0.4159 395.435 0.92 0.3569 
FVFAS + 0.887 6.83 0.0001 1.097 8.53 0.0001 
FVFLI - -0.845 -6.32 0.0001 -1.038 -7.92 0.0001 
NON39AS + 0.990 7.53 0.0001 1.117 8.99 0.0001 
NON39LI - -0.995 -8.11 0.0001 -1.189 -9.98 0.0001 
NTDER + -0.427 -1.11 0.8664 -0.968 -2.45 0.9920 
NTDER*WEAK*VARIN - -1.435 -5.35 0.0001 -1.868 -4.64 0.0001 
NHDER + 2.277 8.44 0.0001 2.897 5.64 0.0001 
NHDER*WEAK*VARIN - -1.899 -6.86 0.0001 -1.654 -2.09 0.0193 
NADER ? -0.001 -6.64 0.0001 -0.001 -7.26 0.0001 
NPL - -0.567 -5.15 0.0001 -0.600 -3.64 0.0004 
GAP - 0.002 0.22 0.5876 -0.038 -3.19 0.0019 
CORE + 0.031 2.16 0.0164 0.059 2.21 0.0144 
OFF ? 0.047 4.53 0.0001 -0.001 -0.05 0.9550 
        
Adjusted R-squared  0.98   0.98   
N  107   110   
White’s chi-square  0.1884   0.1739   
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Appendix C 
 
Table C1 
Descriptive statistics for the CE 
Based on Gebhardt et al. (2001) method 
 
Panel A: By Year      
 Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev. Number of 
Observations 
2002 10.66% 9.72% 25.07% 6.88% 3.11% 88 
2003 8.93% 8.76% 18.71% 1.11% 2.26% 88 
2004 8.88% 8.81% 17.63% 5.43% 1.72% 88 
2005 8.43% 8.55% 18.91% 4.72% 1.76% 88 
2006 8.72% 8.69% 20.35% 4.22% 1.99% 88 
2007 9.84% 9.75% 22.05% 4.56% 2.27% 88 
All 9.24% 9.02% 25.07% 1.11% 2.35% 528 
       
Panel B: By Country (for all years, 2002 – 2007)  
 Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev. Number of 
Observations 
Austria 8.76% 8.91% 9.62% 7.71% 0.68% 6 
Belgium 9.78% 9.68% 12.14% 7.51% 0.95% 24 
Czech Republic 7.37% 6.76% 9.61% 6.02% 1.40% 6 
Denmark 9.73% 9.48% 13.87% 7.35% 1.44% 30 
Finland 9.40% 8.92% 11.11% 8.07% 0.98% 12 
France 10.22% 10.16% 12.63% 8.70% 0.93% 30 
Germany 9.95% 10.34% 19.16% 5.17% 2.90% 36 
Greece 8.25% 8.21% 11.72% 6.32% 1.11% 30 
Hungary 9.28% 9.55% 10.01% 7.55% 0.90% 6 
Ireland 9.07% 8.74% 12.17% 7.45% 1.23% 24 
Italy 9.01% 8.93% 20.79% 1.11% 2.59% 60 
Netherland 9.43% 9.12% 19.16% 6.63% 2.40% 24 
Norway 12.93% 11.79% 25.07% 8.60% 3.60% 42 
Poland 7.92% 7.71% 17.66% 4.22% 2.81% 24 
Portugal 8.39% 8.54% 9.26% 7.01% 0.64% 18 
Spain 7.80% 7.79% 10.16% 4.56% 1.33% 48 
Sweden 9.07% 9.24% 10.16% 7.54% 0.63% 24 
Switzerland 8.47% 8.07% 12.21% 6.05% 1.62% 24 
UK 8.53% 8.44% 12.73% 5.25% 1.50% 60 
All 9.24% 9.02% 25.07% 1.11% 2.35% 528 
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Table C2 
Descriptive statistics for the CE 
Based on Claus & Thomas (2001) method 
 
Panel A: By Year      
 Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev. Number of 
Observations 
2002 11.71% 11.06% 29.82% 4.48% 4.01% 88 
2003 10.02% 10.05% 20.14% 4.49% 2.31% 87 
2004 9.98% 10.25% 21.25% 0.74% 2.70% 87 
2005 9.04% 9.39% 12.87% 3.55% 1.86% 87 
2006 9.24% 9.47% 13.96% 4.15% 1.98% 88 
2007 10.54% 10.60% 20.59% 4.00% 2.65% 88 
All 10.09% 10.04% 29.82% 0.74% 2.81% 525 
       
Panel B: By Country (for all years, 2002 – 2007)  
 Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev. Number of 
Observations 
Austria 10.60% 10.31% 13.33% 9.30% 1.44% 6 
Belgium 9.58% 10.67% 13.12% 3.55% 2.93% 24 
Czech Republic 9.25% 9.37% 10.74% 7.50% 1.12% 6 
Denmark 9.44% 9.35% 16.42% 6.35% 2.10% 30 
Finland 9.81% 9.05% 13.03% 7.28% 1.98% 12 
France 10.95% 10.32% 19.00% 7.47% 2.48% 30 
Germany 11.21% 9.88% 29.82% 5.40% 5.12% 36 
Greece 11.71% 11.77% 14.89% 6.62% 1.83% 30 
Hungary 11.02% 11.07% 11.95% 9.93% 0.81% 6 
Ireland 11.17% 10.88% 15.29% 8.66% 1.51% 24 
Italy 9.85% 10.00% 26.83% 0.74% 3.60% 58 
Netherland 10.76% 10.44% 14.55% 4.48% 2.18% 23 
Norway 7.99% 7.69% 13.00% 4.64% 2.12% 42 
Poland 11.11% 9.14% 21.97% 6.99% 4.41% 24 
Portugal 9.80% 9.93% 12.06% 7.10% 1.26% 18 
Spain 9.59% 9.93% 14.04% 5.54% 1.82% 48 
Sweden 9.75% 9.68% 11.00% 8.50% 0.72% 24 
Switzerland 8.45% 7.92% 14.39% 5.06% 2.42% 24 
UK 10.60% 10.62% 15.05% 7.38% 1.77% 60 
All 10.09% 10.04% 29.82% 0.74% 2.81% 525 
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Table C3 
Descriptive statistics for the CE 
Based on Gode & Mohanram (2003) method 
 
Panel A: By Year      
 Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev. Number of 
Observations 
2002 10.18% 9.14% 35.04% 4.12% 4.46% 82 
2003 8.55% 7.46% 17.66% 0.93% 3.78% 85 
2004 8.71% 8.11% 44.38% 3.05% 5.22% 81 
2005 7.34% 7.25% 15.18% 1.23% 2.98% 80 
2006 7.13% 7.08% 13.44% 2.50% 2.45% 80 
2007 7.28% 7.32% 13.02% 2.19% 2.42% 80 
All 8.21% 7.69% 44.38% 0.93% 3.84% 488 
       
Panel B: By Country (for all years, 2002 – 2007)  
 Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev. Number of 
Observations 
Austria 10.15% 9.71% 12.11% 9.18% 1.10% 6 
Belgium 7.44% 7.20% 14.59% 3.61% 2.58% 24 
Czech Republic 6.08% 5.83% 11.48% 1.72% 3.26% 6 
Denmark 8.05% 6.59% 35.04% 1.67% 6.16% 30 
Finland 5.87% 5.92% 10.36% 2.71% 2.48% 12 
France 8.12% 7.44% 16.40% 1.24% 3.19% 30 
Germany 10.93% 8.87% 44.38% 3.36% 7.26% 34 
Greece 11.50% 11.63% 17.01% 6.78% 2.12% 30 
Hungary 10.12% 10.67% 11.84% 7.49% 1.73% 6 
Ireland 8.01% 7.54% 13.02% 5.08% 2.04% 24 
Italy 9.03% 9.10% 16.78% 2.92% 2.97% 54 
Netherland 6.23% 5.81% 12.30% 1.23% 2.53% 18 
Norway 7.11% 6.25% 17.20% 3.27% 3.64% 16 
Poland 12.48% 11.15% 20.61% 6.64% 4.13% 24 
Portugal 7.06% 6.86% 09.86% 2.50% 1.78% 18 
Spain 8.06% 8.28% 12.29% 4.54% 1.68% 48 
Sweden 4.82% 4.54% 08.13% 2.19% 1.57% 24 
Switzerland 7.41% 7.27% 11.07% 4.64% 1.68% 24 
UK 6.44% 6.70% 12.53% 0.93% 2.12% 60 
All 8.21% 7.69% 44.38% 0.93% 3.84% 488 
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Table C4 
Descriptive statistics for the CE 
Based on Easton (2004) method 
 
Panel A: By Year      
 Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev. Number of 
Observations 
2002 12.61% 11.38% 39.11% 2.73% 5.47% 84 
2003 10.16% 9.63% 23.53% 3.12% 3.91% 80 
2004 10.40% 9.74% 42.79% 3.59% 4.63% 76 
2005 8.93% 9.18% 17.17% 2.17% 2.54% 74 
2006 8.79% 9.00% 13.51% 2.83% 2.11% 72 
2007 9.12% 9.05% 15.26% 3.39% 2.65% 71 
All 10.00% 9.57% 42.79% 2.17% 4.03% 457 
       
Panel B: By Country (for all years, 2002 – 2007)  
 Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev. Number of 
Observations 
Austria 11.50% 11.72% 12.84% 9.81% 1.13% 6 
Belgium 9.02% 9.18% 13.96% 3.80% 2.42% 22 
Czech Republic 8.43% 8.05% 16.28% 3.87% 4.22% 6 
Denmark 10.85% 9.55% 34.18% 2.17% 6.68% 22 
Finland 8.42% 9.05% 12.57% 2.83% 3.66% 7 
France 9.50% 9.12% 14.74% 4.88% 2.40% 29 
Germany 14.04% 10.94% 42.79% 6.17% 8.19% 35 
Greece 12.29% 12.05% 19.72% 8.22% 2.53% 30 
Hungary 9.99% 10.06% 11.15% 8.84% 0.99% 6 
Ireland 9.75% 9.62% 14.69% 6.62% 1.87% 24 
Italy 10.61% 10.75% 22.75% 2.73% 3.54% 53 
Netherland 8.32% 8.42% 15.38% 2.89% 3.11% 16 
Norway 9.58% 8.62% 19.70% 3.28% 3.87% 14 
Poland 12.04% 10.14% 19.92% 4.21% 4.42% 24 
Portugal 8.80% 8.89% 12.46% 4.97% 1.95% 16 
Spain 9.36% 9.56% 12.69% 5.22% 1.76% 47 
Sweden 7.57% 7.14% 13.62% 4.26% 2.42% 18 
Switzerland 8.39% 8.41% 14.68% 3.12% 2.94% 24 
UK 8.96% 9.29% 13.27% 3.39% 2.12% 58 
All 10.00% 9.57% 42.79% 2.17% 4.03% 457 
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Appendix E 
 
 
 
 
1. Global positions of OTC derivatives markets by type of instrument 
 
 
 
The table is a brief reproduction of the Table C.5 in the Triennial Central Bank Survey (BIS, 2007). Amounts 
outstanding, in billion of US dollars 
 
 
2. Exchange rates used to translate banks’ accounts into Euros 
 
 
CURRENCIES 30/12/2005 29/12/2006 
CYP - Cyprus Pound 0.5735 0.5782 
DKK - Danish Kroner 7.4605 7.4560 
GBP - UK pound 0.6853 0.6715 
CZK - Czech Koruna 29.0000 27.4850 
HUF - Hungarian Forint 252.8700 251.7700 
LVL - Latvian Lat 0.6962 0.6972 
LTL - Lithuanian Lita 3.4528 3.4528 
MTL - Maltese Lira 0.4293 0.4293 
RON - Romanian Leu 3.6802 3.3835 
SKK - Slovak Koruna 37.8800 34.4350 
SIT - Slovenian Tolar 239.5000 239.6400 
SEK - Swedish Krona 9.3885 9.0404 
USD - US Dollars 1.1797 1.3170 
PLN - Polish Zloty 3.8600 3.8310 
 
Notes: 1) Exchange rates are per euro, 2) Data on exchange rates are retrieved from DataStream, and are those 
provided by ECB on the last available date of each year 2005 and 2006. 
 Positions at end-June 2004 Positions at end-June 2007 
 Notional 
 amounts 
Gross market 
values 
Notional 
 Amounts 
Gross market 
values 
Foreign exchange contracts 31,500 1,116 57,597 1,611 
Interest rate contracts 177,457 4,582 388,627 6,724 
Equity-linked contracts 5,094 321 10,760 1,213 
Commodity contracts 1,354 176 8,255 690 
Credit derivatives 4,474 131 51,095 906 
Other derivatives 191 65 78 1 
Total contacts 220,070 6,391 516,412 11,145 
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